NEW YORK ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH ET AL. v. EVERETT FISHER ET AL.
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued June 12—decision released August 19, 1980
182 Conn. 272
COTTER, C. J., BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY and PARSKEY, Js.
James R. Fogarty, with whom, on the brief, were Robert A. Epstein and James J. Huron, for the appellees-appellants (named defendant et al.).
PETERS, J. This case involves a dispute over the ownership of church property arising out of a disagreement about the withdrawal of a local church from its prior affiliation with a hierarchical church organization.
New York Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church and its resident bishop, W. Ralph Ward, Jr., brought this action against the Round Hill Community Church, Inc., of Greenwich and
The underlying facts, found in the memorandum of decision and other material uncontested parts of the proceedings at trial; Pandolphe‘s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980); establish the following: A local church having a hierarchical relationship with the United Methodist Church3 was begun in the Round Hill area of Greenwich in the early part of the nineteenth century. Known as the Round Hill Methodist Episcopal Church, it was first located, in 1828, on property deeded in trust to the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1827. Subsequently, in 1871, the church acquired other property from William S. Brown, again in trust for the Methodist Episcopal Church, to which the church sanctuary was then moved, the original parcel becoming a cemetery for the congregation.
In the early part of this century, the Round Hill Methodist Episcopal Church was a struggling country church with a declining membership. From 1907 to 1913, the church may have been temporarily closed and was at least inactive. The Reverend Harold E. Wilson, a Methodist minister and a member of the New York East Annual Conference4 was appointed in 1919 by the Methodist bishop to serve as a part-time “supply” pastor to the church at Round Hill. At the request of the congregation, the Reverend Wilson was, after two years of service, appointed as its full-time pastor.
On February 14, 1921, eleven individuals who constituted the official board of the Round Hill Method-
From 1921 onwards, the church formerly known as the Round Hill Methodist Episcopal Church became known as the Round Hill Community Church (hereinafter Round Hill). The significance of this change is the central issue in the case before us. On the one hand, Round Hill never voted to abandon the Methodist Church, and continued, until 1978, to occupy Methodist Church property, to be led by Methodist ministers and to pay Methodist assessments. Neither Reverend Wilson nor the members of the official board of the church took any steps to withdraw their individual memberships in the Methodist Annual Conference. On the other hand, Round Hill, after 1921, held itself out as a community church in its corporate affairs5 and in its relationship to the community. The ambiguity
As a community church, Round Hill prospered. It acquired substantial amounts of real property, title to which was taken either in the name of Round Hill Community Association, Inc., or in the name of trustees for the Round Hill Community Church or Round Hill Community Church, Inc. Round Hill has also since 1921 accumulated substantial endowment, retirement and miscellaneous funds.
In the years between 1921 and 1978, the ministers at Round Hill were all Methodists. Reverend Wilson‘s successors were selected by Round Hill and appointed by the bishops of the Methodist Church. The present controversy arose when, in 1978, the Round Hill congregation voted to appoint, as pastor of Round Hill, the Reverend Alvin Brewer, a Congregational minister. The Methodist Church, acting through Bishop Ward, attempted unsuccessfully to designate and install a Methodist minister, Reverend Hansen, in place of Reverend Brewer. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants’ insistence upon a minister who is not a Methodist means that the defendants have now in effect withdrawn from the Methodist Church and have forfeited their right to use or take church property which is subject to a Methodist trust. The defendants deny the continued existence of a Methodist trust, claiming that Round Hill is and has been since 1921 a nondenominational community church, independent of the Methodist Church.
