New Mexico Department of Health v. Compton

2001-NMSC-032

34 P.3d 593 DEPARTMENT MEXICO

NEW HEALTH, Petitioner-

OF

Respondent, COMPTON, Respondent-Petitioner.

Fred 26,419.

No.

Supreme of New Mexico. Court 16, 2001.

Oct.

206 Inc., Advocacy System, Mi-

Prоtection Parks, Miller, L. chael Colleen Sandra C. V. NM, Gomez, Albuquerque, for Petitioner. Department Health, Compton’s New Mexico attorney objected, Beth for the first Schaefer, General, time, Attorney W. Assistant failure to hold the within Fe, NM, Respondent. statutorily Santa mandated time and moved to petitions.

dismiss both Compton argued that and Section OPINION mandated be held on Febru- SERNA, Chief Justice. ary 25. Respondent-Petitioner Compton Fred rejected The district Compton’s opinion seeks review of an of the Court of argument and found convincing clear and Appeals, arguing that the Mexico New De- Compton presented evidence that a likeli- (the partment Department) of Health failed hood of serious harm to himself or to others provide him awith civil commitment hear- as a result of a mental disorder. The court ing within the time limits mandated entered committing orders Compton to 1978, 43-1-11(A) (1989) § NMSA and NMSA LVMC for evaluation and treatment not to 43-l-15(B) 1978, (1993, § prior to 1999 thirty days exceed appointing and a treat- amendment). Compton requests that guardian ment Compton him. was dis- statutory Court hold periods the time charged 25, 1999, on March thirty less than strictly should be construed and enforced initially after scheduled petitions and that against him should Compton appealed to the {5} Court of have been dismissed. affirm. Appeals ground on the sole post- ponement February violat- Background I. Facts and statutory rights ed required his and dismiss- Compton involuntarily was admitted to {2} petitions. al of Compton appeal did not (LVMC) Vegas Las Medical Center on Feb- pre- district court’s determination that he 18, 1999, ruary for an mental sented a likelihood of serious harm to himself initially health evaluation. Police encoun- or to others as a result of a mental disorder. Compton tered as a result of threats he made Appeals The Court of opinion issued an af- family admitting psychia- members. The firming the district court’s orders. N.M. Compton’s trist at long history LVMC noted Dep’t Compton, Health v. 2000-NMCA- illness, Compton mental indicated that suf- 078, 10 P.3d 153. The Court fered from a mental disorder as in defined statutory determined that time limits 43-1-3(0) (1993), NMSA and as- by Compton mandatory, asserted were but signed diagnosis schizophrenia, paranoid jurisdictional, Compton and that suffered February 22, type. Department On filed prejudice no from the postpone- petitions court, two in district one for a thir- ¶¶ ment. grant- Id. 19-20. This then Court ty-day commitment for mental health evalua- Compton’s petition ed for writ of certiorari to pursuant and treatment to Section 43-1- Appeals. the Court of 11(A), and appointment another guardian pursuant treatment to Section 43- II. Discussion 1-15(B). Following a determination of indi- court, gency, February district A. Due Process appointed represent Compton counsel to Compton directly does not assert a {6} responding Department’s peti- two violation of his constitutional to due tions. process under the Fourteenth Amendment to A February However, was scheduled for the United States Constitution. he “ date, 25. On that post- repeatedly the district court refers to the ‘massive curtail- ” poned one liberty’ implicated week due to illness by involuntary ment of assigned judge. commitment, relying The court held a civil on the United on March Supreme fourteen calendar opinions States Court’s Vitek v. Compton’s Jones, after admission to LVMC аnd 445 U.S. 100 S.Ct. eight ’days (1980) filing Texas, after the of the treat- Addington L.Ed.2d 552 and guardian petition. ment During hearing, 441 U.S. 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 323 question of wheth- (applying Mathews to hearing rights at (1979), argues that requires proof be- commitment under- er criminal have “constitutional in this case issue Mathews, doubt). Under Additionally, yond we note that a reasonable pinnings.” rely following factors: the Court on the special concurrence we impli- “liberty interests are suggested that First, af- private interest that will be expressed concern this case cated” second, action; official fected violated protection “for these lack of over the depravation of such of an erroneous risk Compton, 2000-NMCA- liberty interests.” used, and through procedures interest 474,10 (Armijo, 078, 23,129 P.3d value, any, if of additional or probable result, J., concurring). As specially safeguards; fi- procedural substitute a thresh- necessary to address as it is believe interest, including nally, the Government’s implications matter the constitutional old the fiscal and involved and the function in order to in this ease procedures used additional burdens that the administrative limitations placе the procedural substitute in their and Section entail. would proper context. Mathews, 424 96 S.Ct. 893. U.S. Supreme States United Mexico, involuntary civil com- In New recognized that civil “repeatedly has Court Health governed the Mental mitment is any purpose constitutes Code, NMSA Developmental Disabilities re deprivation of significant (1977, 1978, §§ as amended 43-1-1 to -25 Addington, quires process protection.” due amendments). 