*1 as a suffered result claims to have injuries he for the ment admitted also of 1995. Davis’ doctor July since the accident injury was spinal if the say for certain not that he could caused some other was or whether to the accident related event. found that: judge trial have believed jury could presented,
From the evidence accident, he since of the was not result pain Plaintiffs twenty days Dr. until from Owen treatment did seek for a limited with him treated accident and then after the Plaintiff believed jury could have period. pain. no suffered at 9. July Mullen, Opinion, Trial v. Court
Davis exer- properly trial court that the determine Accordingly, we for a motion new it denied Davis’ when cised discretion jury believe: basis for the was reasonable trial because there (2) alleged (1) that his pain did not suffer that Davis and/or of the defendant. negligence injury not caused CONCLUSION Court. Therefore, Superior reverse the order we 773 A.2d Jr., NAYLOR, Harry Fox, H. Irvin S.
Valley Acres, Inc., Appellants Supervisors and the Board OF HELLAM The TOWNSHIP Hellam, Appellees. Pennsylvania. Supreme Court Argued May 20, 2001. June Decided *2 Newman, J., filed a dissenting opinion. *3 Blakey, Leber, Bradley
Albert G. Blakey J. & Bupp Yost Schumann, York, for appellants, Naylor Irvin al. S. et Keiter, Seidensticker,
David Baughman, York, Kreiter & for appellees, Tp. of Hellam al. et FLAHERTY, C.J., ZAPPALA, CAPPY,
Before CASTILLE, NIGRO, SAYLOR, NEWMAN and JJ.
OPINION ZAPPALA, Justice. appeal
This presents the issue a municipality whether may enact a temporary moratorium on types certain of subdi- vision and land development the municipality while revises its and subdivision land ordinances. We hold (MPC), Municipalities Planning of July Code Act 'amended, P.L. reenacted and 10101- P.S. grant municipality does not therefore Court, reverse the order the Commonwealth which held to contrary. undisputed Appellants, facts establish that Irvin S. Naylor, Fox, Jr., Harry Acres, Valley Inc., H. own each have an interest tracts of undeveloped land Hellam *4 20, 1995, Township, County. York July On the Hellam Town- (Board) ship Supervisors Board of enacted Ordinance No. 1995-10, imposed on moratorium new residential subdivision development and land for period year. of one 1995-10, Hellam Township §§ Ordinance No. 2 and 5. Com- mercial development and industrial prohibited, were also but only to the development extent that was not serviceable by existing public system. § sewer Id. at 3. Subdivisions already progress prior enactment the moratorium lots, that did not require additional develop- well as land an require subdivision or on- further that did not plans ment Id. from the moratorium. system, excepted disposal lot were suspend purpose § of the ordinance was express 4. approvals while the subdivision and certain revising its completed process Township with that is inconsistent prevent development plan, so as to expired The moratorium Id. at 1. revisions. proposed 25, 1996, July on but was extended own terms 1, August on period two month ordinance for an additional No. 1996-5. Township Hellam Ordinance advertised its revised the Board first On June ordinance. A hear- and land subdivision 27, 1996, became on and the ordinance ing was held June 23, 1996, 22 and September August On effective effective, new approximately two before the weeks subdivision devel- Appellants preliminary submitted their Township plans Zoning Hellam Officer. opment grounds they rejected plans on the zoning officer being the ordinances appeared to been submitted under have they pending ordinances and that revised rather than the ordinances. The comply pending with the failed plans have denied further would been officer indicated pending if ordinances due compliant even with application. the time of moratorium effect at action, seeking a subsequently filed the instant Appellants moratorium was invalid was declaratory judgment that the plans submit- preliminary not in at the time their were effect Appellants requested ted. further the court order the plans accept respective preliminary their Board review^ in effect at the time of their submission. under ordinances summary judgment. Appellants for parties Both filed motions nor that neither the MPC the Second Class asserted Code, May P.L. as reenacted and amend- Act of ed, 65101-68701, authorized the of a enactment ordinance, and therefore the ordinance was inval- Township maintained that the id a matter of law. The properly valid had reviewed and moratorium was ordi- rejected Appellants’ plans pending, under revised nances.
The common pleas
granted
court
summary judgment
Township.
favor of
It acknowledged
the
that the MPC does
expressly grant municipalities
not
authority
prohibit
the
development
or
subdivision
temporarily
permanently.
either
or
held, however,
It
power
is
the
incidental as essential and
necessary for
the effectuation of municipality’s power to
regulate land
the
Although
challenged
use under MPC.
parties,
the
the court went on
examine the scope and
duration of the
reasonable,
moratorium and found them to be
and
discriminatory
enacted without
intent.1
Court
Naylor
Commonwealth
affirmed.
v. Township of
Hellam,
(Pa.Cmwlth.1998).
Summary judgment may
only
be entered
in those
clearly
cases where the record
demonstrates that there are no
genuine issues of
moving
material fact and that
party
judgment
entitled to
matter
law. Dean v.
.as
Common-
moratorium,
upheld
Township's
1. Because it
enactment of a
court did not
Township
address
issue whether the
was entitled to
summary judgment as a
applicability
result of the
pending
doctrine,
ordinance
issue which
an
raised
its answer to
Appellants' complaint
parties fully
and both
briefed before the trial
purposes
clarity,
court. For
the moratorium ordinance was not
pending
already
had
but
been
enacted
extended for an additional
period
Appellants'
month
applications
two
at the time
were filed. Thus
any "pending ordinance” discussion is not
relevant to
issue,
applicability
but rather relates to the
of the new
subdivision land
pending
ordinances that were
at the time
Appellants’ application.
Pennsylvania, Department
Transportation,
wealth
that no
parties
As the
concede
Pa.
*6
remain,
the
must determine whether
issues of material fact
we
concluding
law in
that a
as a matter of
lower courts erred
on
a
power
has
enact moratorium
municipality
the
zoning plan.
while it
revises
v. A-
plenary. Phillips
law,
our
is
As
all issues of
review
with
Co.,
(1995).
124,
Best Products
Pa.
542
Initially,
that it is
that munici
we note
fundamental
authority
that
of the
palities are
of the state and
creatures
v. Bor
Denbow
Legislature
powers
supreme.
over
is
their
Leetsdale,
1113,
(1999);
ough
Pa.
729 A.2d
1118
of
(1933).
Lancaster
City,
Shirk v.
313 Pa.
Aniline Inc. v. Lock Appellants’ misplaced reliance this statement is as tire reference in dicta, City Philadelphia only was not but a misstatement of the Products, recognized law. Court in Aniline Inc. that a Our American corporation through powers municipal can function incidental to those however, that, “[b]eyond granted. expressly 727. We Id. at stated authority, power by implication.” grant municipality possesses no added). (emphasis Id. begin analysis by our examining provi We the relevant so, sions In doing recognize of the MPC.3 we that zoning enabling legislation, opposed to zoning ordinances them selves, liberally must be construed order effect its Abel, purposes. Township Middletown Pa.Cmwlth. (1972); Quarries, 297 A.2d Inc. Exton v. Zoning 169, 174 (1967); Board Adjustment, 425 Pa. 228 A.2d see 1928(c). Moreover, also 1 presumed Pa.C.S. must be intended to favor the interest against 1922(5). any private §' interest. 1 Pa.C.S.
