17 N.J.L. 25 | N.J. | 1839
By the 6th section of the act incorporating the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company, it is provided, that in case of disagreement, as to price, between the Company and the landholder, it shall be the duty of one of the Justices of this Court, upon the application of either party, to appoint three Commissioners to determine “the compensation and damages, which the owner of the real estate or land, lias sustained, by reason of the occupancy thereof by the said corporation.”
Such is the awkward language of the statute; the meaning of which, I apprehend to be, that the Commissioners shall determine the value of the land taken by the company, for the construction of the road, and the damages the land holder may sustain, by reason of having the road made across his land. The statute further directs that the Commissioners shall assess the damages, which any individual may sustain by the said road, “arising from the removing, making and maintaining, the fencing, on the line of the route, of said road, through any improved lands, over which the same may run:” and the Commissiaaers
In Ihis case, Commissioners were appointed upon the application cf the Company. Two of them, (the other dissenting) have awarded to Mr. Suydam, the landholder, the sum of five ilioncum:! eight hundred dollars, for liso land taken by Rio Company, the ihuujges done to Mr.;, by making the road through his lands, and for running, ¡caking and maintaining the fca'ce bn the line of the road where the sains crosses the lands of the defendant. The CiirataiseiomTs have not made two awards; so much for the Talus: of <ho land end damages ; and so Mach .for making ami maintaining fence; but they have awarded the aggregate sum of five thousand eight hundred dollars, to bo paid by the Company to Mr. Suydam; which they say, includes the sura of one hundred and two dollars, asnensed by them for running, making and maintaining the fence, &c. It appears upon the face of the award, that the Company occupied fifty-one hundredths of an acre of land belonging to the defendant, which from the evidence and exhibits in the cense, is pari of an entire tract, or rather of two parcels of land, lying contiguous to each other, separated only ?jy a street or highway, containing in the wliole, six and a half acres. So that deducting the one hundred and two dollars from the five thousand eight hundred dollars, if appears that the Commissioners have allowed Mr. Suydam five thousand six hundred and ninety-eight dollars, for fifty-one hundredths of an acre of land, taken by the Company for their use.
The Company being dissatisfied with this award, by leave of this Court, sued out a writ of Certiorari to the Clerk of the county of Middlesex, directing him to send up and certify to as, the record and proceedings aforesaid, to the end that the same might he set aside if any error therein hath intervened.
If they are not improved lands, (whatever that expression may mean) the Commissioners have exceeded their authority : they have gone beyond their jurisdiction, and their proceedings, so far at least, as relates to that matter, are illegal anti void.
It is no answer- to this objection, to say, .nor even to prove by evidence dehors the record, that the lands in question were improved lands. The fact may be, and probably is so, but it must appear on the face of the award, or else the record will be incomplete. We cannot put such supplementary evidence on the record in the Clerk’s Office, and thus patch up the award and sustain the jurisdiction of the Commissioners. The rule, I apprehend to be clear and well settled, that persons exercising a special delegated authority, must show upon the face of their-proceedings, that they have acted within their prescribed limit, In Rex v Inhabitants of Audley; 2 Salk. 526, Holt, Chief Justice says, as Twisdcn, Justice,had said before him, “if a particular jurisdiction does not show the matter to be within its authority, it must be taken to be without it.” The case of the King v Croke, Cowp. 26, decided in 1774, is a direct authority on this point. By 9 Geo. 3, power was given to the Mayor, Aldermen, &c. to treat for the purchase of certain lands, for the construction of a highway, and in case of disagreement, then the Quarter Sessions, upon the application of the Mayor, &c. and upon, fourteen days previous notice in writing, given to the landholder, were to summon a jury to assess the value of the land. The Corporation being unable to agree with the person owning, or interested in the land, a jury was empannelled, and an assessment made. Whereupon the Quarter Sessions made an order, stating, that “ upon application being made, &c. by the Mayor, commonalty, and citizens of &c., and upon proof on oath, of due notice having been given, &c.” This proceeding was removed by Certiorari into the- Kings Bench, and it was objected among other things. 1st. That it did not appear in the order off Sessions, that the Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council in
The case of Rex v. Manning, 1 Burr, 377, is to the same effect. The Court held, that the existence of the particular circumstances, which gave authority to the Sessions, if not in the form of express and direct adjudication, ought, in some way, to appear on the face of the record. So too in the case of The King v The Mayor &c. of Liverpool, 4 Burr, 2244, the rule is stated that, it must appear upon the face of the proceedings, that those particular facts or circumstances, exist, upon the existence of which, jurisdiction in the matter, is given to the special jurisdiction. In Starr v The Trustees &c. 6 Wend. R. 564, the Supreme Court of New York carried out tills principle, to the full extent. The Trustees liad power to widen streets, provided they did not interfere with any building, the costs of removing which, should exceed one hundred dollars. It was held that the record of their proceeding, ought to show, that they had acted in a case, in which they had jurisdiction ; and therefore it was not sufficient for them to state that the owner of the building had consented to the removing of it, but they ought to have stated, that the expense of removing the building, would not exceed one hundred dollars; that being
This objection however, will not be fatal to (he whole award, if the Commissioners have not so blended the two assessments, that they cannot be separated. There are many cases upon certiorari,in which the Court may reverse in part, and affirm the residue. An order of removal of two or more persons, may be considered as so many distinct orders; and if either is illegal, It may be quashed as to that, and the others affirmed. But when the several parts of the proceedings are connected together, and depend on each other, so that one part cannot be quashed, without leaving the other incomplete, or more extensive than it should be, the whole must be set aside. 3 Amer. Com. Law, tit. cert. letter G. fol. 134; 5 Mass. R. 420; 3 Id. 268; Rex. v Inhabitants of Madley, 2 Str. 1198; Robinson v Hedges, Penn. R. 688; and Hay v Imley, Id. 832.
lu this case,the Commissioners have awarded an entire sum, viz : five thousand eight hundred dollars, for the land and damages thereto, and for the fencing : they afterwards, it is true, inform us, that one hundred and two dollars of that sum, was for the expense of making and maintaining the fences: I do not dearly perceive how by setting aside so much of this award as relates to the fencing, we can correct this error. ¥e can indeed mentally deduct the one hundred and two dollars from the total amount,and ascertain the balance; but we cannot make the record read as it should do,' without using the pen; which we have no right to,do.. If we reverse so much of the ¿ward as relates to the fence, the award will still read five thousand eight hundred dollars for the land, &c.
After all, if there were no objection to this award, more vitally affecting the justice of the case, than this, I should be inclined to reverse only so much of the proceedings, as relates to the fencing, and affirm the residue.