1998, through prior to 1999 425, 1804. This Court 441 at 99 S.Ct. U.S. involuntary stages civil are three There “im recognized that confinement has also Code, contemplated by the each commitment liberty.” right to State pinges [on] requirements. As procedural with different Rotherham, measure, has preliminary a (1996). However, has 1131, 1140 “[t]he state involuntary commit- a method for created patriae parens under its legitimate interest evaluation emergency mental health ment for providing care to its citizens who powers in (1989). 1978, § 43-1-10 and care. NMSA of emotional disorders are unable because may peace officer provision, Under themselves; has au the state also care for to an evaluation facili- transport an individual power protect thority police its under (1) are met: ty if of four factors one community dangerous tendencies from the (2) arrest; subject there person is to lawful mentally Addington, 441 ill.” who are some person grounds to believe the are reasonable 426, 1804; Rother accord at 99 S.Ct. U.S. (3) suicide; just attempted there are ham, 923 P.2d at 122 N.M. at person grounds to believe the reasonable long remain (stating [individuals] that “as as him- harm to presents a likelihood of serious in has an interest com dangerous, the State others as a result of a or herself or to self pub mitting protect [them] them to and (4) disorder; physician or a licensed mental lic”). power is “In a civil commitment state pres- person psychologist certifies that or Adding- punitive sense.” not exercised harm to himself likelihood of serious ents a Thus, ton, 99 S.Ct. 1804. U.S. mental as a result of a or herself or to others liberty interest weigh Compton’s order to 43-l-10(A). A or- disorder. Section Department’s parens patriae and against the person transport the required to der is not being “mindful that the police pоwers, while facility. treatment Section an evaluation and to minimize the legal process function 43-l-10(B). facility, Upon arriving at the decisions,” Addington, risk of erroneous must admitting physician psychologist apply S.Ct. U.S. to determine “whether conduct an evaluation by Supreme balancing test established pro- grounds to detain the exist reasonable Eldridge, 424 U.S. in Mathews v. Court treatment,” for evaluation and (1976), posed client order 47 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. will be determinative of which by the outcome required process amount of to assess the emergen- person detained for whether See Rother Fourteenth Amendment. 43-1- cy and treatment. Section ham, evaluation 923 P.2d at 1147 122 N.M. at 10(E). (3)the detained, If proposed the individual is he or commitment is consis- she tent with the treatment needs of the client and with the least principle. drastic means orally writing by shall be informed and in 43-l-ll(C). Section The court must find facility purpose the evaluation of the and likely “more than not that in the near future possible consequences proceedings, of the person attempt will to commit suicide or allegations petition, right [the] bodily will cаuse serious harm to himself [or days, right to a within [the] seven herself] violent or other self-destructive right to counsel and [the] communicate means,” 1978, 43-l-3(M) (1993), § NMSA attorney independent with an an and men- likely “more than not that in the near future professional person’s] tal health of [the person serious, unjustified will inflict choosing, own and shall have the bodily person harm on another or commit a necessary appropriate receive treat- offense, criminal sexual as ‍‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‍evidenced be- ment. causing, attempting havior or threatening 43-l-10(F). Section harm, such gives which behavior rise to a stage The next of commitment contem- per- reasonable fear of such harm from the plated by thirty-day period Code is son,” 43-l-3(N). Section evaluation treatment. Section 43-1-11. stage The final of commitment under has established a number of an Code is extended commitment of six procedural protections accompany this lev- (1978). months. NMSA 43-1-12 el of commitment. Unlike an procedural protections addition to the avail- detention, transport commit- 43-1-11, able under Section the client has ment must be authorized a court order request six-person jury at the after a at which “the client 43-l-12(B). Moreover, re- represented by shall be counsel and shall gardless stage civil have the on [the evidence proceeding, individuals behalf, including testimony by client’s] have alternative remedies outside of the independent professional mental health 43-l-12(E) § See Code. (“Nothing in this choosing, [the client’s] own to cross-examine right section shall limit the of a client to witnesses and to be hearing.” at the petition the court for a writ of habeas cor- 43-l-ll(B). The client “has the Thus, pus.”). has enacted a right days to a within seven of ad- scheme under which individuals are entitled mission unless waived after consultation with progressively greater procedural protec- 43-l-ll(A). counsel.” Section in response periods to increased of invol- Upon completion hearing, of the untary civil commitment. order a commitment for evalua- This case involves the inter thirty tion and treatment not to exceed stage mediate thirty-day of commitment for a days if the court finds clear and con- рresents evaluation and pro two related due

