16 Barb. 61 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1852
The appeal in this cause only draws in question the decision of the court at the special -term, in overruling the demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action set up in the complaint. I propose to add but few remarks to the well considered opinion of Justice Allen, delivered at the special term.
It is proper to observe that the demurrer was interposed under the sixth ground stated in the subdivision of section 144 ef ■the code; and was by its very terms confined to the specifications set forth in the pleading. The defendant demurred to the third alleged cause of action, in the complaint, on the ground “ that the facts therein stated, are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in this; First, that there is no sufficient consideration therein stated to support the promises therein set forth, die. Second, that the promises therein alleged are otherwise void,” <fcc. &c. How, whether a general demurrer, on the-ground that the count did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, would have been good without any further specification, or not, becomes immaterial; for the defendant, by the express terms of the demurrer, limits his objections to the insufficiency of the facts, in the several respects indicated by the specifications. The demurer is so framed as to exclude all other grounds of objection than -those which -are-particularly set forth.
.(1.) The first objection is, that there is no sufficient consideration set up in the count; and this cause of demurrer is common to the third and fourth counts. The complaint alleges that on the 30th of March, 1849, in consideration, that one Lawrence had theretofore agreed to purchase a quantity of furniture on which the defendant represented that he held a policy of insurance; and in further consideration that Lawrence then and there agreed to pay, when requested, the premium on the policy, he, the defendant then and there promised the said Lawrence, that, before completing the purchase of the goods, and furniture, he would procure the assent -of the insurer, and would assign the policy, &c. How this is .a very plain 'Statement of mutual promises, as the consideration of the defendant’s promise. The promises are laid as concurrent acts, and no reason is perceived
(2.) The second specification in the demurrer is that the promises are otherwise void. The ground of this criticism is, that the true construction of the pleading is, that the defendant was to go to the company and take out a new policy in the name of the contracting party Lawrence; and that even if the defendant was to be taken to contract concerning a policy that he then held, it was not expressly averred that he had paid the premium on it; so that the promise of Lawrence, to pay the premium, would only be a promise to pay the premium to the company, or to the defendant; that he might pay it over to the company, and of course the promise of Lawrence not being beneficial to the defendant, would furnish no sufficient consideration for the defendant’s promise. But it seems to me that we are to take judicial notice of public statutes ; and we therefore
(3.) The next objection is that the policy is not described with sufficient accuracy, and that it involves a question of law. If the description is so uncertain as to be void, then the demurrer is well taken, not otherwise. But it is certain enough. It states the names of the insurer and the insured—that it is an insurance on the furniture in the defendant’s tavern in Norwich, and that it was given for $1000. This, when it is considered that the defendant had it in his possession, and the plaintiff had not, is sufficient.
4.) There is one general ground of demurrer to the entire complaint, for the alleged joinder of incompatible causes of action. This objection is not well founded in fact. The fourth count, if true, shows that the pleader might have complained in fraud. But he did not. All the counts have the unmistakable characteristics of an action on promises.
On the whole I am led to the same conclusion with the justice, who decided this demurrer at special term, that the grounds pointed out by the demurrer as objections to the complaint are none of them tenable 3. and that' the demurrer- must be overruled. The pleading is certainly not drawn with much skill or
Gridley, Pratt, W. F. Allen and Hubbard, Justices.]
Judgment affirmed, but leave is given to the defendant to withdraw his demurrer, and plead, on payment of the costs ordered at special term, and the costs of the appeal.
Judgment affirmed.