But there is' another more serious and substantial objection, urged against this award. It is that the Commissioners have adopted and acted upon illegal principles, in making their valuation of the land, and assessment of the damages. ■
Now it will be admitted that whether the Commissioners.under-. stood the extent of their powers,and the duties imposed upon them; and whether in exercising those powers, and discharging those duties, they were governed by any rule or principle of action ; and if by any, then by what rule or principle of action they were governed, are questions of fact; and they are facts, which the plaintiffs have a right to prove if they can. And when the principle of valuation or rule of action upon which the Commissioners acted, is ascertained, this Courtis judicially to determine,not whether the assessment made upon those principles, was to® much or too little; but whether the principle or rule of action itself, was a lawful or unlawful one.
The Legislature of this State, have thought proper by the agency or instrumentality of a chartered Company, to construct a Rail Road from Jersey City to New Brunswick. Whether in doing so, they have acted in derogation of private rights, or have endangered public liberty, are questions that do not belong to ns, so long as the law is constitutional in its provisions. The legislature then, have manifested their intention that this road should be made, and to secure its completion, it has provided, that if the company and any landholder could not agree upon the price of the land, it should be ascertained by Commissioners appointed for the purpose, in the manner in which these were appointed. But in fixing this price, they are not to act ad libitum, this will not be pretended. They are “to discharge the trust reposed in them,” according to some rule, and form their judgment and determination upon correct legal principles. To deny this, is to placo these Commissioners where nobody else in this country is placed; above law', and beyond accountability. What then is tiiat rule, that just and legal principle by which Commissioners in this ease should be governed ? I answer, the value of the land taken, and a just compensation; a fair equivalent for the damages done to the landholder. If it is asked again, by what scale shrill that compensation be measured ? I answer by the standard-of reason and common sense : for when they are outraged the'one way or the other, the law is violated, and power has been misused or abused.
If for instance, Commissioners should allow a man for one quarter part of bis land, whether for price, or damages, or both, more money than he himself admits aná as every one else believes, the whole tract is worth, they manifestly violate reason and common sense, nay, they act without any rule of action at all,
But how can the Court bo ascertained of the fact, but by hearing evidence and examining surveys,showing the locality,quantity, character, value and condition of the land? Unless such evidence is admitted, the injustice, however enormous, could never ho reached by this Court, and this valuable ami beneficial writ Mould fail to produce its salutary effect in all cases of this kind, i-wiy, if Commissioners, utterly rocideos of ail rales of justice asid propriety, and determined to defeat the declared intention of the Legislature, should sward fifty thousand dollars for a piece of land not worth five hundred dollars, we could not set asido liso award, on the ground of presumptive fraud, or abuse of power, arising from the gross disproportion between the real value of the, land, and the sum awarded, unless such evidence can he received ; for though we might happen individually to be acquainted with the land, yet without evidence of the location and value of the land, suds disproportion could never bo jt:di~ dally taken notice of, and acted upon by the Court.
if only remains then, to inquire whether the evidence which has been exhibited before the Court, is sufficient to establish the fact, that the Commissioners have acted under the influence of illegal principles, or have made their award, upon any improper rule of assessment.
With a view toa correct answer to this quest on, J have carefully attended to the evidence, and made various calculations, the details of which, arc too tedious to introduce here ; but their results arc such as irrcsislably to force conviction on my mind, that the Commissioners ins iced of giving the defendant a just
Upon the whole, from an inspection of the maps that have been exhibited, and an examination of tiie evidence on both sides, in connexion with the quantity of land taken, and the amount awarded, it is plain that the Commissioners must either have valued the land at a price so exorbitant, as to call upon the Court to presume mistake, partiality or prejudice on the part of the Commissioners, or else that the Commissioners have factitiously converted the land into City Building Lots, and then valued them at speculative and prospective prices. In either case, they have committed an error in principle, and acted contrary to law.
Here I desire to have it understood once for all, that when I speak of the award being so enormous, as to justify the Court In presuming partiality or fraud, I speak in legal language, and
The conclusion I have reached on this part of the case, is strengthened by the singular and striking fact, broadly stamped upon the evidence before us, that not one of the ten witnesses on the part of Mr. Suydam, gives any countenance or support to this award, except upon the principle of considering this land as laid out in building lots; and then fixing upon those lots, a price, per foot, at which they all admit, they could not now be sold; and which prices result in enormous sums of money for the whole land : varying according to the different estimates of the witnesses, from nineteen or twenty, to fifty or sixty thousand dollars. And yet not one of those witnesses values the whole tract, even if it was unaffected and uninjured by the Rail Road, at more than thirteen or fourteen thousand dollars.
Upon this and every other view I can take of the subject, I am satisfied, and feel bound, judicially to pronounce, that the Com» missioners have exceeded their authority; or misused the power and trust reposed in them. Not, that they have simply given too much or too little; but that they have made their award upon fanciful and speculative, and therefore upon unlawful and erroneous principles.
I think too, the counsel who have argued this cause on both sides, and particularly on the part of the defendant, have taken too narrow and restricted views of the great principles and important consequences, involved in the case. They have argued the cause as if no one was interested in the result, but the parties on the record : Whereas, it is, in an important sense, a case of public interest, affecting the rights, the powers, and the revenues of the State, The plaintiffs are a public, not a private corporation. If they were the latter, a serious constitutional question might arise as to their right to take private property at all. They are for the purpose of making this great highway through the State, hut the instruments, the quasi agents of the Government. The State of New Jersey in the exercise of its wisdom, and by the strong arm of sovereign governmental authority, is
The result of such a decision, will be to leave the parties in statu quo; and if they cannot agree, Commissioners may be appointed by one of the Judges of this Court, upon the application of either party. The former Commissioners arc functi officio. The old commission is at an end. It has been executed, and the Commissioners cannot malic a new award under it, any more than the same surveyors can relay a road, after their return has been set aside; or a justice can re-try a cause, upon the same process, after his judgment has been reversed. 10 Wend. R. 179. The argument, that if the former Commission has been executed, so has the statute, and that therefore no new appointment can be made, is unsound. The statute remains in force and will continue to operate until it has been effectually complied with; but the proceedings that have taken place under the statute, have in this particular, been ineffectual and abortive; they have been reversed and for nothing holden; and it is therefore as if no appointment had been made. Suppose all of the Commissioners or a majority of them had died or refused to act, or had been misnamed, or selected from an improper county, or had been interested? Would it in such case be pretended that no other Commissioners could be appointed, and that the charter would become void? Or suppose the landholder had been dissatisfied
In the course of this opinion, already too long, I have not examined the authorities, so numerously cited and so elaborately discussed on the argument, touching the office and effect of a writ of Certiorari, and the jurisdiction of this Court in pioccedings removed here by such a writ. It is sufficient to say that a Ceriorari lies in all cases, unless taken away by the express words of a statute: Rex v. Mosely, 2 Burr. 1040; and not only, where there is another remedy, but even where an appeal is given upon the merits. Rex v. Mosely, 2 Burr. 1040, Kingsland v. Gould, 1 Halst. R. 161. Middlesex election case, Coxe's R. 244. Ludlow v. Ludlow, 1 South. R. 389.
