54 Ga. App. 714 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
Mrs. Ittner brought suit against the New York Life Insurance Company on a policy of insurance, seeking a recovery under the terms of the double-indemnity provision thereof. The policy was issued by the defendant on the life of Ittner, the plaintiff's husband, and she was named therein as the beneficiary. Before the filing of the suit the defendant had paid to the beneficiary the face amount of the policy, thereby discharging its obligation under the single-indemnity provision of the policy. The material parts of the double-indemnity provision are as follows: “New York Life Insurance Company . . agrees to pay to the . . beneficiary . . $5000 (double the face of this policy) upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means . . The provision for double indemnity . . will not apply if the insured's death resulted from self-destruction, whether sane or insane." Under the pleadings and the evidence adduced on the trial, the sole issue was whether Ittner had committed suicide. The defendant contended that the evidence authorized and demanded a finding that he had intentionally taken his own life, while the plaintiff insisted that the evidence amply authorized the jury to find that Ittner’s death resulted from bodily injuries inflicted on him, either accidentally or intentionally, by unknown persons. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff was returned. A new trial was denied, and the defendant excepted.
It will be seen that the foregoing evidence strongly supports the theory of the insurance company that Ittner committed suicide. The company, in further support of this theory, offered the testimony of several physicians of Atlanta, to the effect that in 1924 Ittner was a patient in Wesley Memorial Hospital; that his case was diagnosed as one of syphilis, and he was there treated for that disease; that while in the hospital he went into a bathroom and attempted to commit suicide by cutting, with a razor, his throat, arms, wrists, legs, and abdomen; that at the time he was very depressed in spirits and was suffering from melancholia, and when asked why he cut himself he replied that he wanted to die; that he was at the same time treated for dementia, accompanied by syphilitic infection; that he had a suicidal tendency and syphilis of the brain; that when a person has syphilis of the brain, permanent scar tissues are formed in the brain, and that condition “ causes the thing that initiates those [abnormal] actions in a man, which would cause him to destroy himself.” One of the doctors testified: “I expect the suicidal tendency to repeat itself in five or ten years, in a case of a man who has had syphilis, due to the syphilis,” and
In view of the entire testimony of Dr. Gaines, as set out in the motion for new trial, there was no merit in the objection to that portion of his testimony which related to the history of Ittner’s former ailments and his conduct in relation thereto, as recited to Dr. Gaines by a friend of Ittner in Ittner’s presence and hearing. The ground of the objection was that it did not definitely appear from Dr. Gaines’s testimony that Ittner fully understood or heard the history as so recited. We think the evidence of Dr. Gaines sufficiently showed that Ittner heard the history of his case as related by his friend in Ittner’s presence, and acquiesced thereto by his failure to deny any of the historical statements so related. Furthermore, even if the admissibility of the evidence were doubtful, it is a well-settled rule that when the admissibility of evidence is doubtful it should be admitted and its weight and effect left to the jury. Goodman v. State, 122 Ga. 111(2), 118 (49 S. E. 922), and cit.; Purser v. McNair, 153 Ga. 405 (2), 411 (112 S. E. 648); and cit.; Booth v. State, 160 Ga. 271, 279 (127 S. E. 733), and cit.; Standard Oil Co. v. Reagan, 15 Ga. App.
Judgment reversed.