New Richmond v. ByrneNew Richmond v. Byrne
Rex A. Wolfgang, 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendant-appellant
O P I N I O N
RINGLAND, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Terrence K. Byrne, appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Clermont County Common Pleas Court in favor of plaintiff-appellee, village of New Richmond, on New Richmond‘s complaint for a permanent injunction against Byrne requiring him to demolish his trailer/mobile home. We affirm.
{¶2} Byrne owns a double-wide trailer or mobile home and the parcel of land on which it is situated at 100 Caroline Street, New Richmond, Ohio. On July 8, 2008, the
{¶3} Byrne appealed to New Richmond‘s nuisance appeals board, arguing that his mobile home hаd not been damaged beyond 50 percent of its value. After holding a hearing on Byrne‘s appeal, the board upheld the resolution‘s finding that Byrne‘s mobile home constituted a public nuisance, but board member and village solicitor, John Korfhagen, informed Byrne that, under the village‘s nuisance ordinance, he had “the right to apply for a special building permit to make the repairs necessary to bring the property into compliance.” Thereafter, Byrne applied for a special building permit to make repairs to his mobile home, but the village‘s zoning inspector, Howard Kuhnell, refused to grant him one for the reason that the mobile home had been damaged to an extent of more than 80 percent of the cost of reproducing it, and under New Richmоnd‘s zoning ordinance, a property owner is not permitted to reconstruct any such structure if, like Byrne‘s mobile home, it is a nonconforming use.
{¶4} Byrne appealed the zoning inspector‘s decision to New Richmond‘s Board of Zoning & Floodplain Appeаls, arguing that repairs to his mobile home did not exceed 80 percent of its value and that the majority of the repairs already had been completed. A hearing was held on Byrne‘s appeal on October 7, 2008. The BZA treated Byrne‘s appeal as a request for a variance and denied it. Two days later, the village‘s
{¶5} On December 11, 2008, New Richmond filed a complaint in the Clermont County Common Pleas Court, requesting a permanent injunction against Byrne requiring him to bring his property into compliance with the village‘s nuisance and zoning ordinances and prohibiting him from violating those ordinances in the future. Byrne filed an answer to New Richmond‘s complaint, arguing, among other things, that the village had “unevenly applied” its ordinances.2
{¶6} On November 9, 2009, the trial court granted New Richmond‘s motion for summary judgment on its complaint for a permanent injunction, finding that the “issue of whеther Byrne‘s mobile home is in violation of any zoning ordinance or regulation is res judicata” since Byrne did not appeal the BZA‘s October 7, 2008 decision. Consequently, the trial court permanently enjoined Byrne from violating New Richmond‘s nuisance and zoning ordinances and ordered him to remove the mobile home from his property forthwith, since, as a result of his failure to appeal the BZA‘s decision, “it is established that said structure cannot be reconstructed or restored to bring it into compliance with [New Richmоnd‘s nuisance or zoning ordinances] as a matter of law.”
{¶7} Byrne now appeals, assigning the following as error:
{¶8} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶9} “THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE REPAIRS.”
{¶10} Byrne argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to New Richmond because a factual issue exists as to whether the items listed in the nuisance resolution were merely maintenance items for which a sрecial building permit was not
{¶11} On appeal, a trial court‘s decision granting summary judgmеnt is reviewed de novo. Burgess v. Tackas (1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 294, 296. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can only come to a conclusion adverse to the nonmoving рarty, construing the evidence most strongly in that party‘s favor. See
{¶12} Contrary to what Byrne alleges in his first assignment of error, the trial court did not hold that Byrne did not have the right to make repairs to his mobile home, but rather, that the factual issues raised by Byrne in оpposition to New Richmond‘s
{¶13} The doctrine of res judicata “consists of two related concеpts — claim preclusion and issue preclusion.” Fort Frye Teachers Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Employment Relations Bd., 81 Ohio St.3d 392, 395, 1998-Ohio-435, citing Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 1995-Ohio-331. The case before us involves the concept of issue preclusion.