On this appeal, the plaintiffs challenge as error the trial court‘s second conclusion, that Round Hill is a church independent of the Methodist Church, and the trial court‘s third conclusion, that Round Hill has title to and the right to control all of the real and personal property that is the subject mat-
I
Before we proceed to the merits of these issues, we must review, as did the trial court, what authority we may constitutionally exercise, as a civil court, to adjudicate property disputes involving autonomous ecclesiastical organizations. The first and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution protect freedom of religion by forbidding governmental establishment of religion and by prohibiting governmental interference with the free exercise of religion. It is now well established that “the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.” Presbyterian Church v. Mary E. B. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S. Ct. 601, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976); Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368, 90 S. Ct. 499, 24 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). In language often quoted, it was held, in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1871):6 “In this
The principle of deference to ecclesiastical adjudication of disputes concerning ecclesiastical doctrines and practices does not rest on the mandates
Nonetheless, the principle of deference must be applied in accommodation with the competing principle that “[t]he State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.” Jones v. Wolf, supra, 602; Presbyterian Church v. Mary E. B. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, supra, 445. It is now well established that state judicial intervention is justified when it can be accomplished by resort to neutral principles of law arising out of the law of property and of trusts that eschew consideration of doctrinal matters such as the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith. Jones v. Wolf, supra, 602; Presbyterian Church v. Mary E. B. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, supra, 449; see Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 370, 90 S. Ct. 499, 24 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Clough v. Wilson, 170 Conn. 548, 552-54, 368 A.2d 231 (1976).
Because disputes involving church property have arisen with unfortunate regularity, there are well-developed guidelines for us to follow in the application of neutral principles of law. The basic rules, laid down in Watson v. Jones, supra, establish a two-stage test. If property is dedicated by way of an express trust either to the general or to the local church, the terms of the trust will be enforced. In the absence of an express trust, the court must determine ownership of the property on the basis of the polity of the general and the local church: if the property is held by a local church which is independent of the general church, the property is subject to control by the decision of the majority of the local church; if, however, the property is held by a local church which is connected as a subordinate member to a hierarchical general church, then rights to the property are to be decided by the hierarchical church‘s superior ecclesiastical tribunal. Watson has been followed in this state in Independent Methodist Episcopal Church v. Davis, 137 Conn. 1, 13, 74 A.2d 203 (1950), and in Trustees of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church v. Harris, 73 Conn. 216, 224, 47 A. 116 (1900).
Jones v. Wolf, decided by the United States Supreme Court only last year, added to the rules of Watson v. Jones by enlarging the scope of inquiry that a court may pursue, still following neutral principles, to determine the existence of a trust, and, presumably, the polity of a church and a local church‘s affiliation therewith. Under Jones v. Wolf, in deciding secular questions arising out of con-
The first amendment thus requires that civil courts defer to the highest court of the hierarchical church organization to resolve issues of religious doctrine or practice; Jones v. Wolf, supra; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1871); but does not prevent the civil courts from exercising general authority to resolve church property disputes. In the context of the case before us, we have both the authority and the duty to decide whether the property claimed by the Methodist Church and by Round Hill was expressly given in trust to either church. Where the property is not subject to an express trust, we must decide, without becoming entangled in religious controversy, what is the nature of the relationship between the Methodist Church and the local church, and the nature of the affiliation of Round Hill to the Methodist Church. Not all of these questions are still at issue. The trial court found that the property of the Round Hill church that was acquired before 1921 was given subject to an express trust in favor of the Methodist Church, but that the property subsequently acquired was not subject to such an express trust. The trial court also found that the
II
The central issue on this appeal is the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court erred in holding that a new and independent church was organized at Round Hill in 1921. The trial court held that passage of the motion by the local church board that Round Hill be made a community church meant that the Round Hill Methodist Episcopal Church as of that moment ceased to exist. The court held that there was no need for the local church to make application to withdraw from the Methodist Church because there was nothing from which to withdraw. The court therefore did not inquire into the procedures for withdrawal specified in the Methodist Church‘s Book of Discipline, despite its recognition that, before 1921, the church at Round Hill had been affiliated in a hierarchical manner with a church whose polity was itself hierarchical.
The plaintiffs attack the conclusion of the trial court both doctrinally and factually. On a doctrinal level, they come close to arguing that a local church, once connected with a hierarchical general church, cannot disaffiliate therefrom without compliance with the explicit ecclesiastical law of that church. On a factual level, they dispute the infer-
Although it seems unlikely that even a hierarchical general church could bind its local churches in perpetuity to observe any and all of its ecclesiastical commandments, including its constraints on disaffiliation; but cf. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 712-15; we need not reach that issue. On the underlying facts found by the trial court, there is no factual basis for its conclusion that Round Hill had established its independence from the Methodist Church.