vincing evidence that: (1) questions: cess whether the (1) disorder, as a result of a mental time limitation within Section presents client a likelihood of serious harm (2) constitutionally required; whether others; to himself or delay of fourteen calendar between (2) likely the client Compton’s needs and is to bene- admission and his violat treatment; proposed fit from the Compton’s rights.1 ed constitutional We be- necessary 1. We guardian, do not believe it is to address the treatment unlike the on the procedure commitment, appointment petition for the pre- of a treatment is a guardian pursuant deprivation hearing, meaning to Section under individual appointment right a Mathews test. The of a treatment retains the to refuse treatment until guardian 43-l-15(A) ("If infringe liberty does on the interest is ca- client being involuntary of pable understanding proposed free from Al- commitment. nature of though infringe it consequences capable does on the to refuse treatment and its and is treatment, consent, medical to be held within informed [the сlient’s] consent shall be filing appoint three performed.”). obtained before the treatment 210 (discussing “compelling interest” 1147 are answered questions these

lieve both of State). error, Assessing risk of we balancing test.2 Mathews that, emergency justify de- note order the first factor Under 43-1-10, two at least tention under Section Compton test, agree we Mathews reason- must determine whether individuals liberty being interest significant he has a person grounds exist to believe that the able Indeed, involuntary commitment. free from others, danger or herself or to is a to himself curtail acutely of the severe aware “[w]e likely most be- with one of these individuals commit which ment being a ing peace officer and the other entail.” institution can in a mental ment highly who is trained neutral decision-maker Prevost, F.2d Project v. Release evaluating psychological condition (2d Cir.1983). presented in precise issue J.R., 442 U.S. person. Parham Cf. case, however, Compton is not whether (1979) 61 L.Ed.2d 101 99 S.Ct. judi procedure, a particular to a is entitled (“In an inde- general, we are satisfied that involuntary civil hearing, part of аn cial as decisionmaking process, pendent medical procedure, but whether thorough psychiatric in- which includes the fourteen procedure provided within must be earlier, by ad- vestigation described followed initial admission to of his calendar condition, periodic review of a child’s ditional requirement of “The fundamental LVMC. ad- protect children who should not be will opportunity to be heard ‘at process is the due mitted; error we do not believe the risks of meaningful in a man meaningful time and ” significantly re- process in that would be Mathews, 96 S.Ct. ner.’ U.S. formal, judicial-type hear- a more duced Manzo, (quoting Armstrong v. 380 U.S. ing.”). also note that individuals who are We (1965)). 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. involuntarily committed under the Code Thus, from must the risk of error we assess counsel basis have the judicial hearing light the absence of a attorney to consult with being Compton’s liberty interest in not invol profes- independent mental health and an untarily period fourteen confined for a With, resources, to these sional. access Addington, 441 days. See U.S. any risk of erroneous de- are confident that (assessing “the extent of the indi S.Ct. 1804 libеrty prior judicial privation of involuntarily being in not vidual’s interest ” added)). through alternative means can be eliminated indefinitely (emphasis confined (es- NMRA 2001 of relief. See Rule 5-802 against compel weigh this interest tablishing procedures filing writ of ha- exercising its ling governmental interest of circumstances, corpus). these beas Under power protect individuals parens patriae the risk of an errone- we do not believe that police power pro to and its from themselves liberty deprivation interest in not ous society dangerous individuals. See tect from Rotherham, 262, being involuntarily committed mistake is 122 N.M. at 923 P.2d 388, 43-1-15(F) emergency To the extent that the (providing 951 P.2d 605. But see psychotropic position interpreted “nec- administration of medication could be "to cede dissent’s harm”). essary protect judi- the client from serious legislative so much of [the branch] [the result, conducting hearing delay a As a ciary’s] fundamental constitutional control over depriva- a cause the individual to suffer does not Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, protections,” State v. liberty. tion of ¶ 47, emphasize that 129 N.M. 2 P.3d judiciary’s responsibility to ensure that it is the that, by suggests clari- virtue of the 2. The dissent satisfy Legislature enacted statutes ty statutes and the fact that the of the relevant requirements Four- procedural minimum due, process that is has defined Amendment, both on their face and as teenth unnecessary inqui- "the has made Madison, (1 Marbury applied. 5 U.S. v. person ry length be invol- into the of time can is, (1803) ("It Cranch) 60 2 L.Ed. untarily without confined in a mental institution judi- duty emphatically, province However, hearing.” it is the Due Process is.”); say department, law Nu- what the cial Amendment, not the of the Fourteenth Clause ¶48, nez, 2000-NMSC-013, 2 P.3d 129 N.M. Legislature, the amount of "determin[es] ("It judiciary, and not the liberty prop- 264 is the role of appropriate protect process constitution.”). right.” legislature, interpret erty of constitutional interest as a matter 1997-NMSC-061, ¶27, Woodruff, 124 State v.

211 sufficiently great require within Due Requirements Process Emergency days fourteen of admission. Safeguarding Civil Commitments: Patients’ Liberty Without Jeopardizing Health and Appeals Court reached a simi {13} Safety, (1999). 40 B.C. L.Rev. 677-81 Vegas lar conclusion Garcia v. Las Medi hospital “It is obvious that authorities Center, 441, 445-47, cal must be allowed some time to conduct ade- (Ct.App.1991), holding 514-16 that an quate testing and patient observation of the period civil commitment for diagnosis so that a can be made. Consider- twenty days judicial hearing without a did ation given also must be to the necessities of not violate the Due Process Clause of the court administration opportunity and the Fourteenth Ap Amendment. The Court of prepare counsel to for an peals hearing.” effective noted that the Supreme United States Coll, F.Supp. at 911. upheld Court has a Connecticut statute which allowed for a commitment of fifteen We conclude that the physician’s based on a certificate ‍‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‍of hearing requirement in Section 43-1-11 is dangerousness illness, due to mental with an constitutional on its face proce and that the thirty days’ additional permitted confinement employed dures present ease ade without the aof court order. quately protected Compton’s constitutional (relying Id. at Briggs P.2d at 516 on process to due and did not render the Arafeh, v. U.S. S.Ct. statute applied. unconstitutional as We (1973), aff'g L.Ed.2d 304 Logan mem. disagree therefore with the assessment that (D.Conn.1972)). Arafeh, F.Supp. interests,” this case involves “violated The Court of also noted that and we limit the opinion remainder Supreme upheld Court of Colorado an invol statutory requirements discussion of untary civil commitment statute which con statutory remedies. mandatory probable-cause tained no but allowed for a within ten Statutory B. Time Mandates request by patient patient’s or the attor ney. (relying Id. v. Yarbrough, Curnow Compton contends that the time re- (Colo.1984) (en banc)). 676 P.2d 1177 quirements in Section and Sec- addition, other upheld courts have similar mandatory and that the response statutes in process to due chal- appropriate remedy for a violation of the See, lenges. Release, e.g., Project 722 F.2d requirements peti- is dismissal of the (upholding at 974-75 two New York statutes separately tion. We first the time address permitted sixty-day fifteen-day com- requirements in each statute and then subse- judicial hearing mitments without a unless quently address the issue of remedies. requested by the pro- individual due to other Compton argues that Section 43-1- protections, cedural such as the 11(A) mandatory requirement establishes a counsel, statutes). afforded under the These -withinseven of admission. recognize cases nature of an He asserts that the in the involuntary civil commitment and that “the case exceeded this time limitation seven threat of harm to the [individual] others is days. begin by correcting Compton’s of such a nature that confinement must take time calculation. place immediately. When the choice is be- computing period pre- “In a of time tween a loss of life or health and a of loss rule, by scribed or if liberty time, allowed a statute or ... period prefera- for a brief of the period days, the is less than eleven a apparent.” ble alternative is Satur- Hyland, Coll v. 905, (D.N.J.1976) day, Sunday legal holiday F.Supp. 411 is from (per 910-11 excluded curiam) 1978, that, computation.” the (holding general NMSA 12-2A- a involun- 7(E) (1997). situation, tary Application preliminary commitment a of this statute hearing yields following Compton’s right commitment constitutionally is not the results: required Jersey requires hearing to a under because New law Section 43-1-11 accrued weekends, hearing twenty that a final days, excluding be held within seven from Febru- Walsh, days). generally Marybeth Note, 18, admission, ary his date of which would 212 by looking hearing the postponement of 1. The district court con-

