PATRICK NEJADIAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant.
B285016
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC594904)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
Filed 10/1/19
Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County, Susan Bryant-Deason, Judge. Reversed.
Schuler & Brown, Tina Javaherian, Jack Schuler and Irina Rosenberg for Defendant and Appellant.
The Finson Law Firm, Lowell W. Finson; Lenze Lawyers and Jennifer A. Lenze for Plaintiff and Respondent.
With regard to Nejadian’s FEHA retaliation claim, the jury was instructed that Nejadian could establish that claim by proving that County subjected him to an adverse employment action in retaliation for “refusing to participate in activities that would violate state, federal, or local statutes, rules, or regulations and/or for complaining about age discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA.” Because this instruction erroneously allowed the jury to find in favor of Nejadian even if no violation of FEHA was committed, the judgment on this claim must be reversed. As with the
A. The Operative Complaint
The first amended complaint, which was the operative complaint at the start of the trial, alleged causes of action for discrimination based on national origin and/or race, discrimination based on age, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of FEHA. Before trial, the trial court granted County’s motion for summary adjudication as to the first and third claims, leaving only the age discrimination and FEHA retaliation claims for resolution by trial. Those claims were based upon the following alleged facts.
Nejadian began his employment with County in 1990. At the time of the incidents at issue, Nejadian was a chief environmental health specialist (EHS) in the Environmental Health Division of the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health. Nejadian alleged that beginning in 2008, after Angelo Bellomo became director of the Environment Health Division, Nejadian was subjected to verbal abuse and singled out for undue criticism by Bellomo on account of his national origin and/or race, and was denied promotions to manager positions in 2009 and 2015, and to an acting manager position in 2014, on account of both his age and his national origin and/or race. He alleged that he complained to management, including Bellomo, about the discrimination and harassment, but was subjected to further adverse employment actions (including denial of multiple transfer requests) in retaliation for complaining. He also alleged that he filed the substance of the claims alleged in the complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and had received right to sue letters from those agencies.
In his cause of action for age discrimination, Nejadian alleged that he was over the age of 40 years old,3 and therefore was a member of a protected class, and that he was fully competent and qualified to perform the duties of the positions to which he was denied promotions. He identified the denials of multiple promotions as the adverse employment actions to which he was subjected due to age discrimination.
In the retaliation cause of action, Nejadian alleged that he engaged in protected activity when he complained to management at County about workplace discrimination he suffered due to his national origin and/or race. He asserted that County subjected him to adverse employment actions—which he identified as “including but not limited to, the denial of multiple transfer requests”—in retaliation for engaging in that protected activity.
B. The Trial
1. Evidence Presented5
a. Nejadian’s Testimony
Nejadian was the first witness called at trial. At the time of trial, he worked at a district office of the Environmental Health Division, supervising inspectors who inspected restaurants, swimming pools, and apartment buildings. He testified about his history with the Environmental Health Division, where he started in 1990 as an EHS-1, and was regularly promoted until 2002, when he was promoted to a chief EHS position in the mountain and rural water and sewage program (which was known as the land use program). The land use program dealt with private wells and on-site waste water treatment systems (i.e., septic systems) on properties for which there are no public water or sewer systems.
After working in the land use program for several years, Nejadian transferred to a different program, but returned to the land use program in March 2009. He testified that he had been aware before he transferred back to that
For purposes of the issues in this appeal, Nejadian’s troubles began in 2010. Nejadian testified that after the Station Fire destroyed 16 or 17 homes in the Tujunga Canyon area, a contractor who was working with some of the homeowners on their efforts to rebuild their homes complained to Director Bellomo that Nejadian and his staff refused to accept their existing septic systems because Nejadian believed they were in violation of “the Code.”6 Each time the contractor complained, Bellomo called Nejadian to his office to discuss the complaint, and Nejadian explained that the contractor’s request had been denied because it violated “the Code” or the Guidelines. According to Nejadian, Bellomo told him to disregard some of the requirements of “the Code” (which requirements Nejadian did not specify) and sign off on the contractor’s requests. Nejadian declined to do so, but the projects at issue ultimately were approved by Nejadian’s managers or supervisors.
