41 F. 48 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts | 1890
The plaintiffs, the National Rubber Company, being the owners by assignment of the Evory and Heston patent 59, 375,for an
. 1. The defendants insist that the declaration is not sufficient to authorize judgment for the plaintiffs on the facts proved. But I think it is sufficiently alleged, according to the rules of procedure in force in this state, that the defendants accepted the license, and manufactured goods under it. This is sufficient to show an implied undertaking to pay the royalties provided for in the license.
2. The defendants also insist that the shoes manufactured by them do not contain the improvements described in any of the patents except the expired Evory and Heston patent. But it is evident from inspection that the sample produced has the double water-proof flap, composed of extensions of the vamp and quarter folded on each side of the instep, and a buckle and flap-tongue arranged to draw equally on each side of the quarter across the instep, which is the feature of the Williams patent 13Í,201. The sample is also composed of textile fabric and rubber, having an inner cut to fit the last or and an outer cut
3. The defendants also maintain .that the Williams patent 131,201 was anticipated by the expired Evory and Heston patent, and therefore invalid, and that the first claim of the Williams patent 166,669, being for an improved boot, is not infringed by the use of the invention in the manufacture of shoes. I think the defendants have failed in their attempt to show that the patent 131,201 is a repetition of the Evory and Heston patent. This patent was held valid by' Judge Shipman in Williams v. Candee, 2 Fed. Rep. 683. It is also manifest that except for the license they would have no right to apply to the manufacture of shoes a patented improvement for boots. But, apart from this consideration, it appears that from the date of the license until after the period for which recovery is brought in this action, the defendants acted under the license and enjoyed its benefits. They paid royalties without objection up to September 30, 1886, and it was not until March, 1887, that they made any attempt to repudiate it. They are therefore estopped from setting up the invalidity of the patents.
4. Another defense is that the patents have been infringed by other manufacturers; that this has created competition, and compelled a reduction in the price lists; and that the plaintiffs have not taken the necessary steps to put a stop to these infringements. But the license contains no express covenant by the plaintiffs to protect the defendants against infringements by others, and it has been decided by Judge Colt in this circuit that in licenses of this character there is no implied covenant that the licensor shall afford such protection. McKay v. Smith, 39 Fed. Rep. 556. The plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for $1,271.40, and interest thereon from the date of the writ. Ordered accordingly.