51 Ala. 128 | Ala. | 1874
The right of property-holders, or taxable inhabitants, to the aid of a court of equity to prevent a municipal corporation and its officers from usurping powers, or violating duty imposed by law, whereby the burdens of taxation will be increased, is recognized by authority, and supported by principle. Municipal corporations are public corporations, and may not be so completely subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of equity as private corporations; yet, the powers with which they are clothed are to be exercised for the benefit of those residing within the territorial jurisdiction, and the officers exercising these powers may well be regarded as quasi trustees. A court may not intervene to prevent them from exercising, or to control the discretion with which they are of necessity intrusted, while within the line of their prescribed powers. It can and will interfere, to prevent them from exceeding these powers to the prejudice of the body corporate.
The point of controversy has not been as to the existence of the jurisdiction of a court of equity, but as to the proper party to invoke its exercise. Some authorities maintain, that it cannot be invoked by one or more tax-payers, unless the wrong complained of is attended with some special injury to them ; that where the wrong is a violation of public duty, affecting alike all the inhabitants of a municipality, the aid of the court must be invoked by the attorney general, or other proper officer, in the name of the State. Otherwise, it is said, each taxable inhabitant could institute a suit, and the decree in the one suit would not bind the parties to the other; and thus a multiplicity of suits would be engendered and encouraged, and litigation indefinitely protracted. The irresistible weight of modern authority sustains the right of an individual tax-payer, suing in his own name, or on behalf of himself and others having a community of interest, who may make themselves parties complainant, to the aid of a court of equity, to prevent or avoid illegal corporate acts, whereby the burdens of taxation will be increased. In its practical operation, this principle has not resulted in the multiplicity of suits and the continuance of litigation, which was apprehended. The matter of dispute has been generally settled as finally, if not as conclusively, by one such suit, as it would have been by a suit
Corporations, public or private, are of legislative creation. Municipal corporations are strictly of political institution. Legislative sanction is indispensable to their existence, and over them legislative power is generally unrestrained. They have no other capacity or power than that which is expressly conferred, or which is necessary to carry into effect the purposes of their creation. In the work to which reference has been made it is stated: “ It is a general and undisputed proposition of law, that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
The proposed corporate act of which complaint is made, and which the court is asked to prevent by injunction, is the issue by the mayor, aldermen, and common council, of negotiable interest-bearing bonds of the city of Mobile, to the New Orleans, Mobile, and Chattanooga Railroad Company. These bonds are either a gratuity, a donation to the railroad company, or founded on no other consideration than the benefits it is expected will accrue to the city from the location therein of the machine and workshops of the company; the improvement of unoccupied real estate, and, in its improvement, the consequent drainage of a marsh or swamp, now noxious to the general health of the city. If these bonds should be issued, and become debts chargeable on the city in its corporate capacity, the only source of payment is taxation. The mayor, aldermen, and common council are clothed with the power of levying and collecting taxes on property, real and personal, and on various business pursuits and vocations within the city limits. The power of taxation thus conferred must be limited and confined strictly to the purposes for which the corporation is created. The revenues derived from the exercise of this power must be faithfully applied to these purposes. The corporate authorities cannot, without a violation of duty and a usurpation of power, appropriate the revenues thus produced to any other purposes or objects than such as are fairly expressed or reasonably implied in the charter. It is not material what is the character of the object, or how pressing the necessity, or what are the benefits, real or imaginary, which may flow to the city; if not within the purposes of the act of incorporation, there is a want of power in the corporate authorities. Invasion or destruction by a public enemy may be impending, but the duty of repelling the one, and of averting the other, is not within the corporate power, or a duty resting on corporate authority; and an appropriation of the corporate revenue to these purposes could not receive judicial sanction. The erection of houses of worship might beautify and adorn the city, and improve and elevate the moral tone of the community, but their erection does not lie within the province of corporate power. It may be that the location of the machine and workshops of this railroad company within the city would increase its business,
The corporate authorities, doubtless, have power to construct the necessary sewers and drains within the city ; and it may be that the construction pf the buildings the railroad company would erect for its shops, depots, &c., and the grading and filling up of the vacant ground on which they propose to locate them, would incidentally improve the drainage of the city, and promote its healthfulness. This, however, could be said of any other improvement of the same ground. Such drainage is a mere incident to the reclamation of the ground to private purposes ; its extent and character is dependent upon private will. The power of the city to construct sewers and drains is to be exercised for the public benefit, and is coextensive with public necessity. It involves not only the duty of construction, but the duty of continuance and keeping in repair. No such duty would rest on the railroad company. The sewers and drains the corporate authorities may construct remain under corporate control, as do the streets and alleys of the city. The drainage incidental to the improvements made by the railroad company is, like the improvements, a matter of private property and jurisdiction. The proposed issue of these bonds cannot be supported as an exercise of the corporate power over the sewerage and drainage of the city, though these may be improved by the uses to which it is proposed to induce the railroad company to appropriate vacant real estate within the city-
3. The proposed ordinance authorizes the issue of negotiable
If we could reach the conclusion that the corporation had power to make the donation to the railroad company, or to give them the bounty which this ordinance proposes, we would feel constrained to declare that it could not be made to assume
The decree is affirmed, at the costs of the appellant, the said New Orleans, Mobile, and Chattanooga Railroad Company.