*1 legally slight, tending prove sufficient weight negligence, and value of evidence such being jury;....”’ left to the that, meager carry It follows if such evidence is sufficient to to jury verdict, a case over a for Knisley motion directed Keller, supra, it should take no more to overcome motion summary judgment.
Judgment reversed. paid by appellees. Costs to be E. v. REAL ESTATE MORRIS NELSON THE FOR STATE OF COMMISSION MARYLAND Term, 693, September 1976.] [No. 15, 1977.
Decided March *2 argued J., C. and Morton cause was before Gilbert, and JJ. Lowe, Henry appellant. A.
Carlton M. Green and
Babcock for
Aumiller,
Attorney General,
Robert J.
Assistant
with
Burch,
General,
Attorney
brief,
Francis B.
whom was
on the
appellee.
J.,
Lowe, J.,
C.
delivered the
of the Court.
Gilbert,
page 345
concurring opinion
filed a
infra.
Having
defending
charges
been
in
unsuccessful
himself on
brought before the Real Estate Commission for the State of
Maryland
subsequent
appeal
and
the
to the Circuit Court
George’s County (Mathias, J..),
for Prince
Morris E. Nelson
by way
challenges
now
of motion
for the first
time the
jurisdiction
course,
of the Commission and the court. Of
question
jurisdiction
subject
may
over the
matter
any
Resh,
133,
raised at
Resh v.
time.
271 Md.
(1973);
State,
App. 624,
Wheeler v.
As Nelson asserts complaint upon that the which the Commission acted and the circuit affirmed was barred court the statute of support limitations and that the evidence does not findings agree If we the Commission. with Nelson on the jurisdictional issue, journey through we need not the statute sufficiency are, of limitations nor the of the evidence. We however, compelled complete sojourn because are jurisdictional scope not d’accord with view of the Nelson’s Commission, thus, circuit court. controversy which We shall now set the scene from arose. English lawyer, Tayler, and Canadian
John Meredith Washington read an advertisement on June read as follows: Post. The ad type.
“Apt. of Riverdale. units heart Older —4 Excel, $21,000 Asking potential. Assume loan. leaving $29,500. area. Prin. call 772-0033.” Owner by telephoning the listed Tayler responded to ad Mr. spoke appellant, Nelson, who with the number provided himself a real estate broker. Nelson identified Tayler concerning property. met Tayler particulars with inspected apartments which were Nelson and Riverdale, Maryland. Road, Queensbury located at *3 Nelson, reply that in Tayler before the Commission testified question Tayler, property the was a stated that to usage. produced temporary apartment Nelson a licensed for George’s County Department of from Prince certificate the Tayler Inspections informed that a and Permits. Nelson forthcoming when certain permanent certificate would completed. Tayler necessary repairs property the were to with an received Nelson verified the information Department employee the of individual unnamed a Inspections Tayler then entered into contract and Permits. signed the purchase property. At the time Nelson the to in owner,” property one title to the was contract as “contract Rogers, apparently party. straw who was a settlement,
Immediately prior which within a to occurred sale, Tayler days the few of the execution of contract a give license requested Nelson to written assurance that repairs property necessary be issued when the would upon the penned the reverse side of completed. were Nelson contract, “Notwithstanding sale, anything in the contract of fide herein sold as a bona subject property described Tayler their apartment Both subscribed house.” Nelson had respective that Nelson names under the sentence deed proceeded and executed a Tayler settlement written. $8,750 Nelson. in in favor of trust the amount of note Tayler record is not clear as to whether assumed the outstanding $21,000 obligation existing upon then the property. later, Tayler
