12 Del. 419 | Del. | 1887
Lead Opinion
delivered the following opinion:
Notwithstanding the elaborate effort of the learned counsel for the appellant to raise a doubt as to the meaning and intention of the Legislature in passing the Act of April 11, 1873, entitled “An Act Relating to the Taxes of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company ” (Rev. Code, 44), and the long array of authorities cited in support of their contention that it could not have been intended by the Legislature to have any relation to a county tax levied, assessed and imposed by the Levy Court of New Castle County, upon the roadbed or right of way of the Company located within the northern or second collection district of Wilmington Hundred, in that county, or to any other tax than a State tax, or State taxes specifically imposed as such upon the Company by some existing law on the subject, I must confess that I have been utterly unable to discover any reasonable ground whatever for such a doubt on a perusal of the plain and simple words of the Act itself.
All written contracts, as well as legislative Acts, are to be read, understood and interpreted according to the plain meaning and ordinary import of the language employed in them. One leading principle of construction is to carry out the intention of the authors of or parties to the instrument or agreement, so far as it can be done without infringing upon any law of superior binding force. In regard to cases where this intention is clearly expressed there is little room for variety of construction; and it is mainly in cases where the intention is indistinctly disclosed, although fairly presumed to exist in the minds of the parties, that any liberty of construction exists.
Words, if of common use, are to be taken in their natural, plain, obvious and ordinary signification; but if technical words are used, they are to be taken in a technical sense, unless a contrary intention clearly appears in either case from the context. All instruments and agreements are to be so construed as to give effect to the whole or as large a portion as possible of the instrument or agreement. 1 Bouv. Law Dict., 337, 338.
With these rules of construction before us, turning to the Act in question, and assuming as the counsel for the appellant have, that the real estate of the corporation respondent is liable to assess
The first Act of the Legislature, that of Chapter 11, Rev. Code, 84, subjecting the real and personal estate of the Corporation to taxation and assessment for. public purposes, was the general statute for that purpose, and was in force when the Company was incorporated and its railroad was constructed and put in operation under its charter in and across this State. The other three Acts referred to passed prior to the particular Act now in question, that of April 11, 1873, entitled “An Act Relating to the Taxes of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company ” (Rev. Code, 44), were passed long after the general statute first before referred to, and were as follows: the Act of August 11,1864, entitled “ An Act to Raise Revenue for this State ” (Rev. Code, 29, 30), imposing a passenger tax of ten cents for each passenger carried by the Company; the Act of April 8, 1869, entitled “ An Act Taxing Railroad and Canal Companies in this State,” which required them to pay to the State, in addition to the taxes already imposed on such companies by the laws of the State, an annual tax upon the net earnings "or income received by them from all sources during the preceding year, and a tax upon their rolling stock, and also a tax upon the actual cash value of the capital stock of such companies (Rev. Code, 41); and chapter 7 of the Revised Code, which imposed an annual tax of one quarter of 1 per cent upon the capital of the Company.
Such were the statutes and such were the various taxes, all told, to which the corporation respondent was subject when the Act of April 11, 1873, relating to the taxes of that corporation, was passed on that day. It is as follows:
“Sec. 1. That the Treasurer of the State be and he is hereby authorized and directed to accept and receive from the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company in the year of our Lord 1873, and in each and every year thereafter, until otherwise directed by the Legislature, the annual sum of $27,000, to be*435 paid in equal quarterly payments, on the first day of July, October, January and April, of each year, the first payment to be made on the first day of July following, in lieu of all taxes which may hereafter become due from said Company in each year, as aforesaid, under any and all laws of this State, except such taxes as may become due under provisions of an Act entitled ' An Act to Raise Revenue for this State/ passed August 11, 1864.”
"Sec. 2. That upon the payment by the said Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore ■ Railroad Company to the Treasurer of the State of the said sum of $27,000 in equal quarterly payments as aforesaid, in any year, it shall be the duty of the said state treasurer, and he is hereby authorized to execute and deliver to said Company a proper acquittance and discharge from the payment of all taxes due or to become due in the year for which such payment shall have been made, except the tax due or to become due under the provisions of the aforesaid Act entitled ' An Act to Raise Revenue for this State/ passed August 11, 1884.”
" Sec. 3. That nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal, modify or in any manner affect any existing law imposing taxes upon the said Company, otherwise than to suspend a collection of said taxes in any year in which the said Company shall pay to the state treasurer the amount specified in this Act; nor shall the provisions of this Act, or anything herein contained, be construed into a contract exempting the said Company from the payment of such taxes as the Legislature of this State may hereafter impose upon said Company.”
“ Sec. 4. That if the said Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company, or any other railroad company in this State shall either as the operator of its own railroad or railroads, or as lines of other railroads within this State, charge and receive a greater rate per mile for the carriage of passengers (except so far as the same may be increased to the amount of the tax annually paid under the provisions of chapter 458, Vol. 12 of the Laws of Delaware) or for the carriage or transportation of goods, wares or merchandise or other property whatsoever from place ■ to place ■ within this State, or from a place within the State to a place without the State, than is charged by such company for the carriage of passengers and the transportation of property or freight for like*436 distances or per mile from places without the State to places within the State, or from places without the State through the State to other places without the State, the person or persons paying such charges, either as fare or freight, shall be entitled to recover from such company so charging and receiving the same a sum tenfold the amount of the money so paid, to be recovered in an action of debt or assumpsit, as like amounts are now recovered by law.”
“ Sec. 5. That if the said Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company may desire to pay to this State a gross sum of $13,000 in lieu of the said tax provided for in the said chapter 458, Volume 12, Laws of Delaware, in semi-annual installments, on the first day of October and the first day of April, in each and every year, it shall be the duty of the State treasurer to receive the said amount from the said Company in lieu of said tax until otherwise directed by the Legislature of this State j but nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal, modify, or in any manner affect the provisions of said chapter 458, Volume 12, Laws of Delaware, otherwise than to suspend the collection of said tax for any year in which the said Company shall pay the gross amount aforesaid in the manner aforesaid in lieu of said tax; and nothing herein shall be construed as a contract exempting the said Company from such taxation as may hereafter be imposed by law.”
Applying the leading principle of construction before stated (which is, to carry out the intention of the authors of or parties to the instrument or agreement, and that where the intention is clearly expressed, there is little room for a variety of construction, and that the words used, if of common use, are to be taken in their natural, plain, obvious and ordinary signification) to the provisions of the Act in question, I have been unable to discover any room for a doubt as to the intention of the authors of and parties to it so clearly expressed in the plain and common words used in it.
The plain and direct import of them is that the State treasurer is authorized and directed by the Legislature to accept and receive from the other party, the Railroad Company, in the year 1873, and in each year thereafter, until otherwise directed by the Legislature, the annual sum of $27,000, to be paid in equal quarterly payments on the first day of July, October, January and April of each year,
This is the first section of the Act and substantially comprises, in perfectly clear and explicit terms, the aggregatio mentium of the parties to it; while the second section of it, without varying or changing it in any particular, actually repeats and reaffirms it by providing that upon the payment by the said Railroad Company to the State treasurer of the said sum of $27,000 in equal quarterly payments, as aforesaid, in any year, it shall be the duty of the said State treasurer, and he is hereby authorized to execute and deliver to said Company a proper acquittance and discharge from the payment of all taxes due or to become due in the year for which such payment shall have been made except the tax due or to become due under the provisions of the aforesaid Act entitled “An Act to Raise Revenue for this State,” passed August 11, 1864.
And could any form of words or mode of expression be devised to declare in more explicit and unequivocal terms when taken in their natural, plain, obvious and ordinary signification, the meaning and intention of the Act, and of both of the parties to the agreement made and concluded by it, to be that the said sum of $27,000, when so paid as aforesaid by the said Company to the State treasurer in the year 1873, commencing the quarterly payments on the first day of July in that year, and in each and every year thereafter, until he should be otherwise directed by the Legislature in regard thereto, should be in lieu of, or in exchange for, all taxes which might thereafter become due from the said Company in each and every year, as aforesaid, under any and all laws of this State, except such taxes as should become due under the provisions of the Act, entitled “ An Act to Raise Revenue for this State,” passed August 11, 1864.
