Case Information
*1 Before: GILMAN and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; GWIN, District Judge. [*] ___________________________ ORDER ON REHEARING ___________________________
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Both plaintiffs-appellees, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Illinois National Insurance Company (collectively “National Union”) are represented by the law firm of Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (“Plunkett”). All three defendants-appellants, Alticor, Inc., Amway Corporation, and Quixtar, Inc., are represented by the law firm of Wilson Young PLC (“Wilson”).
Attorney John Egan was employed by plaintiff National Union’s law firm, Plunkett, from September 2003 into July 2006. During that time, Egan represented this same plaintiff in this very case, and in other insurance-coverage cases involving defendant Alticor. Egan spent 40% of his billable time representing the present plaintiff in insurance-coverage disputes against defendant Alticor. Egan participated in depositions, document production and strategy sessions, and he drafted pleadings, motions, briefs, and reports for this plaintiff. In this very action, Egan drafted plaintiff’s complaint for declaratory judgment and the Rule 26 initial disclosures. In July 2006, Egan left the employ of Plunkett and became an associate with defendants’ law firm, Wilson.
National Union moved to disqualify the Wilson firm from representing Alticor. National Union’s motion proceeds on the theory of imputed disqualification, under which an attorney’s conflict of interest may be imputed to his law firm under certain circumstances. Specifically, National Union relied on two Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”), MRPC 1.9 (“Conflict of Interest: Former Client”) and MRPC 1.10 (“Imputed Disqualification: General Rule”).
By memorandum order dated October 18, 2006, we granted National Union’s motion and
disqualified the Wilson firm from representing defendants-appellants on this appeal.
See Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn., et al. v. Alticor, Inc., et al.
,
In our October 18, 2006, order, we first relied on MRPC 1.9, which provides, in part, (a) A lawyer [Egan] who has formerly represented a client in a matter [plaintiff National Union] shall not thereafter represent another person [defendant Alticor] in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation. (b) Unless the former client consents after consultation, a lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated has previously represented a client.
MRPC 1.9(a) and (b). We concluded that MRPC 1.9(a) applied here, because Egan himself formerly represented National Union in this very matter. (We also concluded that MRPC 1.9(b) did not apply because, by its terms, it governs situations where the lawyer’s former firm – but not the lawyer himself – represented the now-opposing party.) We reasoned that, because National Union refused to consent to Egan representing defendants, MRPC 1.9(a) prohibited Egan himself from representing defendants.
We then considered whether Egan’s new firm, Wilson, must suffer imputed disqualification, even though Egan is not personally counsel for Alticor in this matter. We concluded that MRPC 1.10 squarely governed the instant situation. At that time, MRPC 1.10(a) provided, in its entirety,
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9(a) or (c), or 2.2.
Former MRPC 1.10(a) (emphasis added). We ended our inquiry there, stating:
As discussed above, MRPC 1.9(a) prohibits Egan from representing Alticor or the
other defendants-appellants against his former client National Union in this same
matter. Therefore, MRPC 1.10(a) states without qualification that no lawyer in
Egan’s new firm may represent Alticor or the other defendants-appellants against
National Union in this matter. Under these circumstances, Wilson Young cannot
avoid imputed disqualification by “screening” Egan from this matter, no matter how
diligently.
See generally
,
Manning
,
Therefore, we GRANT plaintiffs-appellees’ motion to disqualify the law firm of
Wilson Young PLC from representing defendants-appellants in this matter.
National Union
,
By order dated November 14, 2006, however, the Michigan Supreme Court amended MRPC 1.10(a), effective immediately. The amendment makes clear that the instant situation is governed by MRPC 1.10(b), not by MRPC 1.9(a) and MRPC 1.10(a).
The new MRPC 1.10(a) reads as follows, with new text underlined:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from
doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9(a) or (c), or 2.2. If a lawyer leaves a firm and
becomes associated with another firm, MRPC 1.10(b) governs whether the new firm
is imputedly disqualified because of the newly hired lawyer’s prior services in or
association with the lawyer’s former law firm.
Thus, we are obligated to apply MRPC 1.10(b) to rule on National Union’s motion to disqualify.
See In re Dow Corning Corp.
, 419 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2005) (“In applying state law, we
anticipate how the relevant state’s highest court would rule in the case and are bound by controlling
decisions of that court.”) (citing
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.
,
In turn, MRPC 1.10(b), which has not been amended, provides as follows: (b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, is disqualified under Rule 1.9(b), unless:
(1) the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in (2) to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule. written notice is promptly given to the appropriate tribunal MRPC 1.10(b) (emphasis added).
Defendants-appellants’ counsel, Wilson Young PLC, never notified this court in writing of
attorney John Egan’s change in employment and former representation of National Union as
required by MRPC 1.10(b)(2). That failure requires Wilson’s disqualification.
See Town & Country
Apts. v. City of Wixom
, No. 238471,
Accordingly, we grant National Union’s motion to disqualify the law firm of Wilson Young PLC from representing defendants-appellants in this appeal. Alticor and the other defendants- appellants must secure new counsel. Defendants-appellants should notify this court in writing when they have secured new counsel; this court will then schedule oral argument on the merits of the appeal, allowing a suitable time for new counsel to familiarize themselves with the case.
It is so ordered.
ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT /s/ Leonard Green ___________________________________ Clerk
Notes
[*] The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 1