Sometime a received letter from the appropriate requesting apply authorities that he for an apartment prompted by house license. The letter was a complaint by neighbor investigating In filed or tenant.1 the Department complaint, learned of the transfer ownership Queensbury Tayler of 4409 Road. applied for the license, ground but was denied property it on the that single family zoning was in residential area. Efforts Tayler non-conforming to show a use rezoning or to obtain Tayler, We do application failed. observe that his for a use permit, sought (5) apartments. Being five unable utilize property apartments, Tayler property for four lost the at complaint foreclosure. He filed a with the Real Estate against Commission Nelson. For reasons that are unclear in record, complaint dismissed, seemingly was without hearing, reopened in 1974 but in 1975.2No reason is stated why subsequently record as the Commission turned degrees proceeded any event, on matter. In appear hearing Nelson did not but confined his defense to a letter to the Commission in any which he denied wrongdoing. opined Nelson “subject” he would not himself “. . . to further case, harassment which has many setting continued for months.” After view out his Tayler property mismanagement lost the because his own endeavoring and was to use Nelson escape,” “as an Nelson *4 stating, by that, concluded willing “With I am perfectly to by stand on facts as the determined the commission based upon your investigation and whatever other information is you any available to source.” complainant Glenbury residing The is shown in the record as at 4409 Queensbury property times,
Road. At is referred to in the record as the Glenbury. September 23, 1974, 2. Under date of the Real Estate Commission wrote respect Nelson, to investigation complete to “Please be Tayler advised that captioned review and of the above case the Real Estate Maryland Commission of has that determined there has no been violation of the “dismissing by stating Real Estate Law.” Commission concluded that it was closing this case and our file.” wilfully Nelson had The Commission found that Tayler, it, misrepresented property that he sold to and license, 26, 1975, ordered revoked Nelson’s his on December surrendered, real estate canceled his salesmen’s licenses listings, “.. . cease desist from and directed Nelson to and practice estate. of real ...” indicated, challenges
As have Nelson now in the first Nelson jurisdiction of the Commission instance. records, the Commission as introduced into contends that hearing, was not a evidence at disclose that Nelson during period licensed “November to broker 1971,” frame “within which the November time Ergo, reasons, alleged occurred.” Nelson misconduct time, any he inasmuch he was not at that and as licensed respect Tayler him with were outside acts committed jurisdiction. the ambit the Commission’s selling property Nelson that he was his own also contends Supreme of South acting not as a broker. The Court Boineau, Carolina Real Estate Comm’n v. Carolina South (1976) rejected S.E.2d 440 considered similar argument. said: The Court appellant’s prinicpal
“The
issue in the
contention
acting
four
that
of these
transactions he was
all
broker,
on
behalf.
not as
real estate
but
his own
argues
grounds
He
set forth for revocation
license,
solely
apply
of a
estate
.. .
activities
real
acting
capacity. We
of a
while
in his broker
broker
disagree.
subject
of the bar are
Even members
strictly
disciplinary procedures
conduct
practice
law,
may
related
realtors
strictly
conduct not
their
licenses revoked for
they
acting as
in which
are
related to a transaction
at 441-42.
broker.” 230 S.E.2d
argument
fail
think Nelson’s
must
because
Ann.
We
provides
pertinent part
(a)
art.
Code
§
any
may investigate “. ..
the actions of
real
Commission
salesman,
any person
estate
real
who
broker or
estate
capacity
act in
within
shall assume to
either such
*5
(Emphasis supplied.)
.”
specifically
State.
. .
The statute
upon
jurisdiction
investigate
confers
the Commission to
not
only real estate brokers and salesmen but also those who
to act”
In
“assume
as brokers or salesmen.
sub
case
judice,
testimony
the uncontradicted
held
was
Nelson
Tayler
broker,
thrusting
himself out to
as a
estate
thus
real
clearly
himself
jurisdiction.
within
Commission’s
(a)
think it would be
We
seriocomic to construe
so
§
as to allow the Real Estate
call
Commission to
to task those
precepts
acting
brokers who violated the Commission’s
while
as brokers and
same time carve from the
jurisdiction
very
violations,
Commission’s
same
broker,
committed
the identical
capacity.
a non-broker
instance,
In
might
the former
the broker
be branded as
latter,
though
unethical but
in the
even
the broker
violation,
retain, officially,
committed
same
he would
his
good
McKnight
character.
v. Florida Real Estate
1967).
Commission,
(Fla. App.
Nelson contends that on proceedings brought its face the against him are violative of attempting the statute. Without to discuss ad why nauseam all the reasons Nelson’s argument is on shifting sand, point founded we shall out but three.
I. proceedings before its the Commission had as objective protection “sharp” practices public of the of real estate brokers. Just as members of the bar are subject disciplinary proceedings professional misconduct, though strictly even practice related law, are so real estate brokers. *6 aware, Appeals not, has so far as are Court predecessor, Art. its Md. Ann. Courts 5-107 or
considered § has, 57, 11, respect real brokers. It Code art. to estate § however, on a number of occasions ruled that limitations do attorney grievance Recently, in apply in matters. Bar not 250, City Posner, 275 A. 2d Ass’n Baltimore v. Md. 339 657 summarily theory (1975), rejected that the Court Posner’s laches or limitations was a defense the Bar Association’s him, pointing proceeding against that disbarment out public. purpose proceeding protection was the of the of the 582-83, Collins, 578, In Anne Arundel Bar v. 272 Md. Ass’n 724, Judge Levine, writing (1974), A. 325 2d 727 Court ‘ said: “Although appear it we have does previously, question courts considered uniformly disciplinary held that elsewhere have by a proceedings against attorneys are not barred limitations, Heinze, In 47 general Re statute 1951); Woodward, (Minn. 123, 125 300 N.W.2d In Re 1957); Bates, 385, (Mo. v. 162Neb. State S.W.2d 387 310 (1956); Wright, In Re 302, 304 N.W.2d 652, 77 Kan. Ratner, 194 Re 1973); In (Vt. see 1, 2d 9 A. v. (1965); Harrison 865, 873 2d P. 362, 399 Ky. 221, 222 Commonwealth, 379, 204 305 S.W.2d (1947). primarily disciplinary so because a This is law, Maryland proceeding St. neither an action Boone, 420, 430, 2d 438 Bar 255 258 A. Ass’n v. Balto., 209 Md. (1969); Bar Ass’n Braverman v. 830, (1956), denied, 352 U. S. 328, 121A. 2d 473 cert. (1956); 44, 1 51 77 L.Ed.2d S. Ct. nor criminal Ass’n, Bar prosecution, Balliet v. Balto. Co. Bar (1970); A. Braverman 2d supra, supra, Braverman, In Balto., at 348.
Ass’n of we said: exercising its
‘The of a court action attorney is suspend an power disbar or character, inquiry is judicial but the investigation by the court of an the nature officers, into the conduct of one of its own law, and is not the trial of an action at only the order which is entered is an disciplinary jurisdiction exercise which a .’ court has over its officers. . . 209 Md. at 336. general period
We hold of limitations prescribed by apply Art. 1 does not § disciplinary proceedings against brought members (Emphasis supplied.) of the Bar.” We perceive any are unable to difference between protecting public unscrupulous practices by *7 attorney type practice by same a real estate broker.
II. As with matters before Attorney Grievance Commission or the Commission, Judicial Disabilities regulatory by action the Real Estate Commission is “neither civil nor criminal in Diener, 659, nature.” In re 670, 268 Md. 587, 304 A. (1973). 2d hearing 594 A before such an body administrative “prosecution” is not a nor is it a “suit.” We “prosecution” construe the words and “suit” as used in Courts Art. 5-107as follows: §
“Prosecution” means a brought criminal action State, competent in a jurisdiction, by way court of indictment, information, or charging document, other against an accused violation of the or statutory common criminal laws of this State.
“Suit” means an action equity at law or brought in a court having jurisdiction subject over the matter. key
The word in Patently, both definitions is “court.” agency administrative is not a “court” and thus the proscription applicable contained in 5-107is not thereto. § principal
The purpose hearing of a before the Real Estate Commission is to determine the fitness of a licensee. We subscribe expressed by to the view Attorney then General
342 (later Judge Appeals') Hall Hammond Chief Court that: hearing an administrative before board
“[A] whether revoked or determine a license shall be suspended prosecution a is neither nor suit within meaning Op. the statute of limitations.” 36 Att’y 97,98 (1951).3 Gen. Legislature, presumed know of the which Attorney General,
interpretations of statutes made 213, 359 Dept., App. v. A. 2d Sales St. 32 Md. Jackson Marine Works, Pub. 20 Md. (1976); Demory 228 Brothers v. Bd. of 320, A. App. 467, (1974), aff'd, A. 529 273 Md. 329 2d 316 2d Cohen, Trust, Inc. v. (1974). 674 also Crest Investment See Drug 639, 648, (1967); 2d Read & 227 A. 257-58, 166 A. Claypoole, Chemical Co. Attorney annually since (1933), met at least has 1951, but that his handed down General Hammond Thus, changed the General body the statute. has not tacitly approved Assembly silentio has sub Attorney interpretation. General’s applicable hold the statute of limitations is not
We may proceeding pleaded be as bar before subject when the before the Real Commission Estate will is a determination of whether a license Commission suspended revoked.
III. Nelson, by letter, The record shows that submitted time, At he did jurisdiction the Commission. that fact, question In the issue of interpose any of limitations. appeared appeal for time in the first the limitations on the The failure Nelson’s Commission to the circuit court. part proceeding the before the to as a bar to raise limitations raised, properly is, in Commission, even if it have been could any event, a waiver of that defense. tantamount (1969). Op. Att’y Gen. 220 rendered in 54
3. was A similar Finally, Nelson asseverates that the evidence before the support finding Commission did not of “willful misrepresentation.” it, Based on the evidence submitted to the following, Commission held the quote which we editing: minor
“In charge order to sustain a under Section 224(b), the prove must State two facts: Any statements the licensee made to the complainant false, were
2. At the time licensee made such statements, he knew them to be false.
. .. fact, produced first [As the State the] newspaper property advertisement question. The ad was listed under ‘Investment — Property’ and stated ‘APTS. units’. The State produced also sale, contract of on the back which . .. property wrote that [Nelson] was apartment ‘bona fide house.’ testimony From the Taylor [sic], .. . Mr. the Commission finds that... never mentioned to him
[Nelson] that there was any type zoning problem. fact, In ... [Nelson] — — Taylor told Mr. Taylor that he [sic] could [sic] requisite obtained making license repairs. certain where, however,
No appear does it . .. any made flat [Nelson] statement effect that zoning were problems. there no question .. . [T]he Commission must first determine is whether these statements writings of . representations. .. are false [Nelson] finds ad, Commission that the on the statement the back of contract, and ... [Nelson’s] availability statement about the clearly of a license implied zoning there were no problems affecting usage of the structure as a four-unit apartment building. implication Because of which the Commission finds clear, so in the absence any disclaimer [Nelson], ... the Commission *9 344 ad, writing on the that ...
concludes [Nelson’s] contract, the license are false statement about and problem of no when implying the existance [sic] clearly problem. a substantial in fact there was — knowledge ... As second fact ... — presented an time the State at the [Nelson] [Nelson], which affidavit was dated affidavit of ... 4, Paragraphs and thereof indicate 1975. 5 8 March signed, ... that, time the contract was the problem with the knew that there was [Nelson] that, a license zoning property and in of the is of it.. .. This confirmed been denied because had 8, 1975. ... The letter of October ... [Nelson’s] Smiley 1975 Doug M. dated March affidavit of time of knew at the that. .. also confirms [Nelson] property did that contract zoning apartment house. four-unit requisite zoning decision that claims ... [Nelson] error and that clerical or a erroneous was non-conforming use. . .. legal, awere apartments allegation that a Use upon his bases [Nelson] in was issued permit Occupancy #5160U unclear, but fail ... County’s records are issued permit indeed was that a substantiate zoning fact violation 1961. The obvious application for a previous of a is no record there permit was non-conforming indicate that use never issued.” Cason, Court, Comm’r Powers, for this Judge depth (1977), discussed 2d 1067 App. 368 A. an reviewing appeal when courts
role of the transpicuous agency. makes Comm’r administrative — substantial employed by the courts irrespective of the test erroneous, against clearly debatable, or evidence, fairly — the court evidence weight of -the preponderance free to finding and is not agency's review of in a limited agency. Even that of the finding for its own substitute by the drawn disagree conclusions might with the though *10 agency evidence, from the we liberty are disregard not at those conclusions and substitute our own. State Insurance Commissioner v. National Casualty Bureau Underwriters, 248 Md. 236 A. (1967). 2d 282
We believe ample there was evidence for the Commission find, did, as it wilfully that misrepresented Nelson zoning Tayler situation to and knew at the time he that was doing. Judge so Mathias, view, in properly upheld our findings of the Commission. juris-
Motion as order for diction denied. Order affirmed. paid
Costs to be by appellant. Lowe, J., concurring'.