Let the award or report of the Commissioners in this case, he set aside and for nothing hidden, &c.
The New Jersey Rail Road and Transportation Company applied to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, under the sixth section of the charter, 2 Rev. Laws, 379, who appointed three persons to determine the compensation and damages, which Abraham Suydam had sustained, by reason of their road occupying about half an acre of his land. In consequence of a difference of opinion, two only of those Commissioners united in a report, wherein they awarded to Abraham Suydam, live thousand eight hundred dollars, including therein, one hundred and two dollars, for making and maintaining a fence along the line of said road; which award, they tiled of record as. the statute directs, in the Clerks, office of the county of Middlesex. The Company caused that award to be removed into this Court, by Certiorari, and alleged that it was made on illegal principles.— To prove this allegation, they have taken a number of depositions, upon notice under a rule of Court for that purpose; and in like manner, counter affidavits have been taken on the part of the defendant. He the defendant not only denies that the award was made on illegal principles, but lie goes further and denies the authority of this Court, to inquire into the principles a®
This raises a preliminary question. If the legality of the principles on which an inferior tribunal acted, cannot be lawfully inquired into by tilts Court, we need take no further trouble; all we have to do, is to confirm the award, be the principles ever so illegal on which it was made. But it is very evident to my rnind, that such a prohibition would subvert the established jurisdiction of ibis Court; that it militates against ail the public reasons on which the jurisdiction of this Court is founded, and against a series of adjudged cases, from our earliest reporter, to the present time. It is the glorious principle of our political equality, that the rights, privileges, liabilities, contracts, property, and even the lives, of all the citizens, stand upon one and the same law. The mode of insuring this law to every citizen, is to make it binding in the first place on the Supreme tribunal, and then appointing it to see that all inferior tribunals observe it likewise: Upon complaint by a citizen, that the law in his case has been violated by an inferior tribunal, if this Court cannot inquire into the point of complaint, to see whether it has been violated or not, the superintending power may as well be abolished. And then,a judgment, order, conviction or award of an inferior tribunal, need no longer be founded against any man on principles consistent with the law of the State; it will be just as good if founded on the law of the Church, the Jewish law, the Roman or French law, or no law, the color of the eyes, or length of one party’s purse.
But the power to see whether justice is administered according to law, need not be deduced, at this day, from elementary principles: it may be safely rested upon adjudged cases. I will state a few and refer to others, where this Court has looked behind judgments and orders in inferior Courts, upon complaint of errors in law, and, being satisfied by affidavits or otherwise, of the truth of the complaint, have set them aside. The general doctrine was fully laid down in the case of Ruhlman v The Commonwealth, 5 Bin. 26; Tilghman C. J. That writs of Certiorari and supersedeas, are means by which the superior jurisdiction
The allegation is, that the assessment of the land, was not made according to its present value, but according to what it might become worth at some future time, in case the population should increase and the city be extended. Before this objection can be allowed, it must appear satisfactorily by affidavits or otherwise, first, that the Commissioners made the assessment on that principle; and secondly, that the principle is an illegal one.
First. "Was the assessment made on the principle imputed to it? The affidavits present a medley of incoherent and contradictory evidence on both sides; but it is such as may be invariably expected, when mere opinions are asked for, instead of facts. Honest men seldom differ about the truth of facts; but when they cut loose from them, and launch out into the open sea of conjecture and opinion, they sail in such opposite courses, that hardly any two of them are to be found in the same latitude. These affidavits state every thing that may be called matter of fact, nearly alike, while in matters of opinion, hardly any two of them seem to agree. What is more extraordinary, hardly one of them is consistent with himself. Each one assigns a value to the whole lot; then lie puts a value on each of the parts into which it is divided, and the aggregated value of the parts, differs most grossly from his previous estimate of the whole. It is a vain attempt to harmonize such irreconcileablc opinions. I shall therefore rely only on those facts in which the witnesses all agree. Such is certainly the safest way, if the principles on which the assessment was made, can be clearly deduced from them. The facts which stand dear from dispute on either side, are these.
There was a lot of about six acres and a half of land belonging to Slants Yandusen, and this road was laid upon it, occupying about fifty-one hundredths of an acre, of it. No person bad offered to purchase, rent, or improve it, for a great many years.
It is argued on the part of the defendant, that the sum of five thousand eight hundred dollars was not all allowed for the value of the land; that it includes one thousand dollars at least, for damages arising from the manner of making the road, which is constructed upon a horizontal level, through a lot of uneven undulating land, which occasions excavations from a foot to five feet deep, in several places; and before the city can allow streets
The defendant’s counsel refer to the affidavits of his witnesses, and by them would show the principle of valuation. All they know concerning its present value, is the price it was recently sold for, which would bring this.half acre to about seven hundred dollars. Beyond this, they have no knowledge. But they make very free conjectures. They tell us what it “may be” worth, without telling us when. It is all a may be. New-Brunswick some time or other, may be a great and extensive city; and in waking dreams, evidently of future times, their fancies actually run up this lot, to what I had almost called the merry sum of sixty thousand dollars, as remote from the sober fact of eight thousand dollars, at which it was recently sold, as a midnight dream. And a reference to these affidavits, makes it as evident as demonstration can make any thing, that the Commissioners did not estimate the present vahie of the land, but indulged in guessing, just as the witnesses do, at its prospective, future value, without any certain principles of judgment.
Secondly. We are to inquire wiiether in doing so, they acted on legal principles. It will not be denied that every tribunal is bound to conform to the laws of the State. None of them are
It is not meant that the Commissioners may not take into consideration, any and every fact that can bear on the question of present value; such as any pressing demand for building lots on account of their scarcity; the highest price at which actual sales have been made; sums that have been offered with a bona fide intent to purchase, though refused by the holders; tiie proximity of the land to buildings already erected, or to public works, or to the common marts of business; and a multitude of other facts that consistently with law and common sense, might influence the judgment. Such are not visionary opinions; they are matters of fact. But when all the maps and the affidavits shew,on one side of the town only, a region of commons four times greater than the present city; that eight thousand dollars is the' highest price ever known for this whole lot; that half an acre of it at this rate would not come to seven hundred dollars, yet that the Commissioners have allowed four thousand seven hundred dollars for it: we cannot but know, if we are capable of knowing any thing, that they did not mean it to be a judicial opinion of its present value, but an opinion of what it might cometo bo worth, at some future time; yet they have not stated when that time will be; probably they had no fixed idea of it in their own minds, and therefore could make no rebate for it. We have nothing to do with the amount of the award ; it is the principle to which I object. The statute empowers them to award only the present value of the land, and they have not exercised the power within that limitation. I do not say they have violated the statute, by design. I do not think so. It has arisen from mistaking their powers under it; but that is no less fatal to the award.
