After the trial court denied two motions to dismiss Appellant’s, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”), initial complaint in a foreclosure action against Appellee, Stephanie M. Zorie, the court granted her motion for judgment on the pleadings because the promissory note and mortgage did not contain a prepayment rider referenced in the note. Nationstar then filed a motion to amend the complaint, which the trial court denied. Nationstar appeals both the judgment for Zorie on the pleadings and the denial of the motion to amend. Because the prepayment rider did not contain material terms of the note and mortgage, and because the complaint and its attachments stated a valid cause of action, the trial court erred when it granted Zorie’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
On November 4, 2008, Nationstar filed a two-count foreclosure complaint against Zorie. Count one alleged that on February 19, 2007, Zorie executed a note and mortgage in favor of Fremont Investment and Loan (“Fremont”), Fremont assigned the note and mortgage to Nationstar, and by June 1, 2008, Zorie defaulted on the mortgage by failing to make regular payments. In the complaint, Nationstar alleged it owned and held the note and mortgage. Nationstar attached a summary of the original promissory note’s contents and a copy of the original mortgage. However, a copy of the note was not attached to the complaint. Count two sought to reestablish a lost or destroyed promissory note under section 673.3091, Florida Statutes (2008). On December 11, 2008, Nationstar filed the original note and mortgage with a blank endorsement from Fremont and an assignment of lien showing the October 6, 2008 assignment of the note to Nationstar.
On April 10, 2009, the trial court entered a default judgment against Zorie for failure to respond. Two weeks later, Zorie responded to the complaint for the first time by filing a motion to produce documents. In May 2009, she filed an answer, admitting to being late or missing several mortgage payments since June 2008. As an affirmative defense, Zorie alleged Na-tionstar did not have the right to foreclose on the note and mortgage. In May 2009 and November 2012, Zorie filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, both of which the trial court denied.
On September 16, 2013, Zorie filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing: (1) Nationstar waived the ability to prove standing at the time the complaint was filed by withdrawing the claim to reestablish a lost or destroyed note; (2) Nationstar was required to attach a copy of the note and mortgage to the complaint; and (3) the copy of the original note was “incomplete on its face” as a result of the missing prepayment rider. The trial court held a hearing on September 25, 2013.
The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Zorie on October 24, 2013, mistakenly treating Zorie’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion for summary judgment. The trial court provided no rationale to support its decision.
On November 4, 2013, Nationstar filed a motion for rehearing, requesting to amend the complaint to add a count for reformation of the note. On November 14, 2013, the trial court denied Nationstar’s motion for rehearing, denied the motion to amend, and entered the amended final judgment in favor of Zorie. At oral argument, both parties conceded that the prepayment rider was immaterial to the sufficiency of the complaint.
We review a trial court’s decision granting judgment on the pleadings de novo. Thompson v. Napotnik,
To prevail on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Zorie needed to demonstrate that the complaint failed to state a cause of action for foreclosure on the mortgage.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Notes
. As a result of our holding that the trial court erred when it granted the judgment on the pleadings, we decline to discuss whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to amend the complaint. See generally Carry. Eslinger,
. Almost five years after filing the original note and mortgage, in June 2013, with the litigation still pending, Nationstar withdrew its second count, seeking to reestablish a lost or destroyed promissory note.
. On February 28, 2011, Nationstar served Zorie with a complete copy of the original mortgage and note, including the prepayment rider,.
. At the hearing, the parties concluded their discussion with the court on the completeness of the note, as follows:
THE COURT: All right. Here is the Note. (Indicating document.) No prepayment letter attached to it.
[Zorie]: That is a significant part of the Note, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So, what are you going to do about that?
[Attorney for Nationstar]: Judge, I don’t know.
THE COURT: Well, you dismissed the count to reestablish the Note. You didn’t, but somebody did. So, what am I supposed to do?
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THE COURT: Well, this is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
[Attorney for Nationstar]: Right; it is.
THE COURT: If you went to trial on this Complaint with this Note, wouldn’t I have to give an involuntary dismissal? The Note is not complete; right?
[Attorney for Nationstar]: It would not appear as such, Your Honor.
THE COURT: [ (Addressing Zorie) ] Do you have a proposed judgment?
[Zorie]: No, Your Honor, but I would be happy to prepare one.
Zorie argues on appeal that Nationstar admitted the note was incomplete. We reject her argument because the transcript is ambiguous. Nationstar could have admitted the incomplete nature of the note — thus admitting the failure of its complaint — or disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that Zorie would be entitled to "an involuntary dismissal” at trial.
. We acknowledge the second district’s expansion under limited circumstances of the review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings to include documents not attached to but referenced by the pleadings. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc.,
. Had the trial court applied the standard consistently, Zorie would have prevailed — albeit erroneousIy-Under this standard, Zorie should have prevailed on either of her motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, at which time Appellant would have been given the opportunity to amend. Siegel,
