12892, 12899 | Ga. Ct. App. | May 24, 1922
Lead Opinion
Tliis was an action by the administrator of the estate of Bobert A. Coleman, deceased, against the New York Life Insurance Company upon a policy of life-insurance for $2,000, issued by the company on the life of the decedent. The petition •alleged that the policy was issued on November 27, 1917, and that Coleman died on November 11, 1919, less than two years after the issuance of the policy. It was further alleged, that proofs of death had been furnished and that the defendant had failed and refused to pay over to the plaintiff the proceeds of the policy. It was also alleged that the defendant had acted in bad faith in refusing to pay over the proceeds of the policy and was liable to the plaintiff for damages and attorney’s fees. A copy of the policy was attached to the petition. It contained the following stipulation and condition“ Self-destruction. In event of self-destruction during the first two insurance years, whether the insured be sane or insane, the insurance under this policy shall be a sum equal to the premiums thereon which have been paid to and received by the company and no more.” The defendant in its answer admitted the execution and delivery of the policy and the furnishing of proofs of death and the payment of the premiums, and set up as a defense the allegations that on November 11, 1919, within the first two insurance years of the policy, said Bobert A. Coleman destroyed himself by shooting himself in the head with a pistol, and that the insurance under the policy is, as provided therein, the sum equal to the premiums paid thereon and received by the company, and no more. The defendant further alleged that it had tendered to the plaintiff the amount of the premiums received by it on the policjq and that the plaintiff had declined and refused
The view that this court entertains of the case on its merits makes it unnecessary to consider and decide the questions raised by certain special assignments of error, the decision on the merits being conclusive of the relative rights of the parties. Before considering the evidence on the merits of the case and illustrative of the defense set up, there are several well-settled principles of law applicable to the facts and in the light of which the case will be determined. These principles are herein set out without discussion, and will be applied to the evidence in the record, by which it will be determined that a verdict, under the terms and conditions of the policy expressly set out, was demanded, and that the verdict for the plaintiff is not supported by any evidence either direct or circumstantial. In other words, the evidence shows that the insured, Bobert A. Coleman, committed suicide within two years of the date of the policy; and, under the terms of the policy which are controlling on the question, the maximum amount legally recoverable is the amount of the premiums paid within the two years when the policy was in force, and no more can be legally recovered under the evidence and the law applicable thereto.
It is undisputed that the insured, Bobert A. Coleman, died on November 11, 1919, during the first two insurance years of the policy, and that his death was caused from a pistol wound in his
Of course, if there is no evidence as to the cause of death, it will be presumed that the death is from natural causes. But the principle may be carried still further, and it may be regarded as a settled rule that, when the circumstances of the death are such that it might have resulted from negligence, accident, or suicide, the presumption is against death by suicide. This rule is stated by Mr. Cooley in his Brief on the Law of Insurance, Yol. IY, p. 3255. But it is well established that the fact of death by accident is not to be established by conjecture or presumption, unless there is no evidence whatever as to the cause of the death. The pre
It has been repeatedly held by various courts, in discussing this question, that the issue as to the cause of death must be proved like any other fact in a civil action, by a preponderance of the evidence on the question. Modern Woodman of America v. Craiger, 175 Ind. 30" court="Ind." date_filed="1910-06-22" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/modern-woodmen-of-america-v-craiger-7055986?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7055986">175 Ind. 30 (92 N E. 113, 93 N.E. 209" court="Ind." date_filed="1910-12-16" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/rankin-v-mccollister-7056035?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7056035">93 N. E. 209). As stated in several eases on the point, the law does not prescribe any formula by which the hypothesis of accident must be removed; it is sufficient that it is met by evidence, where there are no facts or circumstances shown indicating accident or mistake, and facts and circumstances are shown which establish that the cause of death was suicide. “ Men do frequently commit suicide. It is one of the multitude of legitimate inferences, in which we infer the unknown from the known, having greater or less degrees of probability, which we use in reasoning to arrive at the ultimate fact. Being a probability based upon human experience, in its nature, it is controlling only in the absence of evidence of the actual.” Grosvenor v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 102 Neb. 629" court="Neb." date_filed="1918-06-26" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/grosvenor-v-fidelity--casualty-co-6663128?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6663128">102 Neb. 629 (168 N. W. 596). In other words, in its' essential analysis the question we are discussing should be proved like any other fact. There should be nothing peculiar or exceptional in the method of proof. The tendency to find contrary to the facts in such cases is based upon the tendency of juries to find verdicts in insurance cases frequently against the weight or
