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New Castle County De v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa
243 F.3d 744
3rd Cir.
2001
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 quately explain district court could evaluate the fairness of its reason for the fee fees, attorneys’ was substantial.” 192 F.3d award and because the fee award not does Cir.1999). (9th 1323, 1329 comply requirements with the juris- of our prudence. We will also vacate the District fact, this it Recognizing was the denying Court’s order attorneys’ fees to our Trust which called attention to the the Trust and remand for reconsideration many aspects Kirby’s fee award which in light of the foregoing we have and which discussion and discussed we have opinion. requires by found reconsideration the Dis- Court,

trict we would be remiss if we did acknowledge this benefit29 and remand attorneys’

the Trust’s claims for its own

fees to the District Court for reconsidera- together Kirby’s application.

tion with fee course, require

Of this will the necessary by

submissions the Trust’s attorneys to comply procedures. with fee normal Un- NEW CASTLE COUNTY circumstances, der these we think appro- DE, Appellant, priate for the District Court evaluate the value of the benefit of the Trust’s (to contribution to the ultimate fee be de- NATIONAL UNION FIRE remand) by cided the District Court on INSURANCE COMPANY compensate and to the Trust to that ex- PITTSBURGH, OF PA.

tent.30 No. 00-5157. In so holding, fully we are aware that agreed Cendant had not to contest United States of Appeals, Court award of part fees as of its settlement Third Circuit. agreement. acknowledge We also that the Argued Oct. 2000. return to any Cendant of rights unclaimed may well enhance the value of Cendant’s Filed March 2001. rights to its rights shareholders and bene- ficiaries.

IV.

Although we will not disturb the settle-

ment itself which has not been challenged appeal,

on will we vacate the award of

attorneys’ fees to Kirby and remand this

case to the District Court for a reevalua-

tion of the fees, amount of attorneys’

because the District Court did not ade- 29. It First, bears mention that appellate the Trust's two reasons. the District Court's deci- urged Kirby's brief fees be reduced denying sion fees to the Trust's counsel stands million, $19 $7.6 million to Appellant's {see insofar as argument it related to the by raised Brief, 30), figure similar to the one at counsel before the District Court. We re- which we independently. arrived mand the issue of the Trust’s counsel’s fee request to the respect District Court with brief, appellate In its Kirby suggests Trust’s effect on through the settlement may Second, appeal. the Trust standing not have appeal we have repeatedly em- District phasized Court’s request opinion denial of the importance fee be- in this counsel, cause it was the Trust's reviewing not the court’s role Trust counsel's fees in itself, actions, request that made that in the District class and we believe this role extends jurisdictional Court. argument, though hearing to the District application a fee merit, not without need not concern us point. the Trust's counsel at this *3 Poole, Walsh, Jr., E.

Richard Peter J. (Argued), Potter, Corroon, Anderson & DE, Wilmington, Counsel for Appellant. Christopher Sipe J. (Argued), Bailey & Wetzel, DE, Wilmington, Ap- Counsel for pellee. Troy,

