NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. ESTATE OF KOLLSTEDT ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 93-942
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
March 29, 1995
71 Ohio St.3d 624 | 1995-Ohio-245
Submittеd January 24, 1995. CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA92-06-101.
- A provision in a liability insurance policy which excludes coverage to an insured where the insured expected or intended to cause bodily injury or property damage does not apply undеr circumstances where the insured was mentally incapable of committing an intentional act.
- When disputed, the determination whether an insured lacked the mental capacity to commit an intentional act is a matter to be determined, in the first instance, by a trial court and such determination is to be made by the trial court on the basis of the evidence. Such a determinаtion will not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion.
Droder & Miller Co., L.P.A., and W. John Sellins, for appellant.
Millikin & Fitton Law Firm and Michael A. Fulton, for appellee Tharp.
Stephen C. Lane and David L. Kash, for appellee Abbott.
{¶ 1} On October 18, 1989, Paul L. Kollstedt shot and killed Robert Hatmaker. Kollstedt was arrested and charged with murder, a violation of
{¶ 2} On Octobеr 26, 1989, Kollstedt was admitted to the Dayton Mental Health Center. There, Kollstedt was treated by Dr. Salah M. Samy, a psychiatrist. On February 21, 1990, Kollstedt was transferred from the Dayton facility to the Pauline Warfield Lewis Center in Cincinnati. In May 1990, Dr. Marguerite Blythe, a psychiatrist, reported that no form of active treatment could restore Kollstedt to mental competency. Thereafter, it appеars the murder charge against Kollstedt was dismissed upon a finding that there was no substantial probability Kollstedt would become competent to stand trial. Kollstedt died in 1990 without leaving any written or reсorded testimonial evidence concerning the circumstances of the shooting.
{¶ 3} At the time of the shooting, Kollstedt had a policy of homeowner‘s insurance which had been issued by Nationwide Insurance Company, appellant. On March 13, 1991, appellant filed a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County naming, as defendants, Christine Abbott, Executor of the Estate of Robert Hatmaker (“Abbott“), and Richard J. Tharp, Administrator of the Estate of Paul L. Kollstedt (“Tharp“), appellees. In the complaint, appellant sought a determination that it wаs not obligated to defend or indemnify Tharp under the policy in a wrongful death action initiated by Abbott for the death of Hatmaker. Specifically, appellant claimed that no cоverage was available under Kollstedt‘s
{¶ 4} In a decision filed April 7, 1992, the trial court held that appellant was obligated under the homeowner‘s policy to defend and indemnify Tharp for any causes of action resulting from the Octоber 18, 1989 shooting. Specifically, the trial court, citing Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Turner (1986), 29 Ohio App.3d 73, 29 OBR 83, 503 N.E.2d 212, determined that the exclusion in the policy for “expected or intended” injuries did not apply, since Kollstedt was “insane” at the time of the shooting and, thus, could not have committed an intentional act. The trial court also found that, in any event, the intentional injury exclusion could not be invoked to avoid coverage, since appellant had failed to demonstrate that the injury itself was expected or intended. See Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Swanson (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 189, 569 N.E.2d 906, syllabus.
{¶ 5} On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The court of appeals held that the evidence supported the trial court‘s determination that the intentional injury exclusion did not apply, since Kollstedt lacked the mental cаpacity to commit an intentional act. In so holding, the court of
{¶ 6} The issue that has been certified to this court by the Twelfth Appellate District is “whether, within the context of an intentional injury exclusion clause in an insurance contract, insanity should be defined pursuant to
{¶ 7}
{¶ 8} In Turner, supra, 29 Ohio App.3d 73, 76, 29 OBR 83, 87, 503 N.E.2d 212, 216, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County held that “an act of an individual cannot be treated as ‘intentional’ if the insured was suffering from а derangement of his intellect which deprived him of the capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason.”
{¶ 10} In the case at bar, the trial court, citing Turner, found that Kollstedt lacked the mentаl capacity at the time of the shooting to commit an intentional act. Therefore, the trial court determined that the exclusion in Kollstedt‘s homeowner‘s policy for expected or intended injuries did not apply. The evidence supporting the trial court‘s determination consisted of, inter alia, the deposition testimony of two expert witnesses, Drs. Fisher and Samy. In his deposition, Dr. Fisher testified that Kollstedt suffered from degenerative dementia of the Alzheimer type and senile onset with delirium. Fisher stated that Kollstedt‘s mental derangement at the time of the shooting would have made it impossible for him “* * * to carry on the sequence of events that would have led from the planful [sic] intent to actually executing a deed.” According to Fisher, Kollstedt‘s mental state prеcluded Kollstedt from planning or premeditating an action in a purposeful manner. Similarly, Dr. Samy concluded that Kollstedt‘s mental condition at the time of the shooting precluded Kollstedt frоm making a rational judgment.
{¶ 11} On appeal, the court of appeals determined that the evidence supported the trial court‘s determination that Kollstedt could not have acted intentionally at the time of the shooting, since Kollstedt suffered from a derangement of intellect that deprived him of the capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason. Therefore, the court of appeals, applying Turner, affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the intentional injury exclusion did not apply.
{¶ 12} We affirm the judgment of the court of aрpeals. We hold that a provision in a liability insurance policy which excludes coverage to an insured where the insured expected or intended to cause bodily injury or proрerty damage does not apply under circumstances where the insured was mentally incapable of
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
COOK, J., concurs in the syllabus and judgment only.