Nejadian also testified that he was asked to revise a set of guidelines that specifically addressed rebuilding structures following a fire or other natural disaster (the fire-rebuild guidelines) and to establish new rules for rebuilding. He testified that he revised the fire-rebuild guidelines, in which he did not allow rules that he believed were less protective than “what the County Code provides,” but management amended them, “water[ing] down the requirement[s]” he had drafted, and “disregard[ing] the Code sections that were involved.” Nejadian expressed his disagreement with management’s amendments to Bellomo and other managers, telling them they violated the “L.A. County Code.”
Due to his disputes with management over the requirements under the Code, Nejadian asked to be transferred out of the land use program. His transfer request was not accommodated. He complained to Bellomo, telling him that he wanted to transfer because Bellomo’s approvals of systems that were not in compliance with “the Code” was making his job much more difficult than it should be. He continued to file transfer requests every six months, in accordance with Department policy, until he finally was transferred to the Glendale office of the Bureau of District Surveillance and Enforcement in January 2014.8
In the meantime, Nejadian’s annual performance evaluations returned to prior levels. In 2011 and 2012 he received “very good” in all categories. In 2013 and 2014 he received “outstanding” in two categories and “very good” in the rest. He received an overall rating of “very good” in all four years.
In 2014, there was a posting for an EHS manager position. Nejadian, who had all the required qualifications as well as the desired qualifications
Nejadian’s EEOC complaint, which was filed on February 2, 2015, identified three actions he asserted were discriminatory: the denial of promotion to an EHS manager position in 2009 (which he explained he included to demonstrate the pattern of discrimination), the denial of promotion to an EHS manager position in 2015, and the denial of an out-of-class acting manager opportunity in 2014. Nejadian also stated in his EEOC complaint that Division Director Bellomo and the Assistant Division Director, Terri Williams, demonstrated hatred toward him and repeatedly made demeaning comments to him. In addition, Nejadian provided examples of conduct by Bellomo and others that he asserted was in retaliation for Nejadian expressing his disagreement with staffing decisions (e.g., requiring Nejadian to cover two offices, reducing field staff, etc.) and his displeasure at Bellomo’s disregard of departmental policies with regard to the fire-rebuild guidelines. Finally, Nejadian stated that after the incident regarding the fire-rebuild guidelines, Bellomo retaliated against him by disregarding the transfer requests he submitted every six months.
On the same day Nejadian filed his EEOC complaint, he also filed a complaint with the DFEH, asserting that he was discriminated against when he was denied promotion to acting Envision Connect manager in April 2014, and was denied promotion to EHS manager in January 2015. Seven months later, Nejadian (now represented by counsel) filed another complaint with the DFEH. This new complaint was substantially similar to the earlier EEOC complaint.
Finally, Nejadian testified that there were three vacancies in EHS manager positions after he filed the EEOC and DFEH complaints. He wrote to the current Director, Terri Williams (Bellomo had been promoted, and Williams moved into his former position), to express his interest in being placed as an acting manager for one of those positions. He was not placed in any of the
b. Bellomo’s Testimony
Bellomo was hired by County as the Director of Environmental Health in January 2008. He testified that Nejadian came to his attention in around 2010 due to a number of complaints that were made by industry individuals about how the land use department was handling approvals for properties they were trying to rebuild after the Station Fire. Bellomo explained that generally, when a property owner wants to remodel, expand, or rebuild a home with a septic system, the owner has to upgrade the system to the current standards. After the wildfire, the County Board of Supervisors asked the Department of Public Health to find a way to assist homeowners who had lost their homes in the fire. In response, the Department developed a fire-rebuild policy that allowed the affected homeowners to keep their same septic systems, without having to upgrade to current standards, when they rebuilt their houses. According to Bellomo, Nejadian expressed his displeasure with that policy, believing that the systems should be brought up to current standards.
