45 A.2d 415 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1945
Argued December 11, 1945. This appeal is brought by the plaintiff from the order of the court below, dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction on the part of the alderman before whom the action was first instituted and from whose judgment the defendant appealed. The sole question raised is whether the amount in controversy exceeded the alderman's statutory jurisdiction.
The Keystone Indemnity Exchange was a reciprocal insurance exchange organized under the laws of Pennsylvania. During the period beginning July 2, 1929, and ending February 2, 1933, the Exchange issued eight policies of reciprocal insurance to defendant. The aggregate of the annual deposits or premiums charged for these policies amounted to $250.79. Upon the suggestion of the attorney general, the court of common pleas of Dauphin County on May 18, 1933, ordered the insurance commissioner to take possession of the assets of the Exchange and liquidate its business and affairs in accordance with the Act of May 17, 1921, P.L. 789,
The transcript of the alderman contains the following statement: "Plaintiff's claim is for $250.79 with interest fromAug. 15, 1940, the amount due the plaintiff, from defendant as subscriber and policy holder of Keystone Indemnity Exchange, . . ." (Italics supplied.) This claim with interest from August 15, 1940, to January 31, 1944, the date of the issuance of the summons, amounted to $311.65. The alderman, however, entered judgment for $300 and costs. Plaintiff's statement of claim, filed in the court of common pleas on appeal from the alderman, begins: "Plaintiff brings this action in assumpsit to recover from defendant the sum of $250.79 with interest thereon from the 15th day of August, 1940, upon a cause of action whereof the following is a statement." It concludes: "14. Wherefore plaintiff claims of defendant the sum of $250.79 with interest from August 15, 1940." The learned court below dismissed the action on the ground that the alderman had no jurisdiction because the amount in controversy exceeded the statutory limit.
The jurisdiction of justices of the peace and other inferior magistrates is purely of statutory origin, and they have only such jurisdiction as is given them by statute: Eason v. Smith, 8 S. R. 343; Murdy v. McCutcheon,
Appellant contends that part of the interest was evidently relinquished, since the judgment did not include all the interest. But the alderman's transcript and the statement of claim show the claim was for the principal sum plus interest, the aggregate amount of which exceeded $300. The only suggestion of a remission of part of the interest is found in the amount of the judgment. But in deciding the question of the alderman's jurisdiction, the amount of the judgment is not the test. A justice's jurisdiction is determined by the amount claimed and not by the amount of the judgment. The language of the statute is literally interpreted. The sum demanded is the test of jurisdiction and to ascertain such sum the transcript of the justice of the peace, and the narr. on appeal may be examined:Collins v. Collins,
The order is affirmed. *430