In the present case, after giving the evidence most careful consideration, and applying to it the well-settled principles of law which have been stated, this court is clearly of the opinion that “ the ordinary man would have no doubt as to cause of death,” and that the deceased insured took his life by shooting himself through the head with a pistol. This fact is indicated by a very strong motive. It is demonstrated circumstantially by the physical facts in the case. There is nothing to the contrary of this conclusion except the merest conjecture, and this conjecture must yield to facts. It can only exist in the absence of such facts. Indeed, if there is any evidence in the ease that shows the cause of death, that evidence must prevail. As against the mere conjecture, the slightest evidence of physical facts becomes strong, even conclusive. We do not hesitate to affirm, from a careful consideration of the record in the case, that the undisputed evidence proved that the cause of the death in this case was intentional suicide by the insured shooting himself through his right temple with a pistol. The evidence shows a strong motive for self-destruction. The insured was the unfortunate victim of a loathsome disease. This disease was urged upon him by his physician as a reason why he could not undertake the risk of marriage, and the existence of this disease not only prevented his marriage but caused him great mortification and humilation, so much so that he seems to have been unwilling to have a scientific test made as to the fact that the disease still existed and prevented him from consummating marriage. These two motives furnished reasons which apparently existed, and, in the absence of any other cause for suicide, strongly indicated the reason for the suicide. In addition to these
In the evidence for the plaintiff it is not suggested how the pistol of the insured could have been placed opposite his right temple and be discharged so close as to burn the flesh and produce powder marks around the spot where the bullet entered, except by the intentional act of the insured. If he had dropped the pistol, causing it to discharge accidentally, it is impossible that he would have been shot through the right temple, the bullet going straight in; and it is altogether possible that there would have been no powder burns or burnt flesh. The evidence showed that the insured, just before he was shot, was sitting on the porch of the house, at the top of the steps, with his feet on the steps. There was no one near him just before the shot was fired. When last seen beforé the shot was fired, the pistol of the insured was lying by him on the floor of the porch. A son of the insured testified that immediately after he heard the pistol-shot he looked up and saw his father falling off the porch; that he heard the pistol shoot one time and he immediately called John Crapps; that he then went and looked at his father and saw the pistol under the door-step, about two or three feet from his father, who was lying down on the ground side of the door-step; that his father fell down the steps and rolled on one side; that after he was shot he rolled down the steps; that John Crapps picked up the pistol and opened it, and it was smoking; that as soon as he heard the shot fired he looked right at his father and saw him fall off of the step; that he did not see the pistol drop; that he saw his father fall.immediately after the pistol fired; that his father was sitting down when he saw him fall; and that he did not know which hand his father had the pistol in. This son was so impressed with the correctness of this conclusion that the record contains a statement made by him, as a part of the res gestse, that contemporaneously with the shot and while looking at his father he exclaimed that his father had shot himself. John Crapps testified, that he heard the pistol shot and that he ran and jumped over the fence and went towards where he heard the shot, and stooped down and looked under the house and saw the insured falling on the ground; that he did not see anybody about there, and that he ran up to the insured and that the insured had fallen on the ground with his face towards the
We come to the conclusion that not only the preponderance of the evidence, but all of the evidence, both as to motive and physical facts, connected with the death of the insured, and that all reasonable inferences and deductions therefrom clearly overcome any presumption of law 'on the question of suicide or accidental death, and demands a finding that the insured came to his death by his own hand and intentionally; and, in view of the special condition in the contract of insurance that it should be void in the event of the death of the insured by his own hand within two years of the date of its issue, and it appearing affirmatively that the contract of insurance was issued within two years of the date of death of the insured, a verdict was demanded for the defendant, except that the defendant was liable for the amount of the premiums paid and received by the company; and a new trial should have been granted by the trial judge.
We do not think there is any merit in the cross-bill filed by the defendant in error.
