MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ezeikiel Nevitt pursues this case against United States Steel Corporation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Doc. 4 at 1. Nevitt alleges that U.S. Steel offered him a position at its plant, contingent on him passing a physical examination, then withdrew the offer after learning Nevitt suffered a back injury at a previous job. Id. at 2-4. Nev-itt also alleges that U.S. Steel violated the medical examination and inquiry provisions of the ADA. Id. at 7. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment on the failure-to-hire claim, docs. 25, 29, and U.S. Steel moves for summary judgment on the medical examination and inquiry claim as well. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. See docs. 25, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38. Based on a review of the evidence and the law, the court finds that, regardless of whether the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Nevitt or to U.S. Steel, there are questions of material fact that preclude the court from granting either party’s motion for summary judgment on the failure-to-hire claim. Therefore, those motions are due to be denied. However, Nevitt has failed to meet his evidentiary burden with regards to his medical examination and inquiry claim. Consequently, U.S. Steel’s motion for summary judgment on that claim is due to be granted.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The facts underpinning this lawsuit are largely undisputed. On or about January 1, 2011,
On August 8, 2011, Nevitt applied for a position as a Utility Technician at U.S. Steel. Id. Following an interview, U.S. Steel extended a conditional offer to Nev-itt, contingent on him passing a pre-em-ployment fitness for duty examination, which included a physical examination and an assessment of his relevant medical history. Id. Thereafter, on August 24, 2011, Nevitt underwent a physical examination by a U.S. Steel nurse, doc. 30 at 6, which yielded normal results, doc. 25 at 2. However, during the examination, Nevitt told the nurse about the back injury he suffered at Cascades Sonoco. Id. Consequently, U.S. Steel requested that Nevitt
Nevitt provided U.S. Steel with two doctor’s notes: one from Dr. Robert Poczatek dated May 12, 2011, and one from Dr. Andrew Cordover, dated May 27, 2011. Doc. 30 at 6. Dr. Poczatek’s May 12, 2011 note indicated that Nevitt continued to report lower back pain, which Nevitt “rate[d] as high as 5-6/10.” Doc. 26-7. Although Dr. Poczatek noted that twisting and frequent forward bending aggravated the pain, he stated that Nevitt could return to “regular work duties” if allowed to take a ten minute break every two hours. Id.
Based on these two documents, U.S. Steel’s medical director, Dr. Cheryl Szabo, concluded that Nevitt’s ability to work was subject to the following restrictions: a lifting limit of twenty pounds, no repetitive back movements, and a ten-minute break every two hours. Doc. 30 at 7. Dr. Szabo testified that she discounted Dr. Cord-over’s opinion because it appeared to her that Dr. Poczatek was Nevitt’s treating physician, and that Dr. Cordover’s note was the product of a one-time visit. Doc. 26-3 at 76. She also testified, that she restricted Nevitt’s lifting and movement because Dr. Poczatek’s note indicated that twisting and bending aggravated Nevitt’s pain, and that she simply tracked Dr. Poc-zatek in imposing the break restriction. Id. at 129-30.
The utility technician position at U.S. Steel is physically demanding, and requires the ability to regularly lift at least 50 pounds,
III. ANALYSIS
Nevitt alleges that U.S. Steel withdrew its contingent job offer because it regarded him as disabled, and that it violated the medical examination and inquiry provisions of the ADA. Id. at 7. The court will address each allegation in turn.
A. Nevitt’s failure-to-hire claim
The purpose of the ADA is to “eliminat[e] ... discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). “ ‘[I]n this Circuit, the burden-shifting analysis of Title VII employment discrimination claims is applicable to ADA claims.’” Dulaney v. Miami-Dade Cnty.,
1. Disability
The ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment....” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). An individual is “regarded as” disabled “if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment_”
The parties are at odds regarding the proper inquiry for determining whether the ‘transitory and minor’ defense is available to U.S. Steel. Nevitt argues that the analysis centers on whether U.S. Steel perceived Nevitt’s impairment to be ‘transitory and minor.’ Doc. 35 at 8. U.S. Steel counters that the inquiry is instead whether Nevitt’s actual impairment was ‘transitory and minor.’ Doc. 38 at 5-6.
