381 Mass. 748 | Mass. | 1980
This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner) from an adverse decision of the Appellate Tax Board (the board) which granted a full abatement of meals taxes assessed against the New England Medical Center Hospital, Inc. (the hospital), from February, 1973, to May, 1976. The board held that G. L. c. 64B, § 2A (a), exempted from the meals tax all meals prepared by hospital employees and served in the hospital, thus refusing to uphold the Commissioner’s contention that the exemption applied to such meals only when served to patients. We agree with the board’s determination of the scope of the exemption, and therefore hold that the exemption previously found in G. L. c. 64B, § 2A (a) (presently found, verbatim, in G. L. c. 64H, § 6 [cc]), exempts from the meals excise tax all meals prepared by hospital employees and served in the
The hospital is a large teaching hospital licensed to operate under G. L. c. Ill, § 51. At issue is the tax status of meals served in the hospital cafeteria, which has a seating capacity for 400 persons and is open fourteen hours a day, seven days a week. The meals served are prepared in the hospital kitchen by hospital employees, thus satisfying the two stated qualifications of G. L. c. 64B, § 2A (a). Some patients eat in the cafeteria and are easily distinguished from other patrons, the largest group of patrons being comprised of employees and the smallest group of patrons being comprised of casual visitors. The hospital contends that those meals served in the cafeteria which are otherwise taxable are exempted from the meals tax by G. L. c. 64B, § 2A (a), which, during the period in dispute,
We begin by recognizing a salient principle of statutory construction, namely, that where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, legislative history is not ordinarily a proper source of construction. Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977). A statute is plain and unambiguous if “virtually anyone competent to understand it, and desiring fairly and impartially to ascertain its signification, would attribute to the expression in its context a meaning such as the one we derive, rather than any other; and would consider any different meaning, by comparison, strained, or far-fetched, or unusual, or unlikely.” Hutton v. Phillips, 45 Del. 156, 160 (1949). Applying this definition, we agree with the board’s conclusion that the statute is unambiguous. The language employed is neither peculiar nor technical, but is comprised rather of familiar words commonly combined to express, as they do here, a simple thought. Thus we construe the statute according to the common and approved use of this language. Cf. G. L. c. 4, § 6 (Rules for Construing Statutes). Further, in reading the exemption as applying to all meals otherwise within the express provisions of the statute we can and do reach a result which is consistent with the import of every other clause and section.
Inherent in the Commissioner’s argument is the suggestion that if we are to insert by implication the word “all” into this statute (all meals otherwise meeting the stated
The decision of the Appellate Tax Board abating the meals tax in full is affirmed.
So ordered.
General Laws c. 64B, § 2A(a), was repealed by St. 1977, c. 363A, § 43. The hospital exemption was, however, adopted verbatim as an exemption to the new sales tax on meals. G. L. c. 64H, § 6 (cc). In this opinion the “hospital exemption” refers to the previous statute, G. L. c. 64B, § 2A (a), in order to retain our stated comparisons with other parts of the same statute which are now relocated or repealed.
General Laws c. 64B provided for the imposition of the meals tax. Although c. 64B had a definitional section (§ 1), the term “meal” was not defined. Section 2A provided that those meals meeting the criteria set forth “shall be exempt from the taxes imposed by” G. L. c. 64B. Generally, the exempted meals are either served by charitable or nonprofit organizations or are exempted for reasons of administrative convenience. The “hospital exemption” was mentioned only once in all of c. 64B. Thus our conclusion — that eligibility for the hospital meals tax exemption is not affected by the status of the consumer — will have no effect upon the construction of sections of c. 64B other than § 2A (a), the section at issue in this case.
When the Legislature enacted § 2A(a) in 1953, it was simultaneously presented with four alternative proposals which would have explicitly limited the exemption to something less than all meals served in a hospital. Three of those proposed bills would have expressly limited the meals tax exemption to meals served to patients in a hospital. The Legislature, however, chose to enact an exemption which, by its terms, did not put any such limit on the exemption. See 1952 House Doc. No. 1418 (creating a general exemption but not exempting meals for which there is an individual charge made) and 1953 House Doc. Nos. 287,1264, and 2435 (each limiting the exemption to meals served to patients).