Although by I in majority, concur the result reached I agree why they cannot I II reasons believe that the apply. statute of I limitations does not Because think that prius waiver nonassertion at administrative and nisi dispositive levels is appeal, of the issue of limitations on this 1085, my opinion may Md. Rule well be an exercise in concerned, however, I analogize semantics. am we procedure responsibilities businessman’s license to the of the Appeals disciplining Court of in an of the in officer Court reason Furthermore, it disturbs me when I see an I.. appellate guidelines perpetuating court support without reason, appear II. reason
I majority equates the disciplinary proceeding of a real estate salesman with the disciplinary proceeding of an attorney. But very upon cases relied analogy reasoning rest on totally inapplicable lay world. The quoted case length by majority rejects any such analogy. Judge Levine, writing for the Court in Anne Arundel Co. Bar Ass’n v. Collins, 582-583, stated:
“Although appear it does not that we have previously, question courts
considered uniformly disciplinary held that elsewhere attorneys against are not barred proceedings Braverman limitations, In general .... statute Balto., supra, 328], Bar Assn. [v. said: exercising its
‘The action of court suspend attorney is power to disbar or inquiry but the character, judicial in *11 investigation by the court the nature anof officers, one its own into the conduct of of law, an action and is not the trial of only the order which is entered is an jurisdiction disciplinary exercise of a court has over .. .’ which its officers. added). (emphasis Md. at 336.” circumventing the that the sole basis for It is therefore clear special relationship an between statute was the limitations I attorney he serves. see no basis and the court relationship comparable concluding a that a realtor has the Real Estate Commission.
II majority is bifurcated. assigned by the reason The second because “prosecution” or “suit” is no that there It first states “court” place in a take must prosecutions and suits agency a ‘court’ “Patently, is not an administrative Opinion p. 341. Majority ....” word “court” interpretation of the negatively The restricted supported appear to be implicit in that statement does dictionary The twelve alternate definition. any Heritage Dictionary in The American definitions particular to a Language do not restrict “court” English by a presided over judicial trials and aside for room set contrary, designated judge. To the constitutionally variety interpretation gives breadth of definition and an entirely picture: different open ground An partially
“court ... extent or 1. completely enclosed buildings; walls or street; courtyard. A especially, 2. short alley by buildings large, open walled on three sides. 3. A building, section of glass a often with a roof or skylight. Formerly, 4. a large mansion or other building standing courtyard. a only Now used proper place names. 5. The of residence of a sovereign dignitary; royal or palace. a mansion or 6. sovereign, including royal retinue family personal servants, advisers, his ministers, sovereign’s and the 7. A governing like. body, including the council of ministers and state advisers. A meeting 8. formal called for and presided by sovereign. person over A body 9.a. or persons appointed to hear and submit a decision cases, on civil building, b. The hall or room in which determined, cases are heard and regular c. The judicial session of assembly. Any similar having authorized military tribunal ec- jurisdiction. open, clesiastical area, 11. An level *12 appropriate marked with lines, upon tennis, which handball, basketball, game or another played. body
The of corporation, directors of a company, organization.” or other
The English Dictionary major has listings 19 Oxford sublistings numerous for the word “court”. Black’s Law Dictionary, in an thorough, effort to be provides pages of alternatives which cannot be resorted restrictively. Perhaps the most restrictive is the tenth definition of ed.): “court” Webster’sNew (2d International Dictionary “10. hall, Law. chamber, a The place or where administered, justice is persons b duly The assembled under authority of law for justice, administration of whether specifically appointed only judicial powers, exercise as most
348 combining courts, judicial or