have been March Thus, 4. under the the hearing provisions on March of Code as a whole ducted 43-1-11, hearing days by assessing purposes was three of the seven- Section and late, days late. We consider not seven day limitation.3 See Bank v. time Sunwest three-day postponement permis- Nelson, 1998-NMSC-012, 1114, a whether 125 N.M. 43-l-ll(A). sible under Section 170, (stating neces P.2d 740 that it is 958 sary to “to other construc resort construing a particular “In of in order to discern the intent aids statute, reviewing a court’s concern central legislative Legislature” the face of give effect to the intent is to determine and issue); silence on an Roberts v. Southwest [Legislature.” ex Kline State rel. of Servs., 248, 251, 114 837 Cmty. Health N.M. Blackhurst, 732, 735, 749 line v. 106 (1992) (“Statutes 442, should be P.2d (1988). 1111, plain lan “[T]he P.2d operation to facilitate their construed so as primary guage of the statute indica [is] speci goals and the of the as achievement Whitely legislative tor оf intent.” v. N.M. legislature.”). fied Bd., Pers. P.2d State 115 N.M. (1993). 1011, Looking plain lan Legislature’s provide The decision statute, guage hearing a within of to a seven “the provides Compton that had to a careful admission reflects a balance between days of un within seven admission in- and the individual’s interests with less waived after consultation counsel.” society proper terest of individual and previously Appeals of inter The Court goal establishing care The and treatment. language preted this to be silent on the is is, hand, seven-day a time frame on one postponement hearing; of sue erroneously ensure that individuals are not language “furnishes a means waiver and, against oth- committed their will on the may an waive [the] which individual hand, er to ensure there is a sufficient By challenge [the detention. waiver [the] period of time after initial commitment individual] transforms com diagno- prior proper a voluntary into one.” mitment a State necessary to sis and treatment (In Bunnell), 244, re 100 N.M. Bunnell judicial meaningful conduct effective (Ct.App.1983). 668 P.2d review. The time agree with this assessment the statute. judicial after commitment initial before Legislature has directed a decision begun simply proceedings must be forgo to contest a delay. positive purpose It has a thirty-day commitment can be made aspect compensating There is as well. express knowing voluntary by an waiv 43-1-11(A) person advantage to the committed be- er, but Section is silent on many during period the cause in cases question whether the district court hospital adequately beyond medical staff at can postpone her] his illness or legislative [or alleviate mental requirement. with si Confronted issue, proce- non-emergency diagnostic use on this we must lence determine he she] intended dures determine that is not [or whether to allow McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, ¶25, reject Compton’s argument 127 N.M. 3. We that the time 43-1-11(A) requirements jurisdic (discussing requirement in Section P.2d 65 a tíme agree Appeals tional. We with the Court of Rights stating Act that "we in the Human mandatory statutory requirement that a "the say re cannot intended the be held within either seven quirements jurisdictional”); of this section be appoint or three Regents, Redman v. Bd. 102 N.M. guardian treatment does not affect the essential (Ct.App.1984)(discussing a adjudicate power of the district court to the issue hearing by for a de novo 2000-NMCA-078, Compton, it.” before following State of Education a teacher’s Board agree We also 10 P.3d 153. concluding legislature dismissal and that "the provision that the waiver the Court jurisdictional requirement in the did not intend a 43-1-11(A) Legislature indicates that the timely sense that the to a could jurisdictional re did not intend to establish waived”). be 16; quirement. See id. see also Mitchell-Carr v.