Daniel Wiley, E. Rein & Fielding, DC, Washington, Counsel for Amicus-ap- pellee Litigation. INS ENV SCIRICA, NYGAARD, BEFORE: BARRY, Judges. Circuit from National to cover purchased Union THE COURT OF OPINION period July July from 1992 to NYGAARD, Judge. Circuit interpret us to appeal requires parties disagree whether National “invasion of phrase, obligation has an to defend and Union law and de- under Delaware occupancy,” indemnify New Castle in a number of law ambiguous. The whether it is termine arising zoning permitting suits policies widely used phrase is Delaware real decisions. estate litiga- subject of heated and has been Frank Acierno filed the developer named over country the entire throughout tion complaints, eventually first of three which Because Delaware past thirty years. approximately one million cost the precedent, both provides law no clear case expenses to defend. legal dollars outside the cite numerous decisions *4 of land within Acierno owns two tracts that we authority suggests state. Some County. The first is located New Castle gen- apply ejusdem the doctrine of should shopping mall and the second is near in relation to eris and construe Westhampton. In referred to as (“wrongful evic- specific terms the more plans Acierno’s to New Castle frustrated entry”) preceding it. “wrongful and tion” First, develop tracts. it denied a however, fly would ruling, Such mall and building permit property, for the unambig- and declare face of commonsense second, plan record for voided Acierno’s hundreds generated uous a term that has Westhampton property and instead re- judicial widely varying law suits and zoned it. that, to do and interpretations. We refuse July Acierno filed his first On an “invasion of the instead hold that suit, building contesting the denial and occupancy” ambiguous (“Acierno /”). permit property the mall in favor of New Castle should be construed claimed, § under 42 He U.S.C. the District County. We therefore reverse property him deprived had New Castle summary judgment. grant Court’s law, and had violat- process without due Equal ed the Protection Clause I. arbitrarily Amendment Fourteenth political subdivi- County is a New Castle differently than other devel- treating him It is re- of Delaware. sion of the State prelim- granted District Court opers. The for, things, per- sponsible among other in favor of Acierno. inary injunctive relief property within zoning Mitchell, of real mitting and v. 1992 WL See Acierno pro- (D.Del.1992). reversed, holding In order to geographical its borders. We County itself, officials, ripe employees and its the case was not because its tect Adjustment yet had to rule on Board of practice common legal liability, it is from Acierno building permit. See purchase insurance. for New Castle (3d Cir.1993). Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970 pur- New Castle Between 1991 and National policies number of from chased a claim, filing his first day after One Company of Pitts- Fire Insurance suit, Union time chal- filed a second this Acierno policies The were of burgh, Pennsylvania. regarding the actions lenging New Castle’s (1) II”). (“Acierno Lia- types: Public Officials general two Westhampton property (2) (“POL”) and due bility Commercial claimed he had suffered again He (“CGL”). A violations. appeal equal protection Liability process General rulings followed.1 complicated series of policy that New Castle focuses on a CGL qualified sought legislative First, summary cers who had granted the District Court Cloutier, WL immunity. Acierno v. County procedural on the judgment (D.Del.1993). They appealed this summary judg- process claims. It denied due claims, however, ment, panel Third Circuit reversed A includ- Court. as to all other summary judgment former County the denial of offi- ing the individual those the District Eventually, granted Court policy. agreement POL resolved the dispute summary policy, favor of the over the POL judgment expressly but County did not policy. the CGL address on Acierno’s A most of claims. number of claims, however, his remain undecided. 13, 1996, On June New Castle sent a letter to National renewing Union its re- Acierno filed his third suit on December quest for coverage of legal expenses its (“Acierno III”). it, argued he and liability under the policy. CGL Na- claim in his Ademo I (regarding the tional Union denied coverage, and re- property) mall ripe, had become because sponse, the County filed declaratory Adjustment Board of had re judgment 30, 1997, action. On December fused to issue a building permit. The Dis the District granted Court National Un- again trict granted a preliminary summary ion’s motion for judgment, hold- injunction in his favor. See Acierno v. suit, ing that Acierno’s and its associated County, New Castle 1994 LEXIS 1683 expenses liabilities, were covered (D.Del.1994). We reversed and remanded by the policy. CGL Specifically, the court the case for further proceedings. See held that National Union only obligat- was Acierno New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645 ed to defend New Castle in suits arising (3d Cir.1994). 24, 1997, On October policy’s one of the “per- enumerated Ademo agree settled III with an injuries.” sonal arguably appli- ment requiring New Castle issue a provision, 10(c), cable Definition defines *5 building permit for the property mall “personal injury” as a harm resulting pay from: attorneys’ Acierno’s up fees

$250,000. c. wrongful from, eviction wrong- into, ful entry or invasion the Shortly claims, after Acierno filed his private room, occupancy of a dwelling or attempted the County to contact National premises person that a occupies by or on Union to the poli- discuss POL and CGL owner, behalf lessor; of its or landlord cies. year After almost a of unsuccessful inquiries Castle, by New National Union The District Court held that this definition 25, sent a letter on June stating unambiguous was required County the Acierno’s claims “would not be covered “owner, to act as an landlord or lessor” of under However, policy.” CGL July on Acierno’s property. not, it had Because 9, 1993, National Union indicated that granted court summary judgment would tentatively New undertake Castle’s favor of National Union. The District defense under the policy. POL Its letter Court did not address whether Acierno’s noted, detail, in some that National Union claims constituted an was not waiving rights its to refuse cover- occupancy.” age later. Over the following year, legal New appealed, Castle and we reversed. expenses mounted and in May Na- See New Castle County National Union tional filed Union suit County, (3d Fire Ins. 174 F.3d Cir. seeking a declaration that it was not obli- 1999). We held that “by or on behalf gated to continue New coverage. Castle 10(c) of’ language of Definition ambig was claim, contested the parties but the even- uous and should not be pre construed to tually settled, agreeing buy-out to a clude coverage.2 We therefore remanded officers, jurisdiction but found lacking judgment in re on some Acierno's spect to Upon the current officers. motion outstanding claims. See Acierno v. New Castle Court, banc, for rehearing, sitting en va County, (D.Del.2000). C.A.No. 92-385 decision, cated panel held that there was

