146 N.Y.S. 674 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1914
The real property sought to be condemned is situated along the west side of the respondent’s right of way between the Broadway viaduct and Van Woert street in the city of Albany. One parcel belonged to the Albany Steam Trap Company and the other to Jacob W. Bloom. The latter evidently accepted the award, as the Albany Steam Trap Company alone appeals. The trial of the issues had before a referee resulted in favor of the respondent, the referee deciding that the respondent - had established a necessity for the acquisition for the respondent’s corporate purposes of the property sought to be acquired, and that it should have judgment against both landowners, entitling it to take and hold the property upon making compensation therefor. An interlocutory judgment was thereupon granted, overruling appellant’s exceptions, confirming the report of the referee, awarding condemnation, and appointing three commissioners of appraisal. The commissioners awarded the appellant, the Albany Steam Trap Company, $13,600. The objections and exceptions filed by the appellant to the report of the commissioners were overruled and the report in all things confirmed. This appeal was thereupon taken from the final order, the appellant specifying in its notice of appeal its intention to bring up for review the interlocutory judgment.
Of the many questions raised by the appellant the only ones calling for consideration at this time are as to the necessity of the respondent acquiring so wide a strip of the appellant’s property and the adequacy of the award. As to the first of these propositions it appears that the respondent operates a railroad system extending from the city of New York to the city of Buffalo, and that daily about sixty passenger and from seventy-five to one hundred freight train movements are made over respondent’s right of way opposite the property of appellant, and that the width of the right of way at that place is
The appellant contends that the condemnation is not in good faith and that the respondent does not intend to make the improvements alleged. This claim appears to be wholly unwarranted, as the necessity for the improvement is urgent, and the respondent has already acquired all the other lands needed for making it. The appellant also contends that the referee decided the question as to the quantity of land which the respondent might take under a misapprehension of the law, the appellant claiming that the referee’s finding was based upon the law giving to the railroad company the right to determine that question for itself, and that such determination was conclusive. I do not so construe the finding of the referee, but rather that he held that the respondent had the right to determine what betterments were necessary for its service, and that the court could not supervise and control the reasonable and lawful exercise of that discretion in adopting plans for the consummation of its purpose. The conclusion of the referee is amply supported by the authorities. “To a large extent the company is to determine, under the delegation of power to it by the State, the extent of its wants, and to fix upon the location of lands, subject to the qualification that the purposes for which the land is to be taken are strictly within its charter. Where a reasonable necessity is shown, a reasonable discretion must be exercised, and the courts will not interfere to control that discretion, unless it will result in great injury or is influenced by some improper motive. ” (Matter of N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. M. G. L. Co., 63 N. Y. 326, 331.) “Where the necessity exists and a reasonable discretion is exercised the courts will not interfere. ” (Matter of N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 77 N. Y. 248.) “ When the necessity exists and a reasonable discretion is used, the courts will not interfere, even if the exercise of the power to take lands under the statute is attended with extreme inconvenience and hardship to individuals.” (Matter of N. Y., Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 33 Hun, 148; affd., 98 N. Y. 664; Syracuse, Lake Shore & Northern R. R. Co. v. Carrier, 149 App. Div. 411,
As to the adequacy of the award of $13,600. The appellant’s property is about thirty-six and one-half feet wide and runs from respondent’s right of way to North Pearl street, a distance of about one hundred and ninety feet. Situated nearly at the easterly end of the lot is appellant’s main building, built of brick, thirty-six and one-half feet wide, seventy-eight and one-half feet long, with the east half three stories high and the west half four stories high, with a cellar under all. The portion sought to be condemned included about one-third of the easterly end of this building, and is thirty-seven feet long on the southerly line and forty and three-tenths feet on the northerly fine. In this building is located heavy machinery used by the appellant in its business. Westerly of this building is the.one-story foundry, and westerly of that and fronting on North Pearl street, the office building. The property was purchased by the. appellant in 1906 for $4,500. The appellant expended in repairing the office and main building and in erecting the foundry about $8,400, making the cost of the property to appellant about $12,900. The property was carried by appellant upon its inventory at $13,644.54, or less than $50 more than has been awarded appellant for the piece to be taken by respondent. Upon the hearing before the commissioners the appellant claimed that a large portion of its machinery was so affixed to the building as to be a part of the real estate, and that the commissioners should make their award accordingly. It appears that the greater portion of the heavy machinery has been owned by the appellant for about twenty years, and has been twice moved as appellant changed its business location. The machinery has been carried upon appellant’s inventory as personal property. It has been fastened and held in place by screws, and can be moved without injury to the real estate. It was properly held by the commissioners to be personal property. The appellant also claims that the finding
Order and interlocutory judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs.