17 Ga. App. 502 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1916
Lead Opinion
1. Ordinarily, when one renders service to another, which the latter accepts, a promise to pay the reasonable value thereof is implied. Civil Code, § 5513; Hudson v. Hudson, 90 Ga. 581 (16 S. E. 349).
2. While the general rule is that a past consideration will not support, a subsequent promise (1 Elliott on Contracts, § 213), an exception to the rule is recognized where the subsequent promise is one which, under the facts surrounding it, would be implied by law. 1 Elliott on Contracts § 214.
(a) Where the services were rendered upon a request which reasonably implied a promise of remuneration, no promise of remuneration being made at the time, but subsequently an express promise was made to pay for them, even if this latter promise did not relate back to the previous request, so as to be supported by the services rendered, it was at least evidence tending to show that the services were not intended to be gratuitous, and that there was an implied promise to pay for them. 1 Elliott on Contracts, § 214, and cases therein cited.
3. The evidence in this case was sufficient to authorize a finding that the services rendered by the plaintiff were valuable, were directly beneficial to the defendant, and were requested by the defendant before they were rendered, and that both the plaintiff and the defendant impliedly understood, before and while such services were being performed, that they were to be remunerated. In such a ease, where, immediately after the services are completed, the defendant promises the plaintiff to pay for them a specified, reasonable sum, he is bound by the promise, and the plaintiff does not have to sue upon a quantum meruit, but can bring his action upon the promise.
4. The court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring dubitante. I readily concede that an implied promise to pay for services rendered may authorize a recovery as on a quantum meruit in such an amount as may be reasonable compensation for these services, but I gravely doubt whether the rule can be so far extended as to substitute an express promise to pay a definite amount as the measure for fixing the value of services not rendered under a contract, instead of the reasonable compensation which rests upon an implied promise to pay what the services are reasonably worth. In other words, the right to bring a suit upon a quantum meruit would seem to be excluded where the plaintiff relies even in part upon an express promise, especially when the promise was subsequent to the actual performance of the services.