New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, AUTHORITY, & NEW JERSEY SPORTS EXPOSITION JR., ETC., CRANE, . M. Mc JOSEPH v MONTENEGRO, AL., LOUIS DEFENDANTS-APPEL ET LANTS. CHEYAL, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, AL.,

HENRY ET v. JERSEY, AL., STATE OF NEW DEFENDANTS-RE ET SPONDENTS. CLUB, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, PARK JOCKEY

MONMOUTH AUTHORITY, & v. NEW JERSEY SPORTS EXPOSITION DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. PLOSIA, AL., L. ET PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

JAMES NEW JERSEY AUTHORITY, SPORTS AND EXPOSITION DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Argued February May 22 and March 197 2 Decided 1972.

Mr. Robert N. cause for argued appellant, Wilentz Wilentz, & Goldman (Messrs. Monmouth Park Club Jockey Spitzer, attorneys). Porro, Mr. Jr. argued appellants A. the cause for Alfred Cheval, National Society (Messrs. al and Audubon

Henry et Porro, & Flynn Murray, attorneys). Ralph

Mr. W. Chandless cause for argued appellants Galiardo, Jr., C. Melillo, Guy Louis Montenegro, Philip of Township South Hackensack and the Board of Education of the Township Chandless, South Hackensack (Messrs. Kramer,

Weller & attorneys). Mr. Frederick C. Mezey argued the cause amicus curiae for New Jersey Citizens for Air, Inc., Clean Save the Coalition, Meadowlands al et & (Messrs. Mezey at Mezey, . torneys)

Mr. T. Girard Wharton argued the cause for M. Joseph McCrane, Jr., Treasurer of the State of New Jersey (attor- ney appointed by Supreme Court New Jersey). Jr.,

Mr. F. George Kugler, General Attorney of New Jer sey, argued the cause New respondents Jersey Sports and Skillman, Exposition et al Authority, (Mr. Stephen Assist Jr., ant General, Mr. Attorney M. Joseph Clayton, General, Deputy Attorney on the brief).

Mr. William D. Gorgone argued the cause for appellants L. Plosia, James et al. opinion the Court was delivered

Francis, J. These actions a sought judicial declaration as to the constitutionality the New & Ex- Jersey Sports Law. L. position Authority c. N. J. A. S. 5:10-1 et After a seq. review comprehensive various claims of invalidity, Pashman Judge Court, of the Law Superior Division, found no trespass Constitution, on the and entered summary judgment so certified holding. the ensuing We ap- peal prior argument Division, now, the Appellate being substantially agreement the legal principles applied by Pashman, affirm Judge the judgment entered by him. New & Jersey Sports Exposition Mc- Crane, 119 N. J. Div. Super. (Law However, 1971).

variations and enlargements arguments made below call for further discussion here. some

One of the delicate tasks court has to perform most of a statute. In adjudicate constitutionality our form of has tripartite high government prerogative restraint, and with always been exercised with self extreme awareness that enactment deep challenged represents the considered elected action of a body composed popularly result, from the representatives. judicial As decisions an ac- unswerving Marshall reveal Chief Justice time of every presumption of the principle possible ceptance we an As Legislature. favors the act validity Kervick, all 42 N. J. (1964), in Roe v. noted faithful deference judicial relevant New cases Jersey display men might to the will of the lawmakers whenever reasonable Legislature differ as devised to whether the means And to serve a conform to the Constitution. public purpose study these eases project judicial into the forefront of any of an attack a both the strong enacted statute upon duly to resolve presumption validity duty of and our solemn in to our reasonably conformity doubts favor of conflicting Moreover, charter. reached in such organic the conclusions cases demonstrate that in this salutary effectuating policy, will read the as matters judges implying statute questioned to its constitutional if contains terms requisite viability it which do not exclude such requirements. does not and branch of the government

The judicial or a with the wisdom of statute. policy cannot concern itself exclusive concern of the legislative matters are the Such its branch, firmly and the doctrine is settled that enactment unwise. may not he stricken because a court thinks it Trustees Passaic County College, Holster v. Board Finance 60, Jersey 59 N. J. 66 New (1971); Mortgage McCrane, 414, v. 56 N. J. 422 v. Clayton Agency (1970); Kervick, Kervick, 52 J. Roe v. 42 supra, N. 138 (1968); Kervick, 68, N. 229; N. J. at Fried v. 34 J. 74 (1961); Furman, N. Am. 67 J. 134 Budget Corp. Super. (Ch. 2d, o. b. N. J. 129 16 Am. Jur. aff'd Div.), (1961); Law, Constitutional 294-295 In em pp. (1964). § phasizing the common general sense these controlling principles, in McCutcheon v. Building his dissent Authority, 13 N. J. 46, 79 (1953),1 Justice Jacobs quoted Missouri, the striking Kan. language of Justice Holmes & Tex. Ry. Co. 267, 270, Tex. v. 194 U. S. May, S. Ct. 48 L. Ed. 973 (1904): provisions Great constitutional must be administered with caution. play joints machine, Some must be allowed for the legislatures guardians must be remembered that are ultimate people quite great degree liberties and welfare of the as courts. & here, Jersey Sports statute the New challenged

Exposition Law, was about the adopted bring construction, and maintenance of com- operation sports plex on in the Hackensack site not exceed acres meadowlands. The and authorized envisioned Legislature the development and on- the selected a operation project site consisting stadiums, arenas, “one more coliseums, pavilions, stands, houses, fields, field recreation cen- playing ters, courts, houses, club a race track” and other gymnasiums, structures and facilities suitable for holding of sporting events, shows, trade other expositions or public meetings.

Provisions were made roads, also for driveways, approaches, areas, parking transportation structures, and facili- systems ties, and all other appurtenances necessary or complementary to operation of project. 1971, 137, 6, L. c. a. subd. § and the Act complex,

To create administer the established in Community of Affairs the New Department Jersey & Authority to of the Trea- Sports Exposition consist State surer, General, member of Attorney the Hackensack Commission, and Development Meadowlands four public members to be the Governor with the advice appointed by viewpoint appear 1 The advocated in this dissent be would to have law of v. Bd. come the our See Trustees Passaic State. Holster of of County College, supra, 59 N. J. at 73. of was “constituted Authority consent the Senate. an of instrumentality exercising the State the powers

essential of functionsits exercise governmental func- an conferred was declared be essential Act of mandate, tion and by application State express “the pro- revenue derived from the to the project purposes be vided in act applied this be deemed held [was to] a, b. 1971, 4, in L. c. 137 subds. support of government.” § financially a' self-sus- Authority As constituted It is empowered instrumentality. taining governmental of construction to finance costs issue bonds or notes or notes of the bonds and principal Interest project. ad- for fees, charges be rents and other to met out and from grant the facilities mission to or use of 1971, 137, 10, 11. The im- L. c. any concessions therein. §§ initial as well as to the key Authority’s mediate financial race track term is establishment of horse operation long Revenues from such wagering with pari-mutuel wagering. will complex upon well as from total (as construction) and maintenance of the expenses be used for operation track, of interest and complex, principal the entire payment notes, payments of the bonds or certain to municipalities re- Any whose land for the balance complex. is acquired Fund, must the General deposited maining 40% which is to the Meadowlands appropriated Commission as authorized Laws for of its purposes Chapter J. 13:17-1 et seq. N. S. A. Since the revenues from for the mandated except alloca- pari-mutuel wagering, various used for the construction of the facilities tions, will be maintenance, and their total complex subsequent will be no General there balance Attorney stipulated Fund thereof the General State deposit remaining under of the Act.2 subd. b(6) Section stipulation re 2 We are not certain whether was intended to subsequent payment periods full late to all Bonds. presents problem present But no case. It be noted may here also that 7f Section provides that distribution of sums in deposited pari-mutuel to win pools ners thereof and from payments in the remaining balances such pools stakes, or purses and special rewards trust accounts for horses, breeding development of shall bo accordance with L. N. 1940, 17, c. J. 5 :5-22 S. A. et seq., Commission Act. In Racing addition, an initial payment State, to an amount of all of equal pari-mutuel 1% pools must be deposited annually Eund. the General State All amounts after remaining pari-mutuel such dis pools tribution become revenue of the Authority. or

Bonds notes issued Authority negotiable are general obligations out of of or payable any its revenues funds, subject only any agreement with the holders the particular bonds or notes any particular reve- pledging 1971, nues L. 137, b, or funds. c. may subds. c. 10, They § be sold at or sale and must mature private than 40 from paid not later their date. Their years inception issuance is not Authority subject the consent any department, division, State, any or nor to agency other or proceedings specified conditions those in this except L. c. 1971, 137, 10, Act. subds. f.e, Eor purposes § case, present major the nature provision respecting bonds or notes is that shall they be debts and under no

only any circumstances debts of the State or of its On of each political subdivisions. face note there shall be statement that: pay authority obligated principal in- [T]he thereof or the authority

terest thereon revenues or funds of the any political obligated nor thereof is neither subdivision principal pay such or interest and that neither faith and power taxing political any credit nor State or subdivision pledged payment principal thereof to the of or the interest such bonds or on notes. (Emphasis g addded). L. c. § subd. reso- any visions therein which shall constitute covenants the Au- by and with thority contracts holders of the the bonds. Por such all example, provisions or of may pledge any the part Authority’s funds, revenues or all or agree mortgage any part the property, may covenant as to the establish- ment and of rates and other levying charges, the amount to be raised each year or other or period time tolls other by revenues as to the use and disposition thereof. They may limit the powers Authority construct, acquire or operate any facilities or which properties may compete or 1971, tend to with L. compete 137, the c. 11. project. § It note, however, 15 important Section by with pledges agrees the bond or note holders that it will not in any way that would jeopardize the interest of holders, such limit or alter the or rights powers vested Authority construct and maintain the acquire, project toor the terms of perform any them, made with agreement establish, or to charge rents, and collect such fees and other as may be convenient or charges suf- necessary product ficient revenues to meet all expenses fulfill the terms any holders, made with agreement such bonds, until with interest together thereon “are fully met and or for.” discharged provided The Authority may be dissolved but on Legislature condition that no there are debts or obligations or that outstanding pro- vision has been made for their payment retirement. Upon all such dissolution property and assets become vested L. 1971, 137, in the c. h. 4, State. subd. § The above outline the substance of the brings statute into sufficient focus for consideration of the contentions of con- invalidity stitutional which our atten- particularly engaged tion at the and reargument before us. argument

The claim of in a unconstitutionality emerges composite form, is, it is upon alleged controlling appli- based cability of three clauses of the Constitution. They (1) 8, 3, 1947 II, Article debt limitation clause of the ¶ § 1939 1844 amendment to the Constitu- Constitution, (2) tion, IV, VII, Article (which here applicable § ¶ 4, VII, Article 2 of which, fol Constitution) § ¶ lowing referendum of adoption by horse people, legalized with racing pari-mutuel in New gambling Jersey “from which the State shall derive reasonable revenue support government,” (3) II, Article ¶ § annual appropriations clause the 1947 Constitution.

Article II, prohibits the Legislature creating § ¶ any manner or liability debt of the State which to- gether debts or existing liabilities “shall at any exceed time centum total per one amount appropriated by general for appropriation law fiscal that unless the year, same shall be authorized a law by for some single object or distinctly work therein.” specified specifies It further condi- tions to of a law validity such to make it exempt from the it debt limitation: (1) provide means, must “ways and exclusive of loans, pay to of such interest debt or liabil- due, as it and ity pay falls also to and discharge principal thereof;” a there must be (2) provision that “the law shall * * * be not until such debt and repealed the interest thereon are and fully paid the law discharged;” (3) must be ap- at a election; “all proved by people general and (4) money to raised such law authority be of shall ap- be only object therein, to plied specific stated and to the of the debt created.” payment thereby historical basis for of

The inclusion this clause in the has 1844 Constitution been discussed extensively the dis in McCutcheon v. Bldg. Authority, 13 supra, sent J. N. Court; at and in several other of opinions this Holster v. Board Trustees Passaic County College, 59 N. J. 60 New Jersey Finance v. Mortgage Agency (1971); ¶. McCrane, Kervick, N. J. 414 N. Clayton J. 56 52 (1970); Kervick, Roe v. J. N. 138 42 (1968); and (1964), Parsons, Jersey New 3 N. J. Turnpike below, well as the opinion and need not be re (1949), Basically the intention prevent here. was to one peated from which debts Legislature incurring subsequent Legisla- would be to obliged pay, prior approval by tures without referendum, means unless the thereof payment and debt repeal, until was provided, preserved was satisfied, and unless the funds derived from the specified until it was only devoted to the debt payment means were if follows, of that come course, It debts discharged. of a existence statute through operation into State, faith debts of if the and cannot become are not their pledged guarantee pay- credit the State ment, and are under no Legislatures obligation ap- future then them case there money satisfy default, propriate II, been no of the Con- trespass upon has Article § ¶ arise a An indebtedness' cannot unless there is stitution. money sum of to another who occu- obligation pay legal who creditor, has the to call position right pies for payment. It obvious equally the debtor upon which are legally clause en- applies obligations debt the State. forceable against long has been settled that State does not doctrine all its func- personally

have to serve or perform governmental Performance of a or public purposes. particular pub- tions may be entrusted under project proper guide- lic or purpose to an autonomous independent authority agency. lines has been achieved the view Like when acceptance an is created act of agency Legislature such financial in the execution of obligations authorized to incur tasks, and to raise the funds to delegated governmental its case, its bonds or notes. In such issuing them by meet if in this State and elsewhere is that rule under prevailing an there is declaration that express statute enabling alone, obligations authority or notes bonds their no for liability payment, assumes the State are not for their of State satis- pledged faith credit must look solely that the holders author- faction, and limitation then the debt clause is satisfied. ity payment, Passaic County College; v. Board Trustees Holster New of of McCrane; v. Clayton Finance v. Ker- Agency Jersey Mortgage

15 vick; Kervick, Roe v. all Behnke v. New supra; Jersey High J. way Authority, 25 149 13 Div.), N. aff’d Super. (Ch. Smallwood, 328,

N. J. Ark. 14 McArthur v. 225 (1953); v. 812, 281 S. W. 2d 428 215 Ark. Gipson Ingram, (1955); Dale, 223 W. 595 S. 2d Oxnard v. 45 Cal. (1949); City of & 290 P. v. 729, Ginsberg City County 2d 2d 859 (1955); Denver, 164 v. 572, Colo. 436 P. 2d 685 Book (1968); of Comm’n, State 238 Ind. N. E. 273 Bldg. 120, 149 2d Office Owensboro, McKinney City Ky. 254, v. 203 (1958); 305 of Examiners, S. W. 24 v. Bd. 2d Willett State 112 (1947); of Mont. 317, 115 P. 287 rel (1941); 2d State ex Capitol Add’n 312, Comm’n v. 39 N. 46 P. 2d Bldg. Connelley, M. Meier,

1097 35 P. Moses v. 148 Ore. 981 (1933); 2d Martin, v. 62 Wash. P. (1934); State 2d 2d 833 ex rel Bd. Va. State Governors W. Univ. (1963); O’Brien, E. 142 West Va. S. 2d See (1956). rmak, Bonds, Che The Law Revenue 85-95

generally Heins, (1954); against Constitutional Restrictions Debt, Comment, 13-18, 123-132 Judicial De (1963). Limitations, mise State Constitutional Debt Iowa L. Rev. 646 (1971).

Tested the recited first principles, stages of the attack on the no As present problem. statute serious already noted the Authority is established as an instrumen tality of the State exercising public govern essential mental functions. The ordained that exercise Legislature of conferred “shall powers be deemed and held to be an essential function governmental State.” Prom the judicial standpoint legal actuality of that declaration construction, depends upon whether and main operation tenance sports complex and its varying activities under administration Authority constitute a within the ambit of purpose government. state We are all in agreement the trial court and nu it, merous authorities cited by it was well within the discretion to find Legislature that the sports and ex position complex as described and authorized in the statute In and serves a these public purpose. a project with stadium, pari-mutuel a race track horse sports'

days, referendum state-wide approved by was wagering (which the Consti- of the Amendment prior adoption recrea- and trade center supply and an tution), exposition We thus serve a public purpose. tion for the people—and form under our democratic trial court that agree to pro- not confined are public projects of government life; in such the bare bones of just political viding calculated to speaking, anything generally government, or recreation of the people the education promote Chermak, The Law See proper public purpose. generally Bonds, Revenue 100-124. supra, at respect- Consideration of the argument first aspect ing language debt clause reference to the specific requires of the statute the acquisition regulating controlling costs funds and operating for construction Authority for their liability repayment. of the and the complex, clearly expressed. was in that regard intention Legislature’s out payable only bonds or notes issued Any says they expressly and funds. Section subd. g revenues of the State” liability a debt or any way “shall not be create or con- “shall not Authority; they but indebtedness, liability or obligation stitute * ** faith and credit of or constitute a pledge * * * solely shall be payable the State [Au- [but] their or available for funds pledged revenues thority] effect and fur- specifying to that A statement payment.” is not pledged of the State taxing power ther on face of each appear is required payment their said his dissent Justice Jacobs note. As bond or Authority, supra, Bldg. purchasers v. Stale McCutcheon whatever; under no misapprehension “can be

17 Parsons, N. supra, 242; County J. & at Ginsberg City Denver, Meier, 436 P. supra, 2d at 689. Moses v. supra, 35 P. 2d at 982.

But appellants say there are further which factors present the bond bring within obligation the debt limitation clause.

They point out that the 1939 Amendment the 1844 Con- stitution authorized horse with racing pari-mutuel wagering “from which the State shall a derive reasonable revenue for the support of government.” It is then argued Constitution requires approved of horse type racing a produce revenue that is reasonable, and (1) must (2) go to the State qua State as general revenue to be in deposited the general state treasury disbursed in accordance with the annual appropriations of the 1947 clause Constitu- tion, Article II, 2, and (3), regardless (2), § ¶ creating Authority, it to empowering carry on horse with racing pari-mutuel and to devote the wagering revenue therefrom to operation sports complex to pay off its bonds in manner described in binding statute, the Legislature violated the debt limitation clause. Article II, 3. More refer specifically, appellants to the pledge § ¶ agreement the State with the bondholders pursuant to section 15 of the Act that until bonds issued Authority are off paid the State will not limit or alter the Authority’s power construct, to acquire, maintain and operate the project any way that would their jeopardize rights. They contend that since the revenue contemplated by the Constitutional Amendment is general revenue for use in the overall State, operation binding agreement the bondholders to allocate that' revenue to the Authority for 40 years, or until the bonds are off paid constitutes, without approval by referendum, a guar- of their anty payment, or the of a assumption liability therefor, contrary to the debt clause. clause appropriations prohibits drawing money Treasury the State annual except by ap the current

propriations approved Legislature. Obviously the restriction funds in to be placed relates to or required in the State Van v. Board Chosen Free- Treasury. Riper holders, 137 N. J. L. 1948). & A. It follows (E. if there is particular no such mandate with respect revenues, the no clause is There binding. general mandate that all revenues generated by operation every or department agency authority government of State fact, In deposited general history treasury. negates 1944 Constitution included such view. The proposed “from whatever clause all such revenues source requiring treasury. derived” be It was re- paid general into Convention, jected at the 1947 Constitutional quite ap- dedication of prevent any because it would funds. parently Convention, 1947 Constitutional 151. In Proceedings, circumstance, this and in the absence of any provision finally the Constitution as that all adopted stating money must be into the State a court paid Treasury, should contrary, it. On the the omission to write such imply 'mandate into our charter to have been a seems studied one, and indicative of purpose permit the Legislature to decide what revenues should into the go general fund. See Gipson 595, 223 S. W. 2d Ingram, supra, and compare, Petition Bd. Pub. 363 W. Bldgs., 598, S. 2d 606-608 Sup. 1963), Ct. where it was (Mo. deemed controlling Constitution, 3, Art. 36, S., Missouri V. A. M. pro § vided that “all revenue collected and received money by the state shall into the go treasury.” The Legislature has the to take action or power any course reasonably necessary or incidental to the operation of government is not pro hibited by Constitution expressly or clear by implication. When it has acted within that perimeter, the function of review judicial does not include supervision of the legisla tive judgment. Reingold v. 6 N. J. Harper, 182 (1951).

Indications that the Legislature was aware of its preroga- tive direct the course of its revenues are to be found. Eor the 1967 example, amendment to the Racing Commis- sion Act specifically provides that: moneys by provisions said commission All received under the of this treasury except moneys paid act shall as to be into State Jersey Breeding deposited Development New Horse Ac 6; count, part treasury L. shall of the free funds. c. § be emphasized). (Amendment S. A. N. J. 5:5-68 in N. J. A. Similar S. 52:18A-8: recognition appears department, institution, All State revenue collected commis- sion, board, except shall, committee or official of this as other- State provided by law, deposited, prescribed by wise be in the method * * * Jersey director to the of New in such credit this State de- positories designate. (Emphasis added). State Treasurer shall This awareness is evidenced also 'section 7 of clearly Act under review. There the directed that reve- Legislature nue of all equal pari-mutuel pools paid 1% J-ü Eund, the General State and that all other revenues remain- from the track ing after deduction operation were expenses dsignated revenues of the Authority.

In the of New York where horse racing pari- mutuel was also wagering adopted by constitutional amend- ment in the same language respecting the production “reasonable revenue support government” was 1, 9, included. Art. 1. However, subd the New York Legis- § lature authorized the management of the track by private businesses, with the State to receive certain percentages of the revenues. Incidental to the operation, the Legislature a public created benefit the corporation, Agriculture & New York State Horse Breeding Development Eund, within the Commission, State aid in Racing to the growth develop- industry. ment the Its funds were to be derived from the associations which were private racing it required pay of the “breaks.” The Eund was authorized to deposit 20% the not in the in money, Treasury, but several segre- and to accounts disburse for various de- gated programs to foster the signed growth prosperity industry. of the Eund could not

Any obligations become the debts of 20 State; fact,

the in the were al- expenditures limited Laws, L. 1965, lotted income. c. N. Y. 567. Unconsol. § 8041 et 1971 seq. (McKinney Supp.)

The statute was attacked as unconstitutional the ground on that portion revenues when used for the racing for purposes which Fund was created did not constitute “revenue for the moreover support government,” and track revenues could not be diverted the state treasury where they subject year were the two clause appropriation In H. R. & Agric. Constitution. A. v. Saratoga F., N. Y. S. H. B. D. 22 N. Y. 119, Y. 2d 291 N. S. 2d 335, 238 N. E. 730 (1968), rejected 2d the Court of Appeals was in saying nothing contentions there the constitu- tional all “amendment which revenue in ex- requires of expenses cess to the direct support govern- devoted 22 N. E. 122, ment.” Y. 2d at 238 N. 2d N. Y. 732, at 291 S. 2d at 337. The court declared that the Fund not a fund under the of the State as is em- management term in Constitution, that, out in ployed pointed past, fund made raised every up moneys otherwise, taxation or came within clause. appropriations said to In this instance Fund was be the instrument chose to effectuate through Legislature which the the de- the court saw purpose. nothing scribed And legitimate prevented clause which legislative constitutional either action. New York’s off-track law which betting upholding

In 20 million dollars could racing revenues up 80% municipality to the participating go 20% Laws, Y. 143, 144, L. N. Unconsol. State, 1970, ch. 8061 § 1971 the Court of Supp.), Appeals again et seq. (McKinney, reasonable revenue the support govern- interpreted Lakes R. the State Constitution. Finger provision ment New York State Pari-Mutuel Betting v.A. Off-Track Comm’n, N. Y. N. Y. 2d 331 S. 2d 282 N. E. Misc. N. Y. S. aff’g 2d 2d 592 (1972), 2d court said that horse amend- 1971). racing Ct. (Sup. ment did not the State as require such derive reve- nue from pari-mutuel The betting. portion of the pari-mutuel revenue allocated to participating municipalities a through State must be as of agency regarded use the revenue for of support government. Eejecting argument the State “itself” must be the exclusive bene- ficiary revenues, of pari-mutuel court said that under the Constitutional authorization what constitutes “reasonable revenue for of support government” a question judgment and value and normally within the legislative view province. That is at least as ap- in the base before a plicable where substantial us, portion the horse revenues to an racing are allocated instrumentality of State for the government creation and maintenance of like the public project sports complex.

It should be noted also that the Legislature created an autonomous New York public agency, the Off-Track City Betting Corporation, to conduct the pari-mutuel wagering was operation. agency power to finance given proj- ect bonds which through solely from the paid were revenues. The wagering expressly provided statute bonds were to be the obligation alone, the corporation or and not directly obligation of the State. contingently Moreover, statute contains the as in pledge same Section e., Act., the New i. Jersey with the agreed until that, bondholders the bonds were it would not in paid, limit or alter the way agreement them, any agency’s holders, limit or or authorize impair such rights 1970, L. private competition in off-track betting, Laws, 81, c. 84. Y. 8092, 8094, N. Unconsol. §§ §§ 8095 (McKinney Supp.).

From all of the above we are satisfied that where the an has created instru Legislature corporate agency, government perform mentality public purpose, State, not and which is whose debts liabilities annual dependent upon Legislature appropria tions, II, Article is not It is common applicable. § ¶ 22 to run by prescription legislative for such

practice agencies own their income manage operation, their own independent funds, from such solely their off bonds pay therefrom subject ap- being by without to or control regard Kervick, supra; e. v. See, Clayton g., clause. propriations McCrane, supra; v. Agency New Finance Jersey Mortgage Au Kervick, Jersey Highway v. v. New Roe Behnke supra; ; v. New Parsons N. 13 J. at 30-31 thority, (1953) supra, Smallwood, v. McArthur Authority, supra; Jersey Turnpike Dale, 328; v. supra, Oxnard City S. W. 2d 281 supra, Tuchbreiter, 571, N. E. 414 Ill. 111 859; P. Antle v. 290 2d Comm’n, Bldg. supra, Book v. State 836 2d (1953); Office 587, v. 167 Kan. 273; Regents, N. Board E. 2d Slate 149 Examiners, 121 State v. Board P. 373 (1949); 207 2d Shestack, generally P. See (1948). Mont. 2d Pa. L. Rev. 557-562 The Public U. Authority, Comment, Au a Created State Obligations (1957); State?, 53 Mich. Debts Do Constitute thority: They the ar- not find persuasive We L. Rev. 439 do (1955). in State in Nebraska view contrary expressed guably Steen, Obviously W. 2d 164 (1968). 160 N. 183 Neb. accomplish- a means of efficiency functional agencies’ if the nil virtually be would public ing pressing projects opera- self-sustaining financially their revenue produced and dis- Treasury the State had to be channeled into tion clause. annual appropriations bursed in accordance with the But maintain that appellants situation this case is from those cited because the 1939 different Consti tutional amendment horse approved racing pari-mutuel which a “from the State shall wagering derive reasonable revenue for the This support government.” language, they means that be say, revenue so derived must con be sidered State revenue to deposited general general be used treasury operation State general cannot diverted as a fund to maintain and special support an autonomous agency accomplish State created to In purpose. our judgment such narrow interpreta- tion unreasonable. is a

“Government” It comprehensive term. connotes machinery by which the ex sovereign power presses functions; its will and exercises its it is the frame executive, work of institutions which political ju dicial, and of legislative administrative business the State on; is carried it is the which of authorities rule aggregate our and society public meet its needs. Stokes United States, 264 F. Cir. 1922). (8

As have we the agreed, sports exposition complex serves a public By the Au- purpose. virtue statute thority is the which simply by instrument the State ac- its function complishes purpose; is governmental Thus, one. entirely is reasonable to conclude that in the of context the 1939 Constitutional Amendment the word “State” includes the created legislatively autonomous corporate carry or which on vari- agencies instrumentalities of ous its activities. The aspects governmental Authority an instrumentality it seems sensible to being say such that the revenues received in by it effectuating carrying delegated on the the governmental purpose, including reve- nue from horse received for the racing, support revenues of government.

It cannot be maintained on face successfully that of the statute revenue to be horse produced by racing with pari-mutuel is revenue for not “reasonable wagering of support government.” would constitute What such revenue basically is a matter primarily exercise discretion, of legislative manifestly court should not interfere unless the sum fixed measure established so therefor is palpably unreasonable as to un constitute constitutionally arbitrary Finger action. Lakes R. A. v. Comm’n,

N. Y. State Pari-Mutuel Betting supra. Off-Track The matter be appraised by viewing must State concep tually as unique organism. totality of performance its achieved con- bnt that result be government ultimate arms which independent

stitutionally by operation of not de- which are perform some of the work and the “State” for financial pendent upon support. State, it is receive of qua

In State its capacity into paid pools of the pari-mutuel of y2 1% government. direct of support for the General State Fund al that such action estimates to this One informed party In $1,700,000 annually. producing of location is capable Fund the General deposit cluded also for ultimate complex project total revenues balance of the payment hands after remaining amortization required its and the operating expenses, will be view produc its bonds. Whether this long range the result (as tive is presently contra-indicated In the “State’s” other ca stipulation Authority). the broad connotation of which the pacity, represented susceptible amendment is reasonably constitutional e.j can revenue for the (i. support government signify financially revenue self-sus operation generated instrumentalities of which is taining corporate government, used their of state performing part government), balance of track Authority is receive the revenues It is specified expenses. plain after remaining operating very from the record that balance will be sub probably Since, for the both expressed, portions stantial. reasons State, will be revenue supporting government th trial court was correct no violation finding 1939 constitutional amendment. of the claim of unconstitutionality final portion the debt clause. The argument us back to

brings race track are by operation since the revenues generated restricted asserted compass by State revenues (within to be such virtue of the and must continue appellants) amendment as as horse long racing 1939 constitutional exists, II, Article 3 is with pari-mutuel wagering ¶ § in Section 15 of those reve- violated by pledge the State’s mies until the bonds their date Authority maturity are paid, many years hence. under being noted, As has been this section the State or note pledged with the bond agreed holders not, that until such are it will obligations paid, to their prejudice, limit or alter the rights

to construct and operate Such or sports complex. pledge agreement, contended, amounts to a or guaranty pledge or assumption of a liability by the State intended to be on binding successor legislatures, which cannot be made with- out approval of the aat election. people general

As the cases and cited earlier have secondary sources clear, made whenever the state wishes to enter government upon public immediate project substantial ex- requiring penditure execution, for money its it is faced with the bar of the debt clause. The modern science government has found a clause,3 method of and the courts avoiding have approved it. It is to create an autonomous cor- porate entity undertake the task and to borrow money on own purpose its bonds. These bonds are expressly made the entity’s alone, own debt to be paid by it both enabling legislation the bonds themselves expressly stipulate that the State shall not under any circumstance have any thereon. liability Eunds to meet interest and principal the bonds are derived solely revenues generated by the agency’s operation, which remain a special fund for that until purpose fully bonds As paid. Kervick,

was said in Clayton 52 N. J. supra, at 152: “It is never an evasion of a illegal constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish result, desired which is itself, lawful discovering following legal way Comm’n, to do it.” Book v. State Bldg. Citing supra, Office 149 N. E. 2d at 288.

We have view already expressed that devotion of the from pari-mutuel revenues to Author- racing wagering horse Heins, against Debt, supra, Constitutional Restrictions State 3 See 27, 35, 82-86; supra, vii, Comment, pp. Iowa L. Rev. 56 at 655-656.

26 ity purposes, particularly for the payment bonds, constitutes use of the revenue an instrumentality State for the support government. character of that use will remain constant until the bonds are paid. The re- quirement of the 1939 constitutional amendment being satis- fied, the situation is no different from Clay that involved in ton v. Kervick and New Jersey Finance Mortgage Agency McCrane, In supra. statutes both of enabling those cases State made the same in almost identical pledge e., as language, appears in the act now i. us, before limit, or restrict impair rights of the bondholders under made with agreement until the bonds public agency N. fully paid. 18A:72A-10, were J. A. 19 S. terms (bond N. years); J. A. up S. terms 17:1B-10(g), (bond to 30 up years). cited, many nor in the out-of-

In of the two cases neither any express earlier was there decisions mentioned state the covenant of the State with the declaration implied not to the various authorities’ right impair bondholders by their generated operation revenues use the governmental Constitution, of the debt clause of the even was violative thereby. bound We see were succeeding legislatures though can for such here. There holding no reasonable ground re- by the bondholders to their be no misunderstanding Both and the face the State. the statute lationship terms, them that must bonds, they tell plainest and that Authority to the solely payment, look therefor, liability or contingent direct assuming is neither credit of State to that end. nor pledging purchase our when bondholders bonds In judgment the Act under section solemn from the into between them and State. Article being comes pact 3 of the 1947 Constitution Article 4, VII, ¶ § § secure im against States Constitution make it of the United for a ex legislatures, except proper succeeding pairment abdicated As the police powers. of the State’s never ercise

27 United States Supreme Brand, Court said Indiana v. 303 U. S. 95, 100, 443, 58 S. 82 446, Ct. L. Ed. 685, 690-691 : (1938) principal legislative body The function of is not to make con- policy

tracts but laws which make declare the of the state and subject repeal subsequent Legislature when a shall determine policy. Nevertheless, legislative to alter it is established that a may provisions which, accepted enactment contain when basis of by individuals, action become between them and contracts the State protection 1, or its subdivisions within the of Article If § 10. representatives people’s public they may adopt deem it in the interest policy respect contracting public business term longer Legislature. than the life session of current See, also, Louisiana v. Police 111 U. L. Jury, 716, S. 28 Ed. Yard,

574 New v. 95 L. (1884); Jersey 104, U. 24 S. Ed. Sills, 352 New v. Jersey Highway Authority 109 (1877); N. J. J. Super. 111 N. 313 Div. 424, suppl. Super. (Ch. o. b. 58 N. J. 432 Behnke v. New aff'd Jer

1970), (1971); sey 29; N. J. Highway Authority, supra, 13 at Proprietors Co., & Bridges v. Land N. J. 81 Impr. Eq. Hoboken 13 13 J. aff'd N. 503 & A. aff'd (Ch. Div.), Eq. (E. 1860), 116, 68 U. S. L. 571 Small 17 Ed. McArthur v. (1864); wood, 435-437; supra, 281 S. W. 2d at Canal Nat’l Bank v. Dist., 309,

School Admin. 160 Me. 203 A. 2d 734 (1964); 331 Mich. 49 N. W. 2d 318 Ziegler Witherspoon, 337, Yanda, Dickerson, Wa Wa Inc. v. 18 Div. 2d App. (1951); N. 16 Am. Jur. 251, 1963); 239 Y. S. 2d 473 Div. (App. Law, 441; 298, 561-563, Constitutional

2d, 289, 299, pp. §§ Jur., Am Public 583-589, 788-789 43 Securities (1964); Obligations, 484-485 (1942). pp. § Our dissenting colleagues suggest way pure dictum their discretion (a) that future Legislatures if the (b) days reduce the allotted racing abolish racing, (e) pari-mutuel betting, interest so abolish requires, ob from the the net proceeds “withdraw (d) at so much as equals least pari-mutuel betting, tained Such private a tax taxation at tracks.” thereon at the rate of hypothetical us, are not before questions it is unwise and unnecessary to deal with them in the abstract. Crescent Y., Pk. Tenants Assoc. v. N. N. Realty Eq. J. Corp. of Ass’n v. Board Phar (1971); Proprietary J.,N. macy 16 N. J. New Turn Jersey (1954); Parsons, v. 3 N. J. 240. pike Authority at supra, New Jersey High- In event it is sufficient to any refer Sills, way Authority had supra. Highway Authority The from which to be out of tolls paid arising issued bonds were which and for the of operation payment its autonomoxts the contained alone was The statute responsible. enabling impair not to here) the State we have pledge by (as same until the with the bondholders Authority’s agreement the a ex- A statute Legislature adopted bonds were later paid. of tolls. It National Guardsmen from the payment empting as Division by Chancery was declared unconstitutional the contract Authority’s of obligation the the impairing affirmed the unanimously bondholders, and Court this judgment. here, applicable in Sills are applied equally

The principles Au- of the that the bonds definitively and it stated may be valid contracts in of constitute the hands thority purchasers are en- to their terms, on the binding according against impair- protection titled to the same constitutional are the Legislatures hands of subsequent ment at the A. N. J. S. Authority, Educational Facilities bonds Finance New 18A:72A-10, 19, Jersey Mortgage of the any A. and of other N. J. S. 17:1B-10(g), Agency, for the performance created similarly agency constituted a like by pledge bonds are supported whose public purpose Moreover, applicability from the strict of the State. aside govern- mind our form of in having constitutional principles, branch to ment, legislative we believe the integrity undertake to would not Legislature that a succeeding such in made pledge in material fashion solemn impair Legislature. predecessor faith to bondholders good The dissent here caught up the hypnotic aura with which it has invested the word “debt” in the debt clause Constitution, aas result has turned the wrong direction. It must be repeated again clearest kind of language Legislature has said that the Author- bonds ity’s when issued shall be the sole obligation Authority, purchasers must them buy with that under- And if standing. the constitutionally acceptable device of e., modern day progressive government, i. in- financially dependent authority, is to succeed ac- expeditious complishment purpose projects, in persuading investors to buy authority’s bonds, good faith cove- nant of the Legislature for itself and its re- successors to frain adopting later enactments which will materially impair obligation authority’s bonds must be re- spected. Otherwise the device becomes an formula. empty judicial branch of which government, has im- given its primatur constitutionality device, duty has the to declare invalid at material attempts subversion of the judicial covenant. Such decision would not the signify that of the pledge State was debt. no on Obviously the liability to part State bonds would satisfy the be thus inde- created or It would pendently recognized. mean simply that denied validity the courts had to at- subsequent statutory materially impair the State’s solemn tempt obligation. W. B. W or then Co. v. 56,

See 295 U. Kavanaugh, S. 55 S. L. Ed. 1298 555, Ct. 79 (1935); McGahey Virginia, 135 34 693-694,10 972, ; U. Ct. L. Ed. 314 662, 304, (1890) S. S. Lee, v. Fort N. J. A. 895, 14 Misc. 188 689 Ct. (Sup. Lee, o. b. sub nom. v. Fort

1936), Phelps aff’d 118 N. J. L. & A. Rorick v. Board 1937); 181 Com’rs Ever (E. Dist., 57 F. Drainage 1048, 1055 D.

glades (N. 2d Fla. on 307 1932), jurisdictional 208, U. S. 59 grounds, vacated L. Ed. 1242 Arizona 808, (1939); 83 State Highway S. Ct. Nelson, 105 459 P. 76, 509,

Comm’n v. Ariz. 514 2d (1969); Rock, Little Rock v. Com. Chest Greater Little City of 562, Ark. 163 S. W. 524 522, (1942); 204 2d Canal Nat'l 30 Dist.,

Bank v. School Admin. 160 A. 309, Me. supra, 734, Jur., Am. 2d Public Securities and Obligations, §§ 487-490 Beaumont v. And pp. (1942). compare, Faubus, Ark. 394 S. W. 2d (1965).

