92 Va. 661 | Va. | 1896
delivered the opinion of the court.
The question involved in this case is the power of the appellee, the Board of Supervisors of Northampton county, to tax the appellant company, the New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk Railroad Company, for district school purposes.
The levy in question is as follows: “At a meeting of the Board of Supervisors of Northampton county, held by adjournment, in and for said county, on the 19th day of September, A. D. 1892 :
“ Ordered, that a tax of fifteen cents be levied upon every hundred dollars of the assessed value of all property, real and persona], and incomes, in Franktown School District, in this county, assessed with the State taxes for the year 1892, including a like tax on every one hundred dollars of the assessed value of all the property, real and personal, of the New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk Railroad Company in said Franktown District, as fixed by the Board of Public Works, and that when the same is collected it be applied to said Franktown District school expenses for the year 1892.
“ Ordered, that a tax of fifteen cents be levied on every one hundred dollars of the assessed value of all property, real and personal, and incomes, in Eastville School District, in this county, assessed with State taxes for the year 1892, including a like tax on every hundred dollars of the assessed value of all the property, real and personal, of the New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk Railroad Company in Eastville School District, as fixed by the Board of Public Works, and that when the same is collected it be applied to the payment of the said Eastville School District expenses for the year 1892.
“ Ordered, that a tax of fifteen cents be levied on every hundred dollars of the assessed value of all the property, real and personal, and incomes, in Capeville School District, in this
“T. Sanford Spady, Clerk.”
In accordance with this action of the Board of Supervisors, the treasurer of Northampton county presented to the appellant company the following tax-bill:
When this bill was presented the appellant company paid all of it except the amounts for district school tax, aggregating, with the five per cent, penalty added, $790.21, and
The answer of the Board of Supervisors, as well as that of the treasurer of Northampton, admits the correctness of the allegations of the bill of the plaintiff company as to the assessment and levy of the tax, but denies that the Board of Supervisors had no power to levy the tax complained of, and says “ that the levy was made in pursuance of the provisions of sub-divisions 2 and 3 of section 833 of the Code of Virginia, and that the said district school tax, when collected, can be apportioned under the directions of the court, or by the county school board, on such equitable plan as they may determine upon ; and, further, that the district school tax included in the tax-bill is based on the assessed value of the real and personal property of the plaintiff company as made by the Board of Public Works for the year 1892, as shown by Exhibit “X” filed with plaintiff’s bill, and which is as follows :
“ New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk Railroad Company, value per mile of roadway and track, $12,000 ; number of miles in Northampton county, 22; value of roadway and track, $264,000 ; value of depots, depot grounds, and lots, station building, and fixtures and machine shops in Northampton county, $16,853.50 ; value of rolling stock, including passenger, freight, cattle or stock, baggage, mail, express, sleeping, palace, and all other cars owned by or belonging to the company; boats, machinery, depot and office furniture, and equipments, $215,814; value of stores in Northampton county, $4,728 ; value of telegraph lines in Northampton county, $325 ; total value of all property, real and personal, in Northampton county, $541,721.16.”
It will be observed from the above tax-bill made out against the appellant company that its property is taxed as though it were equally distributed in locality in all the districts of Northampton county, while its property could be taxed for district school purposes, if at all, in the district in which it is located. It is admitted in argument that the greater portion of the property of the railroad company is situated in Oapeville District, and that the roadway and track assessed by the Board of Public Works at $12,000 per mile is the only property of the company situated in the other two districts ; hence the only property of the company that could rightly be assessed with district school tax in the districts of Franktown and Eastville is the road-bed and track proper, while, as before stated, the levy is upon the entire property of the railroad company in the county of Northampton as if it was equally distributed in all three of the districts.
Section 8 of Article VIII. of the Constitution of Virginia, after providing what shall constitute the fund for public free .school purposes in the State at large, further provides:
But another difficulty stands in the way of the tax in question, and it grows out of the failure of the act of the Legislature to provide for the proper assessment and collection of a tax for district school purposes on the property of railroad and canal companies. Sub-division 2 of section 833 of the Code provides for a levy by the county board of supervisors for county purposes on the real and personal property of telegraph and telephone companies, and railroad companies and their telegraph lines, which pass through their respective counties, * * * based upon the assessment
per mile made by the State for its purposes, and furnished by the Auditor of Public Accounts to the board, &c. ; but subdivision 3 of this section only authorizes the board of supervisors “ to levy a tax upon the property in the county sufficient to raise the amount recommended by the school board in their estimates for county school purposes, or so much thereof as they may allow; and to levy a tax upon the property in each school district sufficient to raise the amount recommended iy the county school l>oard for district school pxorposes, or as much thereof as they may alloxof <&c.
It does not authorize a levy on the property of telegraph, telephone, and railroad companies and their telegraph lines for district school purposes, as provided in sub-division 2 as to the levy for county purposes; and in fact the general law of the State does not provide that the assessment of the property of such companies by the Board of Public Works, certified to the board of supervisors of the respective counties, shall show definitely the character of the property, its value, and location with reference to the respective magisterial or school districts in the county.
To meet the difficulties in the way of reaching the property of railroad companies by taxation for county purposes, as disclosed by this decision, the Legislature passed an act authorizing the boards of supervisors of the respective counties to levy a tax for county purposes upon the property of railroad companies, based upon the assessment of the Board of Public "Works, certified down to the boards of supervisors of the several counties. Acts of 1879-80, p. 82. And by a number of decisions following the passage of this act it has been held that a levy for county purposes, under the provisions of the act, is a valid levy. Balto, & O. R. R. Co. v. Koontz, 77 Va. 698 ; Shen. Valley R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Clarke County, 78 Va. 269; S. & R. R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of .Norfolk County, 83 Va. 195; Prince George County v. At., M. & O. R. R. Co., 87 Va, 283; and Norfolk do W. R. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 87 Va. 521. But in none of these cases was the question here under consideration raised. When the revisors of the laws in force in 1887 came to this subject they adopted, in section 833, substantially the provision of the act of February 27, 1880, supra, and of similar succeeding acts, so far as they made provision for taxation for county and' county school purposes, but unfortunately omitted, in sub-division 3 of this section, as did all preceding acts of the Legislature, to
Por these reasons we are of opinion that the decree complained of is erroneous and sjiould be reversed, and this court will enter such decree as the court below should have entered, perpetuating the injunction, with costs to the appellant.
Reversed.