{¶14} “The doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estоppel, holds that a fact or a point that was actually and directly at issue in a previous action, and was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may not be drawn into question in a subsequent action between the sаme parties or their privies, whether the cause of action in the two actions be identical or different. [Citations omitted.] *** [T]he collateral estoppel aspect [of res judicata] precludes the relitigation, in a second action, of an issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action that was based on a different cause of action. Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 112. ‘In short, under the rule of collateral estoppel, even where the cause of actiоn is different in a subsequent suit, a judgment in a prior suit may nevertheless affect the outcome of the second suit.’ Id. at 112.” Fort Frye Teachers Assn, OEA/NEA at 395.
{¶15} In addition to applying to judicial decisions, “res judicata, whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion, applies to administrative proсeedings that are ‘of a judicial nature and where the parties have had an ample opportunity to litigate the issues involved in the proceeding.‘” Grava v. Parkman Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381, 1995-Ohio-331, quoting Set Products, Inc. v. Bainbridge Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 260, 263, quoting Superior‘s Brand v. Lindley (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 133, syllabus. Collateral estoppel is an important element of our legal system, as it provides a necessary degree of finality to decisions rendered by courts or administrative agencies. See, generally, Doan v. S. Ohio Adm. Dist. Council, Internatl. Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 482, 486, quoting Superior‘s Brand at 135.
{¶16} In this case, Byrne appealed the zoning inspector‘s decision denying his request for a speсial building permit to New Richmond‘s BZA, arguing that he did not need such a permit to make repairs to his mobile home since the damages were not as extensive as the zoning inspector had found and he had already completed most of the repairs anywаy. He also argued that he did not need a variance from the village‘s zoning ordinance because he was not reconstructing his mobile home as the zoning inspector had determined, but instead, was only making “basic necessary repairs” to it.
{¶17} The BZA treated Byrne‘s appeal as a request for a variance from the village‘s zoning ordinance and denied it. It is apparent from its decision that the BZA rejected Byrne‘s contentions and affirmed the findings made by the village‘s zoning inspector (Kuhnell). Critically, Byrne did not appeal the BZA‘s decision to the common pleas court, as he had a right to do under
{¶19} Consequently, Byrne‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶20} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶21} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE STRUCTURE BE DEMOLISHED.”
{¶22} Byrne argues the trial court erred in ordering that his mobile home be demolished becаuse New Richmond‘s complaint only sought an injunction requiring him to comply with the village‘s nuisance and zoning ordinances and he already had complied with them by repairing the items listed in the nuisance resolution. We disagree with this argument.
{¶23} In the second count of its cоmplaint, New Richmond requested a permanent injunction against Byrne, “terminating the existing violation” of the village‘s zoning ordinance and “prohibiting future violations of said ordinance.” New Richmond presented evidence showing that its zoning inspector had determined that Byrne‘s mobile home was a nonconforming use that could not be restored or reconstructed under the village‘s zoning ordinance because of the extent to which the structure had been damaged. The evidence also showed that the village‘s BZA dеnied Byrne a variance from its zoning ordinance, thereby affirming the zoning inspector‘s determinations on these issues, and it was undisputed that Byrne failed to appeal the BZA‘s decision to the common pleas court as he was permitted to do under
{¶24} As a rеsult of Byrne‘s failure to appeal the BZA‘s decision, that decision became res judicata, and Byrne is collaterally estopped from relitigating these issues in the current action since he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them by appеaling the BZA‘s decision to the common pleas court. See Fort Frye Teachers Assn. OEA/NEA, 81 Ohio St.3d at 395 and Grava, 31 Ohio St.3d at 263. Therefore, Byrne was not permitted to relitigate the issue of whether his mobile home had been damaged to such an extent that it could not be reconstructed or restored under the village‘s zoning ordinance and thus has to be demolished to bring Byrne‘s property into compliance with the village‘s nuisance ordinance. Consequently, the trial court did not err by ordering Byrne to demolish his mobile home to bring his property into compliance with New Richmоnd‘s nuisance and zoning ordinances.
{¶25} Accordingly, Byrne‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶26} Judgment affirmed.
POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.