NELSON v. THE STATE
S21A0773
In the Supreme
Decided: September 8, 2021
PETERSON, Justice.
PETERSON, Justice.
This Court granted murder defendant Corey Nelson‘s application for interlocutory appeal of the trial court‘s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. At issue is evidence extracted from his cell phone and other electronic devices pursuant to search warrants. Nelson argues that the delay of more than two years between the date on which the electronic devices were seized pursuant to a search warrant for his residence, and the dates on which the devices were examined pursuant to subsequent search warrants for their contents, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Although we posed a question to the parties regarding the significant legal question of when a search warrant has been executed, we need not — and so do not — answer that question to decide this case. The evidence challenged here was extracted days after warrants issued in 2020. The only challenge Nelson now offers to this evidence is the long delay between the 2017 seizure of the devices and the 2020 issuance of the warrants. But his possessory interest in the devices was greatly diminished by the combination of his incarceration for the entire period of the delay and his failure to request the devices’ return. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, and we affirm.
On January 18, 2018, Stoddard obtained separate warrants to search each of Nelson‘s devices for electronic data related to the crimes. On that same day, he submitted a written request for forensic analysis of each device to what is now known as the Cobb Police Department‘s Technology Based Crimes Unit (“TBCU”). But more than a year passed before TBCU analysts performed the examinations: data extraction was completed for the iPhone on February 6, 2019; the Samsung phone on January 8, 2020; and the laptop on January 9, 2020.1
Nelson filed a motion to suppress the evidence taken from these devices, arguing that the January 2018 warrants were void because they had not been executed within ten days as required by the warrants themselves and by
Nelson again moved to suppress the evidence extracted from the devices. He argued among other things that the delay of more than two years from the date on which the electronic devices were seized until the date of the data extraction pursuant to the 2020 warrants violated his federal and state constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure, as well as his federal constitutional due process rights. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court concluded that the 2020 search warrants were properly issued and executed, ruling that they were supported by probable cause and executed within ten days of issuance, and that any delay in the filing of their returns did not render them invalid. The court also held that the delay between the seizure of the electronic devices and the issuance of the 2020 search warrants was not unreasonable. The court explained that it was “satisfied with the reason for the delay as presented by the State” in obtaining the new warrants — identifying that reason in the order as a lack of manpower and resources within the TBCU, as well as the necessity of obtaining the new warrants given the suppression of the evidence pursuant to the 2018 warrants. The trial court found no substantial violation of Nelson‘s rights arising from the delay, noting that he had been in custody since October 2017.
In reviewing a trial court‘s ruling on a defendant‘s motion to suppress evidence, the trial court‘s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; we will not disturb the trial court‘s findings based on conflicting evidence if there is any evidence to support them. See State v. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. 442, 449 (2) (826 SE2d 18) (2019). The trial court‘s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, however. See id. at 451 (2).
Here, the trial court decided that the warrant authorizing the seizure of the devices at issue was insufficiently particular to allow a thorough review of the electronic data contained therein, such that additional search warrants were required. We need not decide whether this holding was correct because we conclude that the trial court did not err in declining to suppress the electronic data ultimately culled pursuant to the 2020 warrants.
A seizure that is “lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment” due to subsequent events that unreasonably infringe upon a person‘s possessory interests in the seized property. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (104 SCt 1652, 80 LE2d 85) (1984). Delay in obtaining a warrant to search a seized item is one example of conduct that can unlawfully interfere with a defendant‘s possessory interests. See Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 454-455 (2) (e); United States v. Mitchell, 565 F3d 1347, 1350-1351 (11th Cir. 2009). The reasonableness of the delay in getting a warrant is determined on a case-by-case basis, in the light of all of the facts and circumstances. See Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 450 (2). We have adopted a four-factor test for balancing governmental and private interests in this context, considering (1) the significance of the interference with the person‘s possessory interest; (2) the duration of the delay; (3) whether or not the person consented to the seizure; and (4) the government‘s legitimate interest in holding the property as evidence. See Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 450 (2) (citing United States v. Laist, 702 F3d 608, 613-614 (11th Cir. 2012)).
Here, it is not seriously disputed that, on the one hand, the State had a legitimate interest in holding the electronic devices as evidence, and that, on the other hand, the duration of the delay was unusually long and Nelson did not consent to the seizure of his devices. This leaves for our examination the significance of the State‘s interference with any possessory interest held by Nelson. In evaluating that factor, we consider “the degree of possessory interest in the subject property, the duration of the delay as it affects that interest, and the efforts of [the] defendant[ ] to secure the return of the items.” Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 451 (2) (a).
Applying those sub-factors, we again note that the delay in examining the devices was lengthy. And people often have a significant possessory interest in personal electronic devices, such as those at issue here. See Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 451 (2) (a) (personal computers, tablets, and cell phones are “unique possessions in which individuals may have a particularly powerful possessory interest” (citation and punctuation omitted)). But the trial court found that it was “aware of no demand from or on behalf of [Nelson] for the return of these devices,” a finding that is not clearly erroneous.5 Moreover, the trial court found that Nelson could not personally use or possess
This case presents unusual facts and an extremely lengthy delay. But given the government‘s strong interest in holding the devices at issue, Nelson‘s significantly reduced possessory interest in the devices, and the consequently limited nature of the State‘s interference with that interest, even weighed against the lengthy duration of the delay and lack of consent to the seizure, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the delay in securing the 2020 warrants did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Compare Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 451-455 (2) (totality of circumstances confirmed trial court‘s conclusion that 539-day delay in securing warrants for search of electronic devices seized incident to arrest was unreasonable, where State made no showing of particular complexity, difficulty in drafting the warrant, or competing demands on a limited number of officers, and record showed that defense had sought return of the devices for a year and a half).7
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.