jurisdiction over 2. The disagreed current and former offi over which words the cers, and disputed reversed the language District Court's denial modified. National Union summary judgment argued to them. See language Acierno v. wrong- modified the Cloutier, (3d Cir.1994). F.3d eviction, interpretation, Dis ful acts. Under its an trict Court conducted proceedings, entry, further or invasion must be committed 23, 2000, and May on “owner, it granted summary premises. landlord or lessor” grant New Our review of the District Court’s whether Cas- the case to determine summary judgment plenary. See New an actions could constitute alleged tie’s 342; County, 174 F.3d Castle of [Acierno’s] “invasion Pacific (3d Linn, Indem. Co. v. The District Id. at 352. occupancy.” Cir.1985). remand, Court, against the again ruled on summary judgment County, granting A. Delaware Insurance Law It held that the of National Union. favor This is the second time that we language the “invasion” plain meaning of allegedly ambiguous lan have reviewed sug- that its context ambiguous, was but 10(c) poli guage in Definition of the CGL to encom- it “should be construed gested County, 174 F.3d at cy. See Castle general of the same pass only those actions previous panel’s 344-51. The discussion ‘wrongful or class as eviction’ type ” pertaining poli Delaware law to insurance Acierno failed ‘wrongful entry.’ Because interpretation starting point is a cy good eviction, or wrongful entry, allege analysis: our injury, the District Court held that similar to defend obligated Before an insurer is apply. did not New Castle the CGL indemnify policyholder, the insured appealed. coverage is avail- must demonstrate that policy. duty under the An insurer’s able II. duty than to defend is broader its premised upon di Jurisdiction which indemnify, but ‘is limited to suits Therefore, must versity citizenship. we assert claims for which it has assumed apply the law of Delaware. substantive liability policy.’ under ‘[W]here Tompkins, 304 U.S. Erie R.R. v. there exists some doubt as to whether (1938). 82 L.Ed. 1188 58 S.Ct. alleges complaint against insured is whether Acier The sole issue for review against, that doubt should a risk insured claims, true, if constitute an “invasion no’s in favor of the insured.’ be resolved *6 private occupancy.” If [his] therefore, an insurer importantly Most do, policy requires National they the CGL any to defend action which ‘required is County’s expenses legal to cover the Union is states a claim which cov- potentially legal question is a liability. Thus, in this policy.’ under the ered Because the interpretation. contractual case, potentially if actions the Acierno yet to ad Supreme Delaware Court has covered under defi- state a claim is directly, predict we must dress the issue 10(c), de- required National is nition New how it would rule. See Castle in actions. county fend the those Co., 174 Fire Ins. F.3d v. National Union potentially the Acierno actions Whether (3d Cir.1999); Family Epstein has claim for which National state a Corp., Partnership Kmart liability depends upon how we assumed Cir.1994). (3d 10(c). aAs basic interpret definition matter, in- requires the us to The District Court construed Delaware law ‘in a com- sum contracts policy narrowly granted terpret insurance CGL must also ex- manner.’ We in National mon sense mary judgment favor of Union. hand, Castle, argued that the other on argument, counsel for National Union At oral language that immedi- suggested proper reading of the defini- modified the words that a the ("that stop person occupies"). required ately preceded and ''breathe” be- a tion one to Castle, "occupies" "by.” disputed The According the words the lan- tween to New by ignoring a number possessory effect is achieved guage same "the interest described of words: person aggrieved.” New Castle the wrongful be com- from, at The acts must F.3d entry wrongful wrongful eviction The into, against person who has the mitted a or invasion of room, premises. We both inter- occupy found premises occupancy dwelling or of a reasonable, owner, pretations and therefore held by landlord or ... or on behalf of its lessor; ambiguous. language was ... disputed language meanings.’ in the have two or more different amine the policy. entire An policy ambiguous, of the insurance is not context however, conflicting ‘merely because two ambiguity, Delaware some ‘Absent interpretations may suggested. be destroy policy not or twist courts will Rather, interpretations must re- guise construing under the language it,’ reading flect a ‘creating ambiguity because an where reasonable of the con- could, effect, Thus, exists in create new tractual must ex- language.’ none we amine, liabilities and rights, contract with county’s not whether the 10(c) parties ha[ve] duties to which the reading possible, of definition is policy language When is am- assented.’ but also whether it is reasonable. however, under Delaware law biguous, County, 174 New Castle F.3d 342-44 apply the doctrine of this Court must omitted). (citations Thus, in order to as- is, ambiguous That proferentem. contra obligations, sess National Union’s Dela- must be construed language requires ware law us to ask whether the drafter and conformance with the rea- potentially Acierno suits state claim un- of the insured. expectations sonable 10(c) policy. der Definition of the CGL premise underlying principle The id. at 343. We must answer proferentem contra is that an insurance language policy affirmative is if contract is one of adhesion. As the De- ambiguous coverage specific as to its Supreme recently laware ex- ambiguous claims. An insurance plained, if there is more than one reasonable inter- entity insurer ... [T]he is the con- pretation of its terms. Delaware Su- process articulating trol of the preme Court has not addressed whether an [of contract]. terms occu- party usually ... very other has little pancy” ambiguous, and both say except about those terms agree opinions lower court in the state take them or leave them or to select provide result, no clear answer. As a we options from limited offered Delaware, must look outside of to other Therefore, insurer.... it is incumbent court public state decisions and relevant upon party the dominant to make the policy, to reach a decision.3 confusing terms clear. Convoluted problem terms are insurer B. Non-Delaware Precedent ... not the insured.... State courts outside Delaware have earlier, As noted due to insurer’s disagreed over whether an “invasion of the *7 position, ambiguity dominant an when is right private occupancy” of is ambiguous. language, found in we A of number state courts have found the against must language construe the disputed language unambiguous, suggest- insurer as a matter of Delaware law. ing that it inapplicable is to Acierno’s therefore, And types unlike with other smaller, claims. A insignificant, but not contracts, inquire of not we need into number of oppo- decisions have held the parties’ actual intent. pri- site—that an invasion of the right of Because ambiguous language is con- occupancy ambiguous vate is and must strued a matter the insurer as of liberally. therefore be construed law, special we take note of Delaware Of the decisions that hold the law for determining language whether is language unambiguous, to be ambiguous. adopt most ‘The settled test for ambi- guity one of provisions reasoning. is in three lines of whether the con- These however, troversy fairly suscep- approaches, are reasonably sharply or are not de tible of different or interpretations may fined per- and often blur. The first and 3. extensively dictionary Both ultimately refer conflict and are inconclusive. As a result, "plain meaning” definitions and the unhelpful. we find this discussion terms. surprisingly, arguments Not their