For the above as well as for those reasons outlined Law con Pashman in the Division we expressed by Judge & Law is consti Sports Exposition Authority clude that the if de reasonably tutional. Even we assume that issue is subject, men batable, reasonable differ on the might duty judicial result be the for event the must same in that within com is to properly legislative sustain act cannot the court’s concern suggested, As heretofore petence. action was wise or expedient. be whether the lawmakers’ not of presents problem power constitutional challenge will legislative in the policy, area strict policy, the preserva Within the necessary must control. limits and the basic of our form of tripartite government, tion state of the Constitu rests, which debt clause on it principle of cases majority (as great tion must be construed autonomous self-sustaining country involving throughout end that done) public have agencies governmental that public will not be stifled and progress development met may be complexity their ever increasing with problems and solved. in the court as to

A was raised trial question the Authority whether statutory grant permission tideflowed meadowland for the State some acquire operation connected construction purposes which, violates trust doctrine sports complex on said, certain limitations the alienation of imposes was After out no sales or title transfers pointing such land. that, case, of that are involved there type present determination, fore, no regard ripe issue the matter as well as the various generally, court discussed upon which will bear ultimate resolution statutes and if necessary when it becomes to deal any problem, such such case now, is no live issue we with it. there Since hold decision on the subject await a must factual framework which judicial makes intervention appropriate.

The last question requiring decision concerns the appel- lants’ claim that the statute requires Authority “con- Commission, sult” the Meadowlands and the Department e., Environmental protection, i. present to those agencies its position respecting site chosen fox the sports exposition complex, after notice of the time and of such place consultation, and to obtain their approval of the location.

Section x subd. of the statute provides that the Au- shall have the thority power location, type project [T]o determine the and character of the *' * *

any part provided authority thereof shall consult making any with the Meadowlands Commission before determina- tyue location, project. tion as to the and character of the And section 23 says: express Legislature It intent

underaking complex the meadowlands shall consult with the Meadow- Department lands Commission and the of Environmental Protection respect ecological constituting with to the factors the environment of the Hackensack meadowlands end that environ- delicate mental balance of Hackensack meadowlands maintained preserved. At the public legislative hearing on the bill creating sports exposition authority, certain witnesses discussed what considered they to be possible deleterious effects on the ecology the meadowlands which would result from construction of sports They exposition complex. out that the bill

pointed contained no measures precautionary to deal such problems. Richard Commissioner J. Sul- livan of the Department of Environmental Protection also testified. other Among he said: things point Department, looking factors, Prom the of view of our at all sports proposal facility like the

we to build a at this think location. We emphasis compatible we would like to see is with the recreation it pollution preferable placed in terms of We think on this land. heavy development commercial, prevention resi- industrial or to dential uses. “it is im- In addition with another witness that he agreed of this mag- construction of portant public project * * * in as go. nitude to build environmental we protection an into the process we would like see somehow built So to the con- impact to review environmental before opportunity In Commissioner undertaken.” actually general struction project: favored the Sullivan things considered, land All an use of the think this is excellent we district, in the and the construction these facilities Meadowlands compatible

would not be best uses the meadowlands identity give help of its own. And with but would to our State little offered, I can be few have which dealt with as the caveats proceeds, without hesitation the construc- matter we would favor buildings. tion of these Hearing, on before S.2175 Judiciary Comm., April Senate pp. 67, 12, 1971, 68, 70. It the bill was hearing this appears subsequent x part amended to include sections subd. the statute ultimately enacted. history particularly

In view the legislative of the 23, we unanimously section strong language Authority been imposed upon an has view that obligation location, Meadowlands site proposal its present Pro- of Environmental and the Department Commission such site the using their tection, opinion and seek balance of the Hackensack meadow- “delicate environmental This preserved.” presentation maintained and bemay lands after notice time place be made should ac- thereof, parties present and actual notice to and all interested persons such time the tion. At views on the subject. their present permitted should Meadowlands Commission speaks section Although and the Department of Environmental Protection, see we no reason why presentation could not be made to both at agencies the same In time. our view the full record should be and can be made at that expeditiously time, to end that if any further review is it sought bemay heard and disposed upon that record.

We were advised on oral argument that Au had been thority in consultation with engaged the named its consideration agencies during site for the complex, and before it decided upon the particular site selected.

In our judgment such informal conferences do not satisfy statute, and purpose the matter must be remanded for the type presentation and consideration described Tabb, above. Zabel v. 430 F. Compare, 199(5 2d 1970), Cir.

cert. den. 910, 873, 401 U. S. 91 L. Ed. S. Ct. 2d 808 Calvert Coord. Comm. (1971); Inc. United States Cliffs C., A. E. 449 F. 2d 1109 C. 1971), Cir. noted in 58 (D. C.,

U. Va. L. Rev. 177 and v. F. P. (1972); Udall 1712, U. S. 87 S. L. Ct. Ed. 2d 869 (1967).

We agree with the that selection and approval of the complex site it and the is a by agencies broadly dis- cretionary matter, and that the decision thereon will not be interfered with by court unless it is palpably arbitrary. decision, whatever the necessity

But basis for for having made has ordained by been the Legislature. Por purposes expedition, after the type de- hearing made, scribed held has been and decision party desiring review certification may apply by direct this Court. modified, to the extent

Except judgment below is affirmed. C. J. in

Weintraub, (concurring part dissenting part). This suit was to resolve all brought constitutional statute, the face of the questions suggested end of bonds and prospective purchasers notes authorized to those matters. respect the statute be informed with here- I in the majority respects join opinion except indicated. inafter Law, L. and Exposition Jersey Sports

The New welfare, health 2 “that the general in section c. declares be promoted by State will people prosperity and other contests, horse racing athletic holding and of trade shows other events sporting spectator State; to induce profes- order in the expositions football and teams, major league particularly sional athletic State, it is franchises in the teams, to locate their baseball facilities for the related stadiums provide necessary teams, facilities for horse in addition of such use events; such sta- sporting and other spectator racing would also accommodate other and other facilities diums which would needed rec- provide and serve other uses events for Section reation, expositions forums and the public.” “that additional facilities are with declaration continues trade shows and other needed in State to accommodate the and in industry development in order to promote expositions a forum The and events.” provide the State Hackensack selects the meadowlands as same section then activities, and the site for declares conglomerate the these will the needed “stimulate complex develop- advent of end, To the New of said meadowlands.” Jersey ment Authority, body corporate Sports Exposition is created. politic, to bonds and notes Authority

The is authorized issue to project. for the Section subd. moneys g expressly obtain away and notes “shall not be in debt any states the bonds and that “neither the faith and liability the State” or the State” to power pledged credit nor the taxing But section 15 payment. provides: their Jersey hereby pledge does to covenant and The State New any pursuant agree the holders of bonds or notes issued to with authority rights not limit or alter or of the act State will hereby construct, maintain, authority acquire, powers in the vested repair improve, operate any project jeopar- way that would holders, perform dize the interest such or to and fulfill terms any agreement notes, made with holders of such bonds or or to fix, establish, charge rents, fees, and collect such or rates other charges necessary produce as or convenient sufficient reve- expenses authority all nues meet and fulfill the terms of any agreement notes, with the made of such bonds and to- holders gether thereon, any unpaid with interest with on interest installments interest, expenses and all costs and with connection action proceedings by holders, bonds, together or or on behalf of such until the thereon, fully discharged provided with interest met and for.

Central to the are the program proceeds parimutuel at the betting proposed racetrack. As the Attorney General said in his brief before ns: * * * key Authority, however, The to the financial success of the pay only per lies in the fact that it must of one cent of the total % pari-mutuel wagering handle general treasury, derived from to the compared larger percentage paid by privately to the owned race 7f; Act, tracks. § L. c. 159. Thus the will use the generated by pari-mutuel wagering

revenues finance construction profitable of the other less facilities it is authorized to construct. question whether section 15 to tie the purports hands of future legislatures respect subject matter way State Constitution forbids. I troublesome,

Before the issues find discussing I should a word say about the claim that authorized project 137 is chapter beyond legislative power. I have no doubt vulnerable on statute is not that account. The Constitu- tion limits to the Legislature pursuit of a public pur- but pose, has vast Legislature discretion in this area and could decide the Legislature public interest would be furthered this venture. It should be stressed that it is not for the judiciary say to whether the decision legislative is sound or unsound. The judiciary can only pass upon to act. legislative power To hold the power is there, is not to endorse the merits of the program. Rather it is respect authority Legislature act, err, if recognize legislators, they are accountable to the voters to the judiciary. not

I selected tbe site tbe itself above, Legislature As noted so, departed In doing Legislature for the racetrack. a track shall be that not existing statutory policy from the of the voters of approval affirmative licensed without in which the proposed of the municipality county J. A. 5 :5—39.1. policy N. S. That track will be situated. whether racing parimutuel as to reflects the dispute Indeed, community. a a it blessing is a bane or betting not a that a track far proposed matter of record public is in this matter was disapproved by from the site involved in 1967. there concerned See municipality the voters of the Downs, Com Jersey v. Division New Racing Inc. Jersey mission, Div. 1968). 102 N. J. Never Super, (App. itself now before us the Legislature in the statute theless not it a referendum. The site and did submit selected the were concerned thereby is whether the residents here question of treatment. denied equality a referendum shall that provided a statute

If single itself operated, a track the State except all as to tracks held classification, for it is validity doubt I would relevant. identity operator that find hard to local decision is to referendum permit for a reason In and associated gambling. desirability racing upon does not matter community, it upon of impact terms I hands. But than private rather a track is treatment to the issue of unequal answer the short believe 137 was which adopted chapter the Legislature a there be Legislature prior decision bound constitutionally referendum, prohibited and hence if between chapter because of the conflict exists inequality which law statute, prior would be the prior 137 and the is not vulnerable chapter have to Therefore yield. would statute. prior from the policy it departs because

37 II Section 7 of 137 chapter authorizes the to apply to the a race- Commission for Racing permit operate track. 7, Section subd. c that if the Com- Racing provides mission remain in force favorably, permit acts “shall authority effect so bonds or notes long any issued for remain complex of the meadowlands purposes contrary to the other law provision any outstanding, say on to notwithstanding.” The same subsection goes law to the con- other “Notwithstanding provision the au- anually to trary, Commission shall allot Racing 100 rac- less than case of thority, racing, harness 56 not less than and in ing days, running racing, the case of made is if and racing days, application to the extent therefor.”

The is question 7, c, whether section subd. read with sec- tion 15 above, quoted binds the State not to abolish rac- (1) ing betting, (3) not to refuse the num- Authority the ber of days just mentioned. racing

It is axiomatic that the police power of the State cannot be bargained away. term, police power, its largest embraces all usage, powers government other than eminent domain and the to tax. power It is probably true some part police power, as defined, thus broadly may be an bargained away as unavoidable incident of a con- tract required public interest. The distinction some- times suggested between the power to govern and the power deal interests of the property State. I see no need here be more for at precise, least this much clear: a legislature cannot contract away the power to pro- tect public safety, morals, health and and the power thus subject inalienable embraces the of racing and gambling. v.