The facts that have a bearing on the continuance of a relationship between Round Hill and the Methodist Church are not limited to the passage of a motion on February 14, 1921, although the circumstances attending its passage are illuminating. At an official meeting of an official board of a church then concededly Methodist, a motion to become a community church was passed. The motion did not speak to the Methodist past of this church, nor did it say that an independent church was being founded. The motion appointed an implementing committee including the local church‘s minister, a pastor who had been and continued to be an active member of the Methodist Church. The motion did not contemplate relocation of the church, then and now on property known to be held in trust for the Methodist Church. It is true that the motion also suggested inquiry into ecumenical liaison with a congregation of another denomination, but the significance of that inquiry depends upon whether such a liaison is necessarily a definitive repudiation of the Methodist faith. That question, in turn,
A fact of particular importance is that Round Hill continued to occupy and to use, to exercise complete dominion over, property expressly entrusted to the Methodist Church. Courts in this and other jurisdictions have consistently held that, although the members of a local church may secede from a hierarchical system, they cannot secede and take the church property with them. Independent Methodist Episcopal Church v. Davis, 137 Conn. 1, 13, 74 A.2d 203 (1950); McAuliffe v. Russian Greek Catholic Church, 130 Conn. 521, 536, 36 A.2d 53 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 726, 65 S. Ct. 60, 89 L. Ed. 583 (1944); see, e.g., Holiman v. Dovers, 236 Ark. 211, 366 S.W.2d 197, 200 (1963); Baker v. Ducker, 79 Cal. 365, 374, 21 P. 764 (1889); Trustees of Pencader Presbyterian Church v. Gibson, 26 Del. Ch. 375, 383, 22 A.2d 782 (1941); St. John‘s Presbytery v. Central Presbyterian Church of St. Petersburg, 102 So. 2d 714, 718 (Fla. 1958); Apostolic Holiness Union of Post Falls v. Knudson, 21 Idaho 589, 594, 123 P. 473 (1912); Stallings v. Finney, 287 Ill. 145, 149, 122 N.E. 369 (1919) (congregational church polity); Stansberry v. McCarty, 238 Ind. 338, 149 N.E.2d 683 (1958) (congregational church polity); Black v. Tackett, 237 S.W.2d 855, 855-56 (Ky. 1951); Hanna v. Malick, 223 Mich. 100, 119, 193 N.W. 798 (1923); Mt. Helm Baptist Church v. Jones, 79 Miss. 488, 502, 30 So. 714 (1901); Erie Conference Central Office v. Burdick, 440 Pa. 136, 139-40, 269 A.2d 735 (1970); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 398 (2d Ed. 1965).
As did the trial court, we find it useful to test our conclusion by examining the events that occurred between 1921 and 1978, when the present controversy erupted. Lar-Rob Bus Corporation v. Fairfield, 170 Conn. 397, 409, 365 A.2d 1086 (1976); Taft Realty Corporation v. Yorkhaven Enterprises, Inc., 146 Conn. 338, 343, 150 A.2d 597 (1959). In these intervening years, the church at Round Hill continued to pay Methodist assessments and to accept the appointment of Methodist ministers. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that Round Hill had a continuing relationship with the Methodist Church because it continued to be led by Methodist ministers. The church at Round Hill described itself, in its literature, as having been founded in 1810 rather than in 1921. In its official history, Round Hill characterized its church as a community church that had not actually severed its connection with the Methodist Church.8 In its 1977 Complete Statement of Principles, published on the eve of the present controversy, Round Hill reiter-
Notes
to full-time work at Round Hill. This was quite a venture for a church which for nearly a hundred years had been cared for largely by short-term supply pastors.’ “However, under the leadership of the Wilsons, the church enjoyed a complete rebirth. Mr. Wilson, in a brief history of the church given on his tenth anniversary here wrote that, ‘While not actually severing its connection with the Methodist Episcopal denomination, the church became a Community Church in name and fact, both in the inclusiveness of its spirit and membership and the program it attempted to carry on in the community.’ This program has ever since been enjoyed by those of all faiths living in the Round Hill area.”