modern formerly, legislative powers, and still as often Parliament, cases, as that of the British some etc.; legislature Massachusetts, an official together assembly legally for the transaction met business; judges judge sitting for the judicial causes, A hearing or c tribunal trial of established justice, judge or d The for the administration jury, e distinguished from the counsel or judges, as assembly.” judicial of a session majority hopes not fulfill the of the since the Even that does proceeding before the Real Estate administrative Code, 56, judicial in See Md. Art. Commission is nature. 224-225. §§ upon majority’s reasoning relies prong of the
The second only statutory courts interpretation device resorted upon lean in their no which to they when other crutch Legislative intent: search for presumed Legislature, which is to know
“The by the interpretations made of statutes St. Attorney General, Sales v. Marine Jackson (1976) Dept., App. 213, 2d 228 Md. 359 A. 32 [cert. v. Demory Brothers (9/24/76)]; den. 278 725Md. 467, Works, App. A. 2d 529 316 Bd. Pub. (1974); (1974), 320, A. 2d 674 see aff'd, 273 Md. 329 Trust, Cohen, Md. Inc. also Crest Investment Drug (1967); & 639, 648, Read 227 A. 2d 250, 257-58, 166 Claypoole, 165 Chemical Co. v. annually since (1933), A. met at least has his down Attorney handed General Hammond then changed body has but that Assembly has sub Thus, statute. the General Attorney General’s tacitly approved silentio p. Majority Opinion 342. interpretation.” original law, sound happens in As so often *13 synergistically reach one reasoning of one is used case years. more another, decision, over the When then synergistic arises, one of the premise distinctive factual support elements is used to isolated and cause wherein the elements, including necessary original other those reasoning, inapposite. are That what has occurred here. seeking Legislative intent,
In inception courts since the judicial system they our held should refrain from interpreting differently prevailing a statute from the interpretation except potent administrative for the most urgent Hays Richardson, 366; reasons. See v. 1 G & J Salisbury Beauty Bd., School v. St. 268 Md. 65-66. Administrative construction and enforcement remains an important interpretive guide, see Public Serv. Comm’n v. Res., 141, 150-152, Howard reports and our are replete variety application. with the of its Read opinion in base of the 1933 rule was at the
That Drug Claypoole, & Chem. 165 Md. there Co. but Attorney opinion upon show, General’s was relied first, was, interpretation what administrative second, makeweight saying as a legal opinion as well as the administrative construction should given weight: great “ legal . .. interpretation such and administrative given great
construction should be consideration determining legislative intent.” Id. at 257. added). (emphasis helpful
What had once been a interpretative guide soon became a determining Legislative substantial source for By 1966, intent. Cohen, Crest Investment v. kept
the Court makeweight and discarded the scale. There upon relied year Court the existence of a 9 old Attorney opinion General’s agency Legislative to an to infer acquiescence by silence, years but failed to mention the 9 application Attorney administrative General’s construction. It appear charged would that the Court Legislature with knowledge of the because it had expressly been recognized study in a report commission Legislature. submitted to the 648,n. 245 Md. at Crest would seem peculiar to stand on its facts had we not fallen trap by into reciting its statutory it a rule of construction rather makeweight, than a mere Demory
350 App. 467, Works, 20 Md. Pub. Brothers v. Bd. aff'd preserved 320, although we later the distinction 273 Md. opinion peculiar role Attorney to its limiting General’s administrative-construction-and- support as added to Marine Sales St. principle. See Jackson enforcement 213, 217, Dep’t, App. cert. den. Md. 32 Md. (9/24/76). interpretative guide proper placed