Thirdly. The face of the report exhibits a technical error which I at first supposed might be amended by the Commissioners themselves, by leave of the Court; but I have since satisfied myself that we have no power to authorize an amendment of the record before us. The award is a fixed record of the Clerk’s
This Cerliorari brings up the proceedings or assessment made by Commissioners appointed pursuant to an act of the Legislature of New Jersey, passed the 7th -day of March, A. B. 1832, to determine the compensation and damages sustained by the defendant in Certiorari, by reason of the Company’s taking and occupying a portion of the real estate or land of Mr. Suydam, for a rail road.
The State of New Jersey being one of the sister republics of the United States, prompted as well by her interest as her inclination to keep pace with other States, in the march of internal or public improvement, on the 7th day of March, A. D. 1832, by the supreme power of the State, chartered a Company for
And the said Commissioners are directed and required also to assess the damages which any individual may sustain, by the said road, arising from the removing, making and maintaining the fence on the line of the route of said road, through any improved lands over which the same may run. And the said Commissioners are required to take an oath or affirmation, faithfully and impartially to discharge the trust reposed in them. And they are to deliver to the Company, a written statement signed by them or a majority of them, of the awards they shall make, containing a description of the lands or real estate appraised, together with the amount of tiie assessment, for removing, making and maintaining the fencing, which statement is to be recorded in the Clerk’s office of the county.
And it is enacted that if the owner of any real estate, land or materials, should feel himself aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioners, he may appeal to the next Court of Common Pleas of the county, and there have the matter tried by a jury. And it is enacted that if in case the Company shall abandon the road, at any time after it is completed, or cease to keep the same n repair,, at any time for three successi ve years, then the char
By the 8th section, it is enacted, that no farmer belonging to this State, shall be required to pay any toll for the transportation of the produce of his farm, to market, over the road in his own carriage, weighing not more than one ton, when the weight of such produce shall not exceed 1000 pounds, but the farmer may be charged toil as for an empty carriage.
By section IT, at the end of thirty years, the State is at liberty to take the road, at an assessment to be made.
By the 18th section, the Company are bound, after a certain period, to pay a tax to the State.
These several enactments are altogether inconsistent with the idea that this road is mere private property, or that it is a grant by the legislature, to a private Company to take the real estate or land of the citizen for private use alone; it is in my view, property taken for the public use; leased, to a private Company, for a term of years, on terms mutually agreed upon by the pub-lie, through their representatives, and this Company.
Mr. Suydam and the Company disagreeing as to the compensation to be made to him, for the land through or over which the road passed, application was made to the Chief Justice, and three Commissioners were, on due notice, appointed to perform the duties designated by the charier. And the said Commissioners after being duly sworn or affirmed,, proceeded to execute their duty, and made their report, which was duly filed in the office of the Clerk of the county of Middlesex. And on motion in behalf of the Company, a Certiorari was awarded by this Court, directed to Mr. Booraem, the Clerk of Middlesex, to bring up the proceedings to this Court; and the return of the writ with the proceedings of the Commissioners are now before the Court, and on which, we are called on to confirm the award, made, or to annul the same.
This is a question of more than ordinary interest; the determination of it may have a bearing on future legislation on matters of internal improvement; and it will be so considered by corporations or capitalists, who are inclined to invest money in those improvements. The right of the agrieved party to redress, Is denied; the power of this Court to inquire at all into this mat
The general superintending power of this Court, over inferior jurisdictions and all persons invested by the Legislature with power to decide on the property or rights of the citizens, should not now he called in question, it has been long exercised and admitted, and is confirmed by many adjudications.
But itissaid thatthis Court cannot look at the anoountofdamages assessed by the Commissioners. And are we then in that strange position, in a Court of Common law, with full powers to correct the errors and mistakes of inferior tribunals, and all who may have power given them by statute, to pass on the property or rights of others; and under an obligation to see justice duly administered to all) that if in the making an assessment of damages, the Commissioners exceed their authority, make a plaia mistake as to the principles on which they are to proceed in making that assessment, or if disregarding all justice and equity, they should assess a sum so exorbitant as to convince every mind that injustice has been done, and that too from impure mo>* tives, that this Court, when the matter is fully before them, and they see that gross injustice has been done, are we to confirm ara assessment of this character, because n© legal technical error is apparent? Can we not look at the amount of assessment, to find out th© principle on which it is made, or to see if it has been made on any legal principle; not, tobe sure,to alter, but certainly we may look to see on what principle it has been done, and we may, if the assessment is made without regard to any principle, or If the principle is neither legal nor just, set asid® the award ?
To the Legislature belongs the power of determining when it is proper to exercise the right which is vested in the State, and what is a public use,for winch private property may be taken. A highway is particularly under the control, (and is at all times to
This right of the State to take and appropriate the lands in the occupation of the citizen, was exercised in this State, soon after the settlement of the country. In Smith’s History of New Jersey, it is said, public roads shall be set forth at any time or times hereafter, at the discretion of Commissioners, in or through aiiy lands taken up, on reasonable satisfaction, at the discretion of the Commissioners.
In 1676, Leaming & Spicer, 118, it was enacted, that two men should be chosen by the town of Middletown, and two by Piscafaqua, to make out the nearest and most convenient way that could be formed between the said towns.
In 1765, it being represented to the Legislature, that the road from Burlington to Amboy ferry, and some other places, might be considerably shortened, Commissioners were appointed, and the act recites, that “whereas the shortening and improvement of the roads will greatly facilitate the conveyance of letters by the post; be of great importance to his majesty’s service, and to the commercial interest and general convenience of the inhabitants of this province : the Commissioners were directed to make a straight and perfect survey thereof from the city of Burlington, through Bordentown, and Cranberry, to Amboy.”
