55 Wis. 161 | Wis. | 1882
The objections taken by the learned counsel for the respondents to the sufficiency of the complaint are the following:
It is first urged that there is an improper joinder of parties plaintiff. This is not an objection which can be taken
The second objection is, that the plaintiffs do not show that they have any interest in restraining the collection of a tax to pay the judgment in question, or that they have any interest in setting aside the alleged fraudulent and collusive judgment obtained against the district, because, it is said, they do not show that they own any property in the district which would be subject to taxation for the payment thereof. This is certainly a good objection if it be well founded. Rut the plaintiffs allege in their complaint “ that they are resident tax-payers and voters in school district No. 1 of the town of Magnolia.” Although this allegation is very general, and might be true although they were not the owners of any taxable property subject to taxation in such district, we are of the opinion that, after the defendants have pleaded to the complaint, and raised the question of the insufficiency of such allegation for the first time on the trial, it should be construed to mean that they pay taxes upon property subject to taxation, in the district, and not upon property taxable in some other locality. Such construction is clearly authorized by the provision of section 2668, R. S. 1878,
There would seem to be no justice in permitting a party to answer a pleading of this kind and suffer the plaintiff to go to the expense of preparing for the trial, and then turn him out of court by giving a strained construction to an, allegation in his complaint for the purpose of defeating its evidently intended effect, when such allegation may be equally construed to mean that which would sustain it as a sufficient complaint, without invoking in its aid that liberality of construction which this court has repeatedly held should bo given to the plaintiff’s complaint upon an objection made to its sufficiency after answer and upon the trial. See Hazleton v. Union Bank, 32 Wis., 34; Lutheran Evangelical Church v. Gristgau, 34 Wis., 328. We think the allegations of the complaint show with reasonable certainty that the plaintiffs were the owners of property taxable in district No. 1, and were therefore interested in preventing the levy and collection of a tax to pay the alleged fraudulent and collusive judgment.
The third objection relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents to justify the,order dismissing the complaint, goes to the merits of' the plaintiffs’ action. It is alleged that, admitting the truth of all the allegations thereof, the plaintiffs are entitled to no relief in equity, because, it is said, they have an adequate remedy at law for any and all injury they may sustain from the attempted enforcement of the collection of the judgment -of the respondents, the CUffords. Waiving any discussion upon the question of practice, as to whether it is too late for the defendants to object to the complaint because, upon the facts stated, it appears that the plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law, .we are of the opinion that the objection is not well taken upon the merits. We think the allegations of the complaint, if true, show that
Section 488, R. S. 1878, provides how a judgment against a school district shall be collected and paid. The collection is to be made on application of the person in whose favor the judgment is rendered, to the town clerk of the town in which the district is situated; and it then becomes the duty of such clerk to assess the amount thereof, with interest from its date to the time when the warrant for the collection thereof will expire, upon the taxable property of the district, in a separate column upon the next tax roll, and the same shall be collected and returned as other taxes. It will be seen that a judgment against the district affects the property rights of each tax-payer therein; and it would seem almost too clear for argument that, if the officers of the district, whose duty it is to protect and defend the rights of its tax-payers, fraudulently collude, with parties who pretend to have claims against the district, and corruptly and fraudulently permit judgments to be rendered against the district in favor of parties who have no just claim against it, the tax-payer or taxpayers may maintain an action in a court of equity to set aside and avoid such judgments. They are not bound to wait until the tax-gatherer proceeds to sell their property to pay such fraudulent and corrupt judgment, before they can proceed to defend their rights. That an action of this kind
In the first of these cases this court-decided that the taxpayers of a school district might maintain an action to avoid a contract entered into by the city authorities, without warrant of law, when it appeared that such contract, if carried into execution, would subject their property to taxation to discharge a liability incurred thereby. In the second case it was substantially held that, a tax-payer of a school district could enjoin the payment of wages to a teacher employed by the school board, when it was alleged in the complaint that the certificate of the teacher' had been obtained by fraud, and that her contract with the board had also been obtained by fraud. And in the third case it was held that a devisee under a will might maintain an action in equity to set aside allowances which had been made by the probate court to -the executor of the will. The actions in the two school district cases were maintained solely on the ground that the tax-payer had the right to protect himself by an equitable action against taxation for a claim made against the district, which was either fraudulent or illegal. There is much greater reason for allowing the tax-payer to protect himself against a judgment fraudulently obtained against the district, as there is, at least, very grg,ve doubt whether he can protect himself in any other way. It was said on the argument that, when it was sought to collect the tax to pay the judgment, the tax-payer could defend against its payment by showing the fraudulent nature of the judgment. The judgment is upon its face a valid judgment against the district. The court rendering it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the district, which appeared by the proper officer appointed by law to appear and defend the action. An
Dillon, in his work on Municipal Corporations, § 919, says: “ So, elsewhere, on the ground that the remedy in equity is more direct, speedy and effectual than by certiorari, it is held that equity will entertain jurisdiction of a bill on behalf of tax-payers to enjoin the misapplication of moneys of the corporation. Based upon such considerations, is has been de
The plaintiffs certainly stated a good cause of action to - avoid the alleged fraudulent judgment; and that was sufficient to entitle them to proceed with their case on the trial. The ruling of the court that no evidence was admissible under the complaint, and the order directing judgment dismissing the same with costs, were clearly erroneous.
By the Cowrt.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.