Viewed in their totality, the events that occurred at Round Hill in 1921, and thereafter until the present dispute arose in 1978, establish a relationship of ambiguous dimensions but not a severance, in 1921, of the connectional ties between the church at Round Hill and the Methodist Church. The trial court‘s conclusion to the contrary, because it is contrary to the underlying facts, is therefore in error and cannot stand. Botticello v. Stefanovicz, 177 Conn. 22, 27, 411 A.2d 16 (1979); White Oak Excavators, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 169 Conn. 253, 256, 363 A.2d 134 (1975); Barrett-NonPareil, Inc. v. Stoll, 168 Conn. 79, 82, 357 A.2d 481 (1975).
The second issue on the plaintiffs’ appeal is a challenge to the conclusions of the trial court with respect to rights in the property of the church at Round Hill. The trial court determined that all of the real and personal property belonged to the local church, and that the Methodist Church had forfeited whatever rights it might once have had, even in property originally expressly given in trust to the Methodist Church. These conclusions are inescapably linked with the trial court‘s earlier determination that Round Hill had severed its relationship with the Methodist Church in 1921. In view of our holding to the contrary in part II of this opinion, these conclusions cannot stand.
The property which is in dispute can usefully be divided into two segments, the property acquired by the Round Hill church before 1921, and the property acquired thereafter. With respect to the pre-1921 property, the trial court found that this property had been lost to the Methodist Church by operation of the law of adverse possession and the doctrine of laches. For the property acquired after 1921, the court found that the absence of an express trust and the creation of an independent church defeated the interest that the Methodist Church claimed to flow from the Methodist Church‘s Book of Discipline. We will address separately the issues raised by the pre-1921 and the post-1921 transactions.
The question raised with regard to the applicability of the law of adverse possession is straightforward. Adverse possession requires “that the owner shall be ousted of his possession and kept out uninterruptedly for a period of fifteen years, by an open, visible and exclusive possession by the claimant without the license or consent of the owner and under a claim of right.” (Emphasis added.) Wadsworth Realty Co. v. Sundberg, supra, 462. The trial court concluded that Round Hill, upon its orga-
The trial court‘s reasoning with regard to laches is, like its holding with regard to adverse possession, derived from its erroneous conclusion that Round Hill had established itself as an independent church in 1921. Laches consists of two elements: (1) an inexcusable delay by a party seeking enforcement of a claim and (2) resulting prejudice to the party defending against enforcement of the claim. Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232, 239, 413 A.2d 834 (1979); Leary v. Stylarama of New Haven, Inc., 174 Conn. 217, 218-19, 384 A.2d 377 (1978); Robinson v. Myers, 156 Conn. 510, 519, 244 A.2d 385 (1968); Owens v. Doyle, 152 Conn. 199, 207, 205 A.2d 495 (1964); Pascale v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 150 Conn. 113, 119, 186 A.2d 377 (1962). The Meth
The facts of the present controversy serve to distinguish this case from the cases in other jurisdictions where the doctrine of laches has been found applicable. In Gabster v. Mesaros, 422 Pa. 116, 220 A.2d 639 (1966), on which the trial court relied, a local church abandoned its prior connection with the Church of Rome to associate itself with an eastern sect known as the Carpatho-Russian Greek Catholic Orthodox Church. For thirty years, the local parish was served and its property administered by priests assigned and removed by a bishop of the eastern sect. In Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church v. Burdikoff, 117 Ohio App. 1, 189 N.E.2d 451, appeal dismissed, 174 Ohio 140, 186 N.E.2d 847 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808, 83 S. Ct. 1694, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1033 (1963), a local Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic church declared itself to be an autonomous church affiliated with the Metropolia, and, for thirty-five years, received financial and spiritual leadership from the Metropolia rather than from its prior leader, the Patriarch of Moscow. See also Greek Catholic Church of St. Michaels v. Roizdestvensky, 67 Colo. 217, 184 P. 295 (1919); Puckett v. Jessee, 195 Va. 919, 81 S.E.2d 425 (1954). In these cases, a court might well conclude that the severance of the local church from its previous affiliation was so uncategorical and so unequivocally manifested by its new and different ecclesiastical leadership that the spiritual jurisdiction of the