Section 105 of the forth purpose MPC sets the broad Act, protect safety, which is to promote citizen health and morals, accomplish promote development, energy coordinated conservation, general provide guiding for the welfare protecting development growth permit municipalities *7 to problems may minimize such exist or presently may carry § 10105. be foreseen. P.S. To out some of objectives, expressly grants these statute authority to adopt comprehensive create and a develop- plan, §§ at. regulate ment id. 10301 and and to develop- ment enacting development subdivision and land ordi- provides §§ nances. Id. at 10501 and 10601. MPC The include, may among things, ordinances provisions, other layout for insuring that the of the and land subdivision devel- opment comprehensive conforms to plan, id. 10503(2)(i), § and provisions for encouraging promoting flexibility, economy and in ingenuity layout and design of 10503(5). § Id. at subdivisions. The MPC further states that zoning may prohibit permit, regulate ordinances uses of land, areas and land as density dimensions of well as the of (3) population 10603(b)(1), intensity Id. at use. (4). A provision catch-all that zoning may states ordinances Township upon municipali- Second Class Code does not confer a Instead, any ty powers regarding development planning. additional provisions refers to the of the as follows: MPC regulations. supervisors may plan "Land use The board for the through township zoning, of the subdivision and land (P.L. regulations July under the Act of No. ” 247), ‘Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning known as the Code.’ § to necessary imple- be provisions “such other contain 10603(c)(4). Id. at MPC].” purposes [the ment found that noted, Court Commonwealth As while the enact a power to expressly plan is incidental to these revises practical effect powers. disagree. We granted existing to suspend of the moratorium enactment until the approval to subdivision zoning applicable ordinances construing the Even ordinances became effective. revised to power liberally, find that the MPC we provisions not ordinance, does purpose, whatever for zoning enact a zoning valid ordi a necessarily power suspend include the Compare 53 P.S. land owner. prejudice nance inval grant authority for (express § 10609.2 days while period for exceed idate ordinance amendment). power significantly, the More it enacts curative historically been viewed development has land suspend and not from inciden as a distinct this Commonwealth Accordingly, development. any power regulate land tal through the regarding planning MPC is silent as the to condone development, we decline temporary suspension of power. of such municipality’s exercise law. Kline prior case support find for our decision We (1949), property 362 Pa. Harrisburg, authorizing the construc- applied building permit for a owners application was building. While the apartment an tion of prohib- ordinance Harrisburg enacted an City pending, dwellings in an family single other than iting all construction *8 districts of residential quo the status attempt preserve zoning property completed plan. its new city while the city enforcing provi- from sought to owners restrain zoning ordi- they to as an “interim” what referred sions of building requested nance,4 city to issue the and to direct permit. decision in favor of the lower court
Our Court affirmed Initially, held that we grounds. various property owners ordinances, “interim” ordinances “stopgap” in cases 4. Known some comprehensive contemplation adoption in of the are those enacted city comply failed to with the procedural requirements for enacting an pursuant act, ordinance enabling the Third City Law Class P.L. June 12198- 4110 to 4113. rejected city’s We argument further that City the Third Class Law implied included an or inherent pass an interim ordinance suspending development. contended, city case, in does the the instant if it did not possess power, property could owners always body’s defeat the local governing in establishing efforts a new zoning plan by wing get their projects approved before the enactment of a zoning new ordinance. response argument
Our Court’s this was two-fold. We stated: first place, although the argument entirely is not merit,
without it is one which must be directed to the legislature and not to the courts. If the wishes to authorize the enactment of “temporary” or “interim” ordinance to maintain quo the status it can provide by so legislation with proper safeguards. place, In the second apparently experience has not indicated the failure to pass “temporary” or “interim” ordinance has any been substantial zoning.... Although menace to there are scores possibly municipalities hundreds of Pennsylvania in with, which have zoning enacted ordinances accordance the expressed provisions statutes, all relevant nature, are similar there is no indication that we legislation could find proposed any either cases in of the courts of this State these have inability suffered from during to maintain quo the status zoning enactment of ordinances. A.2d recognize
We that Kline is dispositive of the in stant predated matter since it interpret- the MPC and instead They usually preserve ordinances. are temporarily intended quo pending adoption permanent zoning regulations. status Annotation, Ordinance, Validity See Zoning “Interim" Effect of A.L.R.3d 1196
407 decision, clear from the City Law.5 What is the Third Class ed is not to a moratorium however, power impose the municipality’s the of a necessary for effectuation essential regulate land use. power to in Boron for our decision support find further
We (1971). 827, 284 744 v. 445 Pa. A.2d Kimple, Oil Company Oil, building permit a for applied for Boron the land owners to borough refused gasoline of a station. the construction process ground that was in the permit issue on the the ordinance, prohibit a which would enacting zoning a new on property. on The issue the landowner’s service station “pending” as of new ordinance was appeal was whether the application therefore whether of the landowner’s date permit pursuant to borough could refuse issue Court held because ordinance doctrine.” Our “pending public meeting proposed on the had a borough advertised for available proposed and made the ordinance rezoning proposed filing application, inspection prior filed and “pending” application when the was was ordinance building permit to issue borough’s refusal improper.