Bellomo explained that the Department developed this fire-rebuild policy with input from the land use program and other advisors. The fire-rebuild policy is set forth in fire-rebuild guidelines, which describe three different procedures, depending upon whether the owner is (1) rebuilding an equivalent structure and the originally approved floor plan is available for review; (2) rebuilding an equivalent structure and the originally approved floor plan is not available for review; and (3) rebuilding a new or modified (expanded) floor plan. Under each scenario, the guidelines list minimum requirements and the documents and information that must be submitted. The guidelines also set forth additional requirements for all scenarios, and note that a full feasibility study and compliance with current code requirements would be required if the septic system was not adequately sized to fully accommodate the proposed number of bedrooms, number of units, and/or plumbing fixtures, or the system was not functioning adequately, or the system was not code-compliant at the time it was installed.
Bellomo testified that the policy was reviewed by County Counsel to ensure that it was consistent with applicable laws. He stated that he was told the fire-rebuild policy was allowed under both Appendix K of the
Finally, Bellomo was asked by Nejadian’s counsel about a specific case involving a homeowner, Duncan Baird, who sought approval to use the existing septic systems11 for the rebuilding of his house, which had been destroyed in the wildfire. In that case, the Director of Environmental Protection Bureau, Alfonso Medina, wrote a letter to Baird following Baird’s meeting with Medina and Nejadian regarding Baird’s request. The letter addressed issues regarding the floor plan of
the home that existed at the time of the fire, as well as the existing septic systems’ compliance with the code in existence at the time of their installation.
According to the letter, Baird told Medina and Nejadian that he wanted to replicate the previous floor plan of three bedrooms and a small office. However, the septic system inspection report Baird submitted indicated that the house was built in 1939/1940 and contained only two bedrooms and two bathrooms. Medina informed Baird that when Baird was not able to provide any documentation showing what he contended was the floor plan that existed at the time of the fire, the Department conducted searches for additional property information, but only found information that was consistent with the inspection report of two bedrooms and two bathrooms.12 Medina wrote that he discussed the issue regarding the previous floor plan with Bellomo, and it was decided that “the Department will yield to your email of May 28th and your statement that the house consisted of three bedrooms and [a] small office.”
Addressing the issues regarding the existing septic systems, Medina wrote that the Department disagreed with Baird’s inspector’s conclusion that the systems were structurally sound. In addition, the Department concluded that the systems were not fully compliant with the plumbing codes from the 1940s
Department made several recommendations for modifications to the systems, including the replacement of one of the tanks with a tank that was compliant with the 1940 Code. Medina also stated that the Department was willing to accept the installation of a new tank without the full feasibility study required under the fire-rebuild guidelines, as long as certain documentation was submitted and inspections were made.
In questioning Bellomo about Medina’s letter, Nejadian’s counsel focused on the part that addressed the size of the house that burned down. Counsel asked if Bellomo violated the law by ignoring the plans that showed the house had had two bedrooms rather than three bedrooms and an office. Bellomo replied that the letter merely showed that there was a dispute between the Department and the homeowner regarding what size the house had been. He explained that although there are a lot of decisions the Department makes that are based upon very definitive rules and regulations, some decisions are based upon discretion. And when resolving a dispute in which the homeowner disputes the accuracy of the plan that is on file, saying that he or she had filed a subsequent plan and no longer has a copy, it is within the discretion of the program chief and his or her supervisor as to how to handle it.
c. Other Relevant Testimony
Of the remaining witnesses, only a few provided testimony relevant to the issues on appeal.
i. Nejadian’s Complaints of Discrimination
The only witness who testified that Nejadian complained to him or her that he was subjected to discriminatory treatment was Linda Ramirez. Ramirez, who was an EHS manager but was not Nejadian’s direct supervisor at the time, testified that Nejadian told her a few years before trial that he felt he was discriminated against based upon his age. She said they discussed it as “professional coworkers.” She did not report Nejadian’s statement regarding the alleged discrimination because it was not a formal complaint.
Another EHS manager who worked with Nejadian at times, Aura Wong, testified that Nejadian told her that Bellomo treated him differently than he treated other people, but he never told her that he believed it was because of his age or some kind of retaliation.
ii. Failure to Appoint Nejadian to Acting Manager in 2015
Shelli Weekes, the Director of Human Resources for the Department of Public Health, testified that the Environmental Health Division attempted to post a bulletin for
And I wouldn’t want to place somebody in a situation where they’re assuming that they’re being promised something.”