We turn, finally, to resolution of the issues that concern ownership of property acquired by the church at Round Hill after 1921. This property consists of (1) five parcels of land,10 (2) endowment and retirement funds and (3) other miscellaneous funds. The trial court held, in a conclusion not challenged on this appeal, that none of this property was expressly given in trust to the Methodist Church. Applying the rules of Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722-23, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1871), that determine church property rights in the absence of an express trust, the trial court went on to conclude that, because Round Hill had become an
The plaintiffs argue that the continued connection of the church at Round Hill to the Methodist Church requires application of the connectional rules of Watson v. Jones, supra. Under these rules, if they apply, courts are instructed to look with a secular eye upon church documents construed according to neutral legal principles in order to decide whether property donated to a local church becomes the property of the hierarchical church in the event of a schism or withdrawal. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-604, 99 S. Ct. 3020, 61 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1979); see also Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 370, 90 S. Ct. 499, 24 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Presbyterian Church v. Mary E. B. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S. Ct. 601, 21 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969). The plaintiffs maintain that governing provisions of the Book of Discipline of the Methodist Church, as well as other church documents, locate title in the plaintiffs. The defendants’ argument to the contrary relies not only on the claimed absence of a continued connection between Round Hill and the Methodist Church but also on their special defenses of waiver, estoppel, unclean hands and unjust enrichment that the trial court failed to reach. The latter questions have been preserved by the defendants’ cross appeal.
Our conclusion that there continued to be, until 1978, a relationship, a connection, between Round Hill and the Methodist Church raises a number of questions that the trial court did not address. Even if Round Hill was then connected to the Methodist Church in a hierarchical fashion, property deeded by express trust to Round Hill would remain subject to the express terms of its trust. Watson v. Jones, supra. The right of a donor to dedicate property to a local church is a right which a donor may exercise whether the property is confided to a local church with a congregational form of government or to a local church associated, as is Round Hill, with a hierarchical polity. Watson v. Jones, supra, 723. Although the trial court determined that title to the property acquired after 1921 was taken in the name of Round Hill, the court made no finding about whether the property was dedicated by way of an express trust to Round Hill. It considered whether the property was subject to an express trust in favor of the general church, the Methodist Church, and determined that it was not, but failed to consider the possibility of an express trust in favor of the local church. Upon remand, this question must be resolved by examination of the documents by which the various parcels of property and the various funds were conveyed to Round Hill. Jones v. Wolf, supra, 604. To the extent that the
It is not unlikely that some or all of the property to which Round Hill holds title came to it without the benefit of an express trust. As to this property, the trial court on remand must consider relevant ecclesiastical documents as well as the possible role of waiver, estoppel, unclean hands and unjust enrichment.
Whatever may have been the precise relationship between the local church and the general church in the years after 1921, the local church‘s property rights might well, in the absence of express trusts, have been subordinated to the rights of the general church. We state this conclusion in tentative fashion, because there has been as yet no factual determination about what the provisions of the Book of Discipline were at the various times at which the various pieces of property were acquired. It is the role of the trial court, in the first instance, to ascertain and to interpret, in secular fashion, the property rules of the Methodist Church that govern the rights of the general church in property deeded to the local church. It may well be that the priority of interest of the general church so clearly articulated in the recent revisions of the Book of Discipline was not yet spelled out in earlier versions. The trial court will have to inquire into the appropriate ecclesiastical rules and regulations, including the Book of Discipline and other applicable Methodist documents to see whether they encompass the transactions under scrutiny. See Jones v. Wolf, supra,
Finally, we must recognize that, whatever the terms of the rules and regulations and Book of Discipline of the Methodist Church, the trial court, on remand, may find that there was considerable ambiguity in the relationship between Round Hill and the Methodist Church in the years after 1921. This ambiguity was known to the Methodist Church through the knowledge of its ministers.12 It is
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion COTTER, C. J., and PARSKEY, J., concurred.
