73090. NEAL v. STATE OF GEORGIA.
73090
Court of Appeals of Georgia
March 4, 1987
354 SE2d 664
BEASLEY, Judge.
BEASLEY, Judge.
The court does not have jurisdiction to decide this case.
The order appealed from simply states that because defendant did not timely аnswer, the case is in default and that a default judgment be entered. No amount of judgment is mentioned, and it has yet to be established.
The complaint, filed by the district attorney as аuthorized by
The complaint sought an establishment of paternity, reimbursement for monies advanced, an order for current support, a judicial inquiry into defendant‘s ability to provide medicаl support, and an order for the payment of all sums into court for transmittal to the dеpartment‘s child support recovery office.
The order appealеd from (which did not involve a verdict), did not determine all of the issues which are to be resolved in the action. In fact, in moving for default judgment, plaintiff only claimed entitlement at that stage to what it regarded as the liquidated damages in its complaint, that is, the debt created by monies advanced. And it freely acknowledged that “It is entitled to a hearing on unliquidated damages (current support) so that a determination can be made by the Court on that issue.” (Parenthetical words in original.) As to liquidated versus unliquidated damages, seе Hazlett & Hancock Constr. Co. v. Virgil Womack Constr. Co., 181 Ga. App. 25 (351 SE2d 218) (1986).
This not being a final judgment, the interlocutory appeal procedure was mandated.
Appeal dismissed. Birdsong, C. J., Bаnke, P. J., Carley, Sognier, and Pope, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Benham, J., dissent.
BENHAM, Judge, dissenting.
This is an aрpeal from an adverse decision in an action filed by
I write separately because I cannot аgree with the majority, which says that the appeal should be dismissed for failure to follow interlocutory appeal procedure.
The majority opines that the entry of the default judgment is not a final judgment since unliquidated damages (current child support) wеre sought by appellee but not determined by the trial court. The majority concludеs that the appeal is interlocutory in nature and should be dismissed for failure to follow the statutory procedure for such appeals. My review of this case leads me to the conclusion that the trial court need not determine the amount of futurе support; therefore, the failure of the trial court to do so does not make this appeal interlocutory in nature.
The statutory scheme provides for a departmental investigation to determine whether a responsible parent is able to support a dependent child receiving public assistance (
I am authоrized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Presiding Judge McMurray join in this dissent.
DECIDED MARCH 4, 1987.
C. Ronald Patton, for appellant.
Stephen F. Lanier, District Attоrney, Deborah Haygood, Assistant District Attorney, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Foil Russell, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