751 employed haps commonly strategy applicable only persons most strued as or phrase in which the things general to examine the context of the same nature or (it always is used almost follows some vari- class as those enumerated.... [S]ueh “wrongful “wrongful ation of eviction” and rule is based on the obvious reason that entry”). cite the Latin maxim if States intended that general was words “ejusdem generis,” a tool of in construction should be used their unrestricted sense, applies when a general term or no mention would have been particular an made of the specific follows enumeration of classes. Ejusdem generis requires offenses.4 Serv., Triple See also Railcar C Inc. v. general phrase courts to construe the nar- City Wilmington, 630 A.2d 629, 631 rowly, only so that it relates to offenses of (Del.1993). Applying ejusdem generis specifically the same kind or class as those would limit the occupancy Supreme enumerated. As the Delaware offenses, similar to eviction or wrongful clearly eighty years articulated over entry, that include a violation of the claim State, ago Donaghy 696, A. 707 100 possessory interest ant’s property. real (Del.1917): Groshong v. Mutual Ins. of Enumclaw Co., ejusdem generis 303, 312-14, The doctrine of ... is a 329 Or. 985 P.2d 1284 (1999) (“[T]he statutory rule of construction ... phrase, ‘other invasion of general where words follow the enumer- private occupancy’ applies particular persons ation of classes of possessory to offenses that involve a inter .”).5 things, general premises words will be con- est at issue Because They wrongful entry 4. also cite a "related” canon of con- requires or eviction and an struction, amicus, Only impingement upon possessory noscitur a rights); Dryden sociis. however, presents applies England, a case that the con- Oil Co. New Inc. v. Travelers In Co., Beach, (1st Cir.1996) City Delray cept. 85 F.3d dem. 91 F.3d (applying ejusdem generis under Massachu the Eleventh Circuit refers to a Florida law); Leasing, setts Red Ball Inc. v. suggests state court decision that that the two Hartford Co., Accident and Indem. 915 F.2d simply Latin are more maxims than "relat- (7th Cir.1990) (applying ejusdem generis un ed”: law); Casualty Surety der Indiana Aetna & [Ejusdem generis] actually application F.Supp. Co. v. Dow Chemical broader maxim 'noscitur a sociis' (E.D.Mich. 1996) (interpreting Michigan general specific which means that ejusdem generis); adopting law as Martin capable analogous meaning words when Brunzelle, (N.D.Ill. F.Supp. together associated take color from each 1988) ("Ejusdem generis principles draw on general other so that the words are restrict- the sensible notion that words such as 'or analogous specific ed to a sense private occupan other invasion of the cy' words. encompass are intended to actions of Thus, simply noscitur a sociis is a broad form as, general though type specifically same ejusdem generis requires no additional within, 'wrongful entry embraced or evic analysis. ”); Liberty tion .’ Mutual Ins. Co. v. East Cen Oregon, In addition to other states that have Coop., tral Oklahoma Elec. 390- ejusdem generis utilized in a similar context (Okla.1996) ("Instead creating an ambi Wisconsin, Florida, Massachusetts, include Indiana, guity, the term 'invasion of the *8 Illinois, Oklahoma, Michigan, Cali- occupancy’ policies is included in insurance fornia, and New York. See v. United States simply provide category a ‘catch-all’ of Co., Inc., 260, Security Mgmt. 264 n. general type “wrong offenses of the same as (7th Cir.1996) (applying 4 Wisconsin law and ”); entry Group, ful or eviction.” Stein-Brief holding ejusdem generis Co., that rule makes 364, "[t]he Cal.App.4th 65 Inc. v. Home Indem. right occupancy (1998); clear that of must exist [a] Cal.Rptr.2d 76 3 Co of may Co., before an individual be said to have lumbia v. Continental Ins. A.D.2d 189 right private (1993) suffered an 'invasion of the of ("By appli N.Y.S.2d 991 Beach, "); occupancy’ City Delray Florida principle ejusdem generis, cation the of the of of Agricultural Ins. key interpreting phrase F.3d the ‘other invasion (11th Cir.1996) (applying private occupancy' Florida law and right of the of lies in the context, 'eviction,' holding phrase that when 'wrongful entry’ read in the definition of and right private 'other invasion of the of occu- actual both of which involve interference with pancy’ possessory rights property.”). means an offense real tantamount elaboration, the allege “[e]mploying do not a violation of ther that claims

