3 Conn. App. 531 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1985
This case began as an administrative appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA); General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189; and, by agreement of the parties
We begin by noting that it was not until oral argument in this court that certain of the substantial procedural difficulties with this case became apparent, since neither the parties’ briefs nor the appellate record disclosed them. As a result, we have examined the trial court file of the case and the administrative record which was supplied to the trial court. That examination reveals the following facts and procedural history: The plaintiffs have, since 1974, owned two parcels of land in the town of Clinton which are separated by a railroad right of way owned by the National Passenger Rail Corporation, known as Amtrak. Access between the two parcels is by a grade crossing over the right of way, which is known as Lawyer’s Crossing or Shoemaker’s Crossing (the crossing).
Elimination of the crossing was proposed in connection with the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project administered by the federal government. That project, which concerns rail service between Boston and
On April 21, 1980, a public hearing was held by the bureau of public transportation of the Connecticut department of transportation (DOT), regarding the proposed elimination of the crossing, and two other crossings in the towns of Guilford and Madison. The notice of the hearing designated the plaintiffs, and others, as parties to the proceeding, and stated that “[i]n keeping with the Federal Railroad Administration’s efforts to provide high speed rail passenger service in the Northeast Corridor from Washington to Boston, and in the interest of safety, certain railroad grade crossings have been proposed to be eliminated. A private crossing referred to as Shoemaker’s (Lawyer’s) Crossing, in the town of Clinton has been so named.”
The plaintiffs and their attorney attended the hearing. At the beginning of the hearing a brief presentation was made by a representative of the office of rights of way of DOT. That presentation noted that any property rights existing at the crossing would be taken, and it explained the appraisal and condemnation process which would ensue in the absence of agreement between DOT and the property owners. The remainder of the public hearing involved an explanation of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project by federal and state officials, and statements and questions by those attending the hearing, including the plaintiffs and their attorney.
DOT’s decision following this hearing is dated September 3,1980. The decision noted that the questions of whether a bridge, some other access mechanism or a buy-out of crossing rights would be used in achieving the elimination of the crossing “were not decisions that were the subject of the hearing. Those decisions were made early on, taking into consideration the eco
By letter dated December 10, 1980, from the director of the office of rights of way of DOT, the plaintiffs were sent a copy of the decision. Referring to the decision directing the closing of the crossing, the letter stated: “The finding directs the extinguishment of the property rights affected by the closing. Our research of the land records in the Town of Clinton fails to find any recorded crossing rights in your favor. Since adverse possession does not run against the railroad, your crossing has been of a permissive nature which is terminable on notice. There are, then, no property rights to be extinguished. This letter is your official notice that effective February 1,1981, Lawyer’s/Shoemaker’s Crossing is legally closed.”
Ultimately the plaintiffs claimed the case for the trial list. It came on for hearing on March 7,1983. The parties and the court agreed that the facts were those appearing on the record, no additional evidence would be submitted, and their briefs would address the issues raised by the appeal, including the plaintiffs’ assertion of a right of way of necessity over the crossing.
At that point, Amtrak was not a party to the proceedings. The court requested that DOT determine whether Amtrak wished to appear as amicus curiae.
In their original trial brief the plaintiffs argued two issues: (1) whether they have a right of way by neces
The trial court, taking its cue from the plaintiffs’ appeal, conceived of the “decision” being appealed from as both the decision of DOT dated September 3,1980, closing the crossing, and DOT’s letter to the plaintiffs of December 10,1980, communicating that decision to the plaintiffs and informing them that they had no property rights to be extinguished. The court held that the issue of whether the plaintiffs have a right of way of necessity was properly before it, that such a right of
The plaintiffs appealed to this court, claiming that (1) DOT had no power to close the crossing, because that power was lodged solely in the federal secretary of transportation pursuant to federal statutes, and (2) the trial court erred by finding that the plaintiffs had not established a right of way by necessity over the crossing.
