117 Wis. 10 | Wis. | 1903
Complaint is made because the court permitted evidence of the market value of products made from the standing timber. In support thereof it is said the measure of damages for waste by removing the timber in an action like this is the diminished value of the land by such removal, not the value of the timber in its manufactured state. True, —and the court so ruled. Respondents’ evidence of the value of the manufactured products was produced merely as a means, in connection with evidence respecting the reasonable .cost of converting the timber into such products and delivering the same upon the market, of showing the value of the element entering into such products represented by the standing timber before it was disturbed, and of thus showing the injury to the inheritance by the partial destruction thereof resulting from cutting and removing the timber. The evidence was competent for that purpose. We do not understand that counsel really contends to the contrary. His complaint seems to be based upon the idea that the court did not confine the plaintiff to the proper measure of damages. That certainly is wrong. The 'record clearly shows that the evidence complained of was offered solely for the purpose of showing the diminished value of the land by the removal of the timber, and that the court, in admitting it, limited the effect thereof accordingly. It cannot be claimed that proof of the value of the standing timber in an action for waste caused by cutting timber from land is not a legitimate way of establishing the
Counsel suggests doubt as to whether the evidence is sufficient to defeat the tax deed upon the ground that the plaintiff failed to pay the taxes or redeem the land, relying upon assurances by the officers with whom he is required to deal in the matter to correctly inform him as to-whether there was any tax against the land to be paid or tax sale to be redeemed from. Counsel does not suggest any infirmity in the evidence, but invites us to go through the record and compare it with the decisions of this court on the subject, citing Gould v. Sullivan, 84 Wis. 659, 54 N. W. 1013; Bray & Choate L. Co. v. Newman, 92 Wis. 271, 65 N. W. 494; and Edwards v. Upham, 93 Wis. 455, 67 N. W. 728. We are unable to discover any ground for counsel’s doubt. There is evidence, as indicated in the statement of facts, satisfying to the very letter this doctrine of those cases: If a person offers to pay to the proper officer the tax assessed upon a particular description of land for a particular year, or to redeem the land from a tax sale-for such tax, and the officer informs him that there is no tax to be paid or tax sale to redeem from, and he in good faith relies thereon, a tax deed based on the tax which he endeavored to so pay, thereafter executed, will not pass title to the land to the grantee therein.
The further point is made that the verdict assessing plaintiffs’ damages at $560 is not supported by the evidence. Here are the salient points of the evidence in substance: The land was of no value except for timber. That was substantially all cut and removed by or under the defendant. Mr. Nelson, one of plaintiffs, testified that he knew what the timber was
By the Court. — 'The judgment is affirmed.