And here I may add that the special exception of this Act from the operation of the agreement only the more conclusively shows that it was the intention of the statute in question and of the parties to the agreement made and enacted into a law for the
The main object of the statute, as well as the express words of it in all the provisions of it relating to that object, was to authorize the Company, during the will and pleasure of the Legislature, to pay to the State treasurer thereafter annually the sum of $27,000 as therein stipulated and agreed upon, in lieu of, and in commutation of, all taxes which might thereafter become due from said Company in each year as aforesaid under any and all laws of this State, except such taxes as might become due under the said Act passed August 11, 1864; and furthermore under the fifth section of it to authorize the said Company, if it should thereafter desire to pay to the State a gross sum of $13,000 in lieu of the said tax provided for in said excepted Act passed August 11, 1864, in semi-annual installments, on the first day of October and the first day of April in each and every year, to do so; and to make it the duty of the State treasurer to receive the said amount from the said Company in lieu of said tax until otherwise directed by the Legislature, and which, with the said sum of $27,000, before mentioned in the first and second sections of the statute, would amount to $40,000 per annum; and which sum of $40,000 when paid in any year thereafter as therein provided for, I am also of the opinion was as clearly meant and intended by the plain and unequivocal words of the statute to be in lieu and satisfaction of all taxes which might thereafter become due from the said Company in any year as aforesaid, under any and all laws of the State subjecting it to taxation for the benefit of the State or any part of it.
And as the road bed or right of way of the Company in the Northern or Second Collection District of Wilmington Hundred, New Castle County, was then subject, as real property, to county
The language of the Act is so broad and comprehensive, expressly declaring that the two sums of $27,000 and $13,000 when paid in any year to the State treasurer by the Company as authorized and provided for in it, should be in lieu of all taxes which might thereafter become due from the Company under any and all laws of the State, that I can find no warrant in the words of it anywhere for the construction contended for by the learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions of it were not intended to apply to a county tax assessed under the general statute and payable to a collector of county taxes, or to any other law than such as specifically imposed, like the other three Acts referred to in the case, a State tax upon the Company to be paid to the State treasurer; first, on the ground, as they earnestly contended, that each of those three Acts was a law of that specific character; and secondly, on the ground, as they also contended, that the words of the third section of the Act required this construction, inasmuch as it provides as follows:
“ That nothing in this Act shall be construed to repeal, modify, or in any manner affect any existing law imposing taxes upon said Company, otherwise than to suspend a collection of said taxes in any year in which the said Company shall pay to the State treasurer the amount specified in this Act, nor shall the provisions of this Act or anything herein contained be construed into a contract exempting the said Company from the payment of such taxes as the Legislature of this State may hereafter impose upon said Company.”
It is upon the meaning which counsel for appellant choose to give to the word “ imposing ” and the word “ impose ” taxes upon the said Company, as they occur in the first three and the last two lines of the section, that they have sought to limit the plain and obvious meaning of the words in the two preceding sections (which
Without entering into any nice or hypercritical consideration of the signification of the word, it is sufficient to say that the Latin word impono, from which it is derived, was as generally used in that tongue among the ancient Romans to mean to lay or levy a tax, as the derivative of it in our tongue has since been used in this country and among all English speaking people, to signify the same thing; and from it is also derived the word impost in our language, which has scarcely had any other meaning than a tax, however assessed, levied or collected by a government, although it has by usage acquired a more restricted meaning and is now confined in its application to taxes or duties imposed by Government on imports. But any tax authorized by the Legislature of the State, for whatever purpose and however ascertained and fixed in its amount, or which is assessed and collected by the instrumentality provided for it in the Act, is in effect imposed by law on the person who is bound to pay it, whether it be laid directly or indirectly upon him; and it is in accordance with both correct and common usage to so employ the word.
And if the word in this case or in any other admits of two senses or either of the meanings contended for, it is a well settled principle of construction that the meaning which will give effect to
It was in the power of the Legislature to enter into such an agreement with the Company to accept thereafter from year to year so long as the Legislature should see proper to do so, the said sum of $40,000 annually, and the Company should continue to pay it yearly as provided for in the Act, in lieu of all taxes to be paid by it under any and all laws of the State, and as the Legislature must have been satisfied that it would constitute a fair and just equivalent therefor, I do not think that either the validity or the wisdom of it can be properly objected to, because the whole of the substituted sum is to be paid into the state treasury for the use of the State, in lieu of and to the total exclusion of any county tax on any part of the road bed in Hew Castle County for the benefit of that county under the general law of the State for the assessment of taxes for county purposes; for the extent to which the county is relieved thereby of State taxes, it is directly benefited by the substitution ; while the Act is so framed and expressed that as soon as it ceases to be a fair equivalent for all the taxes to be yearly remitted and released to the Company in lieu of it, the Legislature may terminate the agreement.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the decree of the Chancellor should be affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
The question presented for decision upon this appeal is whether or not the decree of the Chancellor is erroneous in so far as it perpetually restrains and enjoins the collection by the appellant, defendant below, of the sum of $271.41, rated and apportioned for the year 1885, upon the valuation of the road bed, or right of way of the appellee, complainant below, for the purposes of county taxation.