We are told, that by the act incorporating this Company, an appeal is given only to the land holder, and not to the Company; and under the maxim esepressio unius est exclusio alterius, the right of Certiorari, or the right to except to the assessment, is taken away. I cannot sec that this conclusion is correct. The
The Legislature were aware of the question so frequently raised, and the clamor made against taking private property for public use, without submitting the matter of compensation to the trial by Jury, if requested rand it was perhaps prudent for them, and'safe for the Company, to give the landholder, the appeal in case he was not satisfied with the determination of the Commissioners. But as the Company had no rights or privileges, but those granted by their charter, and it was a matter of choice with them to accept the charter or not, without this provision, they cannot complain that they have not the trial by jury granted them, to correct the mistakes or avoid the effects of a misjudgment of the Commissioners. The Company’s right to a trial by jury, depends on the land holder; if he does not appeal, there can be no jury, and surely this would rather strengthen or increase the disposition of a legal tribunal to extend any other remedy for their relief against an improvident assessment. And I cannotthink it possible, that in a country where the government have the superintendence of the public interest, and where it is admitted that the supreme power has a right to use and appropriate to the public use, private property, that any tribunal created by that power, to decide on the rights or property of the?
If I am right in this principle, that no created power can veto the acts of its creator, then I apprehend that the learned counsellor laid down the position too strongly, when he said, tho court had no power to look atan assessment, because the amount of damages is too great. He denies the power, and asks, where it was created. I apprehend it was given when the tribunal was created, and has always existed with it.
It is the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere.
That the court has the right to examine the award made by the commissioners, to look into it, and if they find injustice has been done, — that erroneous principles adopted by the commissioners, have been the foundation of that award, against which the party complains; or where there can be no principle in reason or justice found, on which the award can be sustained, they have the power to set the award aside.
Admitting the legal positions tobe all as laid down, yet there is still an important inquiry to be made in this case. Have the coimnssioners transcended their powers ? Have they abused tho trust and confidence placed in them? — Have tiiey made an award not founded in reason and justice, — or have they made anaw'arsl founded on erroneous principles? — And to determine these questions, it becomes necessary to look at the act of incorporation, and the object and intent of the legislature. That body bad de
What did the legislature mean by compensation and damages? I presume they intended compensation for the lands occupied by the road, at a fair price, and damages for the destruction of a garden or other improvement, or for pulling down a dwelling house, a barn or other building, on the land to be occupied by the road, or occasioned thereby unnessarily — something real, not ideal, or speculative; and also the expence of removing, pulling up and repairing fencing, on improved lands. It never could have been the intent of the legislature, to give a farmer, damages for having a rail road located between him and his mill or market, or for having the road raised above, or sunk below the level of his adjacent lands — or for having a Loco-Motive engine to pass near, or through his farm. For, by the 12th See, of the act, the company are bound to restore any road or highway, which shall be crossed by their road, to such state or condition, as not to impair its usefulness.
By the Charter, the commissioners are directed to deliver to the corporation, a written statement of the awards they make, containing a description of the Lands or real Estate appraised by them, together with the amount of assessment for removing, making and maintaining the fencing. Can they describe any land or real estate, not taken or occupied by the road; or can they appraise, or value any other lands or real estate, than those they describe? I apprehend not.
Of the lands described and appraised, the Corporation, on paying the assessment, becomes seized in fee.
The facts which the Court have before them, into, and through which, they must look ígt the principle on which the Cotnmis
If we inquire further for the principle on which the assessment or valuation of the land, has been made, as no principle is assigned by the Commissioners, we must look for it, in the evidence produced before the Court. Looking into the depositions read, we find no uniformity of opinion, as to the value of the land occupied by the road. Borne of the witnesses estimate the damages at a sum far below that of the Commissioners; and others, in accordance with the Commissioners. One of the latter description, says it will require much expcnce to graduate the lots of Mr. Suydam, west of the road; and that those lots if a Loca Motive power is to be used, are much reduced in value; and this witness estimates the injury done to those lots, at 1000 dollars.
An another wit ness speaks of the depth of the excavation of the road; says it must be six feet — and that other lots not taken by the road, but contiguous hereto, are reduced in value; and that
A third witness testifies to the fact, that six feet excavation will be required in the road, and that it will require a considerable .expence to graduate the adjoining lots; and he estimates the damage at $5,510, and says, in that estimate, he takes the damages done to the adjacent lots not occupied by the rail road.
And an other witness says, that it will be necessary to graduate the adjoining lots to make them suitable for building lots; and considers the lots west of the road, materially deteriorated in value, in consequence of the necessity of crossing the rail road, to get to New-Brunswick; and also, from the fact that a Loco Motive is to be used on the road; and he estimates the damages done, at 5000 dollars. Other witnesses examined in behalf of the defendant, make the like declarations of the injuries done, as well to the adjacent lots, as the lots west of the road, and make a like estimate of damages on similar principles: and those are the facts presented to the Court, by the defendant, outside of the award of the Commissioners, and in addition to what is apparent to the Court, from admissions and other evidence. And in all this, I am not able to find any principle, void of error, on which the estimate of damages can he made at the sum of 5,698 dollars for 51-100 of an acre of land, being a part of six and an half acres, which in 1836 was only worth 8000 dollars at a fair price between buyer and seller.
It is my opinion that this award of the Commissioners, as it cannot be amended or altered, must be set aside.
On the 18th of April last, upon application made by the above Company, to the Chief Justice, pursuant to the act &c. Nicholas Wikoff, James Fisher and Daniel B. Applegate, were appointed (with the consent of both parties) Commissioners to determine the compensation and damages sustained by Suydam the owner of certain real estate, by reason of the occupancy thereof by the Company, for the purposes of said Rail Road, pursuant to the 6th section of their Charter. Har. C. 379.
The Commissioners having acted in the premises, the dama
The award of the Commissioners, upon its face, and in all mere matters of form, is not objected to, by the Company : but they have assigned numerous reasons, aliunde the record, for setting it aside: such however as have any evidence whatever to support them,may be fully considered, as I apprehend, under the following heads.
I. —That the Commissioners were not disinterested, as required by the statute.
II. —That in making the assessments, they were operated upon by gross partiality or prejudice — and that the amount of the award is grossly exorbitant and unjust.
III. —That the Commissioners adopted an erroneous principle, in making the assessment.
In support of the first of these reaso.ns, it is alledged that Fisher, one of the Commissioners, was a creditor of Suydam, to the amount of $8000, and as such, might have had an indirect interest in procuring for him a large award : that this fact was unknown to the Company at the time of his appointment.