Stone Mississippi, 814, 101 U. 25 Ed. S. L. 1079 (1880); Massachusetts, Boston Beer v.Co. 97 U. S. L. Ed. 989 Kansas, (1878); 133 U. Mugler S. Ct. S.

L. Ed. 205 Northwestern Co. (1887); Fertilizing v. Hyde

Park, v. Ken 24 L. Ed. 1036 (1878); Douglas 97 U. S. 659, 18 Ct. 42 L. Ed. 553 488, 199, (1897); 168 U. S. S. tucky, & Co. Landing Live Stock Butchers’ Slaughterhouse Union Co., 652, 4 746, Livestock 111 U. S. S. Ct. v. Crescent City Q. B. & R. Co. v. Nebraska L. Chicago 28 Ed. 585 (1884); 948 Omaha, 513, 18 42 L. Ed. 57, S. Ct. ex rel. 170 U. S. Blaisdell, 398, 290 B. & L. Assn. v. U. S. Home (1898); El 428 Paso 413, 78 L. Ed. see 231, (1934); 54 S. Ct. 436, L. Simmons, 577, 13 497, 506-509, S. Ct. v. 379 U. S. Ed. 453-455 (1965). 2d not to abolish the State 137 cannot obligate

Hence chapter of bonds or The purchasers or related gambling.1 racing Mississippi, supra, Ed. S. 25 L. 101 U. 1 Thus in Stone company incorporating a to a authorized it conduct a where lottery statute stipulated years upon payment to the sums the for 25 beyond unanimously Supreme State, the held that it was the Court succeeding away bargain power legislature power the to of that 1081) lotteries, saying (25 legislatures prohibit : L. at ed. * * * governmental, stop Certainly right to be them is Anyone, power, by discretion. at their at all times those exercised therefore, implied charter, accepts lottery un- does so with the who through sovereign capacity People, derstanding and in their that the agencies, time properly it at resume constituted their paid require, public good it be and this whether shall when the suspension by get is a such a charter that can for or not. All one subject favor, rights governmental to withdrawal in his of certain effect, nothing has, legal than a license more at will. He time, specified sooner unless named on the terms continue abrogated by permit, power sovereign It of the State. legislative subject existing laws, good against to future but or withdrawal. constitutional control wit, hand, bonds in the case at note a factual difference We might urge purchasers the consideration will be sold thus betting prohibited. point parimutuel has if should be returned hypothesis upon made, which we that the but nonetheless note not been proceeds chapter the credit of is that the bonds not sold on pay say nonetheless have to would State. To police power, legislature thus exercises the would if a bonds future upon chapter way say in that creates debt of course be to meaning part debt clause of the of the State within the opinion, upon Constitution, in Part III this discussed approved by approach chapter refer- fall because it was not 137 would required by debt clause. endum as notes are with that chargeable understanding may not maintain either that State is thus or that the restrained State will a dollar incur if exerts the liability police power or prohibiting racing gambling.

I think stipulation minimum days as to the racing also subject remains if legislative the occasion is change appropriate, either because harm abide undue is found to in the minimum statutory number the tax days because yield to the State from other tracks is unduly impaired so extensive an allocation to this Again, purchasers track.

of bonds and notes must with an awareness of be charged this power to continuing protect welfare.

Ill The 137 most troublesome is whether chapter question VIII, violates clause of Art. the debt our Constitution. II, 3, reads:

§ ¶ Legislature manner, year not, any any The shall in create in fiscal debts, liability State, together a debt or or which liabilities any previous any with debts or time one liabilities shall exceed at per appropriated by general appropria- centum of the total amount the year, by tion law for that fiscal unless the same shall authorized be single object distinctly specified a law for some or Re- work therein. gardless any relating Constitution, of limitation to taxation in this provide loans, ways means, such law shall the exclusive of to and pay liability due, the and of such debt as it and interest or falls also pay discharge principal years thirty-five the from within thereof contracted; repealed the time it is and until the law shall not be liability fully paid such debt or thereon are and dis- the interest charged. No law shall sub- such take until it shall have been effect general by majority people approved mitted to at a the a election legally qualified voting money of of the voters the State theron. All authority applied only by to be raised of such shall to the the law be object specific therein, thereby payment stated of the debt any paragraph created. This shall not be construed to refer money gov- deposited or that has this State been anything paragraph ernment of contained poses States. Nor the United shall in this apply pur- to the creation of or debts liabilities repel suppress war, invasion, or of or to insurrection or to emergency meet an caused or act of God. disaster

40

A first in Constitution debt was introduced clause of The need not be (Art. IV, re §VI, ¶4). history 1844 in had incurred substantial bonded counted detail. States result of in as the purposes, indebtedness pursuit near For that rea which ensued. bankruptcy bankruptcy into all of son debt were almost incorporated clauses Kervick, J. Clayton v. 52 N. 146— state constitutions. was to a object prevent legislature (1968). or to limit or condition its binding succeeding legislatures, absolutely debt pro so. About half of clauses power do sum; a in the clauses two hibit loans in excess stipulated a major loans a vote of more than States such permit upon loans if permit others such ity legislators; Constitutional the voters on referendum. approved by Foundation, Debt Tax Control the States Inc. (The Heins, 17; against Constitutional Restrictions 1954), p. 12; Stale Debt 93-120. In pp. pp. upholding (1963), 9— clause constitutionality requiring approval debt 60% States said voters, Supreme Court United to issue bonds tersely: “It must be remembered that voting of infants committing, voters are credit part, unborn, on such and some restriction com- generations yet Lance, mitment an demand.” Gordon is not unreasonable 1889, 1892, 403 U. S. Ct. L. Ed. 1, 6, S. 2d clause thus to Legislature Our debt bind (1971). permits if approved by majority debt is legislatures succeeding on the pro- of the State legally voting of voters qualified For further unreasonable treatment against assurance posal. 35 years our clause also limits to of future debt taxpayers, which must be requires within the debt period liquidated, means, and ways to state “the exclusive of measure loans,” interest, prohibits pay principal law repeal prior payment. clause, appro- am not of the

I the debt speaking II, VIII, clause Art. Constitution, priations § ¶ in As to the majority opinion. ap- length discussed at clause, propriations I with the agree majority it does not all require State revenues shall go into physically the State treasury.

I find the debt clause applies chapter this upon thesis: that the (1) constitutional provision rac- permitting ing parimutuel betting mandates that shall be a there reasonable yield revenue to the State every such opera- tion, and an (2) irrevocable pledge by the State of that revenue for the of a payment debt the Authority makes that debt a debt of the State within the meaning debt clause despite the disavowal in the statute that the State incurs an indebtedness or its credit. I pledges will discuss those in propositions that order.

(!) has a Gambling well history. documented constitutional The Constitution “No shall be provided lottery state; authorized by this and no any ticket in lottery authorized a law of this shall be or sold bought state within the IV, state.” Art. 2. VII, This was paragraph ¶ § amended 1897 to read: lottery b.o legislature shall be authorized or otherwise state, any lottery

this bought and no ticket shall be or sold within state, this pool-selling, making nor shall gambling any book or kind be state, authorized or allowed within this nor shall gambling practice device, game prohibited by or of chance now law legalized, remedy, penalty punishment provided or the or now any way therefor be in diminished. prohibition The was thus absolute, and it barred gambling event without to the regard identity operator public purpose sought to be furthered with the proceeds The ban gambling. applied itself; it, too, could not conduct a venture. gambling

Parimutuel was betting introduced aby constitutional amendment in 1939. clause, amended, gambling thus read:

43 on, operate hold, carry in race and this State shall lawful It be racing running steeplechase meetings trotting, of or whereat may sunset and the hours of sunrise horses be conducted between tracks, days only duly legalized race at which the in on week roulette, lottery, permitted. pari-mutuel system betting No of shall be Legislature game any authorized of of form shall be or chance bought lottery any State, or shall he sold ticket in this no pool-selling, State, sale; book- shall for nor within this or offered any making, gambling allowed within kind authorized or or of be racing State, except pari-mutuel betting of on results of this only, revenue reasonable shall derive a which the Slate horses device, prac- gambling government; support nor shall of chance, for prohibited betting pari-mutuel tice, game thereon now or or legalized, provided, by law, except otherwise be herein stated and as provided remedy, punishment penalty, therefor be now or the any way diminished. shall “from which the State I the phrase have italicized revenue for the support government.” derive reasonable campaign was critical This revenue promise beyond amendment, I think of the 1939 the adoption mandatory its demand for revenue explicit dispute and unyielding. 1939 amendment an history

The includes abortive to authorize attempt parimutuel to obtain legislative betting revenues. In a fiscal mu- finding emergency affecting adopted chapter which author- nicipalities, Legislature “for ized to lease municipalities property conducting under the operation greyhound racing parimutuel also 179 which Legislature adopted chapter system.” authorized the State Commission to issue licenses for Racing that “a financial exists emergency such operations. Reciting and other whereby in this State sub- municipalities political taxes,” unable collect their the State are sec- divisions that “for the of chapter provided purpose tion subdivisions where such and such assisting municipalities allowed, may per- Commission Racing be dog racing under such system use of the terms pari-mutuel mit tire portion profits and wherein they may prescribe for the thereof.” This support to the paid municipality unconstitutional blatantly was found to be so scheme aof licensed track operator was held liable in a suit for under another penalties statute as- notwithstanding his sertion an that act of Legislature authorizing parimutuel should betting provide protective cover to a prior judicial that void. declaration it is Branch Hyman Kennel Long Club, Inc., 115 N. J. L. 123 & A. In (E. 1934 the 1935).

New Jersey State Racing Commission a urged constitutional amendment to permit parimutuel on the betting, premise that In revenues would be obtained. First Annual Re- its port (1935), the Commission stressed the State’s need for revenue and the tax predicted on admissions on wager- $1,500,000 would ing provide The per year (pp. 19-22). a

Commission used tax 3y2% wagers on that computing yield. estimated The amendment proposed op- strong drew on So, economic as well moral for position ex- grounds. Senators, a news item 1939 that five

ample, reported argued (1) projected assailing racing proposal, $1,500,000 inflated; was yield (2) referendum would $1,000,000; cost increase (3) legalized racing would rolls; a would result (4) corrupt lobby (Newark relief News, Jersey 17, 1939, The New 2:1). June Evening p. The Economic of Commerce issued report,

Chamber Effects the amend- Pari-Mutuel Horse Racing opposing (1939), tax reve- the probable ment the theme that expounding to business done damage nues would not compensate in this State. history

Thus amendment shows clearly derive its mandate to revenue is an essential part of the constitutional provision. Legislature cannot au- parimutuel betting upon thorize except compliance with that demand. The amendment was incorporated in IV, entirety VII, Art. its of the Constitution of § ¶ reference therein to “heretofore sub- gambling to, mitted and authorized by majority of votes cast by the at a people special election.” The “restrictions” Hence continued. amendment were expressly

in the 1939 derive reasonable “the shall the mandate remains that for the support government.” revenue terms of the gambling A reference to other passing theme for the clause the 1947 Constitution is appropriate, produce is permitted is consistent gambling Thus certain worthy organizations for some end.2 moneys net or raffles “when the entire may conduct bingo games chance are to be devoted to educa- of such proceeds games tional, charitable, uses.” public-spirited patriotic, religious So, too, “to the 1969 amendment empowers Legislature * * * authorize lotteries when the the conduct of State for entire net of such shall be State proceeds lottery institutions, aid for education.” The thesis undeviating State been that will for mere has not be gambling permitted amusement or for alone. private profit