Several axioms of administrative law generally, and the UAPA in particular, bear repeating here. Administrative appeals exist only under statutory authority, without which the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 173 Conn. 462, 472, 378 A.2d 547 (1977). The court’s essential function in such an appeal is to review the administrative proceedings to determine whether the action appealed from was legal. Connecticut Television, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission, 159 Conn. 317, 329, 269 A.2d 276 (1970). The scope of judicial review under the UAPA is very restricted. Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn. 705, 707, 372 A.2d 110 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S. Ct. 2930, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1977). Except in the limited situation in which there is an allegation of procedural illegalities not shown in the record; General Statutes § 4-183 (f); that review is limited to the record and the court cannot hear evidence. Arterburn Convalescent
It follows from these axioms that only the “final decision”; General Statutes § 4-183 (a);
The notice of the hearing gave no indication that any person’s property rights would be determined at the hearing. Although the brief presentation at the hearing by the representative of the office of rights of way of DOT referred to the general procedure for appraisals and acquisition of property rights, it did not imply that this hearing was for those purposes. The final decision made it quite clear that the hearing was concerned with the safety factors of the crossing and not the process of acquisition of the property rights of any party. DOT was not purporting, by this general public hearing on the elimination of three crossings in three different
This misconception of the plaintiffs as to the proper subject matter of the appeal was then compounded by the parties and the court when they undertook to litigate, under the rubric of this administrative appeal, the issue of whether the plaintiffs had a right of way by necessity over the crossing. The parties were on the wrong track; since that was an issue which was not within the scope of the administrative proceedings, it was not an issue which could, even by agreement of the parties and the court, be the subject of an appeal from those proceedings. See Arterburn Convalescent Home v. Committee on State Payments to Hospitals, supra; Rybinski v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, supra. Parties may not, by agreement, confer on a court subject matter jurisdiction which it does not otherwise have. Rogers v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 195 Conn. 543, 552, 489 A.2d 368 (1985).
Thus, to the extent that the court exercised its jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ appeal from a decision other than a final decision pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (a), it exercised jurisdiction which it did not have, and the plaintiffs’ appeal was dismissable. Since
This leaves for determination the question of the scope of our remand. The plaintiffs assert in this court, as they did in their reply brief to the trial court, that the trial court session of March 7, 1983, was nothing more than a pretrial, and that they never understood that, by briefing only the issues involving the claim of right of way by necessity, they were abandoning their other claims of error, which were properly directed at the final decision of DOT dated September 3,1980. The defendants in this court dispute the plaintiffs’ assertion, however, and maintain that the session of March 7, 1983, was not a pretrial but was the hearing on the merits of the plaintiffs’ appeal.
The trial court specifically noted in its memorandum of decision that “on March 7, 1983, when the instant appeal came before the court, the parties were agreed that there were no issues of fact requiring the taking of evidence and that their briefs would address the issues raised by the appeal including appellants’ assertion of a way of necessity. ” (Emphasis added.) It also noted as follows: “The fact that both the defendant and plaintiffs understood the March 7,1983, session to be the final one from which a decision would be rendered by the court after submission of briefs is further evidenced by the written waivers dated May 16, 1983 which both executed, waiving the provisions of Section 51-183b of the General Statutes and stipulating that ‘the court shall not be limited as to the time required
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The plaintiffs are Carl A. Neri and Alan A. Neri, who are land owners in the town of Clinton. The defendants are the commissioner of transportation and the department of transportation. Upon invitation of the trial court, the National Passenger Rail Corporation (Amtrak) submitted an amicus curiae brief. On appeal to this court, we permitted Amtrak formally to intervene as a defendant, because of its central interest in the issue litigated.
This was a prudent move, to say the least, since the case purported to litigate the issue of a right of way by necessity over property owned by Amtrak.
Some of the facts asserted in the brief, however, found their way into the trial court’s memorandum of decision. For example, the trial court found that the railroad’s right of way had been in existence since 1852, and that the plaintiffs’ ownership dated from August 21, 1974, which is the date of the copy of the deed attached to their complaint and also apparently attached to their trial brief. None of these facts appears in the administrative record.
General Statutes § 4-183 (a) provides, in relevant part: “A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal under this chapter . . . . ”
Nor do we suggest that this hearing could have been a proper vehicle for adjudicating property rights of land owners affected by the closing of the crossing.