35 Barb. 115 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1861
The action was trespass, for an injury to the plaintiff’s oats. Various defenses were interposed: 1st. A general denial. 2d. Pending suit. 3d. Accord and satisfaction. The plaintiff replied, according to the justice’s return, as follows: “ The complainant demurs. Answers that the defendant’s plea is untrue.” The return also states that the defendant moved to strike out the plaintiff’s pleading, on the ground that it was not sufficiently definite and certain, to enable a man of common understanding to understand it. Thereupon the plaintiff moved for an adjournment, and being sworn, he testified that he could not safely proceed to trial on account of the absence of witnesses. The
I. It does not appear what disposition was made of the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s answer. Nor is it of any importance whatever, inasmuch as a general denial was interposed by way of reply, which superseded the demurrer. The demurrer is therefore out of the case.
II. Nor does it appear how the motion to strike out the plaintiff’s pleading was decided. It will not be presumed, to have been erroneously determined; rather will it be intended that the motion was abandoned or waived. It is a very familiar rule that a judgment will not be reversed for error unless the error be made distinctly to appear. All intendments are in favor of the judgment. Besides, the motion should have been to make the pleading more specific, not to strike out. The record discloses no error in this regard.
III. The return is distinct, that the adjournment was by the agreement and consent of parties. No matter what decision the justice made as to the adjournment; such consent cured all error. But I am unable to discover any error in
IV. It is objected that the witness was permitted to give
As a general rule, opinions of witnesses are to be excluded, except upon questions of science and skill as to wMch they have been specially instructed or educated. But witnesses may also give their opinion upon questions of value; for instance, as to the value of a horse, a cow—and so of almost every kind of property. And on the same principle, opinions are competent as to the amount of damage, when it consists in an injury to or destruction of property. This question is discussed by Judge Selden, in De Witt v. Barly, (17 N. Y. Rep. 340,) with marked clearness and ability. The authorities are there collated and numerous illustrations given, showing in what cases opinions of witnesses are admissible. The learned judge then comments on the case of Morehouse v. Mathews, (2 Comst, 514.) The action in that case was brought to recover damages for feeding the plaintiff’s cattle with bad hay. In that case it was held improper to put a question in this form: “ How much, in your opinion, was the damage sustained by plaintiff in consequence of feeding the cattle the poor hay instead of that agreed upon ?” But Judge Selden says: “Had the question been, what was the damage or injury to the cattle in consequence, &c., it would have been unobjectionable.” (17 N. Y. Rep. 345.) If this question would have been unobjectionable in that case, certainly the one put in this must be equally so. Opinions of witnesses are received from necessity, and are generally allowable where it is impossible or very difficult, from the pau-' city or inadequacy of language, to give a perfect description. So it is common, and in my judgment competent, to admit opinions of witnesses as to the value of property and also as to damages, where the damage consists in its destruction or
But it is insisted that the evidence is abundant to uphold the judgment without this ; and that it should not be reversed even if this evidence was improperly received. (13 Barb. 116. 12 id. 383. 5 id. 283.) I think, however, the decision should be put on the other ground.
V. A cause of action was well stated in substance in the complaint, and was clearly proved on the trial. The insignificance of the claim can make no difference in the law of the case. The record discloses no error in the proceedings or judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Rosekrans, Potter and Bockes, Justices.]