[¶ 1] Kimberly Heilig appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Rockland, Matheius, J.) divorcing her from Ernest P. Neri, dividing their assets, ordering Neri to pay $2,000 toward Heilig’s attorney fees, and ordering him to pay her spousal support for three years. On aрpeal, Heilig contends that the court clearly erred by finding that real estate purchased by Neri during the marriage is nonmarital property, abused its discretion in calculating her spousal support award, and abusеd its discretion by awarding her a lesser amount of legal fees than she requested, We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The court found the following facts, which are supported by competent evidence in the record. See Blanchard v. Blanchard,
[¶ 3] At some point, the relationship soured and they separated, eventually relocating separately to Maine and selling the Honduras properties and business. Once in Maine, they partially reconciled. Neri purchased and sold a property on Oyster River Road in Warren (the “Oyster River Road” property), and then, in 2010, they purchased as joint tenants a property on Crawford Road in Warren (the “Crawford Road property”). They lived in separate quarters at the Crawfоrd Road property until 2014, when, following a complete breakdown of the relationship, Neri purchased and relocated to a multi-unit property in Thomaston (the “Thomaston property”).
[¶ 4] Neri purchased the Thomaston property in his own name, using money obtained from his individual retirement account through his State of Connecticut deferred compensation fund, and by obtaining a loan from Camden National Bank. He paid closing сosts using funds from his retirement account that he had transferred to Damariscotta Bank & Trust.
[¶ 5] Neri is 72 years old. Due to several medical conditions, he has no earning capacity. His income is $74,000 annually, received solely frоm retirement and social security funds. Heilig is 67 years old and is a mediator. Her annual income is $35,800.
[¶ 6] Heilig filed for judicial separation in October 2014, and Neri filed a complaint seeking divorce in December 2014. Following a heаring in January 2015, the court (Worth, J.) ordered Neri to pay Heilig $1,000 per month in interim spousal support, to be applied retroactively from October 31, 2014; $2,000 in interim attorney fees; and the mortgage and homeowner’s insurance pаyments on both the Crawford Road property and the Thomaston property.
[¶ 7] Mediations in May and December 2015, and a judicial settlement conference on April 8, 2016, failed to resolve all issues
[¶ 8] Heilig filed a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of lаw pursuant to M.R. Civ. P, 62(b).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶9] Heilig raises three arguments on appeal. First, she contends that the court clearly erred by finding that the Thoma-ston real estate is nonmarital property and awarding it to Neri. Next, she contends that the court erred in calculating her spousal support award by awarding the support for too short a period of time and by failing to consider Neri’s potential rental income from the Thomaston property. Finally, she argues that the court’s order that Neri pay only $2,000 toward her attorney fees was an abuse of discretion because, according to Heilig, that sum was not reasonable in light of the funds she actually expended on legal costs. We address each argument in turn.
A. Classification of Real Estate
[¶ 10] The court’s classification of property as marital or nonmarital is a question of fact, Spooner v. Spooner,
[¶ 11] “All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually,” unlеss a party demonstrates that it was “acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage,” or for another statutory reason. 19-A M.R.S. § 953(2), (3) (2016).
[¶ 12] Here, although the Thoma-ston property was purchased during thе marriage, the court found that it was non-marital property belonging to Neri alone.
B. Spousal Support Award
[¶ 13] In determining- a spousal support award, a court must consider certain statutory factors, 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2), (5) (2016). These factors include, inter alia, the length of the marriage, each party’s ability to рay, each party’s age, their employment histories, the health and disabilities of each party, their contributions to the home, and “[a]ny other factors the court considers appropriate.” Id. § 951-A(5). The court “may rely on some factors to the exclusion of others.” Jandreau v. LaChance,
[¶ 14] The court here ordered Neri to pay Heilig $1,000 per month in spousal support for a, period of thirty-six months and reached its decision based on findings supported by competent evidence in the record. See Ehret v. Ehret,
[¶ 15] Although Heilig testified that, if she were to have a monetary “shortfall,” she would heed to sell some acreage of the Oyster River Road property in order to make ends meet, and that she is “always looking for work above and beyond” her current employment, we will not overturn the court’s discretionary judgment based upon uncertain future events. See Warner v. Warner,
C. Attorney Fees
[¶ 16] “Divorce courts may order a party to pay another party’s attorney fees based on the pаrties’ relative financial ability to pay the costs of litigation as long as the award is ultimately fair under the totality of the circumstances.” Urquhart v. Urquhart,
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. The court imputed to Heilig social security income of $17,800 annually, which she has a right to collect but has deferred. It added that figure to the $13,000 annual income she receives from mediating.
. We note that Heilig's Rule 52(b) motion correctly included proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Eremita v. Marchiori,
. Heilig’s brief correctly states that equitable distribution of marital property and debt is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, see Thumith v. Thumith,