14 Pa. Super. 443 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1900
Opinion by
It is contended that where the vendee of land is put into
The point actually decided in Fasholt v. Reed was, that a vendee of land in possession is obliged to pay interest, from the time the purchase money becomes due unless he tenders the same and demands his title or gives notice that the money is ready. “ The mere fact that his deed was not made at the time agreed on does not stop the interest.”
In McCormick v. Crall the general rule was stated to be, “ that if lands are sold by articles and the vendee enters into .possession, he must pay interest, though the deed was not made at the time required, yet this is not universally so. There are cases where it may be left to the jury to say whether the plaintiff shall recover interest; as where there has been wilful and vexatious delay, or gross laches in the vendor, in consequence of which the money lies unproductive.” The matter alleged as error was the submission of the question of interest to the jury, but as they found in the defendant’s favor upon that question, and as the Supreme Court held that no error was committed in submitting it to them, the question as to his liability for interest before the purchase money became due did not necessarily arise. •
In Kester v. Rockel, the question was whether the defendant was bound to pay interest on the deferred instalments. He
As to the general proposition that the mere fact, without more, that the deed was not made at the time agreed on does not “ stop ” the interest, the vendee being in possession, there can, of course, be no dispute. Nor is it necessary to discuss the proposition asserted in some of the authorities, that the vendee is liable for interest, if the contract contains no provision as to possession or interest and he enters without right before the time agreed on for the consummation of the contract by delivery of deed. In such a case the profits of the land, presumably, are equal to the interest on the purchase money, and as he has no right to the profits it is equitable, at least, that he should pay interest. This equity is sometimes worked out by implying an agreement on his part to treat the contract as if it was executed, and to pay interest; “ for so absurd an agreement as that the purchaser is to receive the rents and profits to which he has no legal title, and the vendor is not to have interest, as he has no legal title to the money, can never be implied:” Fludyer v. Cocker, 12 Ves. Jr. 25. See also Lang v. Moole, 31 N. J. Eq. 413, Stevenson v. Maxwell, 2 N. Y. 408, and cases collected in Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 162 Ill. 632; 35 L. R. A. 167, 175. But where the contract expressly provides that he shall have immediate possession of the land, and that the purchase money shall not be due and payable until a future day, and is silent upon the subject of interest, no such equitable consideration enters into the case, and we understand the law to be, that he is not chargeable with interest until the debt is due. This point was expressly ruled in the two cases cited in the defendant’s brief.
In articles of agreement for the purchase and sale of land, the vendee agreed to pay one half the purchase money as soon as the vendor made him a title for the land and the remaining
In Minard v. Beans, 64 Pa. 411, the question was, whether or not the vendee was liable for interest between the date of his taking possession and October 1, 1868, the date fixed by the contract for the delivery of mortgage for balance of purchase money, all intermediate instalments having been paid promptly when due. Chief Justice Thompson, after remarking that interest as a general, if not universal, rule, is never demandable until money is due, that it is generally defined as compensation allowed to the creditor for delay of payment by the debtor, and that it is completely due wherever a liquidated sum of money is unjustly withheld, said: “ There was no express contract for the payment of interest up to October 1,1868. That is certain. Where is the principle that implies it? There was no debt due at that time bearing interest, and no overdue debt existed. It was a mistake to imply it from possession of the property by the vendee, when no money was due or withheld. There is a class of cases where interest is always charged on money due, although not payable, by a vendee. For instance, where the purchase money is payable at a certain time, and the deed is to
The learned judge of the court below was clearly right in his first opinion in holding, that under the law and' the facts as then presented the defendant was entitled to have the judgment opened, and to be let into a defense.
The order of December 21, 1898 is reversed at the costs of the plaintiff; the order of August 16, 1897, opening the judgment and awarding an issue is reihstated; and the record is remitted to the court below with a procedendo.