BOGDANSKI, J. (dissenting). The trial court acted properly and legally in concluding that on February 14, 1921, the Round Hill Methodist Episcopal Church of Greenwich ceased to exist and that the Round Hill Community Church was established in theory as a community church and, in fact, acted as a community church during its nearly sixty years of existence.
It is fundamental that conclusions reached by the trial court must stand unless they are inconsistent with the subordinate facts or involve the application of some erroneous rule of law. Craig v. Dunleavy, 154 Conn. 100, 105, 221 A.2d 855 (1966). Since the plaintiffs have not challenged the subordi
It is also fundamental that this court‘s function is to review the case on the record established in the court below and that we cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Penland, 174 Conn. 153, 158, 384 A.2d 356 (1978); Johnson v. Flammia, 169 Conn. 491, 497, 363 A.2d 1048 (1975).
The trier is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and effect of their testimony. Hally v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 162 Conn. 352, 359, 294 A.2d 305 (1972); Salvatore v. Milicki, 163 Conn. 275, 278, 303 A.2d 734 (1972). The trier may disbelieve a witness as to a part of his testimony and accept it in other respects; Birgel v. Heintz, 163 Conn. 23, 30, 301 A.2d 249 (1972); and is privileged to adopt whatever testimony it reasonably believes to be credible. Birgel v. Heintz, supra, 29. A judgment will not be reversed unless an erroneous rule of law has been applied or a conclusion reached that is inconsistent with the subordinate facts or so illogical or unsound or violative of rules of reason as to be unwarranted in law. Schnier v. Ives, 162 Conn. 171, 177, 293 A.2d 1 (1972). Moreover, there is no rule of law that a party cannot prevail unless the evidence produced to establish his case is harmonious and consistent throughout. Indeed, if that were the rule, there could seldom be success in an attempt to prove an ultimate fact. While the incon
The courts have developed two general approaches to adjudicating church property disputes without encroaching upon matters protected by the first amendment. The first approach already noted in the majority opinion is associated with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1871).
In addition to the Watson polity approach, civil courts have avoided first amendment difficulties by relying on neutral principles of property law to resolve church disputes. In Clough v. Wilson, 170 Conn. 548, 552, 368 A.2d 231 (1976), quoting in part Polen v. Cox, 259 Md. 25, 30, 267 A.2d 201 (1970), this court stated: “[t]he fact that the source of the controversy lies in disagreement as to religious doctrinal beliefs and practices is not determinative of whether a civil court has jurisdiction to decide church property disputes, many of which arise over doctrinal controversy. ‘To so hold would too narrowly restrict the scope of the court‘s jurisdiction. The relevant inquiry must be whether the court can resolve the property dispute on the basis of neutral principles of law.‘”
The first amendment does not dictate that a state must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes, as long as the method adopted does not require the court to resolve an issue of religious doctrine. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99
In the present case, it was not necessary for the court to resolve a religious controversy to determine ownership of the property under the “neutral principles” approach. The court was required to determine the ownership of the property acquired before 1921 on the basis of adverse possession. This necessitated a determination of whether the Round Hill Church separated from the Methodist Church. Thus, the trial court based its decision on purely nonreligious grounds.
There is no dispute that originally located on part of the subject premises was a church known as the Round Hill Methodist Episcopal Church. This church had a hierarchical relationship with the Methodist Church. Since at least the turn of the century, Round Hill Methodist Episcopal Church came upon hard times. There was little support for this church and it may have been either closed or at least inactive during the period of 1907 to 1921. By 1921, it became apparent that a Methodist Church could not survive in the Round Hill section of Greenwich.
On February 14, 1921, eleven individuals met at the church, all of whom comprised the official board
From that moment on, the Round Hill Methodist Episcopal Church ceased to exist and the Round Hill Community Church was born as a nondenominational church to serve the community of Greenwich; it was established in theory as a community church and during its nearly sixty years of existence, Round Hill in fact acted as a community church. A community church has been defined as an “interdenominational or nondenominational church for community use ....” Webster, Third New International Dictionary. As a community church Round Hill prospered; its membership significantly increased. The court concluded that Round Hill Community‘s church polity, and that of its corporate successor Round Hill Community Church, Inc., has always been independent and congregational in form, and that it has never had a connection with the hierarchical polity of the Methodist Church.