The only evidence, however, of such indebtedness, is the Copy of an Abstract of a Mortgage, from Suydam to Fisher, on other lands, to secure the amount above stated, as registered in the Clerk’s office of Middlesex; which copy under the certificate of the Clerk alone, was offered and marked as an exhibit by the Commissioner. This clearly was no evidence, and having been received by the Commissioner de bene esse, is liable hero to all legal exceptions. The statute, passed 7 June, 1799, requires that a deed, together with the acknowledgments or proofs, shall be first recorded word for word, with all interlineations, and words visibly written on erasures, See. and the record thereof, is made evidence as available in law, as if the original were produced and proved. But the» it musí appear by the record, that
The act requiring the registry of Mortgages, which was passed the same day, was intended for a wholly different purpose, and contains no such provisions as are found in that just cited. The registry is not a Copy, but a mere abstract of the contents of the mortgage. No copy of the acknowledgments or proofs, are made. Nay, the Statute does not even require any entry or note thereof, in the register: the sufficiency of these acknowledgments or proofs, in the case of mortgages, is left entirely to the judgment of the Clerk, (the inaccuracy of which, is shown by the records of nu'merous deeds with imperfect acknowledgments). To make these Registry-books evidence, would be to give them a higher force, than our records of deeds. It was never so intended: the register is not competent evidence to prove an indebtedness, or for any other purpose, except merely to show the collateral fact, that such a mortgage has been registered, as a ground for the legal inference of notice thereof to subsequent incumbrancers. It is made evidence for that purpose alone, by the statute. At common law, it is certainly in itself, no evidence at all; and if it become necessary to prove the contents of a mortgage, (except as connected with the question of notice) it must be done on common law principles; first by proof of the loss or destruction of the original, and then by evidence of its contents. Den v. Gustin, 7 Hal. 43.
But in this case, the Register itself, even supposing it compo-tent, was not produced, but a copy certified by the Clerk under the seal of the Court, was offered in its stead.
This too, was insufficient. The Clerk is authorized by statute, to certify copies of deeds recorded at length, and such copies so certified, are made legal evidence : but there is no such provision by statute, in reference to the abstract of mortgages. Neither has the Clerk such right, at common law. Copies are of three kinds — Exemplifications—Copies by an officer authorised to make them — and sworn copies — 1 Stark. Ev. 151. The Clerk as before said, is not authorised by statute, to make these copies. Nor is this a swmrn copy — but being under the seal of the Court, it is in the nature of an exemplification. But the Clerk has no
Tiiat we have in this way, jurisdiction over this award, by virtue of our general supervisory powers over inferior tribunals, is too clear to demand either argument or authority. But our powers are not boundless. We are confined, I apprehend, toan inspection of the papers, and an examination of such evidence only, dehors, as may tend to show illegalities therein — including under this term, all misconduct in the Commissioners.
We are told in the books, and from the earlist history of this writ, that “ it is to be granted on matter of law only” — 1 Lill. 252. And this principle has been recognised through all the English cases. Many of the ancient authorities limit the powers of the Court, not to illegalities alone, but to such as appear upon the face of the record. They confine us to an inspection, for the mere purpose of seeing that inferior tribunals keep within their jurisdiction, As in Groenwell v. Burwell, 1 Salk. 144;—Rex. v. Whitebread, Dougl. 553; Rex v. Morely; Rex v. Osborne; Rex v. Reeve, and Rex v. Norris, 2 Burr, 1042; the King v. Lloyd, 2 Str. 999. And other cases may be found in the books to the same effect.
But wherever we meet with such decisions or dicta, it will be found, I apprehend, that they are cases of convictions, where it is required by statute, that all the evidence be returned on the record, 2 Str. 999—or where the Court in some way was possessed of every thing, on the face of the papers, necessary to judge of the legality of the proceedings. At all .events, it is perfectly well settled at the present day, that the powers of this Court are not restricted in its search for illegalities, to a mere inspection of the papers. It is our constant practice on certiorari to a Justice of the peace, to look behind his return, and show by afSda-vits dehors the record, not only that he has exceeded his jurisdiction, but that other illegalities have occurred on the trial. So, of the proceedings and return of Surveyors of the high-ways—Coxe, 128;—4 Hal. 17, 21;—2 Hal. 215; 1 South. 297;—3 Green, 88. So, of Commissioners to divide lands, 3 Hal. 84;—2 South. 554—and indeed of most other persons acting under a special power delegated by statute for public purposes—Coxe, R. 400. But although we are not restricted to a mere inspection of the papers, our powers are limited. There is no review at common
Is it so great as to satisfy us, that these Commissioners were grossly partial or wilfully corrupt ? Here let it be remembered, that the onus is upon the Company, and that the fact of unfairness or corruption as a ground for vacating an award, should he satisfactorily established. Coxe, R. 388.
It is not my intention to recapitulate at length the prominent facts to be collected from the voluminous testimony taken by the Commissioner; it could answer no good end. But I have reflected upon those facts, as presented by the evidence, and with every disposition to give the Company the relief sought, if the case would warrant it. The land was bought by Suydam after the location of the Rail-road was known, and it may be with a
This brief statement presents in bold relief, the alleged exorbitancy of the assessment. On the other hand, ten witnesses testify that the lands in question being adjunct to the inhabited parts of the city of New-Brunswick, are valuable for building lots; and upon that assumption, they severally assess the damages — the medium of the aggregate amount of which (even excluding from the estimate of three of the witnesses, the cost of fencing) falls little short of the actual assessment. Nine other witnesses, again, upon the part of the Company (exclusive of the testimony of Sykes, the engineer) estimate these lands at a comparatively small amount, being valuable in their opinions only for agricultural put poses; but upon a cross examination, some of these witnesses estimate a portion of this land by the foot, and thus would arrive at a conclusion widely variant from their original estimates. The truth is, that among these discrepant calculations, and conflicting conclusions, it is difficult to determine, who is right, and who is wrong. The evidence to my mind, is unsatisfactory. The' witnesses of the plaintiff in certiorari, not only dissent widely from the witnesses of the defendant, but disagree among themselves. Nor is there much more of uniformity among the witnesses upon the part of Suydam. This very diversity of opinion, as to the rightful amount of damages, among judicious and upright men, (who are proved to be judges of tha value of real estate) who are on the spot, and speak from facts and actual inspection, warn us to be careful how we deal with this award, on the ground of excessive damages. This is purely a question of fact, upon which the members of this court, are not more competent to judge, than the witnesses who have differed so widely from each other : and receiving our knowledge of the fact as we do at second hand, are perhaps even more liable to err. . There is nothing which would justify us in saying that
Before leaving this branch of the subject, I must be permitted to say, that I do not conceive the commissioners either have placed, or intended to place, a mere prospective value upon the land in question. The language of their award, repudiates the idea. It says, they assess the damages which Suydam has sustained, ice. The witnesses uniformly base their estimates upon present, and not future value. It is true that for the pnrpose of arriving at a present value, they take into consideration, the gradual increase of the city; but surely, this is legitimate data. Were it otherwise if the road ran through a building lot in the heart of the town, it could be estimated only as land for agricultural purposes. These lots are, with perhaps, three or four exceptions, the only unoccupied lots in that part of the city. They are most favorably situated upon public streets, long since laid out, and in a part of the city improving more rapidly than any other. These streets did not (like others beyond them) come into existence for the first time, in the days of recent and wild speculation, by the creative posver of lithography. They have been
3—But it is said that the commissioners in asscssing"lhese damages, have adopted an erroneous principle — done palpable injustice, and that this court will interfere in all such cases. The. case of Baldwin v. Calkins, 10 Wend. 168, is cited as an authority in point; but it does not sustain the position as here applied. In that ease, damages had been assessed for the overflow of the lands, at the full value of the land, when on legal principles, it should have been only for its overflow for a certain length of time. On certiorari to set the assessment aside, Savage, Ch. J. says, the assessment would have been conclusive as to the amount of damages, if it bad been made on correct principles, but “if they were erroneous, the whole assessment must be set aside.’* A proper interpretation oflanguage, as I shall hereafter show, as well as the whole case, prove clearly, that the erroneous principles here spoken of, were errors in. law, and not in fact.