Acierno’s principle generis, rather than ejusdem interest, adopting ap- this possessory his proferentem, contra adheres to the re- us to rule favor of proach require would interpreted quirement that words be in the National Union. greater fidelity proper context and ensures however, distinction, critical There is a disputed meaning term and the case and most of deci- between this the intentions of the to the insur- ejusdem generis. Almost apply that sions n. ance contract.”6 Amicus brief at 19 5. precedent invoking the Latin all of the however, begs question, the of wheth- policies in- that maxim involve applying ejusdem generis er in this case “other invasion of the phrase clude the help parties’ clarify would intentions. private occupancy.” Some courts right of 5850, *2 Crowley, WL See White (“As presence on the explicitly have focused (Del.Super.1986) with all rules stat- construction, utory [ejusdem generis] does the word “other”: apply when the context shows a con- [Tjhis has stated that the rule of court words, trary goal intention. In other generis peculiar- in contracts is ejusdem statutory construction is to find the specific enumeration ly applicable where [contracting parties], intent of the and the word ‘other’ followed precedes statutory merely rules of construction are .... the term ‘oth- general words use of end.”). means toward that Because Na- phrase er’ to connect ‘invasion demonstrate, tional Union has failed to and occupancy’ to the word- believe, applying ejusdem we fail to precedes it us that the ing that satisfies generis required helpful, is or even our parties intended that such invasion also inquiry must continue. pos- that involve a be limited to claims approach, Under the second some states sessory premises. interest in the concluded, reviewing have after the entire- 313-14, Groshong, 329 at 985 P.2d Or. ty policy, of a that an Mutual, 1284; also, e.g., Liberty see private occupancy” is available in a 390; Dryden landlord-tenant context. See Security F.3d at 96 F.3d at Oil Mgmt., England, Co. Inc. v. Travelers ejusdem generis, 264 n. 4 but (applying (1st Indemnity Company, 91 F.3d noting that “would have application its Cir.1996) (“Under law, Massachusetts preceded more force if the word ‘other’ then, phrase ‘other invasion term.”). general issue occupancy’ would mean case does not include the word “other.” ‘other invasion of the [tenant’s] Neither National Union nor private occupancy,’ since an actionable distinction, why the amicus address this ‘wrongful entry or eviction’ claim under Instead, principle applied. should be may Massachusetts law brought only by be states, landlord.”).7 conclusively the amicus without fur- a tenant against a There is proferentem yel disputed language ambiguous. Appel- Contra is another Latin max im, requires ambiguous ("[T]he which con and ig- lant’s brief at 26 District Court fusing policy language be construed proferentem nored doctrine of contra suggests the insurer. The court must choose between amicus admittedly ambiguous policy construed lan- applying contra insured.”) guage against (emphasis add- preferentem ejusdem generis. This is in ed). This is also incorrect. The District Ejusdem generis correct. determine is used to merely "plain meaning” found that the phrase ambiguous. pre- whether a Contra ambiguous. was It then exam- only applies ferentem after a determination language, ejus- applied ined the context of the ambiguity is made. See Penn Mut. Ins. Life generis, meaning dem and held that its was (Del. Oglesby, Co. v. 695 A.2d 1149-50 apply proferen- clear. Before we can tem, contra 1997) ambiguous, C'[I]f the contract ... holding we must first review this principle proferentem of contra dictates that *9 disputed phrase determine whether the was against the contract must be construed the ambiguous. drafter.”). contrast, County, recog distinction, argues nizes this that but nonetheless preferentem 7. See also State Farm Fire & Cas. applied contra Co. Burk should be be hardt, 1343, (M.D.Ala. cause the explicitly F.Supp.2d District Court found 96 1351

