116 Va. 942 | Va. | 1914
delivered the opinion of the court.
It appears that the policy here involved was issued by the defendant comp.any on the 20th day of November, 1912, upon a certain building, payable to Emma C. Burk-holder, for $800, upon which, in the event of destruction by fire, she was entitled to recover three-fourths of the actual cash value of the building at the time of the fire. The building was destroyed, by fire on the 29th day of November, 1912, and after some months of futile effort to secure payment of the amount due under the policy this suit was brought by the beneficiary and a verdict and
There was no sufficient ground for sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff’s declaration, and it was, therefore, properly overruled.
We are of opinion that the charge of arson, asserted by the company as one of its grounds of defense, is not supported 'by the evidence. The question of whether or not the building was wilfully burned was fairly submitted to the jury and their verdict in favor of the plaintiff sets at rest further controversy on the subject.
We are further of opinion that the charge of the defendant that excessive insurance was obtained on the building is not sustained by the evidence. This question was also fairly submitted to the jury and their finding, upon the evidence, closes that controversy.
We are further of opinion that there was no valid objection to the evidence tending to show the cost of a new building of the size and description of that destroyed. The defendant had made the point that the insurance was excessive and had admitted without objection evidence tending to show that the house could be rebuilt for $800, but when the evidence under consideration, showing that it would cost to rebuild it $1,200 or more, was adduced, objection was made to its competency. If the objection had been entitled to any force it should have been made in the beginning and not after the company had obtained by such delayed objection evidence on the subject favorable to it. The evidence tended to show the cash value of the building destroyed at the time of the fire, and was only introduced for that purpose, the court expressly advising the jury that it could only be considered as aid in the ascertainment of such value. Evidence of the cost at the time of the trial of such a building as that destroyed is admissible as
We are further of opinion that there was no error in the court’s refusal to permit Dr. Miller to testify as to the honesty of J. C. Burkholder, the husband of the plaintiff. His honesty was not an issue, and was in no way involved in the case. The general rule is that in a civil action the character of neither party thereto, nor of any other person, is involved and cannot be made the subject of inquiry. 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 661. The record furnishes no suggestion Why this case should be taken from under the operation of the general rule mentioned.
We are further of opinion that there was no error in refusing to permit the witness, Hoover, to testify as to the amount of insurance he carried on this property some time prior to the date of the present contract. The witness was permitted to give his estimate of the ‘fair cash value of the property at the time of the fire, but it was a matter of no consequence what amount of insurance had been carried on the property for other persons, at other times and under other conditions. The evidence wholly failed to support the charge that the property had. been fraudulently overvalued for insurance and the jury, under correct instructions,” properly so found.
We are further of opinion that the contention that C. W. Wiokes was not a representative of the office of Newman, Jobe & Leary is not supported by the evidence. It appears that Newman, Jobe & Leary were insurance agents at Woodstock, Virginia, representing as such agents the defendant and other fire insurance companies. It abundantly appears from the evidence that W. O. Wickes was their associate in the insurance business and their local representative at New Market, Virginia. This is shown by the advertisements of the Woodstock firm and their repeated appeals to the public to insure their
The jury so found under the following proper instruction: “If the jury believe from the evidence that Newman, Jobe & Geary were the general agents of the defendant, and that C. W. Wickes was their local representative or associate in the insurance business in New Market, and was the person who delivered the policy to the plaintiff and collected the premium and effected the insurance upon her property, then he was the agent of the defendant within the meaning of these instructions.”
We are further of opinion that the policy in this case, under the circumstances shown of record, was not void, as contended, because the legal title to the property whs not in the plaintiff at the time the insurance was taken out or at the time of the fire. The evidence tends to show that about the time the insurance was effected the property was sold at a commissioner’s sale and bought in by J. C. Burkholder, the husband of the plaintiff, for his wife’s benefit, she paying the entire purchase money with her own means. The deed, however, was made to the husband, and this was the state of the title when the defendant issued its policy payable to Mrs. J. O. Burk-holder, the plaintiff, she being the real owner. The evidence tends further to show that this condition of the title was well known to C. W. Wickes, the local agent at New Market, and was also known to Newman, of the firm of general agents at Woodstock, or at least could have been readily known as he was engaged in looking after the title to ascertain when the policy could be issued. This insurance was solicited by the agents of the defendant company, and their efforts to secure it were actively pressed until the contract was concluded by the policy sued on. The knowledge of the agents of the defendant of the condition of the title at the time the policy was issued is imputed to the company and amounts to a waiver on its part of the provision of the policy
We are further of opinion that the objection made that the proof of loss was not sufficiently complete is without merit.
“'The general rule in this State is that, in an action on a policy of insurance against fire, all that can be required of the plaintiff is a reasonable and substantial compliance with the conditions of the policy.” N. British Ins. Co. v. Nidiffer, 112 Va. 591, 72 S. E. 130.
The proof of loss furnished by the plaintiff was a substantial compliance with .the requirements. In this case, however, no proof of loss, no matter how complete, would have availed the plaintiff, she having been promptly informed that her policy was null and void, and Avould not be paid because her interest in the property was not truly stated in the policy; that she was not the unconditional and sole owner by reason of the legal title being at the time of the contract in her husband.
Upon the whole case we are of opinion that there is no error to the prejudice of the defendant company in the judgment complained of, and it must be affirmed.
Affirmed.