*1
367
DISTRICT v. Pam OWENS
NETTLETON SCHOOL
Henry, Barbara Halsey by: Halsey, appellee. case involves the Chief This W.H.“Dub” Arnold, Justice. Act, Fair codified at Ark. of the Teacher Dismissal
interpretation The trial 1993). Ann. to -1510 court Code 6-17-1501 (Repl. § § failed to found that Nettleton School District strictly appellant it with the Act when terminated comply appellee cross-appel- lant Pam for the Both Owens’s contract 1993-94 school year. par- ties order. the trial trial court’s We affirm court’s appeal contract the termination Ms. Owens’s was void. ruling into a the district Owens entered contract with to serve as a counselor School for the University Elementary Heights At 1993-1994 academic 8:00 year. approximately p.m. January *3 11, 1994, Owens, children, Ms. her three went to accompanied by Owens, her classroom. to Ms. to to the According going prior school, she had one and had consumed of wine taken one glass tablet of medication for and stress. She prescription anxiety became while in the her classroom and head down on drowsy put her, her desk. When the children could not awaken called they father, their whom Ms. Owens had served with a divorce com- Mr. Owens plaint day. contacted previous principal Kay who turn contacted Michael Darby, administrator Johnson. The three to Ms. Owens’s classroom. proceeded to According Owens, Ms. she became and when her hus- upset began crying band entered her classroom. to she found Ms. Owens
According principal Darby, asleep on the floor of the classroom on the It was Ms. night question. intoxicated, that Ms. Darby’s Owens was as she opinion could smell alcohol on her Mr. breath. observed that also Ms. Johnson Owens had been Ms. Mr. drinking. and Darby helped Johnson car, Ms. Owens to her Mr. Owens drove children home.
When Ms. Owens to work the reported following morning, Thereafter, asked her to take some work. principal Darby time off Ms. Owens checked herself into Green Leaf for treat- Hospital ment for 21, chemical On dependency anxiety. January hand superintendent Sawyer delivered a letter to Ms. Owens John letter, her that was she In notifying Mr. suspended. Sawyer that, stated had because she been under the influence of alcohol in 11, her classroom on he would to the January recommend school the district’s her violation of terminated due to board that she be Free Work Policy. Drug 24, a on February conducted
The school board each board 1994, distributed to Sawyer at which superintendent him, documents, which, led Ms. according member three to Mr. Saw- from a memo 1) Darby Owens’s principal suspension: 1994, which included not only summary dated January yer incident, had been that Ms. Owens reports January 14, 1993, and at school activities on May of drinking suspected 21, 1993; dated a letter written Mr. 2) September Jan- Johnson had he that Ms. Owens in which related previously uary condition; and Mr. Saw- 3) in an intoxicated on campus appeared 21, 1994, Ms. letter to Ms. Owens. notification January yer’s Silas, Leaf, David Dr. and her Green treating physician Silas, to Dr. while Ms. Owens at the testified hearing. According alcohol, she was not chronic a dependency developed testified at the hear- and Mr. also alcoholic. Darby Johnson 11, 1994, incident, as about the The board January ing. inquired incidents. At the conclusion of hearing, well as the 1993 hours, two into executive session for board went approximately ses- recommended an after which Sawyer open superintendent terminated. The board voted unani- sion that Ms. Owens be recommendation. No other vote Sawyer’s mously accept *4 taken. letter from board March Ms. Owens received a
On to Mr. the board Lennie Hogan, Hogan. According president were the true reasons concluded unanimously following the Free Work for her termination: she violated district’s 1) Drug the she 3) Place she violated district’s 2) Policy; personnel policy; counselor; an and 4) failed to meet the of elementary expectations the best interests of the students. her termination was in Court, filed Circuit Ms. Owens suit Craighead County The that the board’s action was arbitrary capricious. alleging at testified on trial court conducted a which Ms. Owens hearing, the moved for her behalf. her district own Following testimony, motion, the after which directed verdict. The trial court denied the of Mr. the district Ms. Darby, Johnson, testimony presented At the conclu- Mr. and board member Richard Carvell. Hogan, the the trial ruled that Ms. Owens’s termi- sion of court hearing, was void due to the district’s failure to conduct a nation separate vote on whether the reasons in of Sawyer’s support superintendent 12, 1996, were recommendation for termination true. On March court an trial entered order Ms. Owens the balance awarding of her contract for 1993-94 school her year, denying fees for request attorney’s hearing representation and before the Arkansas Division. On Security Employment 4, 1996, the trial court entered an order April denying Owens’s claim for fees for in the circuit attorney’s representation court action.