753 smaller, A relationship no landlord-tenant this but not insignificant, number However, support of long position. Castle a decisions New case. New cites Castle’s Although approach, less uniform their rejected posi- that have list of cases decisions, these in aggregate, address each Appellant’s at 20 n. 5.- tion. See Brief of First, National Union’s arguments. There no need to discuss each of is these some courts have held that an “invasion of cases, except to note that a number of right private occupancy” of ambigu- is owner, a property states allow like Mr. ous as a matter of law.10 The most factu- Acierno, a claim.8 bring to such ally relevant decisions are those of New Third, some states have held that an Hampshire. Grange Town Goshen v. of right private occupan- of Co., 915, 822, Mut. Ins. 120 N.H. 424 A.2d invasion, cy” requires physical a such as a (1980), property 825 a owner sued a town Builders, trespass. Sterling Inc. v. planning board for refusing to allow him to Co., Cal.App.4th United National Ins. 79 develop a subdivision. He claimed civil (2000) 105, 108-09, Cal.Rptr.2d 93 697 rights 42 § violations under U.S.C. 1983. (“[T]here thing ‘non-physi- is no such as a supreme court of the state held that cal invasion’ of a of right private occupan- the town’s policy, which covered cy. ‘Occupancy’requires physical entry a arising suits from “other invasion of the upon property.”). According real to this right private occupancy,” was unclear. merely line of reasoning, impinging upon a result, As a construed the against right enjoy prop- claimant’s to use or real the insurer and held that coverage extend- erty does not constitute such invasion. ed to damages arising from the board’s See Columbia National Ins. v. Pacesetter “plaintiffs denial of right enjoy- to free Homes, Inc., 1, 1, 248 Neb. 532 N.W.2d 10 property.” ment of his See id. at 824-25. (1995) (“[T]he private right occupancy is Later, the Appeals, First Circuit Court of legal right occupy premises, not the law, applying Hampshire held that right enjoy occupying premis- those “other invasion of right private occu- es.”).9 Acierno not allege physical does a pancy” included harm resulting from “nox- sort, odors, invasion of any and therefore his light” ious noise and that interfered claims would not qualify. with the use of property. See Titan Hold- 2000) law); amicus, (applying According Alabama presence Decorative Ctr. Cas., 257, (Tex. Employers 833 S.W.2d 262 "occupancy” terms indicates that "use” and ("The App.1992) concepts. 'other invasion of the are distinct We find this uncon- private occupancy’ provides coverage vincing. examples presented, In all of the only if there exists a consistently appear together, landlord-tenant relation two words ship, plaintiff property long or if the has concepts. a vested amidst list of other It is right.”). equally legis- reasonable to conclude that the synonyms. lature used two words as See, e.g., Royal 8. Ins. Co. America v. Kirksville Med., Osteopathic 10. See, Co ll. 191 F.3d e.g., Beltway Mgmt. Lexington- v.Co. (8th Cir.1999); Pipefitters 963 Co., Educ. F.Supp. Landmark Ins. Welfare Co., (D.D.C.1990) ("The Fund v. Westchester Fire Ins. 976 F.2d phrase 'other invasion of (7th Cir.1992); Holdings Titan private occupancy’ ambigu Keene, Syndicate, City ous.”); Inc. v. Arkwright Gould Inc. v. Mut. Ins. (1st Cir.1990). (M.D.Pa.1993) 272-73 ("We, F.Supp. therefore, personal injury find that the en argument by coverage ‘wrongful The amicus makes a related dorsement with its en distinguishing occupancy. try' between use and and 'other invasion of the is, (contending occupancy’, See Amicus brief at 10-16 in the context of the entire County’s policy only arising policy, ambiguous.”); Hirschberg covers suits ... v. Lum Cas., occupancy, out of harm to a claimant's F.Supp. bermens Mut. (N.D.Cal.1992) ("At minimum, damages whereas Acierno's suits claim relat- the term use). ing authority, to future For the amicus ‘other invasion of the occu primarily upon pancy’ ambiguous, any ambiguity relies a number of Delaware is to insurer.”) occupancy.” statutes that refer "use or be resolved