Diana Aguilar is a staff analyst for the Environmental Health Division who is designated as the Environmental Health administrative liaison; one of her responsibilities is to liaison with the Human Resources department. She testified that before Weekes was appointed Director of Human Resources, when the Environmental Health Division had a vacancy it wanted to fill temporarily, it would send out a bulletin announcing an out-of-class assignment and conduct interviews for the temporary position. However, when the Division attempted to send out a bulletin for an out-of-class assignment to temporarily fill an EHS-4 position after Weekes became Director, the Human Resources department told the Division that it could not use that process. Therefore when, in 2016, the Division sought to temporarily fill two EHS manager positions, Aguilar contacted Human Resources for instructions.
Aguilar testified that Human Resources gave her a list of options and instructed her to start with the first option to see if that met her needs and if not, to try the next options one at a time. The first option was to gather all the performance evaluations and determine which employees received an overall “outstanding” rating. Aguilar testified that she looked at the 2014 and 2015 evaluations; she said that she did not consider the 2016 evaluations because some of them had not been submitted yet, so she thought it would be unfair to use them. Only two employees had received overall ratings of “outstanding.” Both were offered, and accepted, the acting EHS manager positions.
iii. Re-rating Nejadian’s 2016 Performance Evaluation
In November or December 2016, Linda Ramirez, who was Nejadian’s supervisor at the time, submitted to her director, Brenda Lopez, Nejadian’s annual performance evaluation for the period that ended in September 2016. When Lopez reviewed the evaluation, she noticed there were comments in it regarding some projects Nejadian had done with land use, which Ramirez had cited in support of the “outstanding” rating she had given Nejadian in one category. She thought that was odd because Nejadian was not in land use during that rating period; he was in district surveillance and enforcement. She was concerned because it had been decided that if Nejadian was going to
In the meantime, Lopez pulled Nejadian’s evaluation from the prior rating period (i.e., the 2015 evaluation) and saw that the narrative portion was almost identical to the 2016 evaluation. She told Ramirez that the two evaluations were virtually identical, and asked if the things she wrote about really happened during the 2016 rating period;
she asked if Ramirez had any documentation to verify what she wrote about. In response, Ramirez sent Lopez some emails showing dates and times that Nejadian had corresponded with someone regarding land use work. After she received that information, Lopez told Ramirez to put those dates and times in the evaluation and resubmit it. When Ramirez resubmitted the evaluation, she had changed the “outstanding” rating she had given Nejadian in one category, and instead rated him “very good.” Lopez testified that she did not tell Ramirez to change those ratings. Ramirez, however, testified that Lopez told her that if she could not substantiate the “outstanding” rating with significantly more support, she should reconsider her rating.
2. Post-trial Motions, Jury Instructions, Deliberations and Verdict
Following the close of evidence, the trial court heard County’s motions for nonsuit on the
rebuild policy was not a protected act that could be subject to a
The court denied both motions, and turned to the jury instructions, specifically, what protected act would be identified in the instruction for the
Turning to the instructions for the
Despite the trial court‘s overruling of County‘s objection to including the refusal to violate a statute, rule, or regulation in the
During deliberations, the jury sent a question asking, “What is the significance of the difference between questions 4 and 5[?] It seems like the same questions phrased differently.” Discussing the jury‘s question with counsel, the trial court suggested that it could just refer the jury to the
DISCUSSION
As noted, County raises several issues on appeal as to each claim for which it was found to be liable. In light of our conclusion that Nejadian failed to present sufficient evidence to support each claim, we will limit our discussion to those issues that relate to that conclusion.
A. Section 1102.5(c) Retaliation Claim
On appeal, County notes that under
Of course, for the court to be able make the legal determination, the employee must identify what specific activity he or she refused to participate in and what specific statute, rule, or regulation would be violated by that activity. In this case, Nejadian mostly referred to the activities in generalities, with two exceptions.
