National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass. 371

National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee

108 Mass. 371 | Mass. | 1871

Colt, J.

The question whether James W. Bailey incurred any liability by putting his name upon this note, and if so, what that liability is, must be determined by the rules of law applicable to contracts of this description, and by the terms of the contract interpreted so as to give effect, if possible, to the intention of the parties.

It is argued by the defendant, that he only assumed, by his signature on the back of the note, that form of liability which is declared in the body of it, namely, the liability of surety and *373joint promisor, and as the note is payable in words “ to the order of ourselves,” and has never been legally negotiated for want of his indorsement, the action must fail; and that the note is equally defective, if from the position of his signature he is to be regarded as an indorser only, because then the note is not signed by all the declared makers, and is an unexecuted contract, upon which no action can be maintained.

It is to be presumed that one who puts his name upon a note intends to add security and credit to it by his promise, and to become liable upon it in some form, either as maker, indorser or guarantor, either absolutely or conditionally. The time when, with reference to its negotiation, the note is signed by the party sought to be charged, will often determine the nature of the liability. But in the absence of anything to the contrary, it is presumed in favor of an honest holder for value, that all the names on a note, whether on the back or on the face, were placed there at the same time and before delivery. Benthall v. Judkins, 13 Met. 265. If a person not the payee writes on the note at its inception, that he is to be holden as surety, he is liable as an original promisor. Hunt v. Adams, 5 Mass. 358. And this is true, if the signature is simply indorsed on the back of the instrument before delivery. Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Met. 504, 509. Clapp v. Rice, 13 Gray, 403. These and other rules of interpretation have been adopted in order to give validity, in some form, to promissory notes and negotiable instruments, upon which parties have placed their signatures irregularly, with an intention which would otherwise be defeated, — ut res magis valeat quam pereat.

If this paper, as now insisted, was not to have validity as a note without a repetition of the signatures of the parties named as sureties, then Bailey’s act in placing his name upon it at all was nugatory and without purpose. But the presumption is that he intended to add to it the credit of his name; and we think that the instrument, rightly interpreted, carries out the intention. The note was made apparently for the accommodation of Lougee & Bailey. Ingalls & Son and James W. Bailey signed it only as sureties, and so declare in the body of it; but their names, in*374stead of being written on the face of the note, are found on the back, underneath the indorsement of Lougee & Bailey, who as principals alone signed on the face of it. The significance which must be given to the fact, that the sureties thus place their names on the back, is, that the parties all understood and intended the words “ pay to the order of ourselves ” to refer only to the principals who alone signed beneath it; and regarded their indorsement as sufficient alone to transfer the note. James W. Bailey signed his name last of all. A repetition of his signature would not have enlarged or diminished his liability, and was doubtless deemed unnecessary. The defendant’s liability is therefore that of surety and joint promisor in a note payable to the order of the principals and by them indorsed. Story on Notes, § 469.

There is no invasion here of the rule that one who puts his name on the back of a promissory note, before delivery, payable to the maker or order, and indorsed by the maker, is an indorser and not joint promisor. That would indeed be the relation, if the note was in the usual form. But this note is peculiar; and the application of the rule is controlled by the express declaration in the contract itself of the nature of the liability assumed. Bigelow v. Colton, 13 Gray, 309.

According to the terms of the report, judgment upon the verdict is to be rendered upon the last count in the amended declaration. The demurrer is overruled as to this count, and sustained as to all the rest. Ordered accordingly.