52 Wis. 534 | Wis. | 1881
The only question we have to consider in this case is, Was there sufficient evidence to warrant the finding of
The above, in brief, is the material testimony relied on by the prosecution to prove the participation of the plaintiff in error in the commission of the offense as charged. The plaintiff in error was sworn in his own behalf. He denied being in company with Monroe in Milwaukee at any time; said he did not even know him, and had never met him until Monroe was examined for the larceny. He positively denied that he in any way aided or abetted in the criminal act, or had anything to do with it. He explained how he happened to be in the crowd at the time Powers’ pocket was picked, but did not give a very satisfactory explanation of how he came to have possession of Monroe’s hat, or his reason for attempting to conceal it, or what he intended'doing with it. The jury evidently did not believe his testimony. And his learned counsel now contends that the whole evidence, taken together, is entirely insufficient to warrant his conviction, and claims that it shows that Nelson had nothing whatever to do either in the commission of the larceny or in receiving or aiding in the concealment of the stolen money. But we are of a different opinion. We think the jury might well have found from the crimina-tory facts proven on the part of the prosecution, that the plaintiff in error was a confederate of Monroe, and was aiding and assisting him in the commission of the crime. It was certainly the province of the jury to weigh the testimony and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. If the jury believed the statements of the witnesses sworn on the part of the prosecution, and discredited those made by the plaintiff in error, as they doubtless did do, there was sufficient testimony to sustain the verdict.
The learned municipal court instructed the jury that unless they were satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
There was a general verdict. Our statute provides that a person who receives, conceals, or aids in concealing, stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall receive the same punishment as is prescribed for the stealing of such property. Section 4417, R. S. In view of this statute, perhaps it was not necessary for the jury to state in their verdict under which count in the information they found the plaintiff in error guilty.
Upon the whole record, we think the judgment of the municipal court must be affirmed.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.