The first exception involved a contractor, Cliff Jones, who was working for several homeowners who were affected by the wildfire. Nejadian testified that Jones wanted Nejadian to “allow the homeowners to rebuild with the existing system[s],” even though some of the systems needed to be upgraded. The only example for which he provided any specific evidence, however, involved a proposed installation of a new spa on a property in Altadena. According to a string of emails Nejadian introduced into evidence, Nejadian declined to give his approval unless the homeowner conducted testing to prove that the septic system could be expanded in the future if necessary. Nejadian testified that Bellomo wanted Nejadian to “disregard some of the rules” regarding testing for a backup septic system, and that Nejadian declined to do so.
The other exception to Nejadian‘s lack of specification involved the case of homeowner Duncan Baird. As noted, Baird wanted to use his existing septic systems when he rebuilt his house, and there were issues raised about the floor plan of the house as it existed prior to the wildfire and about whether
Although Nejadian identified these two cases in which he objected to giving approvals, he failed to present sufficient evidence to show that the approvals would result in a violation of any specific state, federal, or local statute, rule, or regulation.
With regard to the installation of the new spa, although Nejadian did not refer to a specific rule that he contended approval would violate, we note that paragraph K 1 (E) of Appendix K of the California Plumbing Code in effect at the time of the request for approval stated that “[a]ll private sewage disposal systems shall be so designed that additional seepage pits or subsurface drain fields, equivalent to at least one hundred (100) percent of the required original system, may be installed if the original system cannot absorb all the sewage.”14 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, pt. 5, former App. K, ¶ K 1 (E) (2007.) There was no evidence presented in this case, however, that installation of the new spa would have had any effect on the existing septic system or whether the existing system was designed so that additional seepage pits or subsurface drain fields could be installed in the future. In fact, in the email string that Nejadian introduced, the contractor, Jones, stated that the installation of the new spa would not encroach on the existing septic system, would not prevent expansion of the septic system, would not increase the load on the existing septic system, and would not “in any way, shape or form have anything to do with the existing [septic system].” Thus, it appears that paragraph K 1 (E) does not have any application to this proposed installation.
Moreover, even if that paragraph might apply, if the spa that Jones was proposing to install was meant to replace a spa that was damaged or destroyed in the wildfire, paragraph K 1 (A) of Appendix K of the California Plumbing Code in effect then provides an exception to application of the requirements set forth in the other paragraphs of Appendix K. That provision states that the “Authority Having Jurisdiction” (i.e., the Environmental Health Division of County‘s Department of Public Health) “may grant exceptions to the provisions of this appendix for permitted structures that have been destroyed due to fire or
Finally, a provision of the California Plumbing Code in effect in 2010 specifically provided that “[p]lumbing systems lawfully in existence at the time of the adoption of this code may have their use, maintenance, or repair continued if the use, maintenance, or repair is in accordance with the original design and location and no hazard to life, health, or property has been created by such plumbing system.”16 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, pt. 5, former § 101.5.3 (2010).) Although Nejadian testified about the importance of having a backup system for a septic system in case the existing system fails at some time in the future, he presented no evidence that the existing septic system for the property at issue currently presented a hazard to life, health, or property. In short, we conclude that Nejadian failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that approval of the installation of the spa would result in the violation or noncompliance with any statute, rule, or regulation.