The erroneous principle complained of in the present case, is this; — It is alleged that the commissioners- have assessed the damages to these lands, as building lots, and not as lands fife merely for agriculture; that this was adopting a wrong basis of calculation, or in other words, an erroneous principle. Now this is the point mainly relied on. by the Company; and yet it appears to me, to be based upon an entire misapplication of language. We speak of a principle of law, or a principle of ethics, as meaning a tenet of the science; but we never speak of aprinciple offset.
In my judgment, there is no principle involved in the question whether the Commissioners did right or wrong in. valuing these lands as building lots. If they erred, it was simply an error as to the fact, whether they were or were not valuable for that purpose. But the allegation that the Commissioners hare adopted an erroneous principle, is not only a misapplication of language,
From the above remarks, it is evident that this case,as proved, is not one meet for the action of this Court, on certiorari.
There is yet another view of the matter, which, though not particularly alluded to on the argument, is, in my judgment worthy of consideration.
The subject under consideration^ an award, and so designated by the statute, under which it is made. Not a common law award, it is true; but of a special tribunal, created by statute, to arbitrate between the landholder and the Company. In accepting their charter, the Company have agreed to abide by its terms. They hare adopted the Justices of the Supreme Court,
Without intending to apply to this case, en masse, those legal principles which regulate arbitrations and awards, I cannot help thinking that the same reasons which induce Courts to lean favorably towards them, deserve consideration here. This is, upon the part of the Company, at all events, a tribunal of its own choosing. They sought and obtained this charter with its provision as to the appointment of Commissioners, staring them in the face; it is a summary mode of settling these difficulties, at little expense, and without reference to technical rules of law. It has its advantages, it is true, and in view of those advantages, the Company appear to have lost sight of the maxim, “Qíá sen-tit commodum, sentiré debet et onus.”
From the want of power in this Court, to act upon the case as presented, bij the evidence, and from the nature of the thing to be acted upon, I am clearly of opinion, that the certiorari be dismissed.
Note. Some weeks after the above case was argued, and the above opinion prepared, my attention was directed by one of
gave no opinion, having been of counsel with defendant.
Award and Report of Commissioners set aside.
Indispensable engagements of Governor Yroom, prevented his furnishing his brief to the Reporter, in time for insertion in the usual place. It is therefore placed here.
P. D. Froom, for defendant.
This case is brought before the Court, by the common Jaw-writ of Certiorari. The legitimate office of this writ, is to re
Various reasons have been relied on for setting aside this assessment.
I. It is alleged that James Fisher, one of the Commissioners, was not disinterested, because be held a bond and mortgage against Abraham Suydam,to a large amount.
The answer to this is two-fold.
1. There is no evidence of the fact.
The certified copy of the registry of a mortgage, is not made evidence, by statute. And nothing else has been produced.
2. If the fact be proved or admitted, it establishes no interest.
There is no adjudged caseto be found, in which such a relationship has been held to constitute an objection against the impartiality of a Judge, a Jury, or any person called to pass upon the rights of others; and that should be conclusive. To establish such a principle at this day, would be inconvenient and mischievous in its consequences.
II. It is insisted that the assessment is grossly exorbitant, and therefore should be set aside. And this is, in truth, the principal question in the case. Can this Court sit in judgment on the merits of this assessment?
I take the principle to be perfectly settled, that the writ of Certiorari is given to review the legal proceedings of inferior jurisdictions, and not to re-try or investigate matters of fact. The merits of a question or matter in dispute, can never be retried on a writ of Certiorari.
In Rex v Moreley, 2 Burr. 1042, the Court said, a Certiorari does not go to try the merits of a question, but to see whether the limited jurisdiction has exceeded its bounds.
So in Rex v Glamorganshire, 1 Lord Raymond, 580. A Certiorari will be sent to inferior tribunals, that this Court may keep them within their jurisdictions, and if they exceed it, restrain them.
The same' principle is recognized in Rex. v Lloyd, 2 Stra. 999; Rex. v Whitebread, Doug. 549; Rex. v Liston, 5 D. & E. 340; Anon. 1 Barn. & Adolph. 382; 20 Com. L. R. 405; (S. C.)
In our own state, the same doctrine has always prevailed, that these special proceedings are reviewable by Certiorari, for error, or irregularity or excess of jurisdiction, but not on the merits. State v Chambers, Coxe Rep. 400; Wood v Executors of Tallman, Ib. 155; Vunck v. Whort. 1 Penn. R. 335; Ludlow v Ludlow, 1 South. 389. Independence v Pompton, 4 Halst. 213; Baldwin v Simmens, 4 Halst. 186; Whitehead v Gray, 7 Halst. 36. It is also the doctrine in the State of New York. Starr v the Trustees of Rochester, 6 Wend. 564. So weil settled is this principle, that even in cases, where an appeal is given on the merits, by statute, the writ of Certiorari will also Me to review the legal proceedings. Kingsland v Gould, 1 Halst. 166; Starr v Rochester, 6 Wend. 564. The reason is obvious. The two remedies arc totally distinct in their nature and objects. The appeal is not of right, it must be given by statute. The Certiorari is of right, and can only be taken away by express enactment. The one appertains to the facts, the other to the law.
