Dеfendant Sean Nelson appeals his conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. We affirm.
At the time the оffense occurred, defendant was a high school student who was on supervised probation for an earlier possession оffense. The evidence shows a confidential informant notified the police that he had been at defendant’s residencе earlier in the morning and that defendant had contraband in his bedroom. A police officer and an officer from the juvenile сourt probation office picked the defendant up from school and transported him to his residence. Pursuant to a search of defendant’s bedroom, the officers discovered, in the pocket of a suit coat in defendant’s closet, a bag containing a substance which later tested to be 5.03 grams of crack cocaine. They also found $159 in cash in another pocket of the coat.
The police chief testified the informant who provided the information was under indictment on six counts of sеlling cocaine to undercover agents and pleaded guilty to those counts shortly after defendant’s arrest. The informant called the police chief the day before defendant’s arrest with information which the chief did not consider specific enough to justify a search and the chief told the informant he would need more certain information before he could act. The following day the informant called back and told the chief that he had been to defendant’s residence that morning and he could now report with certainty that contraband could be found in a coat pocket in defendant’s closet.
1. In defendant’s first two enumеrations he contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that he was entitled to a directed verdict оf acquittal. He argues the evidence shows the informant had equal access to the closet as well as a motive for planting the drugs so he could serve as informant and be granted a lighter sentence for his offenses.
The equal access defense is based on the rule that “merely finding contraband on premises occupied by a defendant is not sufficient to support a conviction if it
affirmatively
appears from the evidence that persons other than the defendant had equal opportunity to com
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mit the crime.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Burrell v. State,
2. Where, as here, the equal access defense was not reasonably raised by the evidence, no charge thereon is required. See
Lance v. State,
supra at (2);
Brown v. State,
3. Defendаnt argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his closet because the search wаs conducted without a warrant and without his consent. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that consent to search defendant’s residence was an express condition of his earlier probation sentence. Such consent is a valid waiver of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches.
Allen v. State,
4. During voir dire, one of the prospective jurors stated her opinion that the defendant would not have been charged with a crime if he were not guilty, and the judge ruled her disqualified. The judge, however, denied defendant’s motion for mistrial brought on the ground that the prospective juror’s comments had prejudiced the entire panel. “We hold the court did not err in denying mistrial. First, the appropriate remedy for corrеcting an error in the process of selecting a jury is disqualification of the jury, not the granting of a mistrial. See
Moore v. State,
5. Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to disqualify a potential juror who stated initially in response to questiоning on voir dire that he would have a natural bias toward the State because he was previously employed by the policе department. Upon further questioning, however, the juror stated he could set aside his previous experience and base his opinion in the case solely on the evidence presented. “While a venireman may initially express doubt as to his or her ability to be impartial, this fact alone does not demand that the prospective juror be excused for cause. When the venireman indicates that he can render a fair and impartial verdict based solely upon the evidence presented at triаl, he is prima facie competent to serve. [Cit.] The trial court has the discretion as to whether to strike a juror for cause. [Cits.] We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.”
Lattany v. State,
Judgment affirmed.