There is cause to doubt that the itself may State operate whether parimutuel directly or some betting, through agency. said, As the 1897 ban already constitutional against gambling barred State as well as a operation one. The private pari- mutuel amendment of 1939 the 1969 lottery State (unlike provision) seems to contemplate private management the State a tax revenue from deriving operation. None- theless, since a constitutional restriction upon legisla- tive power should be read will narrowly if sense permit it, I would not read it to ban a State But operation. would do violence to the demand of plain the gambling clause if the State operated parimutuel without satis- betting demand for positive of fying production “reasonable revenue for the Thus, of support government.” although the State customarily does its own exempt opera- statute, racing (without 2 Even the 1933 which authorized horse gambling), required yield gross a tax of of the admission fees 10% thereby by directed that the “revenue received the State Treasurer regularly incorporated hospitals shall over him be turned to either caring charity patients regularly incorporated for to or homes crippled 333, L. children this State.” c. § 12. tions ox of those from taxation section agencies its to do, h here the power of chapter purports subd. demand pari- constitutional is restrained

exempt “a reasonable revenue for mutuel shall betting yield matter, in this of And it cannot support government.” directly the operation whether the State conducts regard, a corporate agency. or through view, as whether my room for argument, in a of State operation of thus obtained

all the dollar gain for the support be “revenue must deemed to gambling com is constitutionally whether there of government” much of that so government only mitted for support a private opera tax imposed upon revenue as matches the is thus I all dollar gain gambling tion. think 137 would trans committed, chapter either view but upon Authority’s substantial projects fer to the support to be obtained which the clause requires revenues gambling provide does Chapter for the support government. an payment

in section subd. f that “as initial all State, pools an amount parimutuel equal 1% Eund.” annually shall be the General deposited all of revenue That does not represent course deposit tax from the Nor it match the does gaming operation. which,

imposed parimutuel pools private operator, upon $40,000,000 as to harness all pools up racing, 6% in a the above year respect calendar to excess 7% of total that to other the racing, as figure, 9.15% N. L. c. J. S. A. 5:5-66 amended pools. by as 1. as Legislature yields The established those thereby § the of government.” “reasonable revenue for the support 1 under but a yi per of cent 137 is payable chapter small of that “reasonable revenue.” portion 137 had not at betting

If excluded parimutuel chapter tax on from the statute the imposing track Authority’s the had the and instead directed that betting, parimutuel much the tax revenue so of Authority Treasurer the pay of 1 cent track as exceeds per the Authority’s Y2 46

its pools, it would be evident that 137 chapter transferred tax revenues to the for Authority payment the its bonds and notes. That fact should be no less evident because chapter took the form of the tax to limiting y¿ cent per of the Authority’s pools. I avoid the

Thus cannot proposition chapter for payment would make available the of the Authority’s indebtedness a substantial of the portion revenues mandated the Constitution “for by go to the State the support Indeed, government.” basic to the of the plan sports con- glomerate is the financial role supporting that parimutuel This, expected course, was gambling provide. by Attorney the from his recognized passage General the brief above said finan- quoted wherein he “The to the key ** * cial success of Authority lies the fact that must de- pay only y2 one cent of the total handle per rived from pari-mutuel treasury, wagering general to the compared to the larger paid privately percentage owned racetracks.”

I there is no want to make it constitutional plain these monej^s support to the use of venture objection Authority. Since seeks to further chapter may decide to project constitutionally pursue, Legislature State, tax whatever it follows that revenues of their source, to that end of course expended (except Constitution to some special revenues dedicated use). could all So the Legislature appropriate tax yielded by parimutuel revenues at private tax from a or from an in- tracks, gasoline the revenues short, In tax. the use of the revenues heritance derived at the track Authority’s Authority’s from betting would indeed constitute use of such revenues for purposes within support government meaning clause. But the issue is whether gambling statute directing of revenues can bind future disposition legislatures with the compliance specific the absence of demands of

47 Constitution, which, notable among debt clause of the voters.3 of the course, approval the demand for the of is Finger Racing Pari- State Assn. v. New York 3 In Lakes Off-Track Betting Commission, Y. 2d N. Y. 2d 331 N. S. Mutuel betting (March 1972), authorized off-track the statute 2d 592 N. E. purpose. pro corporation public a for that The statute created parimutuel per off-track of cent on all vided for tax of one-half one corporation pay reve bets, its net of to directed the 80% municipality participating up $200,000,000 to the nues to 20% equally State, divided total to be the excess over the stated parimutuel municipality. clause of The between the State and the ours, Constitution, adopted also man as was York the New sup for the derive a reasonable revenue dated that “the State shall betting government.” upon port statute The the off-track attack municipal provision claim that the for distribution included the ity upheld by of 4 vote violated that The statute was mandate. rejected claim, (p. majority opinion saying that 3. The 594-595) p. 629, pp. N. : Y. S. 2d E. 2d 282 N. suggest go support Plaintiffs revenues which municipal support governments ‘government’ not for within language, sup- the constitutional or at least not port government. part of State But the of the net revenues which go participating municipalities closely to the is so tied to the dependence governments interrelated financial the local on the State, through agency political that fiscal assistance a State to the regarded sup- subdivisions of the State must be as revenue for the port government, may, Legislature of State since it and the could reasonably will, proportionately conclude benefit the State’s bookkeeping revenues. The end result fiscal balance be- governments. treasury tween revenue The beneficial effect on the State passing municipal governments on to which are creatures very private profits arising of pari-mutuel different from from by corporations operating pari-mutuel races tracks systems. parimutuel required dissenters held that The enues all clause of the rev- parimutuel gambling paid treasury, to be into the State appropriated periodically by legislation. further did case Presumably involve New York debt clause. not purport the statute did not irrevocably payment to commit revenues those to the municipality. any rate, At the issue debt which troubles me relevant, however, was not considered in ease. That case is in- majority sofar as both and the dissent deemed the total net revenue public corporation meaning to be within the “revenue” gambling clause.

48

(2) Thus we come to the question whether the irrevocable of State pledge revenue for payment of the Authority’s bonds notes comes within the clause of the debt Con- stitution.

The source of taxing power being principal State revenues, a commitment to tax binding revenues appropriate until a claim a result State “debt” liquidated must An upon reasonable view of the word. unqualified a promise levy tax for its payment must the hallmark of a debt. The here and decisions elsewhere amply support that evident proposition. divide, not whether upon

The cases elsewhere the question an a a tax promise impose payment obligation State, but rather makes debt obligation upon was intended all whether debt clause to embrace such In held, some it has been either upon debts. States of the debt clause or phrasing upon history, its their constitutions barred a tax only levy upon commitment to with the that an excise tax could be com- property, result irrevocably mitted to the without payment debt running afoul of the I clause. But would that such debt stress cases an do an say thus to be obligation paid irrevocable tax is excise than a other “debt” of the something State. propounded Rather the there the debt proposition is that was intended the owners protect clause of property from ad valorem taxation thereof and hence Legislature to incur a is free debt so as the owners of long property subjected upon are not to a tax their property holdings it. That view was taken State v. Board repay Public Instruction, 214 County, Okaloosa 723 So. 2d (Fla. Sup. 1968); Ct. v. Tampa Sports Authority, State 188 So. 2d 795 State ex Sup. Boynton Ct. rel. v. (Fla. 1966); Kansas Comm., 138 Kan. P. Highway 913, State 28 2d 770 (Sup. Examiners, 1934); Ct. v. State Board Cottingham 134 1, 328 P. ex Mont. 2d 907 State rel. (1958); Capitol Addition Building Comm. v. N. M. Connelly, 46 P. 312, 2d 1097 Ct. 1935); Briggs v. Greenville County, (Sup. S. 135 S. E. 153 (1926). C. an drawn between a tax and line thus property

excise tax of fiscal realities since the is odd the light an revenue. excise tax is indeed essential source debt deem jurisdictions Hence other understandably tax.4 Borchert clause to whatever the nature of the apply Scott, W. 248 Ark. S. 1970); 2d 28 Ct. (Sup. re Resolution 94 Colo. 31 P. 2d

In Senate No. 101, ex v. Chicago rel. City 325 People (Sup. 1933); Ct. of Barrett, E. 373 Ill. 26 N. 393, 1940); 2d 478 Ct. (Sup.

Curlin v. W. ; Wetherby, 275 S. 1955) 2d 934 Ct. App. (Ky. Commission, ex State rel. Diederichs v. Highway State 89 Steen, Mont. 296 P. State v. 205, 1033 Ct. (Sup. 1931); Neb. 297, 160 N. W. Boswell 183 164 2d Ct. (Sup. 1968); State, P. v. 181 Okl. ex State 435, 74 2d 940 (1937); Martin, rel. Finance v. Washington State Committee 62 Wash. 384 P. v. 833 645, 2d 2d see (1963); Naftalin King, 257 Minn. 102 N. W. 2d 301 (Sup. Ct. 1960); 498, rel. see also State ex Public Institutional Building Authority v. 135 Ohio Griffith, St. 22 N. E. 2d 200 604, Ct. (Sup. ex State rel. Public Institutional Au

1939); Building thority v. 137 Ohio Neffner, St. 30 N. E. 2d 705 390, 1940). Ct. (Sup. support Jur., 4 I do the not read cases to the statement in 49 Am. States, Territories, Dependencies, 67, p. 280, an § in the notation, (1936), “generally” R. 100 A. L. debt clauses only property have been construed to cover debts for which tan a is contrary, majority committed. On a of the courts do the not thus limit debt

the clause. encouraged A narrow a view of debt could be clause when clause the loans, absolutely prohibits distinguished permitting as from a clause bor- rowing upon Oregon, a referendiim In vote. in which the clause debt prohibition, notwithstanding is absolute in its a loan was sustained Meier, repayment, for tax commitment Moses v. 148 Ore. 1934). (Sup. P. 2d 981 opinion an Ct. was in excise tax fact tax but the spell did not out for the rationale the result. debt clause demonstrate that labor to We need valorem ad to a of pledge not limited of our Constitution which the Quite and means” “ways obviously taxes. be read mean cannot be specified debt clause requires tire 1844 the time at Indeed, “ad valorem tax.” an only property was no statewide there was adopted, Constitution derived from being government for tax, revenue State Con- present taxes, year and again excise tax State ended State adopted, was stitution withdrew thereby school aid) (for upon property Tax Jersey the New Report tax. the use of the property of 3. In II, p. light (1972), Committee Part Policy taxation history debt clause and our phrasing was clause the debt State, say startling our would be property. the taxation of shield against designed only irrevocable commitment an Thus it is me that plain of an obligation for payment tax revenue State within debt obligation thereby constitutes that This the Constitution.5 the reach of the debt clause of what we held in Holster Board Trustees precisely the Passaic N. J. County College, 59 There the (1971). statute of State provided appropriation moneys to of counties cover one-half the for sums needed the pay ment of bonds the statute authorized a to on issue county court, the sole credit. county’s The trial the construing to to make legislatures statute bind future such appropria held the debt clause and the statute invalid tions, applied for want of wtih compliance the constitutional provision. reversed, but only by finding We that the statute did not to annual bind the State make the appropriations. We said 66-67) : (pp. suggest moneys 5 I do not that an irrevocable commitment State of e., (i. property) other than from be derived beyond taxation of would sale moneys moment, the debt clause. The source of the is no in

my view of that clause. accepted principle statutory interpretation that, possi- It is an if ble, legislation constitutionality. will be so read as to sustain its Our reading judge. of the statute differs from the trial We hold obligations the bonds do not become the of the State and that impose upon legally binding the statute not the a does State or en- obligation pay county upon forceable to them or to reimburse the making payment. Accordingly its we there conclude that is in- no fringement provision of the debt limitation of the Constitution. Although strong payment is there doubtless a likelihood that by legislative appropriations, nothing will in be bonds fact met we find compelling payments in the statute the such make a Hence, issuing purchasing matter of law. both counties and bond- holders on notice that faith the and credit of the State will not pledged respect pursuant enactment, be of bonds issued to this part dependent payment upon ap- but that on the State will be propriations provided Lacking appropria- from to time. such time tions, only county against be had recourse can which will no have against recourse over the State. point Perhaps more sharply made by referring authorization the gambling provision of the Constitu- * ** tion for State lotteries “when the entire net proceeds shall institutions, be for State State aid for education.” If for statute provided $100,000,000 the issuance in bonds for moneys raise State institutions or for State aid for both, education for pledged irrevocably revenues from for State lotteries bonds payment within years, the statute would satisfy the mandate that the net revenues be devoted to the stated in public purposes clause. Such statute would meet gambling also the require- ments of the debt clause for statement of the use issue, by specification be furthered bond and means ways for the of the loan. But payment there would remain be satisfied the further demand of the debt clause that the loan authorized voters. by And it would matter stated the least the bonds explicitly would that the holder look to the revenues lotteries as the and means for and disavowed ways repayment Uor would further claim on the credit of State. it mat- directly ter bonds were issued the State or whether the reason, an of course, created to that end. The authority the that no can bind future as to use legislature legislatures without concurrence of the voters. That of tax revenues the aim clause. An pledge is the of the debt irrevocable and without voter defies the letter approval State revenues of that spirit provision. the

For the I find the Constitution given, (1) reasons revenue to the mandates that there be a reasonable yield from and 137 violates betting (2) chapter parimutuel insofar the mandated funds the debt clause as it commits held to all of mandated revenues are be (whether much so as parimutuel betting net revenues from at tax on such betting private matches yield its Authority upon tracks) support obligations and notes. bonds aspect then is whether unconstitutional

The this question Legis- it We assume the may fairly I think is. is severable. Act to remain. Whether would want the balance lature be will depend continues to viable course the program will

53 is no debt clause such problem in circumstances. I Indeed difference, see no in this between a regard, self-liquidating project to a entrusted corporate authority operated one so by State, the as directly the bonds are long payable from the revenues, own unaided an project’s by promise irrevocable of a tax. an proceeds Accordingly, abstract proposi- tion, could, the State a directly through author- corporate a ity, racetrack, with the acquire costs to paid solely be out of revenues the track. Such fit program within would doctrine, the fund special for I will present purposes, the assume of the track could be un- proceeds also pledged der that doctrine for the of cost the other sundry projects authorized 137. if am by chapter But I correct in view my the Constitution mandates that parimutuel betting shall for yield revenue support government, the special fund demand, doctrine would not obviate that constitutional for the fund special could consist the net proceeds after on tax has been exacted and required wagering paid to the State. Again, successive could legislatures ap- propriate those tax to the if special revenues fund they wished, for by hypothesis project is for a public purpose and tax revenues be to further that But spent purpose. remains can proposition unassailable that no statute bind end,

future to that legislatures except upon compliance with all provisions the debt including clause require- ment for the affirmative voters at approval an election for that purpose.