The ADA provides that either an actual or perceived impairment may give rise to a ‘regarded as’ disabled claim. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). The court observes, however, that it is often the case that an actual impairment, insignificant though it may be, gives rise to a perceived impairment. The court has found little consistency or concrete guidance regarding the interplay between actual and perceived impairments from courts that have analyzed whether a ‘transitory and minor’ defense is available under such circumstances. Some courts have not only focused on the actual impairment, but have gone a step further and found that if a plaintiff suffers from an actual impairment lasting less than six months, he is barred from bringing a ‘regarded as’ disabled claim, regardless of how the covered entity perceived the impairment. See White v. Interstate Distrib. Co,
The court notes that in situations where a plaintiff claims his actual impairment caused a covered entity to regard him as disabled, it is certainly proper for courts to evaluate whether the actual impairment is ‘transitory and minor.’ See e.g., Cobb v. Florence City Bd. of Educ., CV-11-CLS-4132-NE,
unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about disabilities are often just as disabling as actual impairments, and ... correspondingly] desire[d] to prohibit discrimination founded on such perceptions. In passing the original ADA, Congress relied extensively on the reasoning of School Board of Nassau County v. Arline that the negative reactions of others are just as disabling as the actual impact of an impairment.The AD AAA reiterates Congress’s reliance on the broad views enunciated in that decision, and Congress believe[s] that courts should continue to rely on this standard. Accordingly, the ADA Amendments Act broadened the application of the “regarded as” prong of the definition of disability.
Appendix to Part 1630 — Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disability Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App. § 1630.2(Z) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In advancing its argument, U.S. Steel notes that the implementing regulations indicate “[w]hether the impairment at issue is or would be ‘transitory and minor’ is to be determined objectively.” Doc. 38 at 6 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §' 1630.15(f)). The court acknowledges that this instruction injects some confusion into the assessment of perceived impairments, because while an actual injury can be objectively evaluated, see Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.2009) (defining ‘objective’ as “[o]f, relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions”), a perception is inherently subjective, see id. (defining ‘subjective’ as “[biased on an individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions, as opposed to externally verifiable phenomena,” and a ‘perception’ as “[a]n observation, awareness, or realization, usu[ally] based on physical sensation or experience; appreciation or cognition. The term includes both the actor’s knowledge of the actual circumstances and the actor’s erroneous but reasonable belief in the existence of nonexistent circumstances”). U.S. Steel’s filing at least implicitly argues that because the regulations demand an objective analysis, perceptions, which are inherently subjective, cannot be evaluated to determine whether they are transitory and minor. Taken to its logical extreme, U.S. Steel’s contention is basically that improper perceptions that lead to discriminatory conduct should not matter precisely because they have no basis in fact. However, when the regulation’s instruction regarding objectivity is viewed in context, it becomes clear that U.S. Steel’s reading is overly broad:
Whether the impairment at issue is or would be “transitory and minor” is to be determined objectively. A covered entity may not defeat “regarded as” coverage of an individual simply by demonstrating that it subjectively believed the impairment was transitory and minor; rather, the covered entity must demonstrate that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment) both transitory and minor.
29 C.F.R. 1630.15(f). First, not only does the regulation contemplate the objective assessment of a perception, it contains explicit instructions for conducting that assessment: a covered entity must demonstrate that were the perceived impairment an actual impairment, it would be both ‘transitory and minor.’ Id. Second, the regulation’s statement regarding an objective determination is followed by a description of the specific kind of subjective determination the EEOC deems impermissible, namely that a covered entity may not avail itself of the ‘transitory and minor’ defense by merely claiming it subjectively believed an impairment was ‘transitory and minor.’
Finally, the EEOC’s interpretive guidance explicitly indicates how a court should proceed when an actual impairment and a perceived impairment differ:
an employer that terminated an employee with an objectively “transitory and minor” hand wound, mistakenly believing it to be symptomatic of HIV infection, will nevertheless have “regarded” the employee as an individual with a disability, since the covered entity took a prohibited employment action based on a perceived impairment (HIV infection) that is not “transitory and minor.”
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App. § 1630.2(Z). Were the court to follow the approach advanced by U.S. Steel, the employee in this example would not be ‘regarded as’ disabled because the actual injury in question was ‘transitory and minor.’ That is not the result contemplated by the EEOC. To the contrary, the EEOC interpretive guidance clearly indicates that when a perception gives rise to a ‘regarded as’ claim, courts should determine whether the perceived impairment is ‘transitory and minor,’ even if the perception is based on an actual injury that is objectively ‘transitory and minor.’
