56 A.D. 538 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
This is a summary proceeding to remove a tenant, under the provisions of section 2231 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the only question on this appeal is raised by the motion made on the part of the tenant to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that the relation of landlord and tenant is not shown to exist between the parties. The right of the petitioner to maintain this proceeding is predicatéd upon the written agreement between the parties, which makes up a part of the return. We are asked to determine this question.
The petitioner is a building loan corporation, and it is provided in its by-laws that it may purchase or acquire a particular piece of property for any of its members, which is to be paid for by the stock of the corporation when fully paid in. In J une, 1899, the petitioner entered into a written contract with the tenant, in which it was recited that “ whereas, the said Frank F. Keeney, party of the second part, as a member of the above-named corporation, being desirous of acquiring the real property hereinafter more fully described, has bid a premium on the company’s usual form, in accord anee with the conditions expressed in the articles of association of the party of the first part, such premium being a sum of money paid by the party of the second part for priority of right to secure an advance on the shares of stock of the party of the first part for the purpose of aiding him in acquiring the property above referred to, and in conformity therewith has paid unto the party of the first part the sum of one dollar on account of said premium and the contract price of said premises.” The agreement further recites that Frank F. Keeney has subscribed for 218 shares of a certain class of the capital stock of the party of the first part, having a par value of $100 each, “ which shares represent the amount still due and to be paid to the party of the first part, with interest.” Then follows
In other words, the petitioner, being the owner of the premises, undertook to rent the same to the tenant for a period of twenty-one years, with the condition that if all the covenants were observed during that period it would make a transfer of the property to the tenant, and the latter, having come into the possession of the premises under the provisions of this lease, in which he has agreed that on default of payments the party of the first part is to have “ all the rights and remedies of a landlord,” asks this court to hold that the relation of landlord and tenant does not exist under the contract. The scheme of the loan association contemplates the surrender and cancellation of the stock at the time of the transfer, and article 56 of the articles of association provides that “ such surrender and cancellation shall be deemed a valid consideration for the passing of the title from the corporation to the member.” In other words, the paid-up shares of the capital stock stand as an obligation of the corporation, and these are discharged by the transfer of the title to the member on his surrender of the stock. This contract is in spirit not unlike that involved in Stewart v. Long Island R. R. Co. (102 N. Y. 601, 613), where the court held that “ the agreement to transfer the fee to the lessee did not merge the term of fifty years, nor prevent the relation of landlord and tenant subsisting between the original lessee or its transferee of the term during its continuance.” (See Bostwick v. Frankfield, 74 N. Y. 207.) In the case last cited a covenant to convey a fee to the lessee was held not to create an equitable estate in fee in the lessee, in which his estate as lessee merged, but that the lease remained in full force^ and the relation of landlord and tenant continued, until performance
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Judgment of the Municipal Court affirmed, with costs.