I add majority’s reply response foregoing dissent. The raised in the dissent majority say questions and therefore the do answer hypothetical majority them. then majority the State is bound its con- say a number of for tracts, citing indisputable cases proposi- tion. But the issue is whether the commitment the State acquisition may pledged payment itial for the additions to the project. Annotations, (1936) ; A. L. R. 579 A. R. L. (1946). is not hypothetical. and that issue lawful,

in the statute is unless I misunderstand of this proceeding, The very purpose which concern every might issue it, adjudged is to have A to know wants purchaser bonds. prospective purchaser the bonds pledged payment what revenues are he say It is no answer revocable. pledge whether that legislature departs and if future will out when find how I understand the prospec- Nor do script. statute’s the the the observation that enlightened by tive purchaser if major- will it. If the by the State be bound valid, contract is it will too late sold, after the bonds are be mean that ity commitment, the the legality for the to challenge State that the issue legal- demonstrate majority thereby then the And if the hypothetical. now and not must be ity decided not challenge legality mean that State majority all sale, after then of or their course of bonds either before Eor if example, would nullified. restraints be constitutional in of State bald de- a authorized the sale bonds legislature violation, clause, premise, that upon fiance the debt a This would be so because chal- beyond would be redress. on to issuance of the bonds be hypothetical would lenge a succeeding not to be ought supposed legis- thesis that it on other illegal act, lature would repudiate so, do try should to hand, succeeding legislature if late. that we Upon be too approach, would repudiation Holster, reached the debt clause issue should not have N. J. 60. supra, 59 mean the issues majority by “hypothetical”

Perhaps is, they of bonds academic, purchasers that that believe are free future because buy legislatures not decline would will be within their I have said the several actions to take academic, views are thus then If those to take. power majority that the omit respond will not matter course it will concerned purchasers them. But if prospective then, member views, every those validity with will be inhibited understands, of the bonds Court the sale issues con- do not decide those of the Court majority if the trary those views and do so unambiguously. The question then is whether the can majority opinion be read to pass upon those I am hypothetical” issues. satisfied the majority cannot stand opinion reading. several propositions are stated in Part IV succinctly of my opinion. The position of the majority upon those can propositions of course be stated easily and with directly, crystal clarity. Since the majority does opinion not address itself to of those I propositions, must conclude the opinion does under- take to them. pass upon This is supported the fact that the majority opinion does not to meet the attempt theses II expounded Points III of this deal opinion short, therein. In the authorities cited the most that majority can be from the is the gleaned opinion general commitment, is bound lawful proposition without however whether commitments here deciding are lawful or are made. lawfully question

IV I conclude Accordingly (1) fu- power remains in ture legislatures (a) abolish racing, the (b) reduce allotted if the racing days public interest so (c) requires, abolish parimutuel to withdraw from Au- betting, (d) the thority the net proceeds obtained from parimutuel betting at (or least so much as a tax thereon at of equals the rate taxation private at and will in cui- tracks), (2) the State no financial obligation the holders of bonds or notes of the if or all Authority actions are legislative those taken. The statute is nonetheless constitutional but the pur- chasers bonds or notes would be with notice chargeable these conclusions. J., in joins this opinion.

Proctor, J. in

Hall, (concurring part and in dissenting part). These consolidated actions sought declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality the New Ex- Jersey Sports and 137, L. c. N. J. S. A. 5 :10-1 Authority law,

position 1971, et an seq., agency creating empowering (“Authority”) what referred to for operate to construct and present a 750 as a acre enclave within sports complex on purposes 21,000 acres of salt water meadows and marshes swamps, River Reclamation de- lower Hackensack basin. of these were earlier committed to meadowlands velopment an regional autonomous the Hackensack Meadow- agency, L. c. 1968, lands Commission Development (“Agency”), by N. J. A. et law 404, Sports S. 13:17-1 The seq. Authority from the of the jurisdiction removes this enclave largely broad but Agency grants very powers Authority, at the time considerable interrelation with the same requires The acre site been selected Agency. by Sports has Authority with concurrence of the (presumably Agency c. demands, 5, law L. Authority x); as the subd. § Rutherford, the area in the Ber- comprises Borough East bounded Route gen County, Highway Berry’s Creek, Paterson Plank Road and the western spur New included area constitutes Jersey Turnpike. Some land tides below state-owned tideland flowed (the up- flowed mean water some non-tide high line); represents land presently by private persons. claimed com- raised are questions

The constitutional numerous diverse, by many parties having quite advanced plex the trial court is dealt Each interests. differing All 1971). J. Div. N. Super. (Law opinion. face, on its statute essentially validity directed to the of various the legality scheme, i. e. as distinct facts, Certain physical implementation. forms of possible however, were, stipulated, opinion, trial court set forth en- of some concrete generally speaking, for the purpose, raised, including to the with respect questions lightenment Au- immediate plans concerning information entered shows that thority. stipulation the York Giants 1971 with New into lease August rental of a for the term long large football team professional stadium to be constructed the for Authority primarily the use of team. Construction com- required a very menced at date. early also the issuance Implicit and sale by the of a of Authority very amount bonds large to finance that construction as well as the of early erection a state-owned and operated racetrack free (tax except of the pari-mutuel since “handle”), the net 1% profit track the is the principal source to meet debt service and to financially future support projects Authority. trial

The court all rejected to the challenges act as legally insufficient the declared it to judgment be constitutional and valid. Procedurally, cases were decided by grant motion for Authority’s summary judgment, although perhaps disposition could have as well been treated as a trial on non-jury stipulated facts.

The court effect decided that beyond evidence the facts stipulated was legally irrelevant to the chal- constitutional lenges advanced, including certain claims based eco- upon logical environmental considerations. opinion

The of this court affirms majority judgment for the reasons constitutionality substantially given by the trial without mention most of judge questions I raised. cannot majority’s added views on the accept covenants in act c. 7 and (L. 15) against §§ action, bonds, future life of the rela- legislative during tive to continuance of racing pari-mutuel betting, the number of racing days guaranteed to this track and the its revenues inviolability Authority. for use opinion joins the Chief Justice in the majority opinion (and so concurs the trial judge) except he finds that covenants future statutory against legisla- just tive action referred do violate the debt provision Constitution, but are severable. would, He therefore assume, I modify judgment do specify. The differ- that, ence in effect pursuant would be to Holster v. Board of Trustees Passaic J. 60 Qouniy College, N. (1971), such

bondholders would not be protected subsequent against Authority’s action and of the revenues legislative dimunition by reason thereof. to the effect with Chief Justice as thoroughly agree

I and provisions principles constitutional debt and other of the I II, opinion. III and of his forth in IY as set Parts to other matters differences, however, respect have some opinions,' and the trial court his, majority with in dealt reason of im- I be mentioned by which feel ought to addition, it In I believe matter. subject portance I be decided in this to state what conceive advisable of time and the length case. Because pressure date, will sum- my three views be stated opinions quite fashion. mary not referred to in outset, is question although

At view my is opinions, Sports any of other Development so related to the Meadowlands Authority law is in- Authority’s act and the so operations Commission the former law with the functions terwoven Agency’s event unless the latter is constitutional. stand in cannot latter under challenge statute is validity The us. Decision that case pending before appeal another amendments recently been deferred reason proposed has inter-municipal provisions to its vital now tax-sharing the Legislature. before

I As to con empowered public purpose. events,” and facilities for “spectator struct operate sporting facilities, for racetrack, stadiums related including well as facilities for “trade public, the recreation industry in order to promote shows other expositions a forum for in the State provide and development L. 2. c. All to date opinions events.” § a “public activities constitute agree purpose” that such may only that state revenues within the requirement Al- used within that projects encompassed concept. area,

though has wide discretion in the Legislature one for our question still under judiciary system checks balances. The record discloses the projects date be a and a racetrack proposed state-operated football stadium for a lease to enterprise. profit-designed present The read general should not be to holding grant all for time carte blanche any facility activity to or Authority may decide to construct operate. a a majority opinion treats racetrack permissible as

governmental activity because it supplies “recreation for the people.” Realistically, racetracks of the kind planned only here exist to enable them on people go wager which can they horse races observe in the flesh. They state, tolerated in this as the of our history pro- gambling shows, visions that a only so tax on such heavy wagers may be exacted for I purposes doubt that government. they can be classed as recreational in the sense that state or even parks professional football are. stadiums I suppose, however, that state construction operation of tracks can be for validly classified as a public because of purpose the revenue feature —and here the will also re- Authority for ceive its which purposes profits would accrue to an if the owner track were private.

Modern cases to unanimously appear uphold governmental sports construction arenas as for public even purpose, part when used by profit-making entre- large professional should, however, Such be preneurs. operators required full market value for the fixed pay lease, at arm’s length, well which of the require disclosure lessee’s proposed At time, financial records. the same the use so granted so to prevent should not be as fair availability exclusive the stadium other athletic uses public functions to Otherwise, which is is adapted. subsidizing venture at public private profit-making expense — in effect a donation resources to a making private — one, and the no a public corporation purpose longer sports notwith- on professional court’s peroration trial Const., VIII, III, 3. par. Art. Such See 1947 standing. § Judicial Supreme the Massachusetts was view of the sound Justices, N. E. 775, 356 Mass. Opinion Court in the Giants football 558-60 The lease with 547, 2d (1969). is, however, I make not us. The point team is before it. thought approve not be should majority opinion N. J. law, racing As The general to a racetrack referendum. be A. racetrack to established 5:5-39.1, S. permits of the at a election general approval the affirmative upon in which it municipality county voters of c. subd. d specifi L. to be located. proposed § no referendum shall for this provides cally required I correctly track. Part of the Justice opinion Chief out if this were contained in the rac points exception act, it would be invalid here concerned ing denying the residents equ of treatment. But he concludes that ality Legislature passed which was bound chapter which adopted general racing decision one prior law and so the later controls and is valid. This provision be result has to reached on the thesis that the no-referendum 137 this im as to state-owned track provision chapter racing the referendum pliedly repealed requirements law all owned I myself as to tracts. find privately future to with these conclusions. agree Implied repealers unable favored; an are not such intention must be free from reason able It that intended Legislature doubt. is inconceivable track be result, only such but rather this should In such situation the specially differently. treated will be an exception statute considered to special Foods, Hotel Bar 18 State v. N. J. statute. See general 128 And the later statute (1955). creating exception re enactment in order to validly must be constitutional National Insurance Washington See strict the earlier act. general Review, N. Co . Board J. 557 (1949). in to neither statute is unconstitutional but Here itself scheme, an unconstitutional they denying constitute gether proteetiou the residents of Bergen County equal East Rutherford. The results from the later invalidity act and I would therefore hold that Section subd. ofd chapter unconstitutional doing away the referendum I and would requirement, modify the declaratory judgment In my view, however, so state. the entire is not chapter rendered I thereby since believe that invalid, the Legisla- ture would intend the balance of the act to remain even a favorable though referendum vote would be required make effective.

As to the debt and related provisions Constitution. indicated,

As earlier I concur completely with the Chief Justice interplay racing provisions debt provision of the Constitution requires holding that the debt provision is violated by the covenants chapter future against legislative action life during the bonds in the respects previously enumerated, but that Au bonds be thority may validly issued without the covenants. Holster, 59 N. J.

(See supra, I would 60). add only this. So would not mean holding the Legislature may not make these guarantees, only that, but in accordance with the debt the voters of the provision, state must approve such commitments long term to make them on binding future — a Legislatures power expressly reserved to the people.

