This аppeal poses the issue of compensation for attorneys appointed to represent indigent parents and their minor children in actions by the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) for termination of parental rights under
N.J.S.A.
30:4011 to -24. Appellants ask us to determine that the. fees for their services as appointed counsel in a Title 30 case are compensable and legally payable. The two terms have different implications. The fees are “compensable” if appellants have the substantive right to be paid. They are “legally payable,” however, only if the legislature has appropriated funds to pay appointed attorneys in Title 30 actions or if this Court has the constitutional authority to compel the State to pay them.
See Amantia v. Cantwell,
89
N.J.Super.
7,
I
In 1975 DYFS filed a protective-services complaint under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73 and N.J.S.A. 30:4012 against D.C. and M.C., the parents of three minors. DYFS alleged child abuse and neglect, but did not seek termination of parental rights. The Office of the Public Defender appointed pool attorneys to represent D.C. and M.C., and named a public defender to represent the children. After convicting D.C. for abuse and M.C. for neglect, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court conditionally released the children to M.C.
Thе court reviewed the case periodically. Under the terms of Title 9, D.C. and M.C. received the assistance of paid counsel to litigate visitation issues. On several occasions the court placed the children outside the home. In 1983 DYFS filed a separate suit under
N.J.S.A.
30:4015 against D.C. and M.C. to termi
After eighteen days of bench trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of D.C. and M.C. in respect of one child, who was then committed to the guardianship of DYFS. The trial court did not terminate the parental rights as to the other two children. The court ordered DYFS to maintain temporary legal and physical custody over one of them. The third was to remain in the legal custody of DYFS but in the physical custody of his parents. No one appealed that judgment.
Appellants moved to compel the Public Advocate or Attorney General to pay their fees. Finding no source of funds available for that purpose, the trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division vacated the ordеr and remanded, with instructions to the trial court to distinguish between services that are statutorily compensable and payable and those that are compen-sable but not payable. The Appellate Division denied the Attorney General’s motion for reconsideration.
The trial court thereupon ordered the Attorney General and the Public Advocate to show cause why the аppellants should not be compensated. After the parties had filed certifications in lieu of testimony, the trial court determined that a law guardian in a Title 30 action has duties similar to those of an attorney in a Title 9 action. Because Title 9 lawyers are paid, the trial court believed that Title 30 attorneys should also be compensated. It held, however, that it could not order payment of the fees in the absence of funds authorized by the legislature for that purpose.
On the attorneys’ appeal the Appellate Division held that the fees are neither compensable nor payable. 219
N.J.Super.
644, 663,
We granted certification to review that determination. 110 N.J. 312, 540 A. 2d 1289 (1988). Appellants and amicus curiae, New Jersey State Bar Association, make three arguments for payment: it is statutorily authorized; it is required by State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A. 2d 441 (1966); and it is constitutionally compelled.
II
A.
We first consider whether the legislature has provided for the payment of appointed attorneys in parental-rights-termination сases. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73 and N.J.S.A. 30:40-11 to -24 both deal with parent-child relationships. Title 9, chapter 6, provides temporary remedies for child-abuse problems. DYFS, among others, can file a complaint alleging that a child has been abused or neglected. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.33 and -8.34. Pursuant to a finding of abuse or neglect, a “court may place the child in the custody of a relative or other suitable person or [DYFS].” N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.54a. The initial placement can be for a period of eighteen months, which the court can extend for one-year periods. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.54b.
Similarly, N.J.S.A. 30:40-12 allows the Bureau of Childrens [sic] Services (now DYFS) to seek temporary custody of a child. That provision authorizes DYFS to investigate a wide range of allegations against parents and other custodians and to file suit for the care and supervision of the child. The statute рrovides for a “best interests” adjudication granting DYFS care and supervision for six months. After further hearings the court can extend that period.
N.J.S.A.
30:40-15 to -24 differs from both
N.J.S.A.
