Thе parties' 1975 dissolution decree determined that Wendy Neudecker should have custody of the two children and ordered Rolland Neudeckеr to pay weekly child support. Following a hearing upon Wendy's Petition to Modify Support, the trial court substantially increased the support obligation and required Rolland to pay all costs for the older child to attend college for four years following high school. The Court оf Appeals affirmed. Neudecker v. Neudecker (1991) Ind.App.,
Wendy's petition to modify was filed on August 15, 1988, proceeded to trial in July, 1989, and was decided by the trial court on August 22, 1989, at which time the parties' children were eighteen and sixteen years of age. The trial court modified the support from $45.00 per week to $1,048.90 per month when both children are residing in the wife's home аnd $522.00 per month for periods when the older child is away from home attending college.
Rolland contends that the Court of Appeals errеd in upholding the constitutionality of Ind.Code § 31-1-11.5-12(b)(1). He argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, that it impermissibly treats unmarried parents and their children diffеrently from married parents and their children, and that it infringes upon his fundamental child-rearing rights.
It is through subsections 12(a) and 12(b) of Indiana Dissolution of Marriage Aсt, Ind.Code §§ 31-1-11.5-1 to -28, that the legislature has assigned trial courts the discretionary authority to require either or both parents to contribute to a child's education expenses.
12(a). In an action pursuant to section 3(a), 8(b), or 8(c) of this chapter, the court may order either parent or both parents to pay any amount reasonable for support of a child, without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) The financial resources of the custodial parent;
(2) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved or had the separation nоt been ordered;
(8) The physical or mental condition of the child and the child's educational needs; and
(4) The financial resources and needs of the noneustodial parent.
12(b). The child support order may also include, where appropriate:
(1) Sums for the child's educаtion in elementary and secondary schools and at institutions of higher learning, tak *962 ing into account the child's aptitude and ability and the ability of thе parent or parents to meet these expenses;
(2) Special medical, hospital, or dental expenses necessary tо serve the best interests of the child; and
(3) Fees mandated under Title IV-D of the federal Social Security Act.
Rejecting the claim of unconstitutiоnal vagueness, the Court of Appeals noted the rules of interpretation that favor construing statutes as constitutional if reasonably possible, found that the statute provides sufficient guidelines for a trial court to exercise its discretion, and observed that parents "seeking tо dissolve their marriages are aware that the trial court may, in its discretion, order them to pay for their children's education." Newdeckеr,
We likewise agree with the disposition of Rolland's claim that equal protection rights are violated because a divorced parent can be ordered to pay for his child's education, while a married parent may unilaterally refuse to do so.
It is true that there is no absolute legal duty on the part of parents to provide а college education for their children. Haag v. Haag (1959),
When an initial support order or its modification is otherwise appropriate, a party seeking to include therein the required payment of college expеnse must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that such order is reasonable considering the statutory factors in subseсtions 12(a) and 12(b). In this regard, the "standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved" means whether and to what extent the parents, if still married, would have contributed to the child's college expenses.
In finding a rational relationship between the child support stаtutory scheme and the state interest in seeing that children of divorced parents are afforded the same opportunities as children of married parents, the Court of Appeals was correct.
As observed by Judge Sullivan in his separate opinion concurring in result on these issues, the Court of Appeals majority opinion does not directly discuss Rolland's due process claim of infringement upon parental rights. Neudecker,
The expenses of college are not unlike those of orthodontia, music lessons, summer camp, and various other optional undertakings within the discretion of married parents but subject to compulsory payment by inclusion in a child support order in the event of dissolution. The statutes which authorize such orders do not infringe upon fundamental child-rearing rights.
As supplemented by the foregoing, we approve of the opinion of the Court of Appeals as to all issues and summarily affirm pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule *963 11(B)(3). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Notes
. Preliminarily, we observe that considerable correspondence has been addressed to each of the justices from citizens wishing to exprеss their opinions upon issues related to this case but perhaps unaware that the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(A)(4) prohibits the consideration of any such communications concerning a pending proceeding.