We on state: went ail unlimited recognize in Kline was of 5. We that the moratorium also case, duration, which lasted fourteen unlike the one in the instant however, bearing, whether the Town- no months. This factor has any ship suspend for duration. possesses land doctrine,” building “pending permit, be ordinance 6. Under the if, application, an amendment at the time of refused prohibit the of the for pending, which use land ordinance is would sought. pending rule permit is Id. 746. The ordinance which the apply applications for does not subdivision MPC, 508(4) specifically they section are controlled Properties, Inc. proposed kind land use. Monumental addresses this Whitehall, Pa.Cmwlth. Commissioners Board 508(4) essentially provides A.2d Section governed approval plat are ordi- applications for of a subdivision filed. applications time the were nances in effect at the 10508(4). rely Appellants on this As at footnote discussed infra prohibit imposition legislature’s indicative of the intent section as of a moratorium. A caution word of is nevertheless in order. While we do not *10 in this instance a countenance “race to the courthouse steps” by rights landowners to obtain nonconforming to a use, our not present any decision is to be construed sense granting a pendency license to a to the use of a zoning a to impose general ordinance as device either a or selective moratorium on local land development. Howev- a rapidly er much expanding municipality may wish to effect, declare “time out” all stop development, achieved, means would constitutionally whatever be imper- missible.
Id. at 747-748. provisions
We reiterate that these cases do not interpret MPC, the clearly but power demonstrate the to “halt” development is not an any extension or to power incidental regulate to land development. use or Despite our Court’s previous pronouncements rejecting implicit the existence an moratorium, power imposing a legislature the has not acted to municipalities planning objectives authorize to meet their through suspension, otherwise, temporary the pro reviewing cess for proposals. land use As stated Kline we fifty years ago, over “[i]f the to wishes authorize “temporary” the of a enactment or “interim” ordinance to maintain so quo provide legislation the status it can with proper safeguards.” 68 A.2d Assembly, The General is better significant suited examine the policy issues at stake and appropriate to determine the legal standards to govern application a powerful of such planning tool.7 concluding grant that the MPC does the authori- ty impose development, a moratorium on land note we that we also 508(4), reject Appellants’ arguments that sections 508 and 53 P.S. 10508, 10508(4), prohibit imposition of a moratorium. To the contrary, procedural provisions find merely we that these set forth the approval process to be once a properly followed submitted (section 508), and address in what an circumstances ordinance is (section applicable 508(4)). particular application ato for subdivision They directly speak municipality's authority do not impose to a moratorium. reject argument' Appellants' We further that because section 501 of MPC, 10501, entitled, Power,” "Grant of does not include any language referring governing body's ability prohibit to a subdivi- many approved states have fully other are aware
We
develop-
on land
the enactment
enabling
language
municipality’s
in the
express
absent
ment
conclude,
jurisdiction
however, that
cases of each
act.8 We
constitution,
partic-
law the
upon
statutes
case
rest
impose a
power
law
state. As our own case
views
ular
than incidental
from rather
moratorium as distinct
of our
development, we find
cases
regulate
unpersuasive.
jurisdictions
sister
courts erred in
Although
that the lower
we have determined
in favor of
granting summary judgment
of a moratori-
ground
authorizes the enactment
that MPC
ground in support
alternative
um,
Township offered an
*11
not addressed
the lower
summary
which was
judgment,
circumstances,
generally
we would
re-
Under
courts.
these
any remaining
Township’s
claims. The
disposition
mand for
of
to summary
argument was that
was entitled
alternative
application
pending
to
ordinance
judgment due
however,
Court,
the Township
In its
to our
doctrine.
brief
apply
rule
to
pending
that “the
ordinance
does
concedes
submission,
Inc. v. Board
Properties,
Monumental
of
(1973).”