30:40-12 and
N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.21 to -8.73 in that it provides for a
The focus of the instant controversy is the absence of any provision in Title 30, chаpter 4C, authorizing public payment of appointed counsel. That omission contrasts with the provisions for compensated legal representation for both the parents and the child in actions filed under Title 9, chapter 6. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.43a provides that indigent parents may apply for an attorney through the Department of the Public Advocate. N.J. S.A. 9:6-8.23a requires the appointment of a law guаrdian to represent a minor in a Title 9, chapter 6, action.
B.
Absent a contract with the client, a court generally cannot award a fee to an attorney unless authorized by statute or Rule of Court.
Klacik v. Kovacs,
111
N.J.Super.
307, 311-12,
Appellants intertwine Title 30 and Title 9 actions in an attempt to find statutory authorization for attorneys’ fees.
Appellants also argue that because Title 30 actions often involve visitation questions, the legal services provided are analogous to those under Title 9 and therefore should similarly be compensated. But as the court below observed, “[t]he existence of visitation issues cannot obscure the fact that the action was instituted under [Title 30] to terminate parental rights.” 219
N.J.Super.
at 657,
The appellants’ position would extend the cоmpensation provisions of a narrowly-drawn statute to any custody case involving a guardian
ad litem.
There is no indication that the legislature intended
N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.23a and -8.43a to have such wide-ranging effect. Title 9 has a statutory requirement for
Ill
We turn to the argument that we should expand the sweep of this Court’s holding in
State v. Rush, supra,
46
N.J.
399,
The Rush Court applied a three-part inquiry to determine whether to order the compensation of appointed counsel in non-murder criminal cases:
(A) whether the judiciary has the authority to deal with the subject; (B) if it does, whether that relief should be ordered; and (C) whether authority presently exists for payment by the county or some agent of the State. [46 N.J. at 409, 217 A. 2d 441.]
After answering the first two questions affirmatively, the Court considered whether the legislature had set aside funds for compensation. It found such authorization in
N.J.S.A.
2A:158-7, which instructs the county treasurer to pay “[a]ll necessary expenses incurred by the prosecutor for each county in the detection, arrest, indictment and conviction of offenders against the laws,” even in excess of the sums appropriated if authorized by the assignment judge.
Id.
at 414,
Our disposition of that third question, whether there is authority for payment, makes consideration of the first two unnecessary. We find no authorization for funds here as there was in
Rush. Amicus
urges us to find the necessary authorization in the general-appropriation clauses of Title 30. It first
Amicus
directs us next to
N.J.S.A.
30:40-29. That section, however, is for “payments for maintenance” of DYFS. Moreover, that provision grants DYFS “such funds
as shall be appropriated
for the purposes of this act” (emphasis added). Unlike
N.J.S.A.
2A:158-7, the section provides no general grant of “such funds as are necessary.” Nor does it contain the added proviso that an assignment judge can authorize expenses in excess of the appropriated funds. The total expenditures of the Department of Human Services cannot exceed the sums appropriated by the legislature.
N.J.S.A.
30:2-2. DYFS must perform its duties within the limits of such funds as are apрropriated.
State in Interest of D.F.,
145
N.J.Super.
381, 386-87,
That omission contrasts with the appropriations for Title 9, chapter 6:
There shall be appropriated from the general fund such funds as are necessary to implement the provisions and to effectuate the purposes of this act as shall be included in any general or supplemental aрpropriation act. [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.71 (emphasis added).]
We agree with the Appellate Division that that section appropriates funds to compensate counsel in actions filed under
N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.21 to -8.73. 219
N.J.Super.
at 646-47,
As an alternative theory for finding the necessary appropriations, amicus urges that we read Title 9 and Title 30 in pari materia — that is, we should incorporate the appropriations provision of Title 9 into Title 30 because those two Titles both involve the treatment of children. However, as we observed above, despite some apparent similarities, the Titles are significantly different: the legislature provided funding in one and not the other. It is the prerogative of the legislature to determine whether to appropriate public funds for given purposes.