In sum, while some courts have viewed a covered entity’s perception of an impairment as irrelevant if an actual impairment gave rise to the perception, U.S. Steel has not presented this court with any binding authority compelling it to follow suit. Moreover, the court finds that such an approach is unsupported by the regulations and contradicts the intention of the ADA and AD AAA’s drafters as well as the approach advocated by the EEOC. Consequently, the court’s next step is to determine whether U.S. Steel perceived Nevitt as suffering from an impairment that was ‘transitory and minor.’
U.S. Steel indisputably perceived that Nevitt suffered from an impairment that was not ‘transitory and minor.’ As explained above, an impairment is ‘transitory’ if its “actual or expected duration [is] 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). U.S. Steel does not dispute that at some point between August 26, 2011, when U.S. Steel requested additional medical records from Nevitt regarding his physical condition, see doc. 30 at 6, and September 15, 2011, when U.S. Steel revoked its contingent offer of employment, Dr. Szabo concluded that unless U.S. Steel placed Nevitt under significant restrictions, Nevitt would be unable to perform the duties of a utility technician without endangering himself or others, id. at 10, because of the injuries he sustained at the beginning of January 2011, id. at 7. In other words, Dr. Szabo perceived Nevitt as continuing to be impaired by his injuries well over six months after they occurred, and U.S. Steel adopted that perception when it withdrew its contingent offer based on Dr. Szabo’s findings. Id. at 10. Because Dr. Szabo and U.S. Steel perceived Nevitt as suffering from an impairment that lasted more than six months, they perceived him as suffering from an impairment that was not transitory. Consequently, the -‘transitory
Moreover, even if the court conducted the ‘transitory and minor’ analysis advocated by U.S. Steel, summary judgment would be improper because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Nevitt’s actual impairment was ‘transitory and minor.’
2. Qualified Individual
In addition to showing that he is disabled, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show he is a qualified individual. Dulaney,
A disabled individual cannot be qualified for a specific job if he poses a “direct threat” to the health or safety of himself or others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3); see also Pinckney v. Potter,
Whether Nevitt posed a ‘direct threat,’ as U.S. Steel contends, doc. 30 at 19-20, presents a question of material fact. On one hand, Nevitt contends that by June 2011, he no longer experienced back pain associated with his injury, doc. 30, ex. A at 192, (a contention U.S. Steel relies upon when arguing that Nevitt’s injury was ‘transitory and minor,’ doc. 30 at 14), that he was healthy when he applied for the position with U.S. Steel, doc. 30, ex. A at 193, and that the restrictions imposed by Dr. Szabo were unnecessary to ensure his safety, id. at 270. Additionally, the pre-employment physical examination conducted by U.S. Steel yielded normal results, and Dr. Szabo formulated her restrictions based on medical records that contained conflicting opinions regarding whether Nevitt needed to perform his former job at Cascades Sonoco under restrictions and that could be construed as stale. On the other, Nevitt’s condition had not improved between his initial injury in January 2011 and when he saw Dr. Poczatek and Dr. Cordover in May 2011, as he continued to complain of back pain, and in the absence of any documentation indicating otherwise, a fact finder could reasonably conclude his condition did not improve between May 2011 and when he applied for a position with U.S. Steel in August 2011. While Nevitt’s U.S. Steel pre-employment physical examination yielded normal results, Dr. Poczatek and Dr. Cordover also conducted physical examinations of Nevitt when determining if he should work under restrictions at Cascades Sonoco, and those examinations also yielded essentially normal results, in spite of Nevitt’s continued complaints of back pain. Doc. 26-3 at 71. Moreover, as Dr. Szabo noted during her deposition, “people
Because the briefing and evidentiary submissions indicate there is a question of material fact regarding whether Nevitt was a qualified individual, granting summary judgment to either party on Nevitt’s failure-to-hire claim is improper. See Pinckney,
B. Nevitt’s medical examination and inquiry claim
Nevitt alleges in count II that U.S. Steel violated the medical examination and inquiry section of the ADA. Specifically, Nevitt claims that U.S. Steel “refused to hire [Nevitt] because of out-dated and inapplicable medical information,” which U.S. Steel “improperly used to screen out [Nevitt]” based on criteria that “was not job-related and consistent with business necessity.” Doc. 4 at 7.