The proper determination of this question raises two inquiries, viz:
First, Is there authority of law for the assessment and collection, for the purposes of county taxation, of the said sums rated and apportioned upon the valuation of the said road bed or right
Second, If so, is there any principle of law or statute exempting the same therefrom ?
There is no authority in law for the assessment and collection of any sum for the purposes of county taxation, upon the road bed of the said appellee, unless the said road bed be included within the terms and operation of the following provisions of chapter 11 of the amended Code, p. 84, viz.:
“ Sec. 1. All real and personal property not belonging to this State, or the United States, or any county, church, religious society, college or school, or to any corporation for charitable uses, shall be liable to taxation for public purposes.”
That the said road bed is included within the terms and operation of said section 1, and is to be deemed “ real property ” within the meaning of that term, as used in said section, must be conceded in view of the undeniable weight of authority in this country. Farmers Loan & T. Co. v. Hendrickson, 25 Barb., 493; People v. Brandsley, 52 Barb., 107; People v. Cassidy, 46 N. Y., 46; Smith v. Mayor, 68 N.Y., 555 ; People v. Comrs., 19 Hun., 460; New Haven, v. Fair Haven, 38 Conn., 430; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. McLean, 17 Ill., 296; Providence etc. R. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 R. I., 459; Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co. v. Bayless, 2 Gill, 355; Orange etc. R. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt., 177.
The Massachusetts and Pennsylvania doctrines that railways are exempt from taxation, upon the ground that they are public works, established by public authority, like canals, turnpikes and highways in those States, is not recognized elsewhere, and should not now be adopted in this State; and cannot properly be in the present case. The said road bed, therefore, being real estate, and as such, liable to taxation for public purposes under the foregoing provisions of section. 1, chap. 11, it has been suggested that the imposition of a tax upon it specifically is an unlawful regulation of commerce between the States. This objection was but slightly urged and cannot be sustained since the decisive rulings of the Federal Supreme Court to the contrary in Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206 [85 U. S. bk. 21, L. ed. 888], and kindred cases.
It therefore follows that the said road bed of the complainant
Strictly public corporations and the governmental divisions of a State are impliedly exempted from taxation with respect to their public property, although its taxation is within the power of the Legislature, because it cannot be presumed that the Legislature intended (in the absence of express legislation so prescribing) that the public should tax itself to raise money to pay over to itself. But this principle of implied exemption does not apply to the case of a business corporation like the appellee, in which the State has no proprietary interest, and whose property is owned and controlled by private individuals for private profit. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co. v. Bowers, 4 Houst., 506, 530 ; Delaware Railroad Tax, supra.
Accordingly, the said road bed of the appellee does not appear to be exempt from the collection of the said sum rated and apportioned upon its valuation as aforesaid, unless there is some specific statute exempting it therefrom. The said appellee contends that it is exempted and discharged from the collection thereof for the purpose of county as well as state taxation, under and by virtue of the provisions of the Act entitled “ An Act relating to the Taxes of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company ” (passed at Dover, April 11, 1873, 14 Del. Laws, p. 339 ; Amended Code, p. 44), the said appellee having duly paid the prescribed commutation for the said year, 1885, as required by said Act.
The appellant having denied this, the duty of construing said Act is devolved upon this court. "U pon examination of this Act it will be found that it is a statute which does not itself impose any tax; but is entirely separate and disconnected from any Act imposing or prescribing a tax and enacted in the exercise of the taxing power. On the contrary it provides for the satisfaction and discharge, upon the payment by the appellee of the commutation money therein specified, of all taxes due or to become due in the year for which such payments shall be made under any and all laws of this State then already enacted in the exercise of the taxing power, except the tax due or to become under the Passenger Tax Act, passed August
It will be further observed that nothing in said Act of 1873, specifically refers to, or expressly confines its operation to any particular Act or Acts providing for the raising of revenue for the use of the State exclusively. On the contrary sections 1 and 2 of said Act expressly provide that, until the Legislature shall otherwise direct, the payment of the commutation money, as therein specified, shall entitle the appellee to an acquittance and discharge from the payment of all taxes due or to become due from said appellee in the year for which such payment shall be made under any and all laws of this State, except said Passenger Tax Act.