213 judicial including hearing, scheduling, “danger herself] or others.” [or to himself staff, cases, stigma availability judicial of is the impact In such court record of and Parham, length of confinement is 442 avoided and the treatment resources.4 See U.S. (“One 605-06, shortened. at 2493 factor that S.Ct. utilization must be considered is the Logan, F.Supp. at 1269. psychiatrists, psychologists, time of and oth- concerns, response In to these specialists preparing er behavioral for and that, Legislature provided the divi- “[i]f has participating hearings rather per- than sion, physician facility or evaluation decides forming special their the task for which of the client for evalua- to seek commitment training experts Behavioral fitted them. treatment, petition tion and shall be filed hearings help are of courtrooms and little days five of admission court within Coll, F.Supp. patients.”); at 911. 43-1- requesting the commitment.” Section 11(A). is, in five-day period Legis- This seen, Legis As can be proper time judgment, lature’s amount of lature’s decision to establish patient appropriately “to and to evaluate hearing requirement implicates a number of the need make a of for contin- determination Legislature’s different factors. Given Walsh, involuntary hospitalization.” ued su- complex relationship awareness be at be that pra, 690. “It must remembered and of tween these various factors the alter been for the commitment has not undertaken filing remedy a writ of native habeas penal patient sake of detention. is com- corpus, Legisla do not believe care, mitted and some for treatment rigid seven-day ture intended to establish a knowledge her] mental condition [or his 43-l-ll(A). requirement in Section Just as gained by diag- can be visual observation and process due the constitutional nec Logan, nostic This takes time.” tests. essarily flexibility, see requires Morrissey (footnote omitted). F.Supp. If at 1269 Brewer, 92 S.Ct. U.S. Legislature required filing that had (1972) (“It has been L.Ed.2d 484 said so place take imme- others often this Court and as not admission, diately many might upon clients authority require pro that due citation beyond needlessly be detained initial sev- procedural is and calls for such cess flexible Walsh, en-day period. supra, See evaluation protections particular de as the situation that, (discussing at 684 commentators’ view mands.”), we believe intend “many psychiatric episodes because acute flexibility provide enough proce ed to days, many subside within one to four ... requirement of Section 43-1- dural patients would im- whose conditions have 11(B) particular respond demands discharge proved sufficiently in a few example, For of individual cases. because unnecessarily retained would be provided five after ad long periods”). An immediate petition, it is mission to file a conceivable patient’s “may also harm the clinical judicial a full would be re that interest it transforms the doctor- because quired to two patient relationship therapeutic be held within from a to an 43-l-ll(B). addition, filing petition. See adversarial one.” Id. in order to circumstances, highly is it fore adequately protect the individual’s to Under these counsel, might adequate postponement be nec must be an amount seeable that a there essary parties or for either the the court. of time counsel to review the case and Coll, Walsh, (discussing the prepare supra, at 690-91 for the commitment Any ad hoc committee formed F.Supp. 911. time limitation conclusions emergency com placed hearing requirement also to evaluate Massachusetts’ on the must stating procedure “[a]ll of the mitment take into account the administrative burdens nature____[I]t correctly argues process Compton criminal in also Although there seem less 4. no held at be that the commitment reduces the amount of time LVMC, the decision to do so stems from the physicians’ process away takes from clinical "[hjolding hearings hospi- notion Walsh, supra, at 695. duties.” disruptive patients makes the ] less tal representatives judiciary on the Ad when counsel establishes that he [or she] Hoc Committee stated that a minimum of prepare has not had sufficient time to his filing five business between the client’s case.” Id. at [or her] petition necessary and the was flexibility at 1122.5 We believe the need for process petition, prepare courts to Bunnell demonstrates articulated that the judge the case file and schedule a and other rig- did not intend to establish a petitioning hospital staff to travel requirement postpone- id time and that a fact, hearing”). Ap- In hold a the Court of contemplated by ment is ‍‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‍Section 43-1- peals specifically situation in faced a 11(A).6 above, For the reasons discussed necessary postpone which it was seven-day hearing we conclude that re- 43-l-ll(A). hearing required under Section quirement subject Bunnell, In an individual who was involun- postponement good cause. tarily pursuant committed to Section 43-1- interpretation Our of Section 43-1- argued that his Section 43-1-11 11(A) Appeals’ accords the Court of postponed should have been in order to al- interpretation of a different time adequate prepare. low his counsel time to requirement hearing. for an administrative 100 N.M. at 668 P.2d at 1121. The Redman, Appeals Court addressed Appeals potentially Court of noted that provided a statute that that a de novo hear- period filing short of time between the of a ing on a teacher’s dismissal “shall be held” judicial hearing might and a result sixty Board State of Education within prepare” appointed in “little time to receipt appeal. of a notice of 244^-45, Id. counsel. 668 P.2d at 1121-22. (internal quota- N.M. at 693 P.2d at 1270 “[b]alanc[ed] Court the need for a omitted). quoted authority prompt marks and importance with the of a meaningful hearing sixty-day The Court determined imposition before re- however, quirement mandatory; detention” and held that the dis- was grant mandatory trict court “must a short continuance prevent post- did not Appeals 5. We note that protecting patient’s rights”). the Court of also stated in method We do any pоstponement requires dicta in contemplates ap- Bunnell that not believe that the statute preliminary hearing pointment “an beginning immediate to determine of counsel as late as the whether the State can sufficient evidence Section 43-1-11 justify holding beyond the individual sev- en-day emergency period § allowed under 43-1- respectfully 6. We believe that the dissent mis- Bunnell, 10.” 100 N.M. at P.2d reads Bunnell. While the Court in that case did However, given procedural protec- 1122. appropriate, hold that a continuance even 43-1-10, including physician’s tions in Section mandatory, seven-day requirement when the psychologist’s determination that reasonable prevent meaningful hearing, would the Court grounds patient exist to believe that the is a appropriate did not rule that a continuance was others, danger to himself or herself or to and the Indeed, only under those circumstances. remedies, availability of alternative we do not question Court was not faced with the of wheth- require believe that the intended to reasons, postponement er could occur for other probable precondition post- cause as a proposition so Bunnell does not stand for the ponement. We further note that the Court of 43-1-11(A) precludes postponement that Section that, procedures, stated "under State,” current dissent, "by suggested as we do court, not find it inconceivable that the trial as occurred in this case. See Fernan- appoint immediately Co., court could counsel before v. Farmers Ins. dez Bunnell, hearing begins.” (1993) ("The 100 N.M. at general P.2d rule is that 43-l-10(F), 668 P.2d at 1122. Under Section authority propositions cases are not not con- counsel, and the to consult with (quotation quoted authority sidered.” omitted)). marks and counsel, admission, upon attaches and the rely De- Nor did the Court in Bunnell partment 43-1-11(A) language and the district court should endeavor the waiver of Section appointed permit postponement. to ensure that counsel be at the earli- The Court determined 43-l-4(A) opportunity. language est See NMSA the waiver in the statute con- (1978) ("All hearing, clients ... shall be entitled to obtain cerned a waiver of the not a waiver Bunnell, any regarding requirement. advice of counsel at their of the time 244, 100 N.M. at added)). Thus, (emphasis status under the code.” P.2d at 1121. the Court deter- Walsh, 43-1-11(A) generally supra, (discussing implicitly at 690 a com- mined that Section allows appoint- postponement underlying mittee’s conclusion "that immediate when it serves the single goals ment of counsel was the most effective of the statute.