On direct
that
district claims
the trial court
appeal,
erred in
its motion for
verdict
fading
directed
at the close
grant
of Ms. Owens’s case. Because the district waived
reliance on
any
case,
its motion when it chose to
forward and
on its own
its
go
put
Prods,
contention is
Eschenbrenner,
meritless. See Willson
v.
Safety
Subsequent a teacher this granted subchapter, board, vote, by majority writte„n shall make specific conclu- sions with to the regard truth of each reason the teacher in support the recommended termination or nonrenewal. The court trial ruled that the termination of Ms. Owens’s contract district, was void because the while voting unanimously accept termination, superintendent recommendation of Sawyer’s failed to conduct a vote on the reasons or separate the truth of the rea- sons in support termination. The district 6- argues does 17-1510(c) not vote. ter- require Describing *5 mination Ms. Owens as the district contends that the “unique,” vote on board’s the recommended termination and the vote on the reasons support recommendation were simulta- with the Act. In of its and thus were in
neous compliance support to board March the district refers Hogan’s argument, president Owens, in which he related the board’s unani- letter to Ms. her termi- that there were four true reasons for mous conclusion Free Place nation: violation of the district’s Work 1) Policy; Drug meet the failure to 3) violation of district’s 2) personnel policy; counselor; and that Ms. Owens’s of an 4) elementary expectations in the best interests of the students. While termination was of the statute does not terms of speak “sepa- plain language vote, vote on 6-17-1510(c) rate” plainly requires majority the teacher in of the recom- truth of each reason given support make written con- mended termination. The board must specific to each of these reasons. Board member clusions regard testified that the vote taken board was Richard Carvell only by to Mr. recommendation: accept Sawyer’s Hogan: We are in sessionto the Mr. open press. Sawyer,
Mr.. have a recommendation? do you Sawyer: President, Mr. recommendation is that Pam my Mr. Owens be terminated from Nettleton Schools as of February 1994, and that would tomorrow. begin Wilson, Ed the recommendation of the accept Motion: Superintendent. Richard Carvell
Second:
Action: 5-0 Wilson, at adjourn Ed 9:00 p.m.
Motion: Second: Richard Carvell
Action: 5-0 letter, March he Mr. admitted Regarding Hogan’s hearing it, before the trial court that he did not write it merely signed after it to him Accord- presented superintendent Sawyer. Carvell, Mr. the board did Mr. not vote to authorize ing Moreover, the letter to Ms. to write Owens. parties stipulated that the board’s vote to recom- Sawyer’s accept superintendent mendation to terminate Ms. contract was the vote Sawyer’s only at the and that there taken was no vote on issues the termination. four supporting
373 termination The trial court found that Owens’s on the the failed to conduct a vote was void because board the of the termination. reasons or truth of the reasons in support that the did 6-17- We conclude district not with strictly comply the failed to obtain vote when a with 1510(c) regard majority to the truth of each reason Ms. Owens in of the given support a recommended termination. We will affirm the of trial ruling result, court if reached the be it even it for a right may though Chevrolet, different reason. v. Yell 310 Ark. Summers Inc. County, 1, case, 486 In this the trial court reached the S.W.2d (1992). result, correct even we affirm result a other that for reason though than the stated. one
The district’s failure to vote obtain majority to the truth of reasons of the regard recommended ter support mination becomes even more troublesome when considered with Ms. together Owens’s on point district cross-appeal 1993, failed to her notice that incidents in give May Sep 21, 1993, tember would be considered at theAt con hearing. clusion of trial court addressed this issue hearing, as follows: incidents in May of September they weren’t
[T]he letter, of the reasons part superintendent gave his but there fact, was related to testimony those reasons. In the board mem- asked instances, bers in the questions about those two transcript and if those termination, incidents were a of reason part for — then I couldn’t the termination because uphold weren’t they The teacher wasn’t notice superintendent’s letter that those were part grounds termination. don’t that know those were part the reasons. issue,
The
provision
6-17-1507(c), provides
“[t]he
notice
termination
(of
shall include
recommendation)
simple
statement of the
complete
grounds for
recommendation of
...”
termination
Without
information that the 1993 incidents
considered,
would be
Ms. Owens’s
for a
“preparation
well
Hamilton v.
nigh impossible.”
Pulaski
Sch.