With regard to Duncan Baird‘s property, although Nejadian did not testify about this specific property, his counsel in closing argument told the jury that approval of Baird‘s plan violated the fire-rebuild guidelines, which required a feasibility study if the rebuilt home was bigger than the home that had been destroyed or if the existing septic system was not working. The fire-rebuild guidelines, however, are not statutes, rules, or regulations. They are guidelines. Their purpose, as stated in the first paragraph, is “to establish standardized procedures for the review and approval of construction plans for rebuilding a structure following a fire or other natural disaster” in order to “expedite timely disaster recovery.” Thus, a refusal to “violate” the guidelines does not fall within the scope of
In any event, even if the fire-rebuild guidelines were to be construed as rules for purposes of
Because we find that Nejadian failed to meet his burden to show that the activity he purportedly refused to participate in would result in a violation of a federal or state statute or a violation or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, his
B. FEHA Retaliation Claim
In this case, County contends that the trial court gave an erroneous instruction to the jury on the elements of Nejadian‘s
1. Erroneous Jury Instruction
As noted, the court gave an instruction on the
We acknowledge that the special verdict form given to the jury did not include the erroneously-included protected activity, and thus might have rendered the error harmless. However, when the jury expressed confusion about the questions on the special verdict form, the court directed the members of the jury, over County‘s objection, to review the erroneous instruction (along with the instruction on “substantial motivating reason explained“). Because the erroneous instruction allowed the jury to find in favor of Nejadian even if it did not find that his complaint about age discrimination was a substantial motivating reason for the failure to assign him to an acting manager position, the judgment in favor of Nejadian on the
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
a. Protected Activity
In his
Nejadian‘s statement to Ramirez does not constitute protected activity under
b. Adverse Employment Action
In its appellant‘s opening brief, County contends the only potentially adverse employment action that took place after the
Nejadian asserts there were three adverse employment actions that took place after he filed the
c. Retaliatory Motive
County contends that Nejadian failed to present evidence that his filing of the
Nejadian‘s response ignores his burden in this case. As noted, if the employer produces a legitimate, non-retaliatory, reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of retaliation raised by the employee‘s prima facie case disappears and the employee must then prove intentional retaliation. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042.) The employee meets this burden by “prov[ing], [with] competent evidence, that the employer‘s proffered justification is mere pretext; i.e., that the presumptively valid reason for the employer‘s action was in fact a coverup. [Citation.] In responding to the employer‘s showing of a legitimate reason for the complained-of action, the plaintiff cannot ‘“simply show the employer‘s decision was wrong, mistaken, or unwise. Rather, the employee ‘“must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer‘s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [citation], and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for the [asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.‘“‘“‘” (McRae v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377, 388-389 (McRae).)
“[A] judgment may be supported by inference, but the inference must be a reasonable conclusion from the evidence and cannot be based upon suspicion, imagination, speculation, surmise, conjecture or guesswork. [Citation.] Thus, an inference cannot stand if it is unreasonable when viewed in light of the whole record. [Citation.] And although an appellate court will normally defer to the trier of fact‘s drawing of inferences, it has been said: ‘To these well settled rules there is a common sense limited exception which is aimed at preventing the trier of facts from running away with the case. This limited exception is that the trier of facts may not indulge in the inference when that inference is rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted evidence of such a nature that it is not subject to doubt in the minds of reasonable [people].‘” (Beck, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)
In the present case, County presented undisputed evidence that the decision to assign employees other than Nejadian to the acting EHS manager positions, and the decision to investigate and downgrade one of the ratings on Nejadian‘s 2016 performance evaluation were made for legitimate, non-retaliatory, reasons.
For example, County presented evidence that the Director of Human Resources of the Department of Public Health, Shelli Weekes, instituted a new method for making out-of-class temporary assignments when she was appointed to her position in November 2015. Weekes testified that she changed the method previously used by the Environmental Health Division, i.e., posting the position, because she believed it was inappropriate to post for a temporary position. Diana Aguilar, the Division‘s liaison to the Human Resources Department, testified that Weekes imposed the same restriction on posting for a vacancy in an EHS-4 position before the vacancies in the EHS manager position were sought to be filled, and that the method used to fill the acting EHS manager vacancies was based upon set criteria, i.e., the overall ratings in past performance evaluations.
Nejadian presented no evidence to “‘demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [County‘s] proffered legitimate reasons for its action[s] that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [citation], and hence infer ‘that [County] did not act for the [asserted] non-retaliatory] reasons.‘“‘” (McRae, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.) Indeed, Nejadian does not even attempt in his respondent‘s brief to address County‘s proffered reasons, and instead merely asserts that he proved his prima facie case for retaliation. Because there was no evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer (without relying upon suspicion, imagination, speculation, or conjecture) that County acted in retaliation for Nejadian filing complaints with the
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and a new judgment shall be entered in favor of County on Nejadian‘s second amended complaint. County shall recover its costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
COLLINS, J.
CURREY, J.