215 require 239, Legislature’s the intent to a P.2d 1271. “On consider ponement. Id. at 693 at cause, hearing a commitment prompt on showing good of or with a written good may determining in whether cause waiver, the the Board extend State postponement. Any postponement 240, exists for 693 P.2d 1272.7 time.” Id. narrowly prescribed and should be should be Legislature that Our conclusion the {23} long necessity so de- allowed for as permit postponements of a Sec- to intended mands, again legisla- taking into account the 43-l-ll(A) hearing good for cause tion judicial hearing. prompt intent for tive a analogous somewhat supported the also in 5-604 NMRA 2001 requirement Rule case, In district court this the in trial criminal cases. commencement of the hearing timely postponed a but scheduled the important though protects the this rule Even seven-day beyond hearing the three adjudication reso- prompt interest requirement in due to Section Wilson, cases, State v. lution of criminal judge. Compton did presiding illness 390, 1998-NMCA-084, ¶10, 125 962 N.M. object any hearing or make demand for a not 636, the six- district courts extend P.2d hearing the for his until scheduled release requirement “[f]or month commencement circumstances, 4. March these on Under 5-604(C). good Rule As re- cause shown.” post good that cause existed believe power postponement order the to flected postponement was ponement and that 5-604(C), possess “trial courts in Rule infringe sufficiently so as to minimal not dockets,” manage power inherent to their statutory right to unduly Compton’s ¶ 1999-NMSC-038, n. Coffin, State Aaron, 102 prompt hearing. State v. Cf. have P.2d and must 187, 191-92, 1340-41 N.M. ability exigencies arise respond that (discussing requirement of (Ct.App.1984) in do not believe that individual cases. We referring for continuance and good cause Legislature, by establishing the seven- (Colo. Watson, P.2d People v. hearing in 43-1- day requirement Section “good cause Ct.App.1982), in which was 11(A), of prevent intended to the exercise ill”). judge when the trial became shown good in power response cause addition; Ap recognized as the Court postponement. postponement did not affect the peals, the length Compton’s commitment Considering the number thirty- based because district establishing stake in factors at day period on the date requirement of vari number Compton, originally hearing. scheduled delay partic might that necessitate ables 474, 10 2000-NMCA-078, 20, 129 P.3d cases, Legislature that ular we believe court did that district 153. We conclude postponement of the seven- to allow intended 43-1-11 postponing err in Section 43-1- day requirement Section hearing. 11(A). hold that 43-1- We therefore Section requirement 11(A) to the time mandatory that We now turn imposes a 43-l-15(B). by noting begin seven of admis in Section be held within contemplated by Section that good postpone exists to sion unless cause purpose a different good A cause serves determination interests than a commit- any objection by protects different into shоuld take account Sec- Section 43-1-11. client, inter ment under as well as the client’s substantial 43-l-15(A) governs the administration being mistakenly against in not confined est medication, psychosurgery, Further, “psychotropic must her will. district courts his or postpone- expressly allow disallow suggestion if does not that 7. The dissent’s ment, "[[legislative silence is at best tenu- postponement good it to allow cause intended determining guide legislative intent.” explicitly provided would have ous could have so Fingado, 115 N.M. P.2d equally Swink v. applicable to the statute at issue been (1993). objective noting Our resort to "die It is Redman. worth id., sought accomplish,” in the legislature easily provided 43-1- also have in Section could legislative hardly said to 11(A) can be postponements impermissible. As face of silence Redman, 43-1-11(A) “judicial surgery.” amount statute with the therapy, experimental sary convulsive treatment opportunity. treatment at the earliest program involving (1977) (“Each 1978, § or behavior modification See NMSA 43-1-7 res- deprivations.” aversive stimuli or substantial receiving ident client mental health services provides This statute the client “[i]f prompt shall have the treat- capable understanding proposed na- ment----”). period The short of time be- consequences ture of treatment and its and filing petition tween the of the and the hear- consent, capable is of informed his [or her] ing Legislature’s indicates the view of the consent shall be obtained before the treat- immediacy importance ensuring prop- of 43-l-15(A). performed.” ment Section er treatment. We whether assess the three- protect This statute is intended to a client’s day requirement may postponed good be for However, right to refuse treatment. if the light purpose. in of cause physician professional or mental health “be- As the Court of incapable {28} lieves that the client is of informed noted, language 43-l-15(B), consent, Section petition [or he she] the court “shall,” appointment unambig the use of is clear and guardian for the of a treatment mandatory uous and hearing to make a substitute creates dead decision for the client.” 43-l-15(B). ¶ 11, provision Compton, 2000-NMCA-078, line. Section This is in- protect “right However, tended to clients’ to receive N.M. 10 P.3d 153. we note necessary treatment,” appropriate filing Sec- petition of the itself is not 43-l-10(F), they when are unable to mandatory do physician if even or mental protect so themselves. In order to a client’s professional health believes that the client is treatment, right however, to refuse there incapable § of informed consent. 43-1- hearing must abe at which the client 15(B) has the (providing physician that the or mental right right to be repre- and the to professional “may petition health the court counsel, sentation of and the court must appointment guardian” for the of a treatment capable “fmd[ ] that the client is not added)); (emphasis see also NMSA making his [or her] own treatment decisions” 12-2A-4(B) (1997) (“ ‘May1 pow confers a permitted appoint before it is to a treatment er, authority, privilege right.”). In addi 43-l-15(B). guardian. Section The “hear- 43-l-ll(D) tion, provides Section that a ing petition on the shall be held within three appropriate court which makes findings days.” 43-l-15(B), Id. Under Section thirty-day for a commitment “shall hear fur appointment for of the treatment ther evidence as to whether the client is guardian should have been held this case capable of purposes informed consent” for filing three court peti- after the of the determining appoint whether to a treatment February tion on which would have been guardian, regardless filing petition of the February original the date of the hear- 43-l-15(B). pursuant to Finally, Section Thus, ing. for appointment 43-l-15(F) provides Section a mechanism for guardian the treatment was five late. psychotrop administration of “necessary ic if protect medication it is 43-1-11, Unlike Section Section {27} client from 43-l-15(B) petition serious harm” while a for ‍‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‍implicate does not a client’s liber appointment guardian of a treatment pend ty being interest free from result, ing. aAs at least in the context A commitment. under Section 43-1- 15(B) emergency involuntary commitment protects under right a client’s to refuse treat Section 43-1-10 and a right commit necessary appro ment and the 43-1-11, ment priate under Section we be treatment. The client retains the narrowly right prescribed postpone lieve that a to refuse treatment unless a court appropriate three-day hearing requirement makes the ment of the finding following a 43-l-15(B) Thus, purposes good under right of the Section cause will treatment, substantially refuse pro interfere with the client’s pre-determination hearing. “right prompt treatment,” vides As a Section 43-1-7. result, purpose requir believe that the While we caution the district court to make ing every within three comply statutory is to ensure effort with the appropriate clients receive protect and neces- mandate order to the client’s treatment, contemplated dismissal as we conclude that remedy proper proce- for a violation of in postponing not err court did requirements of dural the Code. good cause. remedy We also believe that Remedy C. procedural dismissal for a violation of Compton argues prop requirements at issue in this case would be purposes inconsistent with the Code. remedy er violation First, above, as mentioned Section 43-1- time limits would be the immediate dismissal 15(B) implicate does not interest petition. disagree. being improperly of not committed involun- expressly instead, tarily; implicates it the client’s remedy provided for a violation of informed consent and the client’s Men procedural protections contained in the necessary appropriate Be- treatment. Developmental tal Health and Disabilities 43-l-15(B) contemplates pre- cause Section a “Any his [or client who believes that Code. hearing, to determination the failure hold the rights, by this or her] as established code only within three court affects of or of the constitution the United States necessary appropriate the to treat- Mexico, have violated have a New been shall Thus, remedy ment. not is the of dis- redress____ for to contemplated by missal not Section 43-1- grant appropriate, as is The court shall relief 15(B), entirely antagonistic it but be to would subject provisions of the Tort Claims purposes order of this statute to dismiss- (1978). 