County Special
Dist.,
that he or she was only voting letter, their contradicts the testimony superintendent’s superinten- *7 address at the dent’s hearing: opening I like hand At this time Mr. President would out to you . three documents. One is a document . . written by Kay Darby, of, Mike and the third is it is the (by) other is part Johnson letter that hand delivered and to Pam by myself Kay Darby on approximately twenty-first January. to, Mr. President know you’ve opportunity you board, and the to review the three documents that are in front of Thosedocumentsled to the that was issuedand in that you. suspension there was a recommendation for termination . . . suspension observed, As the trial court there was added.) testi- (Emphasis both the 1993 incidents at mony regarding May September The board members asked about both inci- hearing. questions If, remarks, dents. to the contrary superintendent’s opening 1993 incidents indeed were to have no whatsoever on the bearing terminate, board’s decision to we behind question purpose their to the board. Because the notice of termination presentation incidents, recommendation did not include the 1993 we must conclude that the district failed to with 6-17-1507(c). comply § When the violation of this with considering provision together the district’s violation of we hold that the 6-17-1510(c), dis- § trict’s decision to terminate Ms. Owens’s contract was void.
Ms. Owens further contends that the district faded to in remedial or rehabilitative measures as mandated engage 6- by § She that the 17-1504(c). also district did not complains strictly with which comply requires superinten dent send his notice of termination recommendation by registered or certified mail. Our termination of Ms. holding Owens’s contract was void due to the failure district’s to strictly 6-17-1510(c) 6-17-1507(c) renders moot comply § § claims Ms. Owens that the district failed any strictly comply Act, with other as a district’s termination of a provisions teacher is void unless the district with all strictly complies provi sions of the Act. See 6-17-1503 With added). limited (emphasis here, not this court does not address moot applicable exceptions Co., 239, issues. Leonardsv. E.A. Martin Machinery S.W.2d 546 (1995).
On Ms. Owens claims that the trial court cross-appeal, erred in to award her fees. The trial court refusing attorney’s entered his on Ms. Owens’s of her judgment termination appeal order, on March 1996. In this the trial court denied Ms. Owens’s for fees for at the request attorney’s representation and before the Division. Ms. Employment Security Owens filed her notice of which cross-appeal April recited that she was the trial court’s March 12 appealing judgment. 4, 1996, On the trial court entered an order April denying Owens’s fees for in the request attorney’s circuit representation court action.
The district
that
asserts Ms. Owens’s claim for
fees
attorney’s
for the circuit court
is
barred
representation
since she
procedurally
did not
the
4 order. We
appeal
April
as we have held
agree,
that
the issue of
fees is a collateral matter.
attorney’s
Mason v.Jackson,
323 Ark.
Regarding fees issue attorney’s to the pertaining board and Employment Division Security neither representation, was a civil action. See Sosebeev. Dist., Line Sch. County 412, 897 Thus, S.W.2d 556 (1995). statute, fees attorney’s Ark. Code-Ann. 16-22-308 1994), does not (Repl. § apply, the trial court was correct in Ms. Owens’s denying in his request March 12 order. Based on the we affirm the foregoing, decision of the trial court.
Affirmed on direct affirmed on appeal; cross-appeal. J., Brown, concurs. J.,
Corbin, dissents. L. Justice, Brown, with concurring. Robert agree Jus- tice Corbin that the majority court construes Ark. Code Ann. 6-17-1510(c) however, erroneously; § majority, my
view, district had failed that school was correct determining Ann. 6-17-1507(c) with Ark. Code (Repl. strictly comply reason, I concur in the For 1993). judgment. two court 6-17-1510(c)
The require interprets § however, no such thing: votes. Section provides a teacher this sub- (c) any hearing granted by Subsequent vote, board, written shall make by majority specific chapter, each to the truth of reason regard conclusions the recommended termination or teacher support nonrenewal. Ann. This 6-17-1510(c) 1993).
Ark. Code (Repl. language mandates that written conclusions be made vote. majority only counsel for Owens conceded oral it is not As during argument, for one vote to cover both the termination impermissible conclusions the termination so as supporting long require- ments of the Act are satisfied. Counsel for Owens merely disputed that one vote here was meant for both purposes.