Judgment on the main hill of exceptions reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent from the judgment on the main bill of exceptions. There was no witness to the actual homicide. The defendant, in seeking to carry the burden and overcome and disprove the legal presumption in favor of accident, had necessarily to rely upon proof as to the surrounding facts and circumstances. In the trial of the case in the court below it was incumbent upon the defendant, in thus seeking to carry the burden by circumstantial evidence, to submit testimony of such weight and probative value as could furnish “scope for legitimate reasoning by the jury,” in order to sustain its defense, and the evidence thus submitted must also have preponderated in favor of its suicide theory rather than to any other reasonable hypothesis. Thus, while I agree with almost every proposition of law laid down by
This discussion may be beside the mark, however, so far as the merits of this particular case'are concerned, since the writer does not in any wise argue or contend that the evidence offered by the defendant was inherently insufficient to have authorized the jury to find against the presumption and in its favor. The jury, however, have in fact found in favor of the plaintiff, and the trial judge having approved the verdict, the question before this court is not whether the defendant’s evidence was sufficient to reasonably establish the theory relied upon by it, or whether it preponderated or even very strongly preponderated in its favor, but the question is whether the facts and circumstances proved, with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom, absolutely demand a finding against the presumption and in favor of the defendant’s plea of suicide. It is needless to stress the fundamental and well-recognized proposition, which has so often been announced, that “This court, by the constitutional amendment creating it, is limited in jurisdiction to the correction of errors of law alone, and therefore has no power to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is strongly contrary to the weight of the evidence, if there is any evidence at all to support it.” Edge v. Thomas, 9 Ga. App. 559 (71 S.E. 875" court="Ga. Ct. App." date_filed="1911-06-07" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/jordan-v-state-5605055?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5605055">71 S. E. 875). The Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Adams, in the case of Western & Atlantic R.
Self-destruction, both accidental and intentional, is common enough. Strange, mysterious, and altogether unexplainable are the mental processes which ofttimes’ induce both the one and the other. The loaded weapon carelessly dropped or handled, and the “ pistol that wasn’t loaded,” have claimed their thousands. 1 While suicides, when taken in the aggregate, are not rare, they involve a breaking down of the strongest and most elemental human instinct, supported as it is by all the higher moral perceptions. Man’s impulse is to “ carry on,” and his greatest strength seems sometimes to lie in his capacity to endure. Generally, if indeed it be not always true, the mind must first break down ere he will consent to give up. In the instant case there would seem to be no question as to actual fraud. The policy had been in force about twenty-three and a half months. It could hardly be supposed that it was taken out with intent to defraud. If such had been the purpose of the insured, he had only to wait two weeks longer, when under its own terms the policy would have become incontestable. Thus, there is lacking what might have been argued as the chief and strongest motive for suicide. It is in fact an argument against the theory of suicide that the insured did not wait the few remaining days when the policy by its terms would have been payable on account of death from such cause. The motive actually relied on by the defendant, while furnishing a proper ground of
Before entering upon a discussion of the testimony relative to the location of the wound, which in my opinion constitutes practically the entire strength of the defendant’s case, let us consider the reasonableness of its theory of suicide as tested in the light of common knowledge and human experience. Did the deceased, if in contemplation of and preparation for suicide, conduct himself in that guilty, self-conscious, and secretive manner which human experience shows may have been reasonably expected ? We do not find him behind locked doors leaving to a world he could not face the almost inevitable confession. When last seen he was seated with his feet on the steps of his front porch. The pistol was in no wise concealed, but was lying openly beside him on the floor. To shoot himself while in this position, he would, as he did, necessarily have to fall headlong, face forward down the steps, and roll out into the yard where his little boy was playing. All of these circumstances seem unnatural, but it is especially hard to conceive that the harrowing act could have been intentionally committed in the very presence of his little son. As a suicide, it s.eems utterly unreasonable and contrary to all human experience.
But does the location of the wound in the temple, when taken with the testimony as to powder marks, prove the intent and dispose of the presumption, however contrary to nature it may seem ? The evidence as to powder marks is at best extremely vague and altogether indefinite. It rests solely upon the testimony of the little son and of another witness who arrived on the scene after the homicide, but it will be especially noted that neither of the two doctors who examined the wound was able to say that any powder marks or burns existed. If the pistol had in fact been placed very