Rоbert Edward Nelson was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Nelsоn filed this appeal, enumerating 11 errors, most of which concern the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Having determined that no reversible error occurred, we affirm.
The underlying case arose after two “very loud, very boisterous” masked men entered Candler Federal Credit Union. 1 After forcing all the customers to lie on the floor, they robbed the bank at gunpoint. They were agitated and insistent, and one emphatically brandished a pistol. One robber, later identified as Nelson, confronted the lead teller, placed a mesh bag in front of her, then demanded money. Due to that teller’s еxtremely close contact with Nelson, she was able to discern his facial features through the stocking mask and later identified him. The second man pointed a gun directly at the teller’s face and ordered her to “[b]ack up, b — h.” After the lead teller complied, this same assailant demanded money from another teller.
Unlike these two witnesses, a third bank employee observed the perpetrators before they donned their masks. This eyewitness saw *64 the two robbers on three separate occasions: when she walked outside to her car just before the robbery, thеn again after she reentered the credit union, and, finally, on the screen of a monitor as security cameras captured the armed robbery in progress. After selecting Nelson’s photograph from a photo array, she felt “very sure” about her choice. Similarly, at trial, she was “definite” that Nelson was one of the two men who had walked past her in the parking lot just moments befоre the robbery.
Meanwhile, an employee of a nearby business became suspicious that a robbery was underway after noticing a driver remain inside a vehicle with the engine running while two other men “started walking real fast” toward the credit union. This alert bystander jotted down a description of the getaway vehicle and its tag number just as the men raced out of the bank and “jumped in the car and sped off.” A cap initialed inside with “QED” was discovered at the crime scene near a trail of scattered, dye-colored money. Nelson’s stepdaughter, whose initials are Q. E. D., identified this сap as her “skully.”
1. Nelson contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. We disagree. The State offered both direct and circumstantial evidence to prove Nelson’s guilt. Two witnesses positively identified Nelson as one of the robbers, the getaway car belonged to a friend’s wife, similar transaction evidence indicated that Nelson had committed another robbery in a similar manner, and Nelson’s futile attempt to hide from investigators inside a closet pointed to his guilt. Although Nelson focuses on inconsistencies in the witnesses’ identification, the jury apрarently resolved any conflicts adversely to him.
Byrd v. State,
2. Nelson’s claim that the two counts of armed robbery should have been merged is without merit. Nelson’s robberies of the two individual bank tellers at the same site constituted two separatе crimes and did not merge in fact or law.
Byrd,
supra at 489 (9);
State v. Smith,
3. Nelson asserts that the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce similar transaction evidence that impermissibly placed his character in еvidence. When a probative connection is shown between the similar transaction and the charged offense and the evidence has been found admissible, the trial court has implicitly determined that the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact.
Sheppard v. State,
*65
The State offered as a similar transaction a robbery by force, a prior crime admittedly committed by Nelson. This evidence was offered to prove identity, bent of mind, and course of conduct. The victim recounted the details of the robbery, and the lead investigator, who captured Nelson after a car chase, disclosed incriminating admissions made by Nelson about that robbery. No error has been shown to have occurred in the admission of this evidence. See
Farley v. State,
4. Nelsоn claims that because the similar transaction took place more than 11 years before the credit union robbery, it was too remote in time and should not have been allowed in evidеnce. When similar transaction evidence is otherwise admissible, the elapse of 11 years and 19 years has not demanded exclusion of such evidence.
Rich v. State,
5. Nelson asserts that the State’s Exhibit 29, a certified cоpy of his prior conviction for robbery by force, should not have been admitted into evidence. He further claims that this exhibit should have been redacted.
A certified copy of a piiоr conviction may be used to supplement and in conjunction with testimonial evidence corroborating a similar transaction.
Hudson v. State,
6. In two assertions of error, Nelson clаims that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce, over his objection, the testimony of his stepdaughter, a minor. Before she testified, Nelson objected on two grounds: “her tender agе” and that she had been questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation without parental consent and without a parent present in violation of parental rights.
Whether a child witness is comрetent to testify within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-7 is a matter which lies within the trial court’s
*66
sound discretion.
Wood v. State,
7. Nelson contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine to exclude the testimony оf his stepdaughter.
Trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel.
Phillips v. State,
8. Nelson contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to list his wife as an alibi witness.
A decision not to pursue an alibi defense is a part of trial strategy and therefore is a matter with which this court will generally not interfere.
Polk v. State,
9. Nelson contends that the State violated his due process rights by using a photographic spread that was unduly suggestivе and gave rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. See
McCoy v. State,
10. Finally, Nelson contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a life term as a recidivist during the pendency of an appeal of one of his prior convictions. The sentencing transcript belies this assertion. After Nelson objected to the inclusion of a shoрlifting conviction that was then being appealed, the trial court refused to consider it, and the State offered a burglary conviction in its place.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Nelson’s co-defendant, Roosevelt Byrd, Jr., was acquitted of the credit union heist but was convicted of other armed robberies.
Byrd v. State,