191 Mich. 646 | Mich. | 1916
Plaintiff: filed its bill of interpleader to determine the ownership of a fund of $250 which appellant Emma R. Kuyat claims under a benefit cer
Shortly after their marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Kuyat moved to Moline, Ill., and later they went to Texas. He was an invalid, afflicted with tuberculosis, and he had been “a hard drinking man.” While living in Texas, he seems to have had some trouble with his wife growing out of his habits, and he desired to return to Michigan. To that end he wrote, in February, 1913, to his sister, Sophia Kenzie, for assistance. Mrs. Kenzie and her husband sent him a railroad ticket and some money, which enabled him to go to them at Pontiac, where they then resided. He arrived there in a needy condition. He lived with this sister and family some months, during which time they cared for him and furnished him with medicines, medical attendance, and clothes. In April, 1913, Mr. Kuyat expressed a
The constitution of the plaintiff association provides a means and method of changing a beneficiary in the following language:
“Lost certificates and new certificates may be issued at any time in place of the lost one, or for change of beneficiary, upon the signing of a waiver of the original certificate, and paying a certificate fee of 50 cents.”
The application bearing the name of Mr. Kuyat, and received by the plaintiff, was as follows:
“Form 72. Waiver of Former Certificate.
“I hereby waive all claims for myself and beneficiaries under New Era certificate No. (do not know) issued to me (do not know 191). Said certificate is in my wife’s possession. I desire a new one issued for one thousand' dollars in favor of Mrs. Emma Kuyat, relationship wife $750. Mrs. Sophie Kenzie, relationship sister $250.
“Date at 22 W. Fort St., Pontiac on the second day of April, 1913.
[Signed] Florian Kuyat, Member.
“Witness:-.”
Upon the hearing at the circuit, the court found that the last certificate was in full force and effect at the date of the death of said Florian A. Kuyat, and awarded and decreed the $250 in controversy to the sister, Sophia Kenzie.
The defendant Emma R. Kuyat has appealed. In this court it was her claim:
(1) That Mr. Kuyat could not secure a new policy in the place of the old one without the consent of his wife, the beneficiary.
(2) That the association is estopped from disputing the validity of the first policy.
*651 (3) That there was no valid request in writing from Mr. Kuyat to issue a new policy.
1. We are of the opinion that it is well settled by the decisions of this court that, under the circumstances appearing in this case, the insured has the right, during his lifetime, without the consent of the beneficiary, to change the beneficiary under his policy; that the first beneficiary has no vested right in such policy; and that the association is not required to notify a beneficiary of such change. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. v. Child, 70 Mich. 163 (38 N. W. 1); Union Mutual Ass’n v. Montgomery, 70 Mich. 587 (38 N. W. 588, 14 Am. St. Rep. 519) ; Allgemeiner Arbeiter Bund v. Adamson, 132 Mich. 86 (92 N. W. 786); Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. v. Brown, 160 Mich. 437 (125 N. W. 400) ; Ladies of Modern Maccabees v. Daley, 166 Mich. 542 (131 N. W. 1127); Schiller-Bund v. Knack, 184 Mich. 95, 104 (150 N. W. 337). In the last-cited case we said:
“We must recognize the rule which has been frequently announced by this court that the by-law of a society permitting the changing of a beneficiary is a reasonable regulation of the member to exercise the power of appointment whenever and so often as he pleases.”
2. Upon the subject of estoppel, it is sufficient to say that there is no evidence that Mrs. Kuyat was in any way influenced or injured by the representation or statement contained in the postal card, even if it was sent by authority of the plaintiff. There is no estoppel under such circumstances. Sheffield Car Co. v. Hydraulic Co., 171 Mich. 423, 450 (137 N. W. 305, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1914B, 984).
3. The plaintiff admits its liability to pay the $250 in question. It is not conceded that appellant can raise the question of the validity of the change of beneficiary, but it is claimed that the plaintiff only could
However, it is undisputed that, upon receiving the new certificate, Mr. Kuyat personally signed his name on the bottom thereof, thereby agreeing to its terms and ratifying the change. Upon the whole record, we are satisfied that the trial court made a proper disposition of the case, and the decree below is affirmed, with costs to appellee from appellant.