As a preliminary matter, U.S. Steel contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Nevitt’s medical examination and inquiry claim because Nevitt failed to file an EEOC charge of such a violation. Doc. 30 at 22. Although EEOC charges are not subject to strict interpretation, “a ‘plaintiffs judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ ” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res.,
Around the middle of August 2011, I applied for a utility man position with [U.S. Steel]. I received three interviews and was offered the position around the end of August 2011, pending a physical exam with the company physician. During the exam, I informed Dr. Larry Anthony that I had been previously treated for a disability as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act. Dr. Anthony instructed me to provide a physician’s release attesting to my ability to perform the essential functions of the job. I did as instructed. However, shortly after providing the doctor’s release, the recruiting department sent me an email stating that I did not meet the physical requirements for the utility man position, and, therefore, they were rescinding the job offer. I believe I was discriminated against and regarded as disabled, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.
Doc. 29-1, ex. 16. In sum, Nevitt’s EEOC charge states that U.S. Steel discriminated against him after he provided U.S. Steel with medical records and underwent a physical examination. The court finds this sufficient to set forth a claim that U.S. Steel violated the ADA’s medical examination and inquiry provisions, or, at a bare
Turning to the substance of the medical examination and inquiry claim, the ADA’s examination and inquiry provisions state that:
A covered entity may require a medical examination after an offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to the commencement of the employment duties of such applicant, and may condition an offer of employment on the results of such examination, if — ...
(C) the results of such examination are used only in accordance with this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3).
The parties agree that the question of whether U.S. Steel improperly used Nev-itt’s medical information hinges on whether U.S. Steel “made a reasonably informed and considered decision” before withdrawing its conditional offer. See doc. 30 at 24; doc. 35 at 21 (each quoting Lowe v. Ala. Power Co.,
Similarly, Nevitt provides the court with no legal basis for finding that Dr. Szabo based her decision on stale information. The regulations require that a covered entity’s assessment of whether an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ “shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relied on the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence.” Lowe,
Based on the facts discussed above, Nevitt has failed to show that Dr. Szabo made an unreasonably informed and ill-considered decision. That U.S. Steel may have been wrong in concluding that Nevitt posed a direct threat as it relates to the failure to hire claim does not mean that it failed to reach a reasonably informed decision in the context of the medical examination and inquiry claim. See Solorio,
Because Nevitt has failed to produce evidence indicating that U.S. Steel’s decision to revoke its conditional offer was not based on a reasonably informed and considered decision, he has failed to meet his burden on the medical examination and inquiry claim. Consequently, U.S. Steel’s motion for summary judgment as to count II of the amended complaint is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, because there is a question of material fact regarding whether Nevitt was a qualified individual with a disability, Nevitt’s motion for partial summary judgment and U.S. Steel’s motion for summary judgment as to count I of the amended complaint are denied. However, because Nevitt fails to meet his burden as to his medical examination and inquiry claim, U.S. Steel’s motion to dismiss count II of the amended complaint is granted. The court will enter a separate order consistent with this opinion.
ORDER
In accordance with its Memorandum Opinion, doc. 39, the court hereby GRANTS IN PART Defendant United States Steel Corp.’s motion for summary judgment, doc. 28. Plaintiff Ezeikiel Nev-itt’s medical examination and inquiry claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. As to Nevitt’s remaining failure-to-hire claim,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
PRE-TRIAL DOCKET
HON. ABDUL K. KALLON, PRESIDING
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA
This case is set for a pre-trial hearing pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A conference-type hearing will be held in chambers in the Hugo Black Federal Courthouse in Birmingham, Alabama at the time indicated.
The hearing will address all matters provided in Rule 16, including the limitation of issues requiring trial, rulings on pleading motions, and settlement possibilities.
Counsel attending the conference are expected to be well-informed about the factual and legal issues of the case, and to have authority to enter appropriate stipulations and participate in settlement discussions. Counsel appearing at the conference mil be required to proceed at trial notwithstanding the naming of others as designated trial counsel.
Promptly upon receipt of this notice, plaintiffs counsel is to initiate discussions with other counsel aimed at ascertaining which basic facts are not in dispute, at clarifying the parties’ contentions (for example, just what is denied under a “general denial”) and at negotiating workable procedures and deadlines for remaining discovery matters. At least four (k) business days in advance of the conference, plaintiffs counsel is to submit to chambers (via email at kallon chambers@alnd. uscourts.gov) a proposed Pre-trial Order in WordPerfect format, furnishing other counsel with a copy. It is anticipated that in most cases the proposed order, with only minor insertions and changes, could be adopted by the court and signed at the close of the hearing.
