NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, L.L.C. v. ANGELA M. PERRY
No. 99497
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
November 14, 2013
2013-Ohio-5024
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-759730
BEFORE: Stewart, A.J., Celebrezze, J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 14, 2013
Angela M. Perry, pro se
7855 Summerset Drive
Walton Hills, OH 44146
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew P. Curry
Matthew J. Richardson
Manley, Deas & Kochalski, L.L.C.
P.O. Box 165028
Columbus, OH 43216
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Angela Perry appeals from a summary judgment granting foreclosure in favor of plaintiff-appellee Nationstar Mortgage, L.L.C. On appeal, Perry asserts two assignments of error. First, Perry argues that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment because Nationstar did not own or hold the note prior to filing its complaint. In her second assignment of error, Perry argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Nationstar lacked standing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} In August 2007, Perry executed a promissory note for $240,000 secured by a mortgage for the purchase of property in Walton Hills, Ohio. On July 15, 2011, Nationstar filed a complaint against Perry seeking $238,498.87 after Perry defaulted on her mortgage loan payments. Attached to the complaint was a copy of an unendorsed promissory note naming Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., as the payee. Also attached to the complaint was a copy of the mortgage and two mortgage assignments. The first mortgage assignment demonstrated that on November 18, 2008, the mortgage was assigned from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS“), as nominee for Flagstar, F.S.B., to Flagstar, F.S.B. The second mortgage assignment demonstrated that on December 4, 2009, the mortgage was assigned from Flagstar, F.S.B., to Nationstar.
{¶3} On August 8, 2012, Nationstar filed a motion for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of a Nationstar employee attesting to the
{¶4} On November 29, 2012, Perry filed a motion for leave to respond to Nationstar‘s motion for summary judgment. Perry also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On December 18, 2012, the court denied both of Perry‘s motions. On the same day, the magistrate granted summary judgment in favor of Nationstar. The trial court adopted the magistrate‘s decision on January 4, 2013. This appeal followed.
{¶5} Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing in a foreclosure action. In Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, the court found that standing to sue is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court and is determined at the commencement of a suit. Id. at ¶ 24. In foreclosure cases, standing exists where a party either has a mortgage assignment or is the holder of the note at the time the complaint is filed. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Patterson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98360, 2012-Ohio-5894, ¶ 21. In this case, Nationstar has met its burden of proof with regard to standing because it had both the mortgage assignment and was the holder of the note at the time the complaint was filed.
{¶6} This case is analogous to Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Najar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98502, 2013-Ohio-1657. In Najar, when the appellants-borrowers failed to make payments on their note, the appellee-bank filed a foreclosure action. Copies of
{¶7} In affirming the decision of the trial court, this court found that the appellee-bank was both in possession of the note and was a holder of the note at the time the complaint was filed. Id. at ¶ 58. Specifically, we noted that the evidentiary materials supplied by the appellee bank, including the chain of assignments and transfers of the note and mortgage, the borrowers’ default, and the balance owned on the loan, established that the bank was the proper party entitled to foreclose on the property. Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶8} Here, Nationstar has provided similar documents demonstrating that it is the proper party to foreclose on Perry‘s property. Similar to Najar, in this case there are two notes that are part of the record — an unendorsed note attached to the complaint and a
{¶9} The “holder” of a negotiable instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument.
(1) It is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder.
(2) It is payable on demand or at a definite time.
(3) It does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain any of the following:
(a) An undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment;
(b) An authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral;
(c) A waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.
{¶11} As we held in Najar, although a party seeking foreclosure must establish that it was the holder of the note and mortgage at the time the foreclosure action is filed, it need not present its proof on the exact date of filing. Najar at ¶ 57, citing Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Watkins, 10 Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-539, 2012-Ohio-4410, ¶ 18. Proof may be offered after the filing date, including proof submitted as part of a motion for summary judgment, establishing a plaintiff‘s status as holder of the note at the time the complaint was filed. Najar at ¶ 57.
{¶12} Nationstar demonstrated it was in possession of the note at the time the complaint was filed by attaching the unendorsed note. In its motion for summary judgment, Nationstar demonstrated it was the holder of the note at the time the complaint was filed with the affidavit of one of its employees, along with a copy of the note endorsed in blank. “The mere fact that there were two different copies of the note in the record — one with endorsements and one without — does not mandate a finding that one of the notes was ‘unauthentic’ or otherwise preclude summary judgment.” Id. at ¶ 59, citing United States Bank, N.A. v. Adams, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-11-070, 2012-Ohio-6253, ¶ 19-20.
{¶14} Under
{¶15} Perry argues that the affidavit failed to state in detail how the statements of the employee were based on personal knowledge. However, we find that the affidavit was sufficiently based on personal knowledge for
{¶16} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
