after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court. ■
From the charge of the court, and its opinion on the motion for a new triаl; 20 Blátchford, 4931, it■ appears that the refusal to admit testimony of Hunter’s fraudulent purpose in procuring the policy, and his feloniously causing, whilst the sole1 owner of . it, the death оf the assured, was founded upon the assumption that the insurance money, payable in case the death occurred before the expiration of the poliсy, went to the legal representatives of the assured, and was not assignable, and that the assignment not taking effect Hunter had no interest in the policy, and, therefore, if, hе did feloniously cause the death, the fact could have' had no effect in controlling the payment.
Assuming this to be the - reason. for excluding the evidence offered, thе ruling cannot be upheld. The position that the assignment did not take effect, because the assured died before the expiration of the policy, is untenable. The рrovision for payment in such case to his legal representatives was intended to meet the contingency -of his dying without having disposed of his interest, and not to limit his power оver the contract during ■his life, and pass the insurance to those who should represent him after his death. The term “ legal representatives ” is not necessarily restricted to the personal representatives of one deceased, but is sufficiently broad to cover all persons who, with respect to his property, stand in his plaee and represent his interests, whether transferred to them by his act or by operation of law.- It may, in this case, include assigns as well as executors and administrators.
New York Life Insurance Co.
v.
Flack,
A policy оf life insurance, without restrictive words, is assignable by the assured for a valuable consideration equally with any other chose in action, where the assignment is not made to cover a mere speculative risk, and thus evade the law against wager policies; and payment thereof .may be enforced for the benefit of the assignee, and, under the system of pro
*598
cedure in many States, in his name.
Warnock
v. Davis,
The assignment conveying to Hunter the whole interest of the. assured, his representatives alone would havе a valid claim under it, if the policy were not void in its inception. Proof, therefore, that he caused the death of the assured by felonious means must necessarily have defeated a recovery; and the court erred in refusing to admit testimony tending to prove that such was the fact.
The theory of the defence is, that the purpose of Hunter in obtaining the insurance was to cheat and defraud the company. In support of that position evidence that he effected insurances upon the lifе of Armstrong in other companies at or about the same time, for a like fraudulent purpose, was admissible. A repetition of acts of the same character naturally indicates the same purpose in all of them; and if when considered together they cannot be reasonably explained without ascribing a particular motivе to the perpetrator, such motive will be considered as prompting each act. A creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor, and may very propеrly procure an.insurance upon it for an amount sufficient to secure his debt, but if he- takes out policies in different companies at or nearly the same time, and thus increases the insurance far beyond any reasonable security for the debt, an inquiry at once arises as to his motive, and it may be considered as governing him in each insurance. In
Castle
v. Bullard,
The evidence offered that Hunter obtained insurances m other companies on the life of Armstrong at or near the same time, was, under these authorities, clearly admissible. It tended to еstablish the theory of the defendant that the insurance in this case was obtained by Hunter upon the premeditated purpose to cheat and defraud, the company. Especially would it have had that effect if followed byoproof of the manner of the death of Armstrong.
But, independently of any proof of the motives of Hunter in. obtaining the policy, and even Assuming that they were just and proper, he forfeited all rights under it when, to secure its immediate payment, he murdered the assured. It would be a reproаch to the jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken. As well' might he recover insur-' anee money upon a building that he had wilfully fired.
This view renders it unnecessary to consider the effect upon the' policy of the Statements, made in the application of the assured, as to the amount of other insurances on his life.
Judgment reversed, and cause rememded for a new trial.