There are sound for reasons policy requirement. Sources revenue interest and pay must be principal specified and dedicated for life of the Such obligations. sources, to the extent are thus thereafter required, unavailable for use for other governmental purposes. revenue sources and, are not inexhaustible if too of them many are appro- too priated pay many issues, bond remaining futuro revenue sources other adequate necessary functions. there governmental And is the question priori- with respect many ties capital state; needs of this may some as much more thought important than others. provision

The debt these are envisages matters which a term capital large, long should decide before people made, is commitment, once for the project undertaken, irretrievable. fall within this type enactments of statutory

Whether certainly question debt provision the four corners nothing That has determination. judicial question for validly bring nor wisdom of statute does do with the ac- legislative, deference to judicial about into rubrics play like. The and the constitutionality tion, presumptions misses is inappropriate stress thereon majority’s evasion court to aid wrong And I think it point. quite only years last adopted of a constitutional provision, outmoded. The func- it believes that provision because ago, all pro- enforce constitutional tion of the is to judiciary not to act as an all branches of government visions upon nuga- render summarily ad convention to hoc constitutional v. Ker Roe with which it disagree. tory provisions Cf. vick, Clay N. J. opinion) (1964); (concurring Kervick, J. 138, 52 N. 159 (concurring opinion) ton (1968).

II As considerations. Some and environmental ecological re arguments have fashioned constitutional parties environmental considerations. around volving ecological and future are of tremendous present These considerations northeastern public importance, especially people densely New the most populated portion Jersey, state in union. The constitu most densely populated tional were the trial court. rejected by contentions mentions the from the considerations majority opinion Au statutory, procedural viewpoint prerequisite I more activity. think should be said at thority something level. this finally

Modem man has come to realize —I hope not too resources late —that of nature are inexhaustible. air cannot be misused or Water, land abused without dire and present future to all mankind. consequences Undue disturbance of the chain has ecological its ef- devastating fect at far distanct places and density times. Increased population continuing residential, commercial and in- dustrial development are these truths impressing us. upon We trust solution of problems our in this vital area can be aided by modern technology and the expenditure of money, it but seems evident that we must also thoroughly respect the balance of nature.

One of the most areas this con- important ecological nection “estuarine so-called area between zone”—that sea and the land. Our has de- Legislature specifically clared, in the wetlands act c. N. J. S. A. (L.

13 :9A-1 et it “one of the vital and seq.) most pro- ductive our areas of natural world” and that “it is neces- sary to preserve balance of ecoligical this area prevent its further deterioration and destruction by regu- lating dredging, filling, or otherwise removing altering thereof.” N. polluting 13:9A-1, J. S. A. subd. a.1 The are a Hackensack meadowlands estuarine part zone—about the last natural still its state largely in northeastern New man Jersey. Everyone knows that has abused them beyond almost belief vast pollution the water and the of hundreds of acres of dumping garbage. J. act, Hackensack N. A. meadowlands S. 13:17—1

et their seq., recognizes as well im- ecological as economic While its portance. design is to provide means for the orderly, comprehensive thereof more development provide space needed metropolitan industrial, area com- mercial, residential and recreational and other uses, it also declares that these meadowlands “need special pro- tection air and water pollution special arrange- ments for the provision facilities for the disposal of solid operation 1 The Hackensack meadowlands are excluded from the act, specifically relating the wetlands but the statute to them con comparable provisions. tains See infra. the ecological to consider necessity and that “the

waste” the meadowlands the environment of constituting factors of nature the delicate balance preserve and the need to imposed develop any artificially to avoid must be recognized but affect this area only ment that would not adversely A. declara . . .” N. J. S. 13 :17—1. The- the entire State . to both state-owned apply is intended to obviously tion objective land. The appears and owned privately tidelands for be that of a construction development to balanced —new mentioned, human with at the same the uses previously natural of at or restoration of the state preservation time least of the meadows so to portion substantial as I delicate of nature.” should think destroy “the balance latter to have consideration. The task ought primary is out this Herculean Agency objective carrying im Solomon-like, and almost we cannot assume is but ; call, however, possible accomplishment its does for the highest degree of because destruction public responsibility, the natural state cannot be later undone.

This imposed, same with the same standards obligation, carried over into the section 23 of Authority law 1971, 137): act c. (L. authority Legislature express It intent complex undertaking with the Meadow- shall consult the meadowlands Department Protection and the of Environmental lands Commission constituting respect ecological the environment factors to the environ- the end that the delicate meadowlands to Hackensack may be maintained Hackensack meadowlands balance of the mental preserved. way indicates by guidelines, opinion

As the majority determination the three calls for hearing this will be all interested parties given at which agencies views, with the to right their present opportunity reached, all as a necessary conclusion review of the judicial commencement of construction or any prerequisite disturbance of the natural While ma- present state.2 jority expressly refers to the site of the I complex, pre- sume reference is intended well, as as the implies statute c. x), subd. (L. and character “type § project thereof and all part other matters in connection with all or any part of the . . project . .” I would thus suppose this procedure would also have be repeated as additional projects of the Authority proposed. Furthermore, it would seem that the ecological and environmental impact cannot be projects considered in a vacuum, but rather in relation to the Agency’s plans proposals for the remainder of the mea,dowlands.

I with the agree majority necessity this precedent hearing and agency determination. What dis- turbs me is the tone of the opinion of it. I speaking gain the therefrom that impression while the agencies must motions, the go through can be a proceeding perfunctory, and a one, cut dried with result, foreordained with which no would disagree. court alarm Perhaps my is accentuated majority’s from quotation legislative committee tes- act, in timony support and especially that of the Director of the Department of Environmental Protection— the state official having duty to see to the protection of as one stating reason for approval of environment — act that Authority the sports complex “would help to our a little of its own.” give identity This to me is with the keeping not obligation of his office. IAs have intimated, this ecological and environmental review is an “remand,” majority speaks presumably a 2 The to the three purpose, right agencies, any party desiring for this with the review apply Technically thereof to this court direct certification. sufficiency speaking, encompassed a of such determination is not present envisaged suits. I that within take it what ais new judicial proceeding directly would review which be certified to this application, appeal a notice of on after court the determination Appellate been filed in the Division. has Authority’s proposed vital absolutely prerequisite and form. its extent permissible and will determine project and explored thoroughly These must be considerations other, reached, upon or the way one sound determination Any- environmental aspects. unbiased consideration all term long harm to the may well in untold thing less result public interest. argument, constitutional principal I understand the

As a federal There is its fullest extent: runs like this in environment,” and wholesome to “a clean right constitutional Amend- the Fourteenth possibly the Finth and derived from Implementation Constitution. United States ments meadow- Hackensack to the entire respect of that right facts and conclusion, basis of on the lands requires trial, these that to be at proved opinions proposed expert after natural state in their completely should remain lands development artificial reclamation from pollution, and wholesome a clean destroy irreparably of them would surrounding region, environment that area de- law in such permitting therefore that This claimed constitutional is unconstitutional. velopment exact tenor and amorphous is a very concept, right I find it difficult to comprehend. of which boundaries most in time, developed although be there is con- theory believe, however, it. I yet authority no eededly support of such constitutional need right existence in this case so no fact issue thereon is determined so This is because the properly presented. Legislature, declarations, standards and statutory virtue mandates to, has directed en- referred previously ecological must be and vironmental considerations recognized given effect. positive appropriate

Ill trust As doctrine. This public concept is advanced a basis for constitutional one of argument by the par- ties in my and view deserves than it further mention in I given majority that it does opinion, although agree not to the on-the-face of go Authority constitutionality act and its here is not involved this precise application at time. The is concerned with doctrine limitations on the of utilization and alienation lands owned tide-flowed by state. (The stipulation Authority’s of facts states that acreage lands, includes substantial of amount such appar- ently contemplated purchased be by state; to, we not informed as and this case in its

present posture involve, does the location or exact amount thereof or precisely what use is of proposed them.) be made

Practical limitations extended discussion of the preclude doctrine. It ancient and was origin recognized Eng- common law and lish Por Charta. Magna present pur- it be poses may simplistically defined as state ownership all tide-flowed lands mean up high-water mark, but subject to and permanent irrevocable trust the common benefit and use, resources, as water of all peo- of the state. It has ple long recognized been in this country Illinois Central Railroad (see Co. v. People the State Illinois, 146 U. S. Ct. 110, S. 36 L. Ed. 1018 (1892)) this (Arnold Mundy, state 6 N. L. J. Ct. it (Sup. 1821)), can be although safely said

has not been to in all fully adhered our later cases. I think it now time that high the doctrine be reinvigorated en- forced its full intent and purpose light modern conditions, even we though not be able to undo prior of it. transgressions tidal water Remaining en- resources within it compassed scarce, are becoming very upon demands them, by reason increased population industrial de- heavier, velopment are much and their importance to the public welfare have much become more We apparent. should common safeguard the and interest in what is right left. doctrine, at least in state, this does not prohibit all

use and alienation state such lands, but convey- must subject ances to use conditions depending on the Such conveyances

nature of the land involved. particular rights have to always subject public been the ancient me, navigation fishery. Today it speaking quite seems well rec- that these should include as broadly, public rights bathing, surfing, reational uses where such as appropriate, small on the land below launching walking boats line when Water-related mean the tide high-water permits. uses itself thereto. be where the land lends ought permitted a harbor or tidal would be docks and piers along Examples as the site for abutments estuary. Important public uses such for within the of the trust. bridge seem likewise purpose difficult Compliance problem with trust becomes more are where vast areas of involved tide-flowed meadowlands closely physically where such tidelands are especially connected with non-tidal land. Uses gen- owned privately — meadow for limited to two choices erally filling for the ultimate economic benefit the erection of structures natural state for ecological its people leaving I a balance here presume and limited recreational purposes. portion for some with the each, be struck allowing being by determined the extent allocated the former of the natural state. for preservation need utmost expert knowledge calls This decision faith consideration. objective, good doctrine and that con said trial court recognized tidelands contem state-owned to the veyance not violate it. I think the reasons act would by plated and I sound, are not do that conclusion support given fact them. The mere as approving want to understood by received moneys will be and the paid compensation J. A. S. by (N. statute required deposited, the state Fund for the constitutionally protected in the :1B-13.13), VIII, IV, Art. sec. (Const. Public Schools Free Support establish compliance in and of itself does not 2), par. All received moneys trust requirements. and dedi public purpose used for must be source Nor compliance nothing. fund adds school

cation incontrovertibly demonstrated the fact will that the lands e., i. promote public purpose, racetrack and football stadium. Since do know we not what precise use of tide- flowed lands within the 750 contemplated by acres is the Au- thority, any conclusion as to with compliance trust doctrine is at this quite impossible juncture. point the true of the doctrine be met in requirements must agency location, determinations as to the type and character of the Authority’s in projects various relation to tide-flowed and, owned land the state in decisions of indeed, Meadowlands Commission as to development plans area, that, whole and in my will opinion, compliance be established simply upon above noted bases stated trial court.

I concur with the trial court in its conclusions as to the other issues raised not herein in discussed the majority and, this court as I opinion indicated, have re- of a quirement majority opinion precedent hearing on and determination ecological environmental consid- erations.

I would modify the declaration of L. constitutionality c. set respects II, forth III IV parts opinion Chief Justice and with re- additionally of a spect the matter racetrack referendum as set forth in this opinion.

For Jacobs, Francis, Justices Schettino affirmance: Mountain —4.

For Chief Justice and Justices Weintraub modification: Hall —-3. Proctor In to secure bonds notes payment order them include Authority authorizing pro- lution of the

Notes

notes bonds or Authority, dis obligation rely upon they State, and alone.” upon obligation from the tinguished Jersey Turnpike Authority New See, also, J. 73. N. at

notes be Authority bonds and whether the upon Holster, that suc- buyers if understand, purchased the revenues not bound thus devote legislatures ceeding to the Authority conducted from parimutuel betting notes. those bonds payment a to the end that its irrelevance subject mention I should out. There is fund” doctrine “special pointed when a self-liquidating facility acquired. usually invoked fund,” “the the users constitute special charges paid The fund alone that bondholder agrees is to and it this referred to concept fund was payment. special look Parsons, J. 3 N. Turnpike New Jersey Kervick, at Clayton v. N. J. 149. supra, 246 (1949), purchase that when bonds issued to held generally It is out the user payable charges are thus facility debt clause does not I there else, apply.6 agree nothing go step project further courts hold where 6 Most self-liquidating basis, acquired on a the revenues from the in- thus

Case Details

Case Name: New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane

Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Date Published: May 12, 1972

Citation: 292 A.2d 545

Court Abbreviation: N.J.