A sample of a proposed Pre-trial Order is available on the Chamber web site (www.alnd.uscourts.gov/Kallon/Kallonpage. htm) to illustrate the format preferred by the court and also to provide additional guidance and instructions. Each order must, of course, be tailored to fit the circumstances of the individual case.
Counsel drafting this proposed order should consider the utility this document will provide for the litigants, the jury, and the court alike. The court anticipates using the pretrial order to (1) identify and narrow the legal and factual issues remaining for trial, and (2) provide jurors with the legal and factual context of the dispute. This order should not revisit at length arguments made in previous filings with the court, nor should it serve as another venue for adversarial posturing. Pretrial orders should be simple, short, and informative.
IN ANY CASE WHERE COUNSEL HAVE ANNOUNCED SETTLEMENT TO THE COURT, A CONSENT JUDGMENT IN SATISFACTORY FORM MUST BE PRESENTED TO THE COURT PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED TRIAL DATE; OTHERWISE, THE CASE WILL BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Notes
. The parties’ filings and evidentiary material contain inconsistent dates for Nevitt's injury. See doc. 25 at 2 (Nevitt’s brief in support of his partial motion for summary judgment stating that the injury occurred in "January 2011”); doc. 30 at 3 (U.S. Steel’s brief in support of its motion for summary judgment stating that the injury occurred on January 3, 2011); doc. 29-1 at 68-69 (Nevitt's deposition in which he is unable to recall the exact date of the accident); id.., ex. 2 (medical record stating the injury occurred on December 31, 2010); id., ex. 19 (proposed worker’s compensation settlement stating the injury occurred on January 3, 2011); id. (medical record stating the injury occurred on January 1, 2011). This disparity has no bearing on the court’s analysis.
. Dr. Poczatek only intended for this restriction to last for four weeks, but its limited scope was not indicated in the note Nevitt provided to U.S. Steel. Doc. 25 at 3, n. 1.
. Nevitt notes that while Dr. Szabo testified that utility technicians regularly lift objects weighing eighty to one hundred pounds, U.S. Steel managers testified that the job only requires lifting fifty pounds. Doc. 25 at 6. At any rate, fifty pounds is still significantly heavier than the twenty pound lifting restriction Dr. Szabo placed on Nevitt.
. Until recently, the ADA required a plaintiff alleging a 'regarded as' claim to prove that the perceived impairment "substantially limited a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2008), amended by ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110— 325, 2008 Stat. 3406 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102). The ADAAA explicitly eliminated the substantial limitation requirement for ‘regarded as’ claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (stating that an individual who is ‘regarded as' disabled is considered disabled under the ADA, "whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity”).
. “[Ajlthough administrative interpretations of an Act by its enforcing agency are not controlling, they ‘do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which [courts] may properly resort for guidance.’ " Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc.,
. U.S. Steel notes that "[w]hile ‘transitory’ is defined ... at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3) and further explained by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f), neither the statute nor any regulation defines ‘minor,’ ” and that "[a] number of courts have combined ‘transitory and minor,' inferring that a transitory impairment (less than 6 months) is ipso facto a minor impairment.” Doc. 30 at 16 n. 3 (citing Cobb,
. Nevitt argues that although he concedes his injury resolved within six months, his impairment should not be treated as transitoiy because, according to Dr. Szabo, his "injury was subject to aggravation and exacerbation in the future.” Doc. 35 at 11. The cases Nevitt cites in support of this argument do not stand for the proposition that the possibility of future recurrence renders an impairment non-transitory. In Ruggles v. Va. Linen Serv., the plaintiff had been "diagnosed [with] a permanent degenerative condition.” No. 6:12-cv-00064,
. Additionally, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) provides that "if certain criteria are used to screen out an employee or employees with disabilities as a result of such an examination or inquiry, the exclusionary criteria must be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” The criteria U.S. Steel relied upon when it revoked Nevitt's conditional offer was job-related and consistent with business necessity. Nevitt contends that Dr. Szabo placed restrictions on him because she believed he would injure himself in the future, not because she believed he was presently unable to perform the functions of a utility technician, and that such a belief is an insufficient basis for concluding that Nevitt was a ‘direct threat.' Doc. 25 at 15-16. However, Dr. Szabo repeatedly testified that she placed restrictions on Nevitt because she did not believe he could perform the heavy labor required of a utility technician based on his injury. See Doc. 25-3 at 44, 46-47, 97, 99, 115, 139. Whether an employee can safely execute his duties is clearly job-related criteria and consistent with business necessity. C.f. Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc.,