Commissioners,
105,
Justice a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN files NEWMAN, Justice, dissenting. I Municipalities
Because believe Planning Code (MPC), July 31, Act of P.L. and reenacted amended, 10101-11202, grant municipality P.S. does to enact types moratorium on certain subdivision and land while the and revises subdivision land ordi- nances, I respectfully dissent. Majority points out,
As the the stated purpose of MPC very broad. Section 105 defines purpose of the act: intent, purpose It is the scope and act to protect this and morals; promote safety, health accomplish and coordinat- development; provide ed for the general welfare guiding protecting ... development growth!;] (cid:127) (cid:127) (cid:127) guide structures, uses of type and location of streets, public facilities; grounds other promote energy!;] conservation permit ... and to municipalities minimize such problems may presently exist or which may be foreseen. 10105. To achieve this purpose, stated the MPC
grants to, authority among things, other prepare and a adopt comprehensive development plan,1 regu- late development by subdivision and land enacting subdivision ordinances,2 and development use, land regulate land structure use, population density and by enacting activities zoning ordi- nances,3 and enact such zoning provisions ordinance as be necessary to effectuate the purposes the MPC.4 §§ 1. 53 P.S. 10302. §§
2. 53 P.S. 10503. §§
3. 53 P.S. 10603.
4. with the decisions agree and Majority, I from the dissent I believe because Court and court Commonwealth the trial expressly powers to the broad in or incidental “implicit mora- authority impose municipalities is upon conferred in the are regulations land use development while toria Hellam, Township being Naylor revisited.” process of 503(2)(i) (Pa.Cmwith.1998). autho- Section A.2d (Board) to Supervisors Board of rizes the Hellam arrangement layout that “the insuring for adopt provisions to the shall conform” development land subdivision or 10503(2)(i). The trial plan. 53 P.S. comprehensive Board’s that subdivi- stated, ensuring logical means of aptly “[a] court compre- municipality’s a conform with development and sion existing comprehensive an during time as plan such hensive are development ordinance and subdivision and plan quo maintain the status would be to and enacted being revised development.” and subdivision enacting a moratorium on Op., p. Trial Court to monitor of the Board clearly responsibility
It necessities, adequate public community growth provide and to water, parks. In sewage, schools transportation, patterns in the development the Board noticed public sewage system township changing and that the were response, longer no service additional residences. could plan. After developing comprehensive a new began Board develop this new years to research Board invested five plan, pace of subdivision dramatically. The Board knew township within escalated plan they proposed comprehensive a that once announced new existing plan, landowners substantially altered for subdi- applications Board with developers would flood the existing plan. Recog- development pursuant vision and would soon be comprehensive plan nizing proposed that the obsolete, only that would allow Board invoked the tool to do under they are authorized to enact such them moratorium on imposed the MPC. The Board lim- nondiscriminatory, that was subdivision and *13 412 duration,
ited in in good and enacted faith.5 concedes, Majority As the liberally the MPC must be con Abel, strued in order to its purpose, effectuate Middletown v. 6, 7 (1972), Pa.Cmwlth. 297 A.2d presume 525 and we must intended to favor the interest as 1922(5). against any private interest. 1 objec Pa.C.S. underlying tives of the use moratoria are consistent purposes with the of A the MPC.6 moratorium allows the municipality in which time to create a new comprehensive plan. enacted, plan Until the new is no development allowed, thereby insuring that development is with consistent plan. the new Supreme The California in a Court stated landmark temporary moratorium case:
It
ais matter of common knowledge
zoning plan
that a
contemplated
the extent
in the instant case cannot be made
day;
in a
judicial
therefore we
take
notice of the fact
that it will
much
take
time to work out
the details
such a
plan
obviously
if,
and that
it would
be destructive of the
incubation,
during
period
of its
parties seeking to evade
operation
permitted
thereof should
upon
be
to enter
course of
which might
construction
progress so far as to
part
defeat whole or in
the ultimate execution of
plan.
Miller v. Board
Public Works City
Los Angeles, 195
477,
(1925),
dism.,
Cal.
P.
781,
234
381
app.
273
47
U.S.
S.Ct.
(1927).
460, 71 L.Ed.