Rush
explicitly left open the question of whether in the absence of statutory authority this Court has the inherent power to order the disbursement of public funds for appointed counsel. 46
N.J.
at 413-14,
New Jersey courts have consistently adhered to the principle that the power and authority to appropriate funds lie solely and exclusively with the legislative branch of government. There can be no redress in the courts to overcome either the Legislature’s action or refusal to take action pursuant to its constitutional power over state appropriations. (Citations omitted).
That principle applies even if a party is clearly entitled to compensation. In
City of Camden
we endorsed the holding of
Amantia v. Cantwell, supra,
89
N.J.Super.
7,
That principle is qualified, however, when funds are constitutionally mandated. Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 354-55, 339 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 217, 46 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). We therefore must decide whether compensation for attorneys appointed in Title 30 actions is constitutionally mandated.
IY
Amicus argues that several constitutional principles require the payment of appointed attorneys in parental-rights-termination cases. Amicus first contends that appointment of unpaid counsel in Title 30 actions violates equal protection by arbitrarily distinguishing (a) legal professionals from other licensed professionals, (b) private attorneys from other officers of the court, and (c) counsel appointed under Title 30 from counsel appointed under Title 9.
We pause only briefly on the first two contentions. The distinctions between attorneys and other professionals and between attorneys and other officers of the court need be only rationally related to a legitimate state objective.
Taxpayers Ass’n v. Weymouth Township,
80
N.J.
6, 37, 364
A.2d
1016 (1976),
cert. denied,
430
U.S.
977, 97
S.Ct.
1672, 52
L.Ed.2d
373 (1977). Quite simply, that threshold is met because neither an engineer nor a stenographer can provide legal representation to an indigent parent or child.
Cf. New Jersey Ass’n of Health Care Facilities v. Finley,
83
N.J.
67, 83,
Amicus
next claims that the failure to compensate appointed attorneys in Title 30 actions is a deprivation of property without due process. In rejecting such a claim in
Rush,
we said that “[cjonceivably the burden upon the bar could reach such proportions as to give the due process argument a force it does not now have.” 46
N.J.
at 408, 217
A.
2d 441.
Amicus
claims that the burden on lawyers has reached that “extraordinary stage.”
Ibid.
To support that claim, it reminds us that the trial here lasted eighteen days. Although
amicus
does not indicate whether that span of time is normal or unusual, attorneys for the Department of Law and Public Safety claim that in their experience, most guardianship trials last only one or two days. This trial therefore appears to have been abnormally long. As further evidence of the burden on an appointed attorney,
amicus
asserts that during 1987 between 600 and 1000 Title 30 cases required appointed counsel. It surmises that one-half to one-third of the complaints result in a
Even if its assertions and figures are correct, amicus does nоt show that the burden on attorneys in Title 30 actions is any greater than the burden on criminal lawyers in Rush. It provides no evidence that Title 30 cases are more numerous, more complex, more costly, or more protracted than the criminal actions at issue in Rush. Indeed, amicus conceded at oral argument that the number of cases involved here is “not nearly as significant” as the number involved in Rush. In short, amicus provides no basis for distinguishing between the circumstances here and those in Rush, in which we rejected a due-process claim.
Finally,
amicus
argues that the current scheme constitutes a taking without just compensation. We dismissed that contention in
Rush,
calling it nothing “new.” 46
N.J,
at 408,
V
We find no basis on which to order payment of the costs incurred by the appellants in the underlying Title 30 action. It may be that the legislature’s decision not to compensate Title 30 attorneys can be seen as an incentive for the State to seek termination of parental rights rather than less severe remedies. We are confident, however, that when DYFS decides to seek termination of parental rights, it bases its decision on the needs of the child, not on the State pocketbook. Moreover, as we have pointed out, there are several rational reasons that the legislature may have considered in distinguishing between the
Judgment affirmed.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
Opposed — None.