The words “ all taxes ” “under any and all laws of this State,” are surely broad and comprehensive enough to include the laws of the State providing for and prescribing county taxation, while they are certainly so clear and explicit as to exclude any possibility of their ambiguity or any shadow of doubt as to their precise and unmistakable meaning. It would be impossible to find words which more clearly and indisputably express the deliberate intention of the Legislature to discharge the appellee from the payment of every description of tax, both county and state, authorized by any law of this State, except by said Passenger Tax Act.
But it is argued, with great earnestness and logical skill by counsel for the appellant, that the following words of section 3 of said Actj viz.: “ Law imposing taxes upon the said Company ” and “ such taxes as the Legislature of this State may hereafter impose upon said Company,” indicate that the intention of the Legislature which passed said Act was to limit the operation of said sections 1 and 2 strictly to an exemption and discharge from the payment only of those taxes which were designed exclusively for the support of the State government, and not for county purposes, and which were imposed solely under and by virtue of the provisions of section 2, chapter 7, p. 28, of the Amended Code, and of the Act of April 8, 1869, chap. 392, vol. 13 Del. Laws (Amended Code, p. 41).
The fallacy of this argument is in assuming that the laws of this State, providing for county taxation, are not laws imposing
Under these provisions of law the duty to collect taxes for the support of the county government in every year is as imperatively and directly imposed upon the said county officials as is the duty upon the State treasurer under the provisions of any statute of this State, requiring him to collect taxes designed exclusively for the support of the State government.
And the taxes are none the less imposed by law, because in the former case the amount and rate thereof are required by law to be collected and laid by the Levy Court, while in the latter this is done by the law-making power and specified in the Act prescribing the tax. In either case the tax is “ imposed ” by law, and in both it is for a public purpose. And, moreover, in both it is a “ State ’’ tax, in the sense that it can be imposed by no other authority, and is to be used for the public benefit, whether through the general government of the State, or through the county governments which are State agencies established for the more convenient government of its people. Camden etc. R. R. Co. v. Coms., 3 Harr., (N. J.) 72.
This interpretation of the word “ imposed ” as employed in the Act under consideration is certainly a fair, reasonable and natural one. But even if it be also susceptible of the construction claimed by the appellant, and could be interpreted to mean a tax whose rate is fixed by the Legislature and expressly specified in the Act providing for said tax, what .would be the result ? Simply that this particular language of Section 3 of the Act would be ambiguous or susceptible of two constructions; whereupon, the inquiry would arise, which of these two meanings shall prevail.
It is an established rule that where any cause of doubt arises, although apparently the doubt attaches only to a particular clause,
According to this rule the language of section 3 must be construed in connection with the provisions of sections 1 and 2, in such a way as will, if possible, avoid any contradiction or inconsistency, and so reconcile the different provisions as to make the whole Act consistent and harmonious.
The rejection of the restricted meaning of “imposed” as claimed by the appellant, and the adoption of the other broader and more reasonable one above mentioned, will alone secure this result.
The words of sections 1 and 2 are clear, comprehensive and unambiguous, and, standing alone and without section 3, would, beyond doubt, expressly exempt the appellee trom payment of the said county tax upon its said road bed. This much was substantially conceded by the appellant at the argument. But if the meaning of “ imposed ” contended for by the appellant is to prevail instead of the other broader and more reasonable meaning, then his proposition amounts to this: that an unambiguous section of an Act is to yield to and be controlled by an ambiguous one, and that a reasonable meaning of which the ambiguous provision is susceptible, and which will make the whole Act consistent and harmonious must be rejected, and another meaning adopted which will produce the contrary result. Such a proposition cannot be maintained.
It must be remembered that the provisions of the Act which provide for the exemption and discharge of the appellee from the payment of “ all taxes under any and all laws of this State,” as prescribed therein, are to be found exclusively in sections 1 arid 2 thereof, while section 3 is merely a saving provision against the former sections, to prevent their said provisions from operating as
If the provisions of sections 1 and 2 had expressly provided that the said discharge should be from all “ state and county ” taxes, and in those very. words, with the language of section 3 being as it now stands, it could not be maintained that the laws regarding the assessment and collection of county taxes against the real property of the appellee would not be within the saving provisions of said section 3, nothwithstanding the use of said word “ imposed.” Yet, if the restricted meaning contended for by the appellant should be given to the word, then said saving clauses would not, in such case, embrace any existing or future laws providing for county taxation.
If, therefore, the Act of 1873 is, as the foregoing consideration of it is believed to have demonstrated, clear, explicit and devoid of ambiguity or doubt in respect to the exemption and discharge from the payment of the said county tax on the said road bed of the appellee, then there is no ground upon which the appellant can seek a construction contrary to or outside of the express language thereof.