Temporary
889
moratoria allow the
jurisdictions
5. Other
approved
that have
the use of moratoria have done
grounds
so on the
that moratoria contain similar constraints.
See
Co.,
Arnold Bernhard
Planning
Zoning
Inc. v.
Commission of
152,
Westport,
(1984); Almquist
194 Conn.
Collura v. moratoria, authority to munic- invoke Without exceptionally heavy drafting task in ipalities have an plans sprawl the urban amidst implementing I do not shortages of facilities. believe the and their place municipalities such a intended burden Majority’s interpretation narrow planning boards. The and, “if purpose the MPC’s broad MPC unsubstantiated enforced, governing bodies’ would serve hinder or reduce act, as express ability purposes to effectuate the compre- which follows the growth, coordinated Naylor, problem solving.” plan, proactive hensive A.2d at for and jurisdictions have articulated reasons
While several
moratoria,
addressed
temporary
few have
approved uses
safeguards”
“proper
these moratoria must contain.7 Both
the trial court and the
in
Court
this case
Commonwealth
constitutionality
examined the
temporary
the Board’s
mor
atorium. The Commonwealth Court determined that
temporary moratorium
reasonably
limited
time and
narrowly
prohibit
only
tailored
so much
necessary to
its purpose.
effectuate
Naylor,
The MPC authorizes the
of temporary
long
use
moratoria so
they
faith,
are
good
duration,
enacted in
limited
*15
nondiscriminatory.
question
The
of
temporary
whether
mora-
toria
good
were enacted in
faith
a question
is
of fact and
courts should focus on
purpose
the stated
for invoking the
Marietta,
City
See Dills v.
planning
tool.
reflect the new See 329 N.E.2d procedure, at 737. Under such a the landowner is in the same position as if subject municipality- the ordinance was to a issued moratorium. eases,
The Majority relies on two v. Harrisburg, Kline 362 (1949) Pa. 68 A.2d and Boron v. Oil Co. Kimple, (1971), Pa. for proposition that “the power to ‘halt’ not an extension of or incidental any power regulate development.” to to land use or Majority Opinion, p. case, 565 Pa. A.2d at In p. this we have been to focus asked the text the MPC and implicitly determine whether the municipali- MPC authorizes impose temporary to ties moratoria on subdivision and devel- I opment. citing fail see to the relevance of two that do cases interpret provisions not of the MPC.12Kline has made clear that the City imply Third Class Law did not authority. two Majority cases the not attempt references do do what we do today, interpret the text of MPC and ascertain the intent township whether determine planning boards use accomplish moratoria to promote safety coordinated of its resi- up-to-date via comprehensive plans. dents Finally, the Board in instant argues case that if it does possess implied power not or inherent tempo- enact a rary suspending subdivision and development, developers expedite and landowners filing will of their applications to gain approval before the enactment of the new Kline, comprehensive plan. response, Majority cites to I do find it relevant that both Kline published and Boron Oil were prior Statutory to the enactment of the Construction Act of 1501-1991, requires liberally Pa.C.S. us to construe statutes give purpose promote justice. effect to their particularly considering, I find it relevant "[c]ourts have construed enabling municipal strictly liberally. statutes both A strict con struction, limiting municipal power provisions, express favors construction, making imply individual landowner. A liberal it easier to made, Hostettler, expressly municipality.” favors the Naylor Validity Hellam: The Moratoria on Land Constitution, Development Pennsylvania Under 8 Widener Pub.L. J. *17 entirely without stated, is not “although argument merit, which must be directed is one to authorize legislature wishes courts. If the not to main- or “interim” ordinance “temporary” of a enactment legislation[.]” Majori- provide by quo it can so tain status citing at 775-76 pp. A.2d p. ty Opinion, 565 Pa. call Kline, our legislature responded A.2d at 189. MPC, authorizing only enacting by creating and plan and adopt create granting also development, but regulate subdivision and objectives. out such Be- carry tools to necessary them the tool, is one cause I believe that I respectfully dissent. A.2d Pennsylvania, Appellee
COMMONWEALTH LIGONS, Appellant. Antoine Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of 2, 2001. Submitted Jan. July
Decided J., concurred result. Nigro,