While a delicate balance must be maintained during such an inquiry it appears from footnote nine of Justice Brennan‘s majority opinion in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 715, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976), that a slightly more in-depth inquiry is permitted for the sole purpose of confirming the court‘s conclusion as to the church‘s polity. Accordingly, the following facts can be pointed out which confirm the polity of Round Hill as independent and congregational in form: By its name, by its written invitations to
This claim overlooks the fundamental fact that the congregation in 1921 clearly organized a new church to serve the community and not just the Methodist denomination. It is thus clear that with this finding Round Hill was and continues to be an independent church and the contract and implied trust theories by which the plaintiffs seek to gain control of the property must fail. See Baldwin v. Mills, 344 So. 2d 259, 265 (Fla. App. 1977).
The plaintiffs also contend that they cannot be bound by the actions of the congregation in 1921 or by any subsequent acts taken by Round Hill because they were never given notice. The fact of the matter is that the individuals that organized Round Hill in 1921 had no obligation to give the Methodist Church or any other denomination notice that it was organizing an independent church.
Nevertheless, the Methodist ministers of Round Hill were aware of all the significant acts taken by Round Hill from its inception in 1921 through the adoption of its revised statement of principles in 1977. These ministers were not only Methodists but they were also members of the plaintiff New York Annual Conference.
For purposes of constructive notice, these Methodist ministers were agents of the plaintiffs. Principals are presumed to have knowledge of the acts done by their agents when the agents act in rela
Lastly, the record reveals that the New York Annual Conference and the Bishop and his predecessors had actual knowledge of the organization of Round Hill as a nondenominational community church and the subsequent actions taken by it. The claim of lack of knowledge has no foundation in fact or law.
I would therefore find no error.
ARTHUR H. HEALEY, J. (dissenting). I concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bogdanski. I would, however, make certain other observations. I think that the majority has not observed the proper function of this court on review of the decision of the trial court. See Practice Book, 1978, § 3060D. We have recently stated: “On appeal, it is the function of this court to determine whether the decision of the trial court is clearly erroneous. See Practice Book, 1978, § 3060D. This involves a two part function: where the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision; where the factual basis of the court‘s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in the light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous. That is the standard and scope of this court‘s review of the
The majority does not refer to undisputed facts concerning events that took place after 1921 that, nonetheless, shed light on the intention and effect of the 1921 resolution. These facts, recited in Justice Bogdanski‘s dissenting opinion, are characterized by the majority as “conduct [that] deviated from the normal practices of more orthodox methodist churches.” The majority concludes that any such deviation presents an “ecclesiastical matter to be adjudicated not by us but by the proper authorities within the hierarchical church.” I believe that either a civil court has constitutional authority to decide, in order to settle title to real property, whether Round Hill separated from the Methodist Church or it does not. If it does, then all the facts as disclosed by the memorandum of decision and the undisputed facts; see Pandolphe‘s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, supra; which bear on that ultimate conclusion of fact should be considered. These facts, which reflect the intention and effect of the 1921 resolution, were therefore relevant in the trial court and should be considered by this court in deciding whether the subordinate facts found by the trial court support the trial court‘s ultimate conclusions. When all the facts are considered, it is evident to me that the trial court‘s decision is not “clearly erroneous.”
Turning to the property claims themselves, as the majority points out, the issues relating to them are inextricably joined to and controlled by the decision relating to separation. Once the trial court‘s decision relating to separation is sustained or set aside,
Finally, although it might be argued that the trial court could have reached the result reached by the majority, that is not the issue on appeal. “We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. Rather, we focus on the conclusion of the trial court, as well as the method by which it arrived at that conclusion, to determine whether it is legally and factually supported.” Pandolphe‘s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, supra, 222.
The trial court heard the witnesses and considered a plethora of documentary evidence. It prepared a thorough memorandum, forty-three pages in length. To set the trial court‘s decision aside, it must be “clearly erroneous“; Practice Book, 1978, § 3060D; and that test has not been met here. Therefore, I dissent.