It this is time perpetuating its unwarranted perspective, instead of simply Attorney opinion growth. An General’s is lawyer. opinion If is of another considered Assembly, by or was received the General solicited and record, Legislature honestly. can be it before as of knowledge charged and an inference can be drawn with its charge subsequent for a inaction. But court to every opinion to Legislature knowledge of rendered with the every agency, department, board other State institution credulity appellate much for even an court. demands too self-esteem, Perhaps contrary our common own sense public servants tells us that those overburdened sense opinions, our let probably even have time to read do not Attorney upon myriad by General rendered alone the request. presumed every I would restrict official — — role, or knowledge acquiescence to its limited silent altogether reaching Legislative discard it for the intent interpreting statute. when an unclear charged hand, Legislature with On the can other knowledge of its laws and their of the administration annually interpretation. It consequent administrative and has appropriates funds to effect that administration standing statutorily created to review committees Code, procedure and conduct. Art. administrative Attorney logic pointing There some out an 40A. is also § interpretation submitted the administrative General’s agency, precision what construction had to indicate placed upon agency. been the statute course, is, only when are not the words of statute It Legislative ambiguity definite free of that we need seek meaning ambiguous, when the the verbal intent. But significance examining may be divined the evil the Legislature sought inhibit, Baltimore, Stoll v. 163 Md. 282, 292, language is the itself it the statute provides primary determining Legislative source for Fabritz, State v. intent. my opinion
It is that the statute of limitations now found Code, Art., 5-107, in Md. Cts. was intended from its § *15 inception only monetary “fines”, to relate monetary “penalties” monetary and If “forfeitures”. that be so the hearing subject license revocation would not be one year justified by limitation. This view can be Black's Law Dictionary definitions of the words used in the statute. meaning: “Fine” is defined as impose pecuniary punishment
“To a or mulct. person To sentence a convicted of an offense to pay penalty money.” a in
“Penalty” carry variety and “forfeiture” meanings. a of However, ejusdem generis, under the rule of we do not construe those terms in their apply broadest sense but them only things general of the same kind or class as that specifically mentioned, i.e., Therefore, an alternative “fine”. definition in Black’s for the “penalty” term is most n appropriatehere:
“The term also money denotes recoverable virtue imposing of payment by way statute of deleted). punishment.” (authorities The same interpretation rule of applies to “forfeiture”. The ninth definition in Black’s appropriate is the most in context: thing
“9. A money sum of forfeited. Something imposed punishment as a for an offense or delinquency. The in word frequently sense is ” associated with the ‘penalty.’ (authorities word deleted). Applying ejusdem generis the rule of only application reasonable but appropriate a most light one in construe Legislative history. While should objectives, Green in furtherance of their limitations statutes 389, objectives found Johnson, must often be 3 G & J their objects sought light purposes to be attained in and Co., Fert. v. Dorchester their enactment. See McMahan which a 155, and under Md. 159-160.The time circumstances passed into originally be taken was should statute ascertaining the true intention consideration 283, Worden, 52 Legislature. Maurice v. as a last clause original
The 5-107 was enactment § lengthy procedural after-thought, applied to a law entitled: fines, “An direct which manner all Act recovered, penalties, forfeitures and shall forfeitures, penalties fines, manner what amerciaments, applied.” Dorsey's Laws shall be Maryland. 1777, Ch. 6. — money wrongful payments for statute dealt with entire acts, by Even when it was first whatever name called. changed, it still dealt Laws Ch. § *16 history apparent monetary is there its penalties. Nowhere Legislature any indication that the ever intended to deviate year upon the institution a applying one limitation any “fine, prosecution penalty, or forfeiture” suit or pecuniary other than in sense. assigned for our
Therefore, need if reasons statute, felt more I would have interpretation of that statutory through seeking Legislative intent comfortable presumed acquiescence history by relying on a tacit than analogy else, and an lawyer’s rendered to someone profession. a learned between a licensed business and