105 Mo. App. 540 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1904
(after stating the facts as above.)
However, in the later case of McCann v. Eddy, 133 Mo. 59, the rule was abridged to the extent that such carrier can not contract for a through shipment to a, point beyond its own line and at the same time exempt itself from liability for negligence, of the connecting or forwarding carriers completing the transportation. The ruling of the Supreme Court in the last cited case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States (174 U. S. 580), which last decision was invoked in the last consideration of the act by the Supreme Court of Missouri. Western, etc., Co. v. Railway, 76 S. W. 998.
The shipment of the goods and the contract of transporation were made in the State of Illinois, at Joliet, and in absence of the above statute, the receiving carrier could limit its common law liability, and would not be liable beyond its own line. Snider v. Adams Ex. Co., 63 Mo. 376; Coates v. Railway, supra; Dimmitt v. Railway, supra.
It has not escaped notice that the bill of lading is silent as to the connecting point over the line of appellant, to which the shipment was to be transported, probably by omission to properly fill up the blank in the bill of lading for such insertion; but it is clear from the general terms of this evidence of the contract between the carrier and the shipper, that transportation merely to its terminal point and delivery there to the connecting carrier was intended.
In the case of Minter v. Railway, 56 Mo. App. 282, a like omission is perceived and thus disposed of by the court:
“We do not think the fact that the name of the station where the transition on its line ended was not mentioned in the bill of lading is of importance. Its exemption from liability under the special agreement set*550 forth in the bill of lading begun after it had safely, and without unreasonable delay, transported and delivered the plaintiff’s oats to the connecting carrier. The language of the exemption clause was, we think, sufficiently specific for every purpose.”
The same inaccuracy is manifest in the bill of lading considered by this court in Patterson v. Railway, 56 Mo. App. 657, and was regarded by the court as immaterial, and not affecting the restriction of the liability in the contract.
Respondent in argument invoked a statute of the State where the delivery of the goods to the first carrier was made, but it can not be considered, as no proof was introduced of its existence and the presumption obtains that the common law prevailed in that State. Edwards, etc., Co. v. Stevenson, 160 Mo. 516. No presumption can be indulged that the State of Illinois has enacted statutory laws identical with or similar to those of this State (Morrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 47 Mo. 521); hence the liability of appellant as carrier was restricted to its own line, and converted into that of forwarding-agent of the shipper for the connecting lines, completing the transporation as the Missouri statute was inoperative and could have no effect extraterritorially upon the agreement made in a sister State. Connell v. W. U. Tel. Co., 108 Mo. 459; Stanley v. Railway, 100 Mo. 435; State v. Gudener, 134 Mo. 572.
One of the essential ingredients to vest jurisdiction in the justice was absent, that is, there was no issue presented by any statement or pleading of any cause of action whatever filed before him. He was, therefore, without jurisdiction to hear and determine any subject-matter pending before him. The justice being without jurisdiction none was conferred on the circuit court by appeal (Turk v. Funk, 68 Mo. 18; Sandige v. Hill, 70 Mo. App. 71), and it was not competent for the parties to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court by appearing and going to trial. White v. Railway, 72 Mo. App. 400; Bank v. Doak, 75 Mo. App. 332; Belshe v. Lamp, 91 Mo. App. l. c. 479; Fields v. Maloney, 78 Mo. 172; Barnett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56.
The judgment is therefore reversed.