Both school board member Richard Carvell and school Lennie testified that on the board everyone president understood what was voted on in the vote being single following vote, their two-hour closed session. The to Car- single according vell and was to resolve whether the four cited in Hogan, the notice of termination were true and whether Ms. Owens *9 should be terminated. The then that the other parties stipulated board members’ would match that of and Carvell testimony the Added to this evidence is letter from board Hogan. follow-up to Ms. her that she had been Hogan informing president letter, terminated. In the that the school board Hogan reported concluded that the four were true. unanimously The letter with the from board Hogan coupled testimony and members Carvell unmistakable that the Hogan provide proof board, vote, school made written conclusions by majority specific the truthfulness of the reasons for the recommen- regarding given dation of termination in strict with the statute. Noth- compliance else was to the of Ark. Ann. elements Code ing required satisfy
377 that more was and the errs in saying majority § required.
Nevertheless, be affirmed direct the should judgment Sch., under Allen v. Texarkana Pub. 794 appeal Sch., S.W.2d 138 v. Altheimer-SherrillPub. 294 (1990), Murray cases, Ark. 743 In we (1988). S.W.2d 789 those recognized are that teachers entitled on the rely “simple complete” statement of reasons for nonrenewal termination. Ark. or See Code Ann. 6-17-1507(c) (Repl. 1993).
In Allen we the held that school district failed to make a sim- statement of reasons for nonrenewal when ple complete spe- cific acts issue the not before board were mentioned the recommendation of nonrenewal. We said:
To allowthe superintendentand board to delveinto ad libbed renders charges of sections meaningless requirements 16-17-1507(b) and 16-17-1507(c) [sic], and our language [sic] that are Murray teachers entitled on a rely and com- simple statement of reasons plete as to nonrenewal of their contracts. Sch., Allen v. TexarkanaPub. 303 Ark. at S.W.2d 140. us, This rationale well to the facts equally before and I applies that Nettleton School agree District ran afoul of this principle when it two presented other drunkenness at reports suspected school without notice Owens. providing proper L. Justice, I dissent because I dissenting. Corbin, Donald believe the of Ark. Code majority’s Ann. 6-17- interpretation incorrect, is (Repl. 1993) the facts especially presented in this case. court, before the trial During hearing testimony was taken from board member Richard Carvell and board presi- dent Lennie After Hogan. their testimony, parties stipulated members would remaining duplicate thus, statements of Carvell and their auto- Hogan; was testimony received. matically
Both Carvell and testified that board members understood recommendation for superintendent Sawyer’s Owens’s termination based the four reasons outlined in *10 upon her her Both members stated the letter of advising suspension. of the was to understood they special hearing purpose in the letter of Both consider the four issues listed suspension. the four members stated that board discussed issues during session, executive and that when had returned to the they recommendation, on the record and made his under- Sawyer they stood that were four issues as discussed. they voting Hogan further that he board member if he under- testified asked every on, stood what the board was and that under- voting everyone stood. when asked the trial court what would Finally, by they all have done if had not with four reasons for termina- they agreed tion, both Carvell and indicated that had there been any issues, doubt on would have asked for an individual any they doubt, vote on each of the issues. There was no such as the board terminate Owens on the reasons unanimously agreed presented. After the a letter the four for termina- hearing, reflecting tion was sent to Owens from Hogan.
In the board members indi- my testimony by opinion, cates that the set statutory complied requirements out section which more than a requires nothing vote with written as the truth conclusions of each rea- majority son for termination. The decision would given majority’s require vote on each of the four reasons for ter- separate majority given mination. that section as vote to interpret requiring majority terminate with written on each conclusions reason given. Here, the school district with section complied 6-17-1510(c) Owens, that the board voted to terminate after hav- unanimously discussed each of the four reasons for termination in executive ing session, and a letter each board’s writ- follow-up reflecting ten conclusions was sent to Owens. conclusion that the district
Notwithstanding majority’s failed to Owens notice of the two 1993 inci- give proper drinking dents, I believe the of section 6-17- majority’s interpretation technical, and I is dissent. Further- 1510(c) unduly respectfully more, I believe the fact that the district not have may incidents, notice as to the does not warrant a deter- drinking prior mination this court that the district acted or arbitrarily capri- To the ciously. contrary, any testimony concerning prior *11 school activities incidents of intoxication on or at Owens’s campus extraneous because the based its determination district merely to terminate on the four set out in the suspension letter.
In trial court’s the school district light finding not acted without rational or basis arbitrarily, capriciously, Owens from her remand this would terminating employment, case with instructions that trial court enter an order in favor the school district.
Roderick Leshun RANKIN v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 96-1025
Opinion July denied rehearing September [Petition 1997.]