As аppellee Miller was driving his pick-up truck in the left-hand lane of a suburban Cobb County road, an automobile driven by *404 appellant Nelson quickly pulled from the right-hand lane into the left lаne ahead of Miller and came to a stop preparatory to making a left turn into a driveway. Miller applied his brakes but was unable to stop before hitting the rear оf appellant’s car, damaging it extensively and causing appellant to sustain injuries. There was disputed testimony as to whether appellant gave any kind of signal prior to changing lanes.
In Nelson’s action, in which she alleged negligence against appellee, a jury found for defendant-appellee. Nelson appeals from this judgment, enumerating as error the trial court’s jury instruction on accident. She contends that the evidence did not warrant such an instruction, and that the court’s giving it denied her a fair trial and caused her to suffer substantial harm as a matter of law. Appellant’s counsel on appeal acknowledges that his predecessor, who represented appellant at trial, did not object to the challenged instruction either when initially given or when repeаted at the request of the jury. Held:
Appellant’s counsel contends that, although no objeсtion was made at trial to the jury instruction on accident, nevertheless it constituted harmful еrror and should be reviewed by this court. The general rule regarding failure to make a timely objection in a civil case is stated in OCGA § 5-5-24 (a) (Code Ann. § 70-207): “[N]o party may complain of the giving оr the failure to give an instruction to the jury unless he objects thereto before the jury returns its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury. Objection need not be made with the particularity formerly required of assignments of error and need only be as rеasonably definite as the circumstances will permit.” Failure to object at the prеscribed time constitutes waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal.
Pierce v. Pierce,
Appellant asserts, however, that despite the admitted failure of appellant’s counsel to make timеly objection, the situation in the instant case comes within the exception set forth at OCGA § 5-5-24 (c) (Code Ann. § 70-207): “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code section, the appellatе courts shall consider and review erroneous charges where there has been а substantial error in the
*405
charge which was harmful as a matter of law, regardless of whether оbjection was made hereunder or not.”
Dixon v. State,
We cannot agree that in the instant case the instruсtion on accident constituted an error — if error it was — of such magnitude as to require rеversal of the judgment below. Sufficient competent evidence was adduced to authorize a jury to find that appellant’s act of rapidly changing lanes and coming to a stop was negligence that proximately caused the collision. The record disсloses no evidence that the jury’s verdict in favor of appellee was based оn the accident theory rather than a theory of comparative negligencе. See
Dendy v. MARTA,
supra. Had there been evidence that the verdict was based on accident rather than comparative negligence — and
a fortiori
had the error been preserved — we would be bound to reverse. See
Chadwick v. Miller,
Judgment affirmed.