24 Conn. 468 | Conn. | 1856
There is no question, in our view of the constitution, that the legislature could properly authorize a court to nonsuit the plaintiff upon the defendants’ motion. The clause in the constitution, which provides that the trial by jury shall remain inviolate, presents no obstacle to this legislation. Its object is simply to preserve a jury trial in questions of fact, and it does not relate to questions of law with the court. The jury have nothing to do with the relevancy and materiality of evidence, or with inferences of law from facts fully established or not.' denied. If all the facts, claimed to be proved by the evidence of the plaintiff, cannot, if true, make a prima facie case for,him, it would be worse than idle to proceed further with the trial; since no verdict • could be rendered in his favor, which c.ould be retained. It is no uncommon thing to raise the question of the sufficiency of evidence upon demurrer to evidence, wherever the court will give its consent, as the readiest way to end the trial, and this is not a violation of the constitution. The trial by jury would indeed^present a singular spectacle, if because an issue in fact is joined to the jury, whatever evidence is offered by the plaintiff, to prove his case, must be received and considered, lest the province of the jury should be invaded, or if the fact, claimed to be proved, is admitted, its materiality or sufficiency may not be decided by the court. If the court come to a wrong decision, there may be an appeal to the supreme court to correct the error, and beyond this, there is no relief known to the law. The statute, as well as the com
The more important question in the case is, did the plaintiffs make a case, which should have been submitted to the jury ? A majority of the court think they did not. This declaration is in the form of case for default of duty as common carriers from Winchester, or Waterbury, to New' York or Boston, or both, varying somewhat in the different counts in the declaration, and is doubtless the only form for obtaining relief, which could have been adopted, with any hope of success. The termini of the defendant’s duties as set forth, are quite important to the issue, not only as descriptive of the evidence to be adduced on the trial, but as to the place and circumstances, where the loss of the property happened, and if the defendants are not common carriers to Boston or New York, as described, they are not liable for any default on this declaration. 2 Greenl. Ev., § 209. 1 Bing., 162. 2 B. & P., 54. 12 East., 89. A common carrier is one who holds himself out to the public, to carry persons or freight for hire. If this is so, we of necessity look to see from the evidence, or facts detailed in the record, what there is which conduces to prove that the defendants held themselves out to the public as common carriers to New York, or Boston, or to any place beyond their own road. If the mark, on boxes of freight, “ Boston” or “ New York”, proves this fact, then if they had been marked Philadelphia, New Orleans, or London, this would have proved they were com
We need hardly remark, that we see no evidence of a
The other piece of evidence, supposed to make in favor of the plaintiff, is an advertisement in the Waterbury American and other papers, and set up in certain public places. We commented upon this testimony at length in the case of Elmore against the present defendants, when we said we attached but little or no importance to its import, and we still entertain the same views; that it furnishes no proof, that the defendants were carriers to New York, or that they undertook by special promise, to become such, even if a special promise could do it. The present argument has served to strengthen those convictions. It is even now said on the part of the defendants, that this advertisement, instead of making a case for the plaintiffs, makes against them. It begins, “ Naugatuck Railroad,—summer arrangement,—five trains to and from Waterburyit then goes on to say, what passenger trains, and what freight trains leave Bridgeport to go north to Winsted, and what trains go south from Winsted to Bridgeport. Not a word is said about their trains running beyond Bridgeport. Nor do I believe that the plaintiffs, or any one else, from a mere perusal of this notice or advertisement, inferred anything more. What it says in allusion to the N. Y. & N. H. road, is that the defendants’ trains will, at Bridgeport and Milford, meet the trains of that company. In the former case, we likewise commented upon that part of the advertisement, which speaks of the freight-bill; we will not now repeat what we then said, but refer to that as our present opinion, viz. that no argument can be derived from it, in behalf of the plaintiff,
It has been claimed, that if the defendants are common carriers to Bridgeport, and no further, they are even then liable, in this instance, since it does not appear that the Alice, which was burnt, with the plaintiffs* goods on board, in the harbor, was a suitable vessel to receive the goods, to be transported to New York. It is obvious that the motion was not drawn upon the idea of any such question, for none such was made, or alluded to below, as we understand from the judge who presided, nor, as we have a right to presume, from the fact that it was not made, will it be. of any benefit to the plaintiff, if we grant a new trial; hence, we do not feel bound to grant a new trial on that account, and besides, if the defendants are not common carriers as described in the declaration, they cannot recover, in this suit.
In this opinion, Storrs, J. concurred.
said he felt bound to yield to the opinion of the court in the case of Hood v. The New York & New Haven Railroad Company, 22 Conn. R., 502, and Elmore v. The Naugatuck Railroad Company, 23 Conn. R., 457, and, on the authority of those cases, did not dissent from the foregoing opinion, although, but for those eases, he should have felt bound so to dissent.
A new trial not granted.