139 Ark. 13 | Ark. | 1919
Appellant was convicted of the offense of selling intoxicating liquor, and the principal contention on this appeal is that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict.
. The testimony of one Boss was the only .direct testimony tending to establish appellant’s guilt. Boss testified that he obtained money from one Mr. Swaim with which to buy whiskey, and that he purchased the whiskey from appellant in Lonoke County, where the venue in the case is laid in the indictment. Boss was rigidly cross-examined, and according to his testimony as copied in the record he was to some extent vacillating and uncertain in some of his statements,-but he testified that he, purchased the liquor from appellant. His credibility was a question for the jury, and we cannot say that there was not substantial evidence in support of the verdict.
Appellant was introduced as a witness and denied that he sold whiskey, but this contradiction was a question for the jury to determine whether or not appellant was, beyond reasonable doubt, guilty of the offense charged in the indictment.
It is next contended that certain remarks of the prosecuting attorney in his opening statement to the jury before the testimony was introduced constituted prejudicial error. The remarks objected to, as copied in the record, were as follows: “The prosecuting witness, George Ross, after making and inquiring and having information as to the defendant selling whiskey, and another man by the name of Strong, and talked with him about the matter.” The remainder of the statement of the prosecuting attorney is not brought into the record and we have no means of knowing definitely just the connection in which this remark was made, but we assume that it was a part of the preliminary statement leading up to an outline of the testimony of the witness Ross. The substance of the remark is that the prosecuting witness, after receiving information as to the defendant selling whiskey, talked with him about it and proceeded to buy the whiskey. It does not appear to have been an effort on the part of the prosecuting attorney to introduce hearsay testimony, nor does it appear that the remark was made otherwise than in good faith in an attempt of the officer to correctly outline to the jury the testimony which he expected to introduce for their consideration. Good faith is generally the test in passing upon the conduct of such an officer in his preliminary presentation of a case to the jury. McFalls v. State, 66 Ark. 16. According to the test we do not think that there has been any prejudice to the rights of appellant so as to call for a reversal of the judgment.
Objection is made that the prosecuting attorney was permitted to interrogate appellant on cross-examination concerning the commission of other offenses, but that was for the purpose of reflecting upon his credibility as a witness, and was competent. It has been so decided in numerous cases in this court.
Other matters are argued here as grounds for reversal, but the record fails to show that exceptions were saved concerning those matters.
Judgment affirmed.