754 similar, have, Keene, past, adopted a New We City Inc. v. ings Syndicate, (1st Little v. MGIC approach. See practical 272-73 Cir. F.2d Hampshire, (3rd that, Cir. 1990). Corp., “Town noted Indem. 1987) (“[Tjhat have ar allegation an different courts require Goshen does a claim comes interpretations of the conflicting before at physical invasion rived liability arising policy’s coverage strongly indicative of the within private occu right of ‘other invasion ambiguity.”). essential ” at 273. pancy.’ Id. relevant, sum, non-Dela a In review have criti- number of states Although a law, there is a suggests ware case Goshen, follow Town cized or refused favoring of cases National number greater Builders, Cal.App.4th Sterling see However, job “our is not position. Union’s 110-11, others have Cal.Rptr.2d of cases on to count the number simply conclusion. The Su- same reached the sides,” County, 174 F.3d New Castle has held that Washington preme Court We must instead evaluate at 347. qualify trespass claims and both nuisance Reducing counsels’ underlying reasoning. invasion[s] “other as persuasive many arguments to their most Kitsap County v. Allstate occupancy.” See essence, existing non- we believe that the 964 P.2d Ins. 136 Wash.2d can be characterized as Delaware caselaw (1998). Kitsap, In the court noted 1185-86 hand, fairly large a num on one follows: popular ordinary, and “plain, apply doc court decisions ber of state of in- average purchaser meaning ambi ejusdem generis and find no trine of ‘other ascribe surance would other, number of on the a smaller guity; private occupancy’ right of invasion of the broad, upon either eoncluso- rely decisions a trespass against on or would include narrow, fact-specific analy ry language or premises or land.” to use person’s right opposite find sis to reach the result. We added). The court (emphasis Id. at 1185 result, approach convincing. As a neither applica- rejected the also considered public policy turn to concerns and com we generis. ejusdem tion of monsense. California, uni- which has almost Even ap- Hampshire’s formly rejected Policy Public and Commonsense C. occasionally softened its inter- proach, has the three briefs submitted Of disputed In language. pretation of case, only attempts pub the amicus this Corp. Insurance Co. Martin Marietta policy argument: lic America, 1113, 1134, Cal.App.4th North uncertainty when great create [C]ourts (1996), a state court of Cal.Rptr.2d “ unambiguous they disregard express, ‘other invasion of the appeal held that circumscribing provisions defining susceptible to private occupancy’ agrees risks that the insurer to cov- interpretations, and under Cali- numerous the insurance er. Failure to enforce interpretation, of contract fornia’s rules price written can affect the contract as in favor of the insured.” must be construed availability coverage for those claims environmental The ease involved who lack the resources to self-insure— Martin entities federal and state notably, most individuals and small busi- Marietta. nesses. courts have held the lan- Finally, some (citations omitted) (em- Amicus brief at 25 ambiguous simply be- guage at issue is added). completely agree with phasis We among judicial the wide variance cause of fact, one would be this statement. Travelers Indem. Co. v. decisions. See disagree. hard-pressed anyone find America, 715 N.E.2d Corp. Summit as- (“This problem is that this statement (Ind.1999) disagreement 937-38 central issue away sumes further indicates the am- among the courts lan- disputed policy case—whether biguity personal injury provisions.”). *11 755 ambiguous. beyond perad- is It is answer. The guage District Court concluded venture, contends, companies that that insurance as the amicus intend “[i]n- the dis- puted context, important language an economic and to be read in surance serves function,” meaning take specific social and courts must enforce it terms (almost always in follows unambiguous policy language “wrongful order to eviction” “wrongful entry”). viability. question Perhaps maintain its re- this is is, however, true. But if mains, even their policy whether the is intent has CGL been, be, and continues to unclear. unambiguous, parties pro- and none of the any policy arguments addressing vides A pres- Westlaw search from 1973 to the particular question. that ent reveals 249 cases that include the phrase right private of opinion, important In our the most occupancy.” Approximately half of those relevant in observation this case was required decisions interpretation direct casually by referenced the District Court. disputed fact, of the language. Nation- The court noted: al Union itself has been forced to litigate companies Insurance have included the the meaning phrase on numerous from, ‘wrongful clause eviction wrongful occasions, and has lost at least four into, entry of right invasion of Yet, times.11 spite in of this extensive in private occupancy1 policies their for at history of litigation, and obvious disagree- twenty years, litigants least have amongst parties alike, ment courts and repeatedly disputed the meaning of the companies, and National Union term ‘invasion of the particular, continue to use the ... occupancy.’ any without language defining scope. its litigation After at least two decades of ask, again, “why?” Once we must over the meaning the term ‘invasion private occupancy,’ courts It is well settled under Dela at a have arrived uniform definition policies ware law that insurance are con attempt of the term. Rather than to tracts of adhesion. Therefore it is the construe the term ‘invasion of the responsibility of the insurer to write clear private occupancy’ solely based on its policies with adequately defined terms: plain meaning, courts have concluded interpret [Insurance contracts] must be ambiguous, the term is and have manner, ed in a common giving sense techniques resorted to other of contract provisions effect to all so that a reason court, interpretation. similarly will policyholder able can understand the examine the term in meaning scope and coverage. limitation of It is policy. broader context of the CGL obligation insurer state companies Insurance employ continue to clearly policy.... the terms of the the term ‘invasion of the principle behind this is that occupancy’ policies, despite in their issuer, the insurer or the as the case twenty years legal decisions finding be, may entity control of the ambiguous. this term is It in- process articulating the terms. The structive to why. ask party, ordinary other whether it be the investor, We also find it instructive usually very ask insured or the has “why?” we cannot say except conceive of little about those terms —because 1184-86; (9th 1995) Kitsap County, (unpublished opinion); 11. See 964 P.2d at 70 Cir. Co., (9th City Servs., 24 Ins. F.3d 249 Cir. Rozet Wackenhut Inc. v. National Union Fire 1994) decision); (unpublished Great Northern Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Ins. Co. 15 Co., Corp. Nekoosa v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. (S.D.Fla.1998); F.Supp.2d 1323-24 Gould, (N.D.Miss.1996); F.Supp. 416-18 368, 373, Stein-Brief, Cal.App.4th at F.Supp. 729. National Union 3; Cal.Rptr.2d Energy Sys., O'Brien Inc. v. has, occasions, prevailed on other in similar Employers' Pa.Super. American Ins. e.g., City suits. See Oakland National 957, 959, (1993). 