In the construction of statutes it is a rule of general application that effect must be given to the words used by the Legislature, if there is no uncertainty or - ambiguity in their meaning. It is true that exemptions to individuals, from the common burdens laid upon citizens by the necessities of government, are not favored by the courts and are generally strictly construed, and that the courts have therefore required an exemption from taxation to be, beyond any reasonable doubt, within the intention of the Legislature, or they have declined to enforce it. And this intention must be manifested by the Legislature in plain and explicit language, concerning which there can be no misunderstanding.
These stringent requirements are more especially applicable to cases in which exemptions from taxation, or the surrender of the taxing power, are embodied in the charters of private corporations. The present is not a case of a surrender of the taxing power, nor strictly of an exemption from taxation, but rather of a release from
The objection that the operation of the Act, under the foregoing construction of it, will bring embarrassment and inconvenience to the county officials in their administration of the county tax laws, and deprive the county of a source of revenue and thus increase the burdens upon other property owners, cannot avail against the clear intent and express letter of the law. This result is within the discretion and power of the Legislature; 18 Wall., 225 [85 U. S. bk. 21, L. ed. 894] ; if intentional, and if unforeseen, as is often the case, or unintentional, it may be remedied by legislative, but not by judicial, intervention.
The cases in 17 Grattan, 181; 32 Iowa, 429; 91 N. Y., 584, and in other reports, cited by the appellant to show that the words “ all taxes under any and all laws of this State ” might be construed and restricted to mean only State and not county taxation, are not applicable as controlling precedents in the present case. In none of them was the language so comprehensive, explicit and indubitable as that used in this Act. ■ In all of them there were peculiar features, and especial reasons for the conclusions therein reached, not existing in the present instance; and in some of them there was found (as is not so in this case) internal evidence in the Acts in controversy, indicating a legislative intent not to include the tax, the exemption from which was in question; while in most, if not all, of them, exemption from municipal taxation only was involved, which question is not now before this court for adjudication.
The claim of the appellant that the “ Joint Resolution relating to certain taxes” adopted at Dover, April 19, 1883, 17 Del. Laws, 562, is “ in pari materia ” with the said Act of 1873, and therefore “ operates as a legislative authority and command fixing and determining the status of the appellee as to the extent of its exemption
The resolution itself affords internal evidence that it does not affect the taxation or exemption of the appellee; but, on the contrary, only of other companies. Again; the resolution refers exclusively to such companies as were in arrears for taxes due the State at the time of its adoption; while it appears by the record in this case that the appellee was not in arrears therefor at that time.
It may be true that the Act of 1873 exempted the appellee from the payment of both county and State taxes, upon the payment of the specified commutation as prescribed therein, while the said Resolution, and other commutation Acts, may exempt all other companies only from State taxation. But since the legislative power to create this discrimination and inequality is indisputable, it affords no valid objection to the Act of 1873, if its terms and meaning clearly and unmistakably manifest a legislative intent to exempt or discharge the appellee from the payment oí both county and State taxes, as it has been shown they do, beyond any reasonable doubt. People v. Davenport, 91 N. Y., 589.
It cannot be conceded that the construction which is given to this Act necessarily leads to an absurdity, or manifest injustice. It is possible to conceive of many reasons which would be sufficient to induce the Legislature, in consideration of a certain adequate sum paid into the State treasury annually, to release and discharge the appellee from the payment of all taxes, both county and State, from year to year, until otherwise directed by the Legislature, even though in doing so it discriminated against other companies. It is not necessary to enumerate ihese reasons, or any of them. That in the legislative judgment, this course has been adopted as a wise and beneficial policy for the State, and that such legislative purpose has been “ manifested in plain and explicit language concerning which there can be no misunderstanding,” is enough. That it has been so manifested in -the Act now in question seems incontrovertible.
The conclusion, therefore, follows that the decree of the Chancellor, in so far as it perpetually restrains and enjoins the collection by the appellant of the said sum of $271.41, rated and apportioned
If this interpretation of the Act of 1873 shall result in hardship or inconvenience to any, or in confusion or other embarrassment in the administration of the laws enacted for the purposes of county taxation, relief may be had by immediate application to the General Assembly now in session, the Legislature of 1873 having wisely and expressly reserved the power to modify or repeal the provisions of said Act at any time.
Comegys, C. J., dissented.