Eut it is asked is there no remedy for excess in damages? Wo answer that when the damages aro so extravagant as to prove corruption, the assessment can easily he set aside, if the proper course is taken. In any thing short of this, there is no remedy, or if there is, it is not by Certiorari. And in tisis there is no hardship. The Company submitted this matter to a tribunal of their own selection. The act was passed at their instance, and not that of the landholders. It secured an appeal upon the merits, to those who were compelled to part with property against their will. It gave none to the party who took it. The Legislature had a right to make this distinction. It was just and equitable. And by acceplingthe charter, the Company agreed to it.
It is evident that tiie positions and rights of the landholder, and the Company, are different, by tire act. And it was intended they should be. The one has the right to appeal, given on the merits. The other has not. But if the Company can review the merits of this assessment, by the writ of certiorari, then they can do just what the landholder is permitted to do by the appeal. They can do at common law, what the landholder can only do by the aid of a statute, This is inconsisteat.
In those cases, writs of certiorari might have been brought to remove the proceedings, on proper grounds. But if brought, would the Court have set aside those assessments, for the same E’easons that tiicy did on the motion? Surely not. And yet that statutory remedy did not abridge the office and power of the writ of certiorari. The remedy was cumulative. A rid without it, the Court would have had no power to look into the merits of the assessment.
By the statute under which the present proceedings have been had, there is no such power given. The plaintiff has come to this Court with a common law writ. He can have no other than the appropriate remedy, and that by the appropriate means. There is a wide difference between the two charters, and the meaning of both is too plain tobe mistaken. When the Legislature intend to give an appeal on the merits, it is given in express terms. When it is not given, the writ of certiorari cannot supply the omission, and thus vary the provisions of the charter, and the rights of parties.
III. But another exception is taken to this award. It is said that the Commissioners acted on “erroneous principles.”
Tiie specification under this vague charge is, that they allowed moi’e than the present value of the land, and therefore must have made their estimate on some supposed or fanciful, or prospective, or speculative value.
This exception must overcome many difficulties, before it can prevail.
I. This Court cannot know, nor can they ascertain what principle of calculation the Commissioners assumed in making their assessment. The Commissionei’s are not before the Court. They have not been examined. There was no evidenee or testimony adduced before them, on which they were to found their opinion,
2. If the Court resorts to evidence to show the actual value of the property taken, and damages sustained, it must depend on the opinions of witnesses, and perhaps not the most competent and disinterested. Then it will have the opinions of those witnesses, w ith which to compare the judgment of the commissioners; and if they are discrepant, which is to prevail? The law says, the commissioners shall estimate the compensation. This Court cannot say that their judgment shall be controlled and overcome by the judgment of witnesses. That were to change the tribunal provided by law.
3. But a more serious difficulty remains. The Court can get at the “erroneous plinciplc” of compensation complained of, only by instituting an inquiry into the amount that ought to have been assessed, and comparing it with the assessment actually made. There is nothing on the face of the award, that throws any light on the subject. Every thing must depend on evidence. And what is this, but an investigation of the merits of the award? The very first step to ascertain this pretended “erroneous principle,” is to go into an estimate of value and damages. Now this is just what the Court has no authority to do.
Tiie cases cited on the other side, from Wendell, do not support the ground contended for, by the Counsel of the Company. There, tiie commissioners erred in point of law; and the cases, prove the position, which is not disputed, that when inferior tribunals act on erroneous principles of law, their proceedings will be set aside. In the one case, the commissioners, in direct contravention of the law under which they acted, neglected to assess the damages, on all the property that should have borne the burden. In tiie other, the damages were given as for an estate in fee, when the party injured had but a limited interest. These authorities are entirely consistent with an argument, that only legal errors can be corrected by certiorari. In one of the cases, the Court expressly adopted the principle, tliat when the assessment was made on the right persons, and property, and estate, the Court had no authority to look into the amount. This rule
The argument then, that this Court can examine this award, because the commissioners have acted on “erroneous principles,” in the mere mode of calculating damages, is a fallacy. The only erroneous principles that can successfully invoke the corrective power of the Court, sitting simply as a Common law tribunal, are erroneous legal principles. In this case, the right person has been awarded compensation for the right property, and the right estate. There is no principle of law involved in the question. The only complaint is that the assessment is too high. If then this assessment can be dealt with by the Court, any other one can be in like manner, when it is too high or too low. And if a difference of opinion between witnesses and commissioners, is to be taken as proof that the latter have proceeded on erroneous principles, then the simple question of damage, is open to the Court, in every case of assessment.
What greater power could the Court exercise, if the right of review by appeal, was given them directly by statute ?
4. If the Court should feel bound to look into the question of damages, the evidence will be found fully to sustain the award.
Ten respectable witnesses from the neighbourhood, the most of them long resident in and near the city of New-Brunswick, and well acquainted with this property, have certified as to its value, and as to the damage, the landholder has sustained; and they have given reasons for their estimate. They say, that this property was more eligibly situated for improvement, than any other adjoining the city. It was directly on the main entrance into the business part of the town. The improvements in the street, on which great part of it was located, were rapidly extending into the heart of the property, rendering it highly valuable. The property is cut diagonally by the Rail road, the base of which was in places, from four to eight feet” below the surface
1. James C. Van Dike, estimates the value and damages at - - six thousand five hundred dollars.
2. Slants Van Deursen, at five thousand eight hundred, do.
3. Jamos H. Newell, five thousand five hundred &ten, do.
4. A. Schuyler Neilson, - - five thousand, do.
5. Matthew Brown, - - five thousand, do.
6. John V. Crawford, (without fencing) five thousand, do.
7. Henry Solomon, - six thousand six hundred & ten, do.
8. Squire Martin, - five thousand five hundred do.
9. James C. Zabriskie, five thousand nine hundred & fifty, do.
10. Fetor R Stelle, - - - - six thousand, do.
The avarage estimate of these witnesses, is five thousand six liufiurcd and eighty-seven dollars. The award, including compensation for fencing, is five thousand eight hundred dollars. Making a difference of only one hundred and thirteen dollars.
This does not savour mucli of excessive damages.
It is truc, a number of witnesses examined on the part of the Company, estimate the property taken, and the landholder’s damage, at a much smaller sum. But they insist on valuing the land by the acre, as though it were plough-land, hence the difference in their conclusion. If this difference involves any principle of law on which the Court can rest, I am unable to perceive it.
The commissioners arrived at the same result as the ten witnesses did, who subsequently testified on the part of the landholder. What mode of computation they adopted we do not, and cannot know, but as it coincides with the honest judgment often respectable citizens, it cannot be far out of the way.
If any thing can make manifest tlie impropriety of entertaining this certiorari, it is the aspect of the case, as now presented. Upwards of twenty witnesses have been sworn, and volumes of testimony taken in regard to the value of this property, and the
There is nothing to sustain the suit, and it should be dismissed*