629 A.2d 963-63 Pa., Pittsburgh, Union Fire Ins. Co. L.P. Mgmt. SI v. Win or to select commonsense. See or leave them take them (Del.1998) (holding inger, the in- 707 A.2d options offered from limited Therefore, it insurance contracts “must be inter is incum- or issuer. surer manner, giving party preted to make a common sense the dominant upon bent *12 that a reasonable confusing provisions effect to all so or terms clear. Convoluted scope policyholder can understand the problem of the insurer or terms are the obligation It the coverage. limitation of insured. issuer-not the clearly the terms of of the insurer state Mutual, Be- 695 A.2d at 1149-50. Penn which in policy.”). single phrase, A nature of insurance cause of the one-sided companies consistently have re surance companies are in the policies, insurance define, generated and that has fused to clarify potentially ambigu- position to best lawsuits, widely with literally hundreds of disputes. terms and avoid future ous results, cannot, applica under our varying surrounding the mean- persistent litigation commonsense, unambig be termed tion of right of the ing of “invasion such, that an “invasion uous. As we hold in- occupancy” strongly suggests they that private occupancy” must be right simple A definition of deed should do so. liberally, poli construed and that the CGL it phrase, indicating, example, that County’s legal expenses cy does cover the requiring physical a refers to offenses liability arising from Acierno’s and its (or only involving invasion to those a ten- claims. etc.) dispute, dispos- would be ant-landlord itive. grant We reverse the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of National argument, why At oral we asked counsel Union, and remand the cause for further had not to further National Union chosen opinion. consistent with this proceedings phrase. define the contested Counsel re sponded phraseology that “this makes the SCIRICA, Judge, dissenting. Circuit response In to our policy marketable.” follow-up question, counsel denied that the I affirm judgment Because would Court, solely respectfully was “marketable” because it the District I dissent. confusion; instead, created he stated that County alleg- Acierno sued New Castle policy purpose language “the of this is that permit ing building that its denial of a patterns it covers fact and situations and deprived him unlawfully property of his narrowly fall within scenarios don’t process without due of law and that parameters ‘wrongful entry1 of a arbitrarily differently treated him than ” true, “wrongful eviction.’ Even if this is real developers other estate violation defining we fail to see how further Equal of the Four- Protection Clause scope language would undercut this alleged teenth Amendment. Acierno also purpose. anything, help clarify If it would County rights that the violated his to due situations, patterns, which fact and scenar process equal protection when it void- specu ios are covered. We will not indeed development plan ed his and rezoned his late why as to National Union has consis property. Contending alleges Acierno tently clarify language, refused to its but private occupan- one thing provision is clear: The at issue County cy,” the maintains National Union policy the National am Union CGL Company duty a Fire Insurance has biguous. essence, asserts defend. place alleged County’s reg- There is a time and for reliance that Acierno that the upon principles ulatory impaired Latin maxims and of statu- actions Acierno’s construction, tory expense enjoy property.1 not at the his but of use noted, Liability injury” injury, 1. As the Commercial General 10. "Personal means other "bodily injury,” arising out of policy than one or purchased from National Union Fire following more of the offenses: provides part: Insurance policy, the District a Interpreting voiding development plan, and the rezoning of land. “duty holding to defend” Court denied “personal injury” does not extend to alleges Acierno that the County improp- involving claims frustrated commercial ex- erly deprived him of his to use and pectations regarding development future enjoy his land. He makes no allegations property. After to construe declining eviction, entry or similar wrongful dis- the term “invasion turbance. occupancy” plain meaning reading, on The District Court found: employed the District Court the well coverage ejusdem known tools of construction of CGL *13 does not extend to County’s liabili- generis and noscitur a sociis. ties from arising litigation. the Acierno recognized, As the District Court This conclusion is consistent with the private term “invasion of the occu- nature of policies pur- the insurance ’ pancy” specific follows the enumeration of by chased County. The County relating possessory actions to interests bought policy POL4 from National property-wrongful real wrong- eviction and Union to against potential insure it lia- seem, therefore, entry.2 ful It would that bilities arising from the conduct of its definition, applying a broader would ex- officials and employees. Although the pand coverage beyond scope disagreed intended “prior whether the liti- gation” exclusion policy language. policy of the POL obli- gated National Union to indemnify the The related doctrine of noscitur a soci- County litigation, for the Ademo there points is also to the conclusion that when dispute is no policy the POL covers context, phrase read in the kinds of liabilities incurred occupancy” given should be County in its zoning permitting and ac- meaning analogous “wrongful eviction” tivities. Recognizing County “wrongful entry.” “inva- already had insured itself under occupancy” sion policy against arising POL liabilities appear does to encompass financial regulatory from the exercise of its au- harms like building permit, thority, the denial of a surprising is not that its CGL from, wrongful wrongful specific City c. The Delray eviction words.” Beach v. into, entry Co., 1527, (11th or invasion of the Agric. Ins. room, occupancy dwelling premises of a or Cir.1996). person occupies by that a or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor. 4. The District Court found that "in Na County tional Union sold the a Public Offi County, 2. See Sadler v. New Castle 565 A.2d (Del. 1989); Hercules, Employees Liability cials and Insurance Poli Inc. AMEC (Del.Su 439-12-94) (the Virginia, cy (Policy policy”). 1999 WL at *4 No. "POL 1999) ("Where per.Feb.12, general words fol policy $1 The POL has a million limit of persons things, by low an enumeration or liability policy period May for the 1992 to particular specific meaning, words of a July POL excludes cover general such words are not to be construed in age arising prior litigation, for claims extent, their widest but are to be held as stating that National Union shall not be made applying only persons things of the same any payment liable to make in connection general specifically kind or class as those any any wrongful occurring with claim for act mentioned.”). 12, 1992, prior May for which the might reasonably expect wrongful that such 3. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis holds that give act would rise to a claim.” New Castle "general specific capable words County v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. analogous meaning together when associated (D.Del.2000). F.Supp.2d general take color from each other so analogous words are restricted to a sense potential a different set policy covers

liabilities. Castle, at 556. F.Supp.2d the reasons set forth

Substantially for Court, I affirm its would

by the District

judgment. America, STATES

UNITED NAPPI, Quan Tequan

Robert a/k/a Wade,

Nappi, Keith a/k/a Appellant. Tequan Nappi,

Robert

No. 99-6126. Appeals, States Court of

United

Third Circuit.

Argued Nov. 2000. March

Filed

Case Details

Case Name: New Castle County De v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Mar 21, 2001
Citation: 243 F.3d 744
Docket Number: 00-5157
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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