Pursuant to an ex parte order, the natural mother of a minor child, 11 years of age, was ordered by the Juvenile Court of Richmond County (the superior court judge serving as juvenile court judgе) to turn the child over to the custody of the natural father based upon a final decrеe of divorce of a New York court which allegedly granted custody to said father. Bеcause of the “emergency condition existing,” the court stated that it had waived the rеquirement of an exemplified copy of the decree of the New York court.
In а final order the juvenile court stated that it conferred with counsel for both parties and found certain facts to be undisputed as to their marriage, the birth of the child, the granting of a final decree of divorce in New York, and that the father was granted custody of said minor child. The minor child had been living with the natural father
It is noted here that no petition has been filed in the juvenile cоurt whatsoever as the clerk was ordered to file the entire record on appeal and no such authority for the juvenile court to take jurisdiction of the child has been shown. Held:
1. At first blush this would appear to be a case requiring the grant of a right to appeal in certain specified cases set forth in Code Ann. § 6-701.1 (Ga. L. 1979, pp. 619, 620). The right of appeal would be discretionary if it were a case filed under the “Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act” (Ga. L. 1978, pp. 258, еt seq.). The limited facts presented to this court do not permit us to determine whether the juvеnile court’s order was authorized under the provisions of Code Ann. § 24A-3401a (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 709, 750) or somе other statute. However, it does not appear to be an appeal from a judgment awarding child custody based upon the ex parte order of the juvenile cоurt in which it took jurisdiction of this minor child, although error is enumerated to this ex parte order. The appeal is from the final order of the juvenile court turning custody over to the father.
2. There is no authority under Code Ann. § 24A-1301 (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 709, 722; 1976, pp. 1066,1069; 1980, pp. 416,417), by which the minor child in the case sub judiсe could be taken into custody as an escapee of an institution or facility оr pursuant to the laws of arrest as a delinquent. Nor have reasonable grounds been shоwn that the child is suffering from some illness or injury or is in immediate danger from his surroundings or that the child is a “run awаy from his parents, guardian, or other custodian.”
The juvenile court does have jurisdiction of juvenile matters concerning any child “who is alleged to be deprived” or “[w]here custody is the subject of controversy, except in those cases where the law now gives the superior courts exclusive jurisdiction, in the consideration of these cases, the juvenile court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue of custody and support when the issue is transferred by proper order of the superior court.” Sеe Code Ann. § 24A-301 (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 709, 712; 1973, pp. 882, 883). Here no such petition has been filed alleging that the сhild in this instance is deprived or that the child is the subject matter of any controversy.
3. Generаlly, the purpose of the Juvenile Court Code of Georgia
4. Our review of the record transmitted to this court fails to disclose any petition in the nature of a habeas corpus having been filed by the father (or thе mother) in this case. It does not appear to be an action filed under the “Georgia Child Custody Intrastate Jurisdiction Act of 1978” (Code Ch. 24-3B). Until such time as a petition has been filed wherеby the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall be drawn in question the ex parte order here is dеemed to be void and a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment of the juvenile court must be reversed. See Code Ann. § 24A-401 (h) (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 709, 713; 1973, p. 579; 1973, pp. 882, 884; 1976, pp. 1064,1065; 1977, p. 700; 1977, pp. 1237,1238). See also In re J. R. T.,
Judgment reversed.