1978, § This Act.” NMSA 43-1-23 remedy prevent a al because such would distinguishes violation of the time statute a necessary ap- receiving individuals from requirements in the from the violation Code Instead, propriate to treatment. order analogous requirements in time other stat- of protect necessary client’s 5-604(F) example, or rules. For Rule utes treatment, protect appropriate and to upon a expressly provides that failure harm, from there is a client self-inflicted comply requirements time com- with the statutory remedy for a of violation Section in- of trial mencement “the information 43-l-15(B). physician “If a licensed believes against person be dictment filed such shall psychotropic of medi- that administration Similarly, in prejudice.” ad- dismissed with necessary protect is the client from cation dressing requirement that a time harm which would occur while serious prescribe “does not a result failure B this are provisions of Subsection of section Redman, comply,” at 693 P.2d satisfied, being [or he administer she] Appeals at the Court of has held basis.” medication complete “the to commence and failure 43-l-15(F). Section error, sixty days within is reversible Secоnd, respect to a violation of requirement waived unless unless the is 43-l-ll(A), requirements the time in Section Id. at delay good occurred for cause.” genuine- not of a it is true release In the 693 P.2d at 1271. absence mentally person ill ly is no worse for then, statutory remedy, proper analysis “the individual than the failure convict delay prejudiced is whether the dismissal suffering guilty. is from debili- One who a Compton, individual.]” 2000-NMCA- [the tating in need treat- illness and mental 153; 12, 129 N.M. 10 P.3d accord wholly nor free ment neither Budau, 21, 22-23, P.2d 86 N.M. State said, therefore, stigma. It cannot be (discussing (Ct.App.1973) 1226-27 mentally ill it much better for arraignment within fifteen mentally “go free” person to than filing of the information or indict- person to be committed. normal ment). pro- Legislature’s express Given 43-1-23, remedy Addington, 441 these U.S. S.Ct. vision Section omitted). case, (citations approaches analogous requirements although Compton “disputes no- plain language example, inapposite. Based on being involuntarily 43-1-23, he off tion that was better we do not believe that subjected procedural detained and mental requirements for violation of the institutionalization,” health he does dis- of the Code. therefore affirm. pute finding by the district court’s clear and IT IS SO ORDERED. convincing presented evidence that he a dan- ger to himself or others as a result of mental BACA, WE CONCUR: JOSEPH F. necessitating thirty day illness commit- Justice, MAES, and PETRA JIMENEZ ment. The Court of noted that Justice. [Compton’s] “[t]he district court asked attor- FRANCHINI, GENE E. ney explain remedy [Compton] what Justice had if existed, (dissenting). grounds [Comp- for commitment replied, ton’s] counsel ‘that he doesn’t receive MINZNER, PAMELA B. Justice he, the treatment which in accordance with (dissenting). ” testimony, requires.’ Compton, doctor’s ¶3, 2000-NMCA-078, MINZNER, (dissenting). Justice remedy clearly 153. This would frustrate Sec- I respectfully agree dissent. I purpose ensuring tion 43-1-11’s that indi- moot, the issues in this case are not I but pose danger viduals who to themselves or statutory provisions believe the rep- at issue others as a result of mental illness receive judgment resent the clear proper Although care and treatment. in a that Petitioner was entitled to release when different case a violation of Section 43-1- provided he was not within seven 11(A)might prejudice an individual’s to days. 43-l-10(F), -11(A) §§ NMSA impropеr be free from involuntary commit- (1989). Thus, I believe that the relevant stat- ment due to an finding erroneous under Sec- utory provisions compel us to reverse the 43-1-10, we believe that the alternative Appeals Court of and remand this case to the remedy filing petition for writ of habeas district court with directions to dismiss the corpus provides adequate safeguard. district court’s order. Logan, F.Supp. light at 1269. In Petitioner has been released from the {36} urgent cases, need for treatment these the Center, Vegas Las Medical and we need not potentially consequences harmful to either him through restore to the mandate of this the individual or to improper others for an liberty sought court the he from the district release, express provision the Indeed, court. we cannot restore himto the remedy, availability and the of the alternative liberty deprived. of which he was Neverthe- remedy corpus, of habeas we do not believe less, represents he a class of citizens for Legislature that the intended dismissal of the whose Legislature interests the has petition рroper remedy as a for a violation of specific provision. made For other members requirements the time in Section 43-1-11 or class, of that the issues appeal raised in this Section 43-1-15.8 remain undecided. pos- There is the distinct sibility that those issues recur but evade III. Conclusion reasons, review. For these for these citi- zens, We conclude that the ought {33} district court we to resolve the issues raised in postponing did not err in the Section 43-1-11 this case. The Appeals Court of was good three due to raised, cause and address the issues rather than to for five appeal court dismiss the as moot. See State v. good (In Bunnell), cause. also conclude that Bunnell re 100 N.M. petition dismissal of a proper remedy 1119, 1121 is not a (Ct.App.1983). suggests "only” 8. The dissent proper quire single that remedy applies uniformly that relief case is dismissal. We do not rule rights, all cases in which there is a violation of or possibility out the particular "relief" and right, "redress” even a violation of a it would not Legislature to which the referred in Section 43- have vested the district court with discretion to might relief, 1-23 petition include "appropriate” dismissal select and if the custody release appropriate from under circum- had intended for the relief to be automatic or immediate, stances as determined the district explicitly required court. it would not have However, if had intended to re- client the court for redress. 43-1-11(A) 43-l-10(F) prepare his had sufficient client’s Sections {37} 245, 668 provision, case.” 100 N.M. at P.2d 1122. straightforward. The first Moreover, court noted that the trial “[i]f concerning emergency mental health evalua- grants continuance, care, such it must also “[u]pon court arrival tion and states preliminary hold an immediate facility, proposed client an evaluation State can determine whether orally writing by and in shall be informed justify holding the indi- sufficient evidence right to facility of ... his a hear- evaluation beyond seven-day peri- vidual days____” provi- ing seven The second within od.” Id. sion, concerning the commitment adults begins “[e]very period, adult majority The construes Bunnell as involuntarily to an client admitted evaluation authority Legisla- for its conclusion that the facility pursuant tо Section 43-1-10 NMSA question ture been silent “on the to a seven 1978 has the within may postpone whether the district court after of admission unless waived consul- seven-day hearing beyond requirement.” tation with counsel.” Majority Opinion respectfully I 18. dis- I agree. supports Bunnell believe view Appeals attempted The Court of only appropriate when: continuance is provisions, construe these with reference to (1) being requested by it is the individual cases, jurisdictional require- our as either (2) committed, person’s it serves that mandatory preconditions.

