81 Iowa 732 | Iowa | 1890
Lead Opinion
The cause was submitted to the •court below upon an agreed statement of facts. It involves less than one hundred dollars, and the certificate of the trial judge, which is the basis of the appeal, shows the following facts in substance : ' In June, 1886, •one W. K. Syp executed to the plaintiff a mortgage upon certain real estate to secure the payment of ten thousand dollars and interest. Syp failed to pay the interest which became due January 1, 1887, and, at the March term, 1887, of the district court, plaintiff
“ The grantors herein are tobe released from personal liability for the payment of the mortgage upon the said premises for the sum of ten thousand dollars .to the grantee herein, dated June 22, 1886. We hereby covenant with the said New England Loan & Trust Company that we have not heretofore conveyed our interest in the said premises to anyone. The object of this deed is to make more effectual the lien of said company against the said premises by virtue of the sheriff’s certificate of sale which they hold against the same.”
Taxes to the amount of seventy-five dollars upon the personal property of Syp were levied for the year 1887, and were entered upon the tax books against said real estate. The question to be determined is, do the taxes for 1887 upon the personal property of Syp constitute a lien upon the land, which may be enforced by tax sale, and, if so, is such lien superior or inferior to plaintiff ’s lien under said foreclosure decree and sale? The district court held that the taxes were a valid lien upon the land superior to any lien or claim of the plaintiff. If the taxes had become a lien prior to the foreclosure and sale, there can be no question that they would be prior and superior to the mortgage lien. It is a general principle that when taxes are made a lien upon real estate they are prior and superior to all mortgage or judgment liens. A mortgagee of real estate would not cut much of a figure in attempting to defeat a tax sale of the land upon the grounds that his mortgage was a lien prior to the taxes, and that his lien
The fact that he conveyed the land to the plaintiff after the tax became a lien cannot affect the question. Plaintiff could not defeat the lien for taxes under any form of conveyance taken from Syp.
We think the court did not err in finding that the taxes were a lien upon the land. Affirmed.
Rehearing
UPON REHEARING.
I. This case was submitted at a former term, and an opinion rendered affirming the decree of the district court. In view of the nature and importance of the questions involved, a rehearing was granted, and the case has again been carefully considered. It ÍS' an action in equity to restrain the defendant, who is-treasurer of Union county, from proceeding to collect certain taxes on the personal property of one Syp, by the sale of real estate claimed to be owned by appellant. There was a decree for the defendant, and plaintiff' appeals. The case involves less than one hundred dollars, and the certificate of the trial judge shows the following facts: In June, 1886, one W. K. Syp executed, to appellant a mortgage upon certain real, estate in Union county, to secure the payment of ten thousand dollars and interest. Syp failing to pay the interest,.
The general rule is that taxes are not a lien unless expressly made so by statute, and, when created, the lien is not to be enlarged by construction. Cooley, Taxation, 444; Jaffray v. Anderson, 66 Iowa, 719. Turning to section865 of the Code, we see that “taxes due from any person upon personal property shall be a lien upon any real property owned by such person, or to which he may acquire title.” This lien is upon the real property, not upon any particular interest in it. It is upon any real property owned by the person against whom the tax has become due. The lien attaches when the tax becomes due, which for the purposes of'this case may be taken as January 1, 1888 ; without now determining whether such taxes became due at the time of the levy, or when the books are placed in the hands of the treasurer. Castle, Trustee, v. Anderson, 69 Iowa,
II. Upon the question as to the superiority of these liens, it is urged that the statutes do not expressly declare the lien for taxes on personal property superior
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — The first division of the majority opinion determines that the personal property tax is a lien on the real estate, and of the correctness of that rule I make no question. The second division deals with the question of priority of liens, and upon that question I dissent from the rule announced, and base my conclusion upon .three propositions: First, that the rule announced does not reflect the letter or spirit of the statutes sought to be interpreted ; second, that it is opposed to natural justice ; and, third, that it contravenes every authority known to us on the subject. The propositions will be briefly noticed in the order stated.
As the main reliance is now placed on the opinion filed on rehearing, my references will be, mainly,, if not entirely, to the reasoning in that opinion. It is there stated that “the general rule is that taxes are not a lien unless expressly so made by statute, and when created the lien is not to be enlarged by construction.” That rule is acceptable, and is to be kept in view," for, in my judgment, its teaching is forgotten in the reasoning of the opinion. The opinion quotes but a portion of- the statute essential to a correct conclusion. I quote as follows, inclusive of that quoted by the majority : “Taxes upon real property are hereby made a perpetual lien thereon against all persons except the United States and this state, and taxes due from any person upon personal property shall he a lien upon any real estate owned hy such person, or to which he may acquire title.” The italicized portion is that quoted in the other opinion. I first inquire if there is anything in the italicized portion, taken alone, that should make such a lien paramount to one formerly
But I think a greater mistake is in leaving the other part of the section without consideration in determining the question before us. We are told on authority that “it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part by another part of the same statute, for that best expresses the meaning of the makers.” Let us apply the rule to this case. It will be observed that the legislature, in creating the statute in question, was not only providing that taxes should become a lien upon property, but also against whom the lien should exist; and, with that in view, it enacted as to real property that taxes thereon should be “a perpetual lien thereon against all persons except the United States and this state.” That language is unmistakable, and makes the lien against all persons, and is the kind of language the legislature selected to express such an intent. If it intended the same as to taxes on personal property, would it not, in reason, have employed the same or equally specific language ? As to real property, it not only prescribed the lien, but those against whom it should exist, ‘ ‘ all persons.” As to personal property, it
•I base the proposition that the construction is against natural justice on the fact that, as a result, the property of one person may and is likely in some instances to be taken to pay the taxes or obligations of another, and any law enacted with such a purpose in view would meet with general condemnation. Let us suppose that A is the owner of forty acres of land of the value of one thousand dollars, which he sells to B, and takes back a mortgage to secure two-thirds of the purchase price. Such occurrences are usual. It is true, also, that there are persons in Iowa whose unpaid personal-property taxes will aggregate large amounts, — we may say one thousand dollars or more. I will designate C as one of them. B transfers the title of the forty acres of land to C. C has now acquired the title, and the taxes without question become a lien. The majority opinion makes them a paramount lien, and nearly seven hundred dollars of A’s money or property is taken to pay the debt of C. It is said by the majority opinion that “it is entirely within the power of those taking such securities to protect themselves.” I fail to see how, unless A shall refuse to sell his land upon credit. If the opinion has .especial reference to those who loan money,I fail to see how they are able to do so. Conceding, for argument, that they might reasonably do so, as to the mortgagor, it does not follow that the title might not be conveyed until it would rest with one whose unpaid taxes would impair, if not destroy, the security. It is not an answer to say that such instances would be rare. Such a law
I have said that the rule announced contravenes every authority known to us on the subject. The supreme court of New Jersey, in construing a law equally favorable to the view of the majority, used this language: “An intention to give such a tax priority in any case should not be imputed to the law-makers in the absence of unmistakable language to that effect. While the law when it is clearly written must be enforced according to the letter, however harsh and impolitic it may appear to the judicial mind, in a case of real doubt and ambiguity, the consequences of a particular interpretation may be regarded. To declare that a. mortgage on land shall be subsequent to all after taxes assessed on the personal estate of the owner of the equity of redemption differs but slightly from taking the property of one citizen to pay the debt of another. The injustice of such a proceeding would be so. striking as to cast a doubt upon