ments or interests; is, it does not violate his that when Appeals Court of concluded that the statutes process rights. her It seems to me due quoted ] above not affect “do[ essential that Bunnell understood Section adjudicate power district preclude postponement of it.” Dep’t issue Health v. before permit hearing by waiver the State but ¶15, Compton, 2000-NMCA-078 being individual committed. respectfully I 10 P.3d 153. submit that wrong Court addressed the statutes, clarity of our Due to jurisdictional-mandatory issue. The distinc- delay of need not decide whether the four- applicable to tiоn is not instances involun- Compton’s teen calendar between ad- tary purposes. for mental health confinement hearing mission and his violated his constitu- The in cases not the issue such is whether rights. Legislature Had intended tional comply with the time limits de- failure “good exception to the cause” jurisdiction. prives the district courts of question, in it time frame of statutes Rather, limits the issue is whether the time easily The could have said so. addition provide protection protections that the phrase good simple “except cause shown” Legislature attempt- class of citizens the was Alternatively, Leg- would have sufficed. ing in the protect can enforce district provided have for a islature could I no court. see reason construe the text period of time.” The “within reasonable protection they limit of the statutes to Legislature approaches. took neither these provide. seem intended to Rather, Legislature has made unneces- length sary inquiry into the of time a statutes, In addition to the text of the {39} involuntarily in a person can be confinеd do our law indicates that the statutes case The mental institution without contemplate not routine continuances. process Legislature has defined the that Bunnell, 668 P.2d at N.M. due, argued Leg- has Petitioner not 43-l-ll(A) reasoned that Section narrowly, rights his too islature defined provide in- postponement “does not but Leg- whether the Court need address by an individ- stead furnishes a means which rights broadly. islature has defined his too challenge his ual waive his Legislature I has ultimately conclude that the detention.” The court held {42} by mandatory seven-day time limit seven-day hearing provided mandated Sections 43-l-10(F) 43-l-ll(A) involuntary pro- could be contin- ued, only ceedings, although right may be person waived. [for but “when counsel being pro- he has not I also conclude committed] establishes that remedy express vided an mandatory hearing violations of the within seven of his statutory provisions at issue. NMSA or her commitment is immediate release (1978) facility. 43-1-23 states: certainly from the The individual is subject confinement, future if but one Any rights, client who believes that his as 1978, § of the conditions of NMSA 43-1- by by established code or this constitu- 10(A) (1989) Furthermore, is met. the deter- tion of the United States or of New Mexi- mination that the individual meets one of co, have been violated shall have a these conditions must be based on evidence petition the court for redress. The client person’s mental health status at the represented by shall be counsel. The time of dismissal. To allow re-confinement grant appropriate, court shall relief as is previous based on evaluations and evidence subject provisions of the Tort would render the individual’s release mean- [41-4-1 Claims Act to 41-4-27 NMSA ingless. 1978]. majority suggests that the reme- The Court of noted that “be- dy public of dismissal would not serve the cause there is no indication the record that purposes health medical con- [Compton] sought to be released on Febru- Majority 25, 1999, Opinion finement. I ary objected 31. believe to the continuance has taken into account seven-day hearing of his until the purposes crafting those later, statutory was held seven the district court 43-l-10(F) scheme of which Sections grant and 43- was unable to him dismissal as a reme- 1-11(A) part. Ultimately, dy.” the nature Compton, 2000-NMCA-078, ¶20, right protected by N.M. scheme emphasis, 10 P.3d 153. The how- compels ever, dismissal when Department should not on be the actions taken provided Health has not the district court the rights, individuals to enforce their but rather necessary evidence within ensuring the time limit set rights that those are not violated Legislature. As our courts place. in the have said provision first The waiver on other occasions a somewhat different states that the to a context, legislative therapy, judi rather than can be “waived after consultation surgery, cial required. E.g., Amaco Prod. counsel.” This indicates that waiver is v.Co. N.M. Taxation & Dep’t, Revenue be an affirmative act. The burden rests (Ct.App. Department with the of Health and with the 1994). district court ensure that place proscribed takes within the time limit reasons, foregoing For the respect- I Legislature. If the rights individual’s fully dissent. violated, objection are nonetheless his or her practical necessity. becomes a practical The I FRANCHINI, CONCUR: GENE E. ‍‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‍necessity justify does treating the ab- Justice. objection sence of any as a waiver of protection intended the hear-

ing to ensure and the court to enforce. speaks The statute “appropriate” being granted.

relief forgoing analysis

leads me to appropri- conclude that the

ate relief for given one who has not been

Case Details

Case Name: New Mexico Department of Health v. Compton

Court Name: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date Published: Oct 16, 2001

Citation: 34 P.3